It might be expected, sir, from a patriot, a lamenter of the degeneracy of mankind, and an inflexible opponent of corruption, that he should consider rather facts than persons, that he should regulate his decision by the unvariable principles of reason and justice, and that, therefore, he should not applaud at one time what he condemns at another.
But this gentleman seems to have established some new maxims of conduct, and, perhaps, upon new notions of morality; for he seems to imagine, that his friends may seize, as their right, what his adversaries cannot touch without robbery, though the claim of both be the same.
It is well known, sir, to the whole army, that a noble person, whose abilities are so loudly celebrated, whose virtues are so liberally praised, and whose removal from his military employments is so solemnly lamented as a publick calamity, obtained his first preferments by pretensions very different from military merit, and that at the age only of seventeen, a time of life in which, whatever might be his abilities, very little prudence or experience could be expected, he was advanced to the command of a regiment, and exalted above many officers whose known bravery and frequent hazards entitled them to favour.
I do not assert that he was undeservedly promoted, or condemn those who either solicited or granted his commission; I maintain only, that what was then reasonable and just, is not now either iniquitous or ridiculous, and different persons in the same circumstances have a right to the same treatment.
In the reign of queen Anne, a reign, sir, which every Briton recollects with so much satisfaction, and which will for ever afford examples of the wisest councils, and most successful wars, when new regiments were to be raised, it was far from being thought necessary to observe this gentleman’s favourite method of rotation; posts were filled, not with the officers of other regiments, that room might be left for the promotion of serjeants, but with gentlemen who had never seen a battle, or learned any part of the military discipline.
But though, sir, the regulation of our army be thus violently attacked, the greatest crime of the ministry is, in this gentleman’s opinion, that of levying new troops, when we have no employment for our standing forces, of laying unnecessary impositions upon the nation, and alarming with the fears of an invasion, only that the army might be increased.
On this head, sir, a declaration of the duke of MARLBOROUGH has been produced, with a great pomp of circumstances, and such a seeming accuracy of narration, that the attention of the house was engaged, and the account was received with all the solemnity of universal silence, and with the veneration due to so high an authority in a question of so much importance.
The subject is, indeed, so worthy of regard, that I think, sir, every man ought to contribute to its elucidation, and, therefore, I take the liberty of adding to the honourable gentleman’s relation, what I hope will be heard with equal curiosity, the method by which that great commander proposed to put a stop to an invasion with so small a number.
He was very far, sir, from imagining that he should be able to repel them by open force, he was far from being so confident of his superiority in military skill, as to imagine that he should defeat them by stratagem, and, therefore, he designed, by burning the villages, and destroying the country, to deprive them of the means of subsistence, and harass them with famine; to hover at a distance, and cut off those parties which necessity should force out to forage, till a body of troops could be assembled sufficient to overthrow them in a battle, or to drive them back to their ships.
Such was the scheme, sir, as I have been informed, of this great man, nor, perhaps, can any other be struck out by human abilities, where greater numbers are to be opposed by smaller. But this scheme, though preferable, in the last extremities, to slavery, is such as cannot be mentioned without horrour, and of which the execution ought to be avoided by every expedient that can be practised without the danger of our liberties. We ought, certainly, not to reject a nauseous medicine, by which that health is preserved, which, if lost, can only be restored by the amputation of a limb.
As it was, therefore, necessary, sir, to secure our coasts from an invasion, it was necessary to raise new troops for the American expedition; nor did this method produce any delay, for the regiments were completed a long time before the ships of war and the transports were ready to convoy and receive them, nor could the utmost ardour and diligence despatch them sooner from our coasts.
The ships, sir, were, by the violence of a frost, scarcely exampled, retained, for a long time, in the harbours, without a possibility of being put to sea; when they were all assembled at the place appointed for their conjunction, they waited for a wind; all the delay that can be objected, was produced by the seasons, of which the regulation was in no man’s power.
But the time, sir, which was unwillingly spent in the camp, was not, however, lost or misemployed, for the troops were, by the order of the general, every day exercised, and instructed in the art of war, so that what was lost in time, was more than recompensed by the advantage of better discipline.
Nor did these troops appear an herd so ignorant and contemptible, as they have been represented by malicious invectives and ludicrous descriptions; there were not, indeed, among them many grey-headed warriours, nor were their former campaigns and past exploits the subjects of their conversation; but there was not one amongst them who did not appear ready to suffer, in the cause of his country, all that the most hardened veteran could undergo, or whose alacrity and eagerness did not promise perseverance in the march, and intrepidity in the battle.
Their general, sir, who saw them pursue their exercises, declared how much he was satisfied with their proficiency, applauded their appearance, and expressed his confidence in their courage; nor do I doubt, but our enemies will find, that it is not necessary to send out our most formidable forces to humble them, and that the youth of Britain will compensate their want of experience by their courage.
If I, sir, have been drawn aside from the present question, it is by following, perhaps, with an exactness too scrupulous, the honourable gentleman, whose propositions I have now shown to be erroneous, and whose reproaches will, I believe, now appear rather the effects of disappointment than of zeal, and, therefore, I think it now necessary to return to the business before us, the consideration of the present establishment, from which, as it was approved by the duke of MARLBOROUGH, and has been defended with very strong arguments, by one of the most experienced officers of this time, I cannot think it safe or prudent to depart.
Mr. GRENVILLE spoke next, to the following effect: — Sir, as a noble person has been frequently hinted at in this debate, to whom my relation is well known, and whom, as I know him well, I have the strongest motives to reverence and honour, I cannot forbear to give, on this occasion, an attestation which he will be allowed to deserve by all those whom interest has not blinded, and corruption depraved.
It will be allowed, sir, that he is one of those who are indebted for their honours only to merit, one whom the malice of a court cannot debase, as its favour cannot exalt; he is one of those whose loss of employments can be a reproach only to those who take them from him, as he cannot forfeit them but by performing his duty, and can only give offence by steady integrity, and a resolution to speak as he thinks, and to act as his conscience dictates.
There are, sir, men, I know, to whom this panegyrick will seem romantick and chimerical, men, to whom integrity and conscience are idle sounds, men, who are content to catch the word of their leader, who have no sense of the obligation of any law but the supreme will of him that pays them, and who know not any virtue but diligence in attendance, and readiness in obedience.
It is surely, sir, no loss to the noble person to be debarred from any fellowship with men like these. Nothing can be more unpleasing to virtue than such a situation as lays it under a necessity of beholding wickedness that cannot be reformed; as the sight of a pesthouse must raise horrour, though we should suppose the spectator secure from the contagion.
Mr. ORD spoke next, in s
ubstance as follows: — Sir, as I cannot approve the scheme now proposed, for augmenting our forces, I shall endeavour to show why the arguments, by which it has hitherto been supported, have failed to convince me, and shall lay before the house some reasons against it, to which I shall expect an answer, before I shall think that I can agree to it, without squandering the money of which my constituents have intrusted me with the disposal.
The argument, sir, with which this motion was introduced, which is, indeed, the strongest that has yet been offered, was, that this estimate is less expensive than one that was laid before the house in a late reign, and that, therefore, it could not reasonably be charged with extravagance.
Let us now consider this argument with that care which is required by the importance of the question, let us inquire what consequences will follow from it, and to what previous suppositions it must owe its force.
The argument, sir, evidently supposes that the estimate in king William’s reign was drawn up without any intention to deceive the house, or to raise money for purposes different from those for which it was really expended. But if we suppose that estimate to be fraudulently calculated, this may contain the same fallacies in a lower degree, and the only merit that can be claimed by the authors of it, will be, that they are not the most rapacious plunderers of their country, that, however they may be charged with profusion of publick money, they are yet more modest than some of their predecessors.
But it is known, sir, that in king William’s reign, very few estimates were honestly computed; it is known that the rotation of parties, and fluctuation of measures, reduced the ministry to subsist upon artifices, to amuse the senate with exorbitant demands, only that they might obtain the necessary grants, and to pretend expenses which never were incurred, that the supplies which the publick affairs really required, might not be withheld; as fraudulent tradesmen fix immoderate prices, that the buyer may make offers proportionate to their demands.
The estimates, therefore, of that reign are of very little authority, though they might sometimes pass the house without censure; for it is to be considered, that by the frequency of new elections, the greatest part of the members were often unacquainted with the state of publick accounts, and that an army was so little known to this kingdom, that the true expense of it might easily be concealed.
Nor is this, sir, the only fallacy of this argument; for it supposes, likewise, that the nation is no less wealthy than in the time when that computation was offered, with which this is so triumphantly compared. For every man knows that publick as well as private expenses are to be proportioned to the revenue by which they are supplied, and that the charges which are easily supported at one time, may threaten ruin at another.
But unhappily, sir, it is evident, that, since the days of that sovereign, the nation has been exhausted by a long and wasteful war, and since, by a peace equally destructive, it is embarrassed with an enormous debt, and entangled in treaties, of which the support may call every day for new expenses; it has suffered since that time a thousand losses, but gained no advantage, and yet the expenses of that time are mentioned as an example to be compared with those which are proposed in this.
The difference of the condition of the British nation at those two periods of time, sir, is not less than that of the strength of the same man in the vigour of youth and the frigidity of old age, in the flush of health and the languor of disease, of the same man newly risen from rest and plenty, and debilitated with hunger and fatigue.
To make such a comparison, sir, betrays, at least, a very criminal insensibility, of the publick misery, if it may not be charged with greater malignity. I know not whether those who shall hear of this debate, may not impute such reflections rather to cruelty than negligence, and imagine that those who squander the treasure of the nation take pleasure in reproaching that poverty which their counsels produce, and indulge their own vanity by contemplating the calamities from which they are themselves secure, and to which they are indebted for opportunities of increasing their own fortunes, and gratifying their ambition. It is evident, that an estimate which requires less than that which has been mentioned, may yet exact more than the nation can now raise, without feeling too great inconveniencies to be compensated by the advantages which can be expected from our new forces. Nor is it sufficient that it is lower than those of former times; for, as it ought to be the care of the government to preserve the ease and happiness of the people, it should be reduced in proportion to the diminution of the national wealth.
The right honourable gentleman confesses, sir, that frugality is a virtue, and his argument supposes that to contract expenses is an argument of prudent measures; why then is he afraid of carrying virtue to a greater height, of making the burden still more light, and preferring the cheapest estimate that can be proposed, when it is asserted by those whose authority is most worthy of regard, that it will produce no weakness in our troops, nor give our enemies any superiority?
I do not pretend any other skill in military affairs, than may be gained by casual conversation with soldiers, and by a cursory observation of daily occurrences; but I speak with greater confidence on this occasion, because I do not think any other qualifications necessary for the determination of this question, than a habit of just reasoning, and freedom from the prejudices of interest.
Every man knows, sir, without a military education, that it is imprudent to purchase any thing at a greater price which may be procured at a less, and that when the same sum will buy two things, of which one is evidently preferable to the other, the best ought to be chosen.
If the application of either of these two positions will decide this controversy, there will be no need of recurring to experience, of citing the authority of foreign commanders, of comparing the actions of the German and British generals, or of inquiring how battles have been lost, or to what victories are to be ascribed.
It is evident, sir, that the scheme now proposed, is twice as costly as that which is recommended in opposition to it, and therefore, unless it will produce twice the advantage, it must be acknowledged to be imprudently chosen. The advantage in war, is to be rated by comparing the strength of different numbers in different circumstances, and inquiring what degree of superiority will be found.
If we suppose, sir, two bodies of men, equally armed and disciplined, opposed to each other without any advantage of situation, we must conceive that neither party could be conquered, that the balance of the day must remain equal, and that the contest would continue undecided.
It cannot be objected to this supposition, sir, that no such event is recorded in history, because in war many causes really act which cannot be estimated; one army may consist of soldiers more courageous, and more confident in the justice of their cause; unforeseen accidents may operate, orders may be mistaken, or leaders may be misinformed; but all these considerations are to be set aside in speculation, because they may equally be alleged on either part.
Two bodies of men, sir, equally numerous, being, therefore, supposed equal, it is to be inquired how either may be superiour to the other. It is proposed, on one part, to produce this effect by doubling the number of officers rather than increasing that of the soldiers; on the other, to double the soldiers under the same officers, the expense being the same of both methods.
When two armies, modelled according to these different schemes, enter the field, what event can be expected? Either five thousand men, with a double number of officers, must be equal to ten thousand, differently regulated, or the publick has paid more for assistance of the officers than its real value, and has chosen, of two methods equally expensive, that which is least efficacious.
This, sir, is the state of the question now before us; our present deficiency is not of men but money, and we may procure ten thousand men regulated like the foreign troops, at the same expense as five thousand in the form proposed; but I am afraid that no man will be found to assert, that the addition of officers will be equivalent to a double number of soldiers.
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Thus it is evident, sir, evident to demonstration, that the most expensive method is, at the same time, the least advantageous, and that the proposal of new regiments is intended to augment the strength of the ministry rather than of the army.
If we suppose, sir, what is more than any foreigner will grant, that the additional officers raise a body of five thousand men to an equality with six thousand, is not the pay of four thousand men apparently thrown away? And do not the officers receive a reward which their service cannot deserve? Would it not be far more rational to raise seven thousand, by which our army would be stronger by a seventh part, and as the pay of three thousand would be saved, the publick would be richer by almost a third.
Surely, sir, numerical arguments cannot but deserve some consideration, even from those who have learned by long practice to explain away mere probability at pleasure, to select the circumstances of complicated questions, and only to show those which may be produced in favour of their own opinions.
In the present question, sir, there is very little room for fallacy; nor do I see what remains to the decision of it, but that those gentlemen who have been acquainted with military operations, inform us, what degree of superiority is conferred by any assignable number of officers; that we may compare their service with the price, and discover whether the same money will not purchase greater advantages.
The experience of the late war may evince, sir, that those troops which have the greatest number of officers are not always victorious; for our establishment never admitted the same, or nearly the same number with that of the French, our enemies; nevertheless, we still boast of our victories; nor is it certain that we might not have been equally successful, though the number of our officers had been yet less.
Complete Works of Samuel Johnson Page 206
