He adds that ‘ these attributes are not mutually opposed’, but diverse.’ In these words again there is a contradiction, for when the question concerns attributes that constitute the essence of substances, there can be no greater opposition between them than the fact that they are different. Once it is admitted that ‘this is different from that,’ it is equivalent to saying that ‘this is not that’; but to be and not to be are contraries. ‘Since they are not mutually opposed,’ he says, ‘but different, there is no reason why mind should not be an attribute co-existing in the same subject with extension, though the one attribute is not comprised in the concept of the other.’ In these words there is an obvious fallacy, for he comes to a conclusion with regard to every possible attribute, which can be valid only in the case of modes properly so called; and yet he nowhere proves that the mind, or inward principle of thought, is such a mode. On the contrary, from his own words in Article V I will soon demonstrate that it is not so. Of the other attributes which constitute the natures of things, it cannot be said that those which are different, and of which neither is contained in the concept of the other, are co-existent in one and the same subject, for that is equivalent to saying that one and the same subject has two different natures, and this involves a contradiction, at least so long as the subject in question is simple and not composite — as in the present case.
Three points are to be noted here, a sufficient grasp of which would have prevented this writer from falling into such obvious errors.
First: It belongs to the theory of modes that, though we can easily comprehend a substance apart from a mode, we cannot, conversely, clearly comprehend a mode unless at the same time we conceive the substance of which it is a mode (as I have explained in the first part of the Principles, Article LXP), and on this point all philosophers are agreed. That our friend however paid no respect to this rule, is manifest from his 5th Article. In that passage he admits that we can doubt about the existence of the body, while, at the same time, we do not doubt about the existence of the mind.’ Hence it follows that the mind can be comprehended by us apart from the body, and, accordingly, is not a mode of the body.
The second point which I would note here is the difference between simple and composite entities. A composite entity is one in which are found two or more attributes, any one of which can be comprehended distinctly apart from the other, for it is from the fact that one can be thus cognised without the other, that each of these constituent elements is seen to be, not a mode, but a thing, or the attribute of a thing which exists by virtue of that attribute. A simple entity is one in which such attributes are not found. Hence it is clear that that subject in which we understand extension only, with the various modes of extension, is a simple entity. So, too, is a subject in which we comprehend thought only, with the various modes of thought. But that in which we observe extension and thought co-existent is a composite entity, to wit, a Man, who consists of soul and body. Our author seems to assume that man is body alone and that mind is but a mode of body.
Finally, we must note here that in subjects compounded of several substances there is frequently one substance predominant. This we contemplate in such a way as to treat any of the remaining substances which we connect with it as nothing more than a mode. Thus a man clad may be contemplated as a compound of man and clothes, but the being clad, in comparison with the man, is only a mode, although garments are substances. In the same way our author might, in the case of man, who is a compound of soul and body, consider body the predominant element, in relation to which the being animate, or the possession of thought, is nothing other than a mode. But it is foolish to infer from that, that the mind itself, or that through which the body thinks, is not a substance different from the body.
This dictum he endeavours to corroborate by means of the following syllogism: ‘Whatever we can conceive can exist. But the mind is one of the aforesaid (viz a substance, or a mode of a corporeal substance), because it can be conceived; for none of these things involves a contradiction. Therefore etc.’ Here it must be noted that though the rule, ‘whatever we can conceive can exist.’ is mine, and true, so long as the question concerns a clear and distinct concept, in which is contained the possibility of the thing to be realised (because God can bring into being everything which we clearly perceive to be possible), nevertheless we must not make rash use of it. A man might quite easily imagine that he rightly understood something which in reality he did not understand, being utterly blinded by some sort of prejudice. This is the case of our author when he maintains that there is no contradiction involved in the statement that one and the same thing possesses either of two natures which are utterly incompatible, to wit, that it is a substance, or a mode. If he had only said that he perceived no reasons for believing the human mind to be an immaterial substance rather than a mode of a material substance, his ignorance might have been excused. If he had said that no reasons could be found by the brain of man to prove either alternative, his arrogance would certainly have been reprehensible, but his statement would have evinced no contradiction. But when he says that the ‘laws of nature allow that the same thing may be a substance, or a mode,’ his words are altogether self-contradictory and betray the irrationality of his brain.
In the third article he makes known his judgment concerning me. For it was I who wrote that ‘the human mind can be clearly and distinctly perceived as a substance different from corporeal substance.’ Our friend, however, though he relies on no other arguments than those self-contradictory ones which he has unfolded in the preceding article, proclaims that I am in error. Of that I make no account. Nor do I examine the words ‘of necessity’ or ‘ in actuality,’ which contain a certain ambiguity; for they are not of great moment.
Moreover, I scruple to examine the statements regarding Holy Writ in the fourth article, lest I should appear to assume the right of investigating another man’s religion. Thus much I will say: Here one must distinguish between three types of questions. Certain things are believed through faith alone. Such are the mystery of the Incarnation, the Trinity, and the like. Others, however, though they have a certain bearing on faith, can nevertheless be investigated by the natural reason. Among these are generally ranked by the orthodox theologians the existence of God, and the distinction of mind from body. Finally, there are others which belong in no wise to the sphere of faith, but only to the sphere of human reason, e g the question of the squaring of the circle or of making gold by the art of alchemy. And even as these men abuse the words of Holy Scripture, who, from a distorted interpretation of it presume to elicit these last questions, so do those others diminish its authority who undertake to solve the first type of question by arguments sought from philosophy alone. Nevertheless all theologians contend that these questions should be shown to be in nowise incompatible with the light of nature, and to this end they direct their most zealous endeavours. As for questions of the second class, not only do they deem them in no way incompatible with the light of nature, but they even exhort philosophers to solve these questions, so far as in them lies, by theories evolved from the mind of man. But never have I seen any one who would affirm that the laws of nature allow that anything should be otherwise than Holy Scripture teaches, unless he wished to show indirectly that he had no faith in Scripture. For as we were born men before we became Christians, it is beyond belief that any man should seriously embrace opinions which he thinks contrary to that right reason that constitutes a man, in order that he may cling to the faith through which he is a Christian.
But perhaps our author does not imply this, for his words are, ‘Through study of nature some may find doubtful that which is already ‘placed beyond all doubt for us by the Divine Revelation in Holy Writ’ In these words I find a two-fold contradiction. In the first place, though he refutes the doctrine that the essence of one and the same thing does not always remain the same (because, if it be supposed to become different, it will be by this very fact a different thing, to be indicated by a differen
t name), yet he supposes that that essence, so far as the study of Nature goes, is doubtful, and accordingly changeable. The second contradiction is in the word ‘ some,’ because, as Nature is the same for all men a thing that can be doubtful only to ‘some’ is not doubtful according to Nature’s showing.
The fifth article is to be related to the second rather than to the fourth, for in it the author is concerned, not with Divine Revelation, but with the nature of mind — the question as to whether it is a substance or a mode. To prove the defensibility of the view that mind is nothing other than a mode, he attempts to refute an objection taken from my writings. I wrote that we could not doubt that our mind existed, because, from the very fact that we doubted, it followed that our mind existed, but that meantime we might doubt whether any material things existed; whence I deduced and demonstrated that mind was clearly perceived by us as an existence, or substance, even supposing we had no concept whatever of the body, and denied that any material things had existence; and, accordingly, that the concept of mind did not involve any concept of body. This argument he thinks to explode by saying that ‘ it only proves that, so long as we doubt about the body, we cannot term mind a mode of body.’ Here he shows that he is utterly ignorant of what it is that philosophers term a ‘mode’; for the nature of a mode consists in this, that it can by no means be comprehended, except it involve in its own concept the concept of the thing of which it is a mode — as I have explained above. Our friend, however, admits that mind can sometimes be cognized apart from body, to wit, when there are doubts about the body; whence it assuredly follows that mind cannot be termed a mode of body. And what is sometimes true about the essence or nature of a thing is always true. Nevertheless he affirms that the laws of nature allow that mind may be only a mode of body. These two statements are manifestly irreconcilable.
In the sixth article I fail to apprehend his meaning. Certainly I remember hearing in the Schools that the mind is an activity of the organic body, but till this day I never heard the mind itself termed ‘organic.’ For this reason I crave our authors indulgence, to the end that, as I have nothing certain to base my remarks on at this point, I may expound my conjectures, not as though they were true to fact, but simply as conjectures. I seem to observe two irreconcilable statements. One of these is to the effect that the human mind is a substance really distinct from the body. This the author openly states, but, so far as he can, waives argument on the point, and contends that it can be proved only by the authority of Holy Scripture. The other statement is that that same human mind, in all its activities, is organic or instrumental, that is to say, such that it does not act of itself, but is used by the body as though it were something that strengthened its members and other corporeal modes, and so he affirms in effect, if not in so many words, that the mind is nothing other than a mode of body, as though he had drawn up his whole artillery of argument to prove this point and this alone. These two statements are so manifestly contraries that I do not think the author wished them both, at one and the same time, to find credence with readers, but deliberately coupled them together, so that he might in some sort give satisfaction to the more simple-minded, and to his friends the theologians, by his citation of Scriptural authority, and that, meantime, his more keen-witted readers might realize that, when he said ‘ mind is distinct from body,’ he was speaking in irony, and that he was heart and soul of the opinion that mind is nothing but a mode.
In the seventh article again, and the eighth, he seems to be speaking merely in irony. And he retains the same Socratic figure of speech in the latter part of article IX. But in the first part he appends a reason to his assertion, and thus, it would seem, is to be taken seriously in this passage. He teaches that, so far as nature shows, it is doubtful whether any material things are really perceived by us, and submits as his reason the statement that ‘ the mind can be affected in the same degree by things imaginary as by things real’ If this theory is to be received as true, it must be granted that we have use of no understanding properly so called, but only of that faculty which is usually termed the ‘ common sense’ whereby impressions are received of things imaginary as much as of things real, so that they affect the mind — a faculty which philosophers commonly allow even to the brute creation. But surely those who have understanding, and are not fashioned like the horse or mule, even although they are affected not only by images of real things but also by those which occur in the brain from other causes (as happens in sleep), can distinguish the one kind of image from the other with the utmost clearness, by the light of reason. The method in which this happens, surely and infallibly, I have explained in my writings, so accurately that I am convinced that no one who has read them throughout, and is capable of understanding them, can be a sceptic.
In the tenth and eleventh articles it is still possible to suspect him of irony. If the soul be believed to be a substance, it is foolish and ridiculous to say ‘ the bond which maintains body and soul in union is the law of the unchangeableness of nature, whereby every individual thing persists in the state in which it is.’ For it is equally true of things disunited as of things united that they persist in the same state so long as nothing changes that state.
This is not at present the point at issue. The question is, how it happens that the mind is united with the body, and not dissevered from it. But if soul be supposed to be a mode of body, it is rightly said that no bond of union need be sought other than the fact that it persists in the state in which it is, since modes have no other state than that present to the things of which they are modes.
In article twelve he appears to dissent from me only in words, for when he says that the mind has no need of innate ideas, or notions, or axioms, and at the same time allows it the faculty of thinking (to be considered natural or innate), he makes an affirmation in effect identical with mine, but denies it in words. For I never wrote or concluded that the mind required innate ideas which were in some sort different from its faculty of thinking; but when I observed the existence in me of certain thoughts which proceeded, not from extraneous objects nor from the determination of my will, but solely from the faculty of thinking which is within me, then, that I might distinguish the ideas or notions (which are the forms of these thoughts) from other thoughts adventitious or factitious, I termed the former ‘innate.’ In the same sense we say that in some families generosity is innate, in others certain diseases like gout or gravel, not that on this account the babes of these families suffer from these diseases in their mother’s womb, but because they are born with a certain disposition or propensity for contracting them.
The conclusion which he deduces in article XIII from the preceding article is indeed wonderful. ‘ For this reason,’ he says (i.e. because the mind has no need of innate ideas, but the faculty of thinking of itself is sufficient), ‘ all common notions, engraven on the mind, owe their origin to the observation of things or to tradition ‘ — as though the faculty of thinking could of itself execute nothing, nor perceive nor think anything save what it received from observation or tradition, that is, from the senses. So far is this from being true, that, on the contrary, any man who rightly observes the limitations of the senses, and what precisely it is that can penetrate through this medium to our faculty of thinking must needs admit that no ideas of things, in the shape in which we envisage them by thought, are presented to us by the senses. So much so that in our ideas there is nothing which was not innate in the mind, or faculty of thinking, except only these circumstances which point to experience — the fact, for instance, that we judge that this or that idea, which we now have present to our thought, is to be referred to a certain extraneous thing, not that these extraneous things transmitted the ideas themselves to our minds through the organs of sense, but because they transmitted something which gave the mind occasion to form these ideas, by means of an innate faculty, at this time rather than at another. For nothing reaches our mind from external objects through the organs of sense beyond certain corporeal movements,
as our author himself affirms, in article XIX, taking the doctrine from my Principles; but even these movements, and the figures which arise from them, are not conceived by us in the shape they assume in the organs of sense, as I have explained at great length in my Dioptrics. Hence it follows that the ideas of the movements and figures are themselves innate in us. So much the more must the ideas of pain, colour, sound and the like be innate, that our mind may, on occasion of certain corporeal movements, envisage these ideas, for they have no likeness to the corporeal movements. Could anything be imagined more preposterous than that all common notions which are inherent in our mind should arise from these movements, and should be incapable of existing without them? I should like our friend to instruct me as to what corporeal movement it is which can form in our mind any common notion, e g the notion that things which are equal to the same thing are equal to one another,’ or any other he pleases; for all these movements are particular, but notions are universal having-no affinity with movements and no relation to them.
He goes on to affirm, in article XIV, that even the idea of God which is in us is the outcome, not of our faculty of thinking, as being native to it, but of Divine Revelation or tradition, or observation. The error of this assertion we shall the more readily realise if we reflect that anything can be said to be the outcome of another, either because this other is its proximate and primary cause, without which it could not exist, or only because it is a remote and accidental cause, which, certainly, gives the primary cause occasion to produce its effect at one time rather than at another. Thus all workmen are the primary and proximate causes of their works, but those who give them orders, or promise them reward, that they may perform these works, are accidental and remote causes, because, probably, they would not have performed the tasks unbidden. There is no doubt that tradition or observation is a remote cause, inviting us to bethink ourselves of the idea which we may have of God, and to present it vividly to our thought. But no one can maintain that this is the proximate and efficient cause, except the man who thinks that ‘we can apprehend nothing regarding God save this name ‘God,’ and the corporeal figure which painters exhibit to us as a representation of God. For observation, if it takes place through the medium of sight, can of its own proper power present nothing to the mind beyond pictures, and pictures consisting only of a permutation of corporeal movements, as our author himself instructs us. If it takes place through the medium of hearing, it presents nothing beyond words and voices; if through the other senses, it has nothing in it which can have reference to God. And surely it is manifest to every man that sight, of itself and by its proper function, presents nothing beyond pictures, and hearing nothing beyond voices or sounds, so that all these things that we think of, beyond these voices or pictures, as being symbolised by them, are presented to us by means of ideas which come from no other source than our faculty of thinking, and are accordingly together with that faculty innate in us, that is, always existing in us potentially; for existence in any faculty is not actual but merely potential existence, since the very word ‘faculty’ designates nothing more or less than a potentiality. But that with regard to God we can comprehend nothing beyond a name or a bodily effigy, no one can affirm, save a man who openly professes himself an atheist, and moreover destitute of all intellect.
Delphi Collected Works of René Descartes Page 41
