“By these means, and by your support and assistance, I trust in God, I shall be able not only to secure to my own subjects the enjoyment of many valuable rights and privileges, long since acquired for them by the most solemn treaties, but effectually to preserve the peace and balance of Europe, the only view and end of all my endeavours.
“It is not to be doubted, but the enemies to my government will conceive hopes, that some favourable opportunity for renewing their attempts may offer, from the prospect of new troubles and commotions: they are already very busy by their instruments and emissaries in those courts whose measures seem most to favour their purposes, in soliciting and promoting the cause of the pretender; but I persuade myself, notwithstanding the countenance and encouragement they may have received, or flatter themselves with, the provision you shall make for the safety and defence of the empire, will effectually secure me from any attempts from abroad, and render all such projects vain and abortive.
“When the world shall see that you will not suffer the British crown and nation to be menaced and insulted, those who most envy the present happiness and tranquillity of this empire, and are endeavouring to make us subservient to their ambition, will consider their own interest and circumstances before they make any attempt upon so brave a people, strengthened and supported by prudent and powerful alliances, and though desirous to preserve the peace, able and ready to defend themselves against the efforts of all aggressors. Such resolutions and such measures, timely taken, I am satisfied, are the most effectual means of preventing a war, and continuing to us the blessings of peace and prosperity.”
Who would not have been terrified, my lords, at a treaty like this? Our religion was to be destroyed, our government subverted, and our trade reduced to nothing. What could a ministry, thus intimidated, do, but resign themselves implicitly to the direction of a kind neighbour, that promised to shelter them from the storm?
There have been ministers, my lords, in former times, who, upon hearing such a representation, would have considered, that Britain was an island, that the pretender could not be forced upon us without an army, and that an army could not be transported without ships, that the emperour of Germany had neither navies nor ports, that Gibraltar might be easily supplied with every thing requisite for its defence, and that any attempt made by Spain to injure our trade, might easily be punished by intercepting their Plate fleets.
They would then have considered whether attempts so improbable, and stipulations so absurd and ridiculous, ought to be credited upon the information of an ambassadour’s secretary, who, as he proposed to reveal his master’s secrets for a bribe, might as probably take another reward for imposing upon those whom he pretended to inform. Those, therefore, who advised his majesty to assert to the senate what they knew from no better authority, those whose daring insolence could make their sovereign instrumental in alarming the people with false terrours, and oppressing them with unnecessary burdens, well deserve to feel a senatorial censure.
But our ministers, my lords, were too much frighted to make such reflections: they imagined that destruction was hanging over us, and, in a dread of arbitrary government, oppression, and persecution, concluded at Hanover a treaty with the French.
Thus the French gained our confidence, and raised in us a distrust of both the powers with whom it was our interest to be united: but the alliance of the emperour of Germany with Spain made them still uneasy; and, therefore, they determined, once more, to make our credulity instrumental in procuring a reconciliation between them and the Spaniards.
To effect this, they kindly gave us intelligence, that when the Spaniards should receive their treasures from the Western Indies, they designed to employ it in favour of the pretender, and that, therefore, it was necessary to intercept it. This advice was thankfully listened to, a fleet was fitted out, and thousands were sacrificed without any advantage; for the French not only forbore to assist us in the expedition, but forbade us to seize the treasure when we had found it.
The Spaniards, apprehending themselves attacked, omitted no opportunity of showing their resentment; they seized our ships, and laid siege to Gibraltar, while our new allies looked quietly on, and expected the event of their own scheme, which was far from being defeated by our policy; for the Spaniards, finding the return of their American revenues insuperably obstructed, and knowing that the emperour of Germany, that emperour who was to invade Britain, had not any power even to assist them, were obliged to have recourse to the nation which they then hated, and to forgive the past affront, that they might obtain their good offices in this exigence.
But, my lords, it was not sufficient for the designs of the French, that they had recovered their ancient allies the Spaniards, unless they could disunite them from the emperour of Germany: this it was, likewise, our interest to prevent, and yet this, likewise, we enabled them to effect; for they prevailed upon us to promise, in our stipulations with the Spaniards, what they had not the least claim to demand, that Spain, instead of neutral troops, should be introduced into Italy, to secure certain successions there to a son of the queen of Spain.
With what reluctance the emperour of Germany would consent to see troops placed in the provinces bordering upon his dominions, which would certainly, on the first occasion, be employed to invade them, it was easy to foresee, and with what degree of good-will he would regard those by whom they were introduced; yet, my lords, such was the influence of France, and so ardent our desire of diverting Spain from setting the pretender upon the throne of Britain, that we complied at all events, without any prospect or promise of advantage.
Thus were the Spaniards, by being persuaded to make this demand, and we, by granting it, brought equally to ill terms with the emperour of Germany; and France was, by procuring such agreeable conditions to the Spaniards, again considered as their most useful ally.
That nation, my lords, is in a very unhappy state, which is reduced to admit such terms as mediators are pleased to prescribe. We durst not refuse the introduction of Spanish troops, nor durst we introduce them without the emperour of Germany’s consent, which, however, he granted at an easy rate, for he demanded only that we should become guarantees of the Pragmatick sanction. This we gladly agreed to, and thought ourselves so happy in purchasing, so cheaply, an opportunity of ingratiating ourselves with Spain, that we desired no other recompense.
This treaty with the emperour of Germany, was, however, by no means improper, nor could we, after the errours which had been committed, do any thing more effectual to preserve the balance of Europe, and reestablish our credit.
But, my lords, this only treaty, which it was for our interest to make, seems to have been made without any intention of observing it; for about this time all the northern powers were alarmed by the approaching election of Poland, and every nation that had any thing either to hope or fear from the event of it, endeavoured to influence it.
How this election was determined, my lords, and by what means, it is unnecessary to relate; but it may not be improper to remark, that whatever cause we may have to congratulate ourselves upon the choice, it does not appear that we had any part in promoting it. Nay, as it is not common for ministers to keep the best part of their conduct secret, there is reason for suspecting that they were not altogether without foundation reported to have favoured France.
The emperour of Germany, sensible of his own interest, promoted the election with vigour and resolution, proportioned to the greatness of the danger that might have arisen from neglecting it. By this conduct he drew upon himself the resentment of the French, who had now a pretence for taking measures which might effectually reunite them to Spain, and, as the event showed, alienate us from the emperour, and, therefore, in vindication of the claim of Stanislaus, declared war upon Germany, in conjunction with Spain.
Now, my lords, the emperour learned to set the true value upon his alliance with Britain, and all Europe had an opportunity of remarking our spirit, our power, and our vigilance. The troops which we p
revailed upon his imperial majesty to admit into Italy, were now drawn out of the garrisons against him, his dominions were attacked on each side, by formidable enemies, and his British allies looked with tranquillity and unconcern upon the difficulties into which they had betrayed him. The liberties of Europe were endangered by a new combination of the houses of Bourbon; and Britain, the great protectress of the rights of mankind, the great arbitress of the balance of power, either neglected or feared to interpose.
Of the event of the war, my lords, I need only observe, that it added new strength to France, and contributed to such an union between her and Spain, as the most artful politician cannot hope to dissolve.
Thus, my lords, whether by negligence, ignorance, cowardice, or treachery, it is not easy to determine, we were made the instruments of the French policy. Thus was that power enabled by our assistance to retrieve all that she had lost by the ill success of her arms, and by her indecent and contemptuous treatment of Spain. Thus was the German emperour dispirited and weakened; thus were we deprived at once of our allies and our reputation.
Our loss of reputation, the greatest loss that bad measures can bring upon a nation, is made evident beyond controversy, by the insolence with which the Spaniards have treated us while we were flattering, enriching, and supporting them. While we were fitting out squadrons to convey their princes to Italy, and increasing their dominions at our own expense, they seem to have considered our good offices, not as the benefits of friends, but the drudgery of slaves, and, therefore, could scarcely refrain from insults while they employed us, at least when they no longer wanted our immediate assistance. They renewed their contempt and cruelty, their robberies and oppressions; they prescribed laws to our navigation, and laid claim to our colonies.
To these ravages and injuries what did we oppose? What but humble intreaties, pacifick negotiations, and idle remonstrances? Instead of asserting our just claims, and incontestable possessions, instead of preventing war by threatening it, and securing ourselves from a second injury by punishing the first, we amused ourselves with inquiries, demands, representations, and disputes, till we became the jest of that nation which it was in our power to distress, by intercepting their treasure, and to reduce to terms almost without bloodshed.
Thus, my lords, did we proceed, new questions ever arose, and the controversy became more intricate; commissaries were despatched to Spain, who returned without obtaining either restitution or security, and in the mean time no opportunity was neglected of plundering our merchants, and insulting our flag: accounts of new confiscations and of new cruelties daily arrived, the nation was enraged, and the senate itself alarmed, and our ministers, at length awakened from their tranquillity, sent orders to the envoy at the Spanish court to expedite an accommodation; these directions were immediately obeyed, and produced the celebrated convention.
What was given up, or what was endangered by this detestable treaty, your lordships have often had occasion to observe, and the consequences of it were so obvious, that the nation was astonished. Every man saw that we were either treacherously betrayed by our own ministry, or that the ministers were almost the only men in the kingdom utterly unacquainted with our claims, our injuries, and our danger.
A war could now no longer be avoided, it was not in the power of the ministry any longer to refuse to send out our fleets, and make an appearance of hostile measures; but they had still some expedients remaining to shelter the Spaniards from our resentment, and to make their country yet more contemptible: they could contrive such orders for their admirals as should prevent them from destroying their enemies with too little mercy; and if any one was suspected of intentions less pacifick, there were methods of equipping his fleet in such a manner as would effectually frustrate his schemes of revenge, reprisals, and destruction.
These, my lords, are not the murmurs of the disappointed, nor the insinuations of the factious; it is well known to our countrymen and to our enemies, how ill admiral Vernon was furnished with naval and military stores, and how little his importunate demands of a supply were regarded. What opportunities were lost, and what advantages neglected, may be conjectured from the success of his inconsiderable force. A very little reflection on the situation and state of those countries will easily satisfy your lordships, how far a small body of land-forces might have penetrated, what treasures they might have gained, and what consternation they might have spread over the whole Spanish America.
That our squadrons in the Mediterranean have been, at least, useless, that they have sailed from point to point, and from one coast to another, only to display the bulk of our ships, and to show the opulence of our nation, can require no proof: I wish, my lords, there was less reason for suspecting that they acted in concert with our enemies, that they retired from before their ports only to give them an opportunity of escaping, and that they, in reality, connived at some attempts which they were, in appearance, sent to prevent.
There are some miscarriages in war, my lords, which every reasonable man imputes to chance, or to causes of which the influence could not be foreseen; there are others that may justly be termed the consequences of misconduct, but of misconduct involuntary and pardonable, of a disregard, perhaps, of some circumstances of an affair produced by too close an attention to others. But there are miscarriages, too, for which candour itself can find no excuses, and of which no other causes can be assigned than cowardice or treachery. From the suspicion of one, the past actions of the admiral who commands our fleet in those seas will secure him, but I know not whether there are now any that will attempt to clear the minister’s character from the imputation of the other.
All the insolence of the Spaniards, a nation by no means formidable, is the consequence of the reunion of the houses of Bourbon; a reunion which could not easily have been accomplished, but by the instrumental offices of our ministry, whom, therefore, the nation has a right to charge with the diminution of its honour, and the decay of its trade.
Nor has our trade, my lords, been only contracted and obstructed by the piracies of Spain, but has been suffered to languish and decline at home, either by criminal negligence, or by their complaisance for France, which has given rise to our other calamities. The state of our woollen manufactures is well known, and those whose indolence or love of pleasure keeps them strangers to the other misfortunes of their country, must yet have been acquainted with this, by the daily accounts of riots and insurrections, raised by those who, having been employed in that manufacture, can provide for their families by no other business, and are made desperate by the want of bread.
We are told, my lords, by all parties, and told with truth, that our manufactures decline, because the French have engrossed most of the foreign markets; and it is not denied even by those whose interest it might be to’ deny it, that the cloth which they ruin us by vending, is made of our own wool, which they are suffered to procure either by the folly of an unskilful, or the connivance of a treacherous administration.
If our own manufactures, my lords, had been carefully promoted, if the whole influence of our government had been made to cooperate with the industry of our traders, there had always been such a demand for our wool, that they could not have afforded to purchase it at a price equivalent to the danger of exporting it: and if any means were now steadily practised to prevent the exportation, our trade must consequently revive, because cloth is one of the necessaries of life which other nations must have from Britain, when France can no longer supply them.
But, my lords, notwithstanding the decay of trade, our expenses have never been contracted; we have squandered millions in idle preparations, and ostentatious folly; we have equipped fleets which never left the harbour, and raised armies which were never to behold any other enemy than the honest traders and husbandmen that support them. We have, indeed, heard many reasons alleged for oppressing the empire with standing troops, which can have little effect upon those who have no interest to promote by admitting them: sometimes we are in danger of invasion
s, though it is not easy to imagine for what purpose any prince should invade a nation, which he may plunder at pleasure, without the least apprehension of resentment, and which will resign any of its rights whenever they shall be demanded: sometimes, as we have already heard, the pretender is to be set upon the throne by a sudden descent of armies from the clouds; and sometimes the licentiousness and disobedience of the common people requires the restraint of a standing army.
That the people are, to the last degree, exasperated and inflamed, I am far from intending to deny, but surely they have yet been guilty of no outrage so enormous as to justify so severe a punishment; they have generally confined themselves to harmless complaints, or, at least, to executions in effigy. The people, my lords, are enraged because they are impoverished, and, to prevent the consequences of their anger, their poverty is increased by new burdens, and aggravated by the sight of an useless, despicable herd, supported by their industry, for no other purpose than to insult them.
By these useless armaments and military farces, our taxes, my lords, have been continued without diminishing our debts, and the nation seems condemned to languish for ever under its present miseries, which, by furnishing employment to a boundless number of commissioners, officers, and slaves, to the court, under a thousand denominations, by diffusing dependence over the whole country, and enlarging the influence of the crown, are too evidently of use to the minister for us to entertain any hopes of his intention to relieve us.
Let it not be boasted that nine millions are paid, when a new debt of seven millions appears to be contracted; nothing is more easy than to clear debts by borrowing, or to borrow when a nation is mortgaged for the payment.
But the weight of the present taxes, my lords, though heavier than was perhaps ever supported by any nation for so long a time, taxes greater than ever were paid, to purchase neither conquests nor honours, neither to prevent invasions from abroad, nor to quell rebellions at home, is not the most flagrant charge of this wonderful administration, which, not contented with most exorbitant exactions, contrives to make them yet more oppressive by tyrannical methods of collection. With what reason the author of the excise scheme dreads the resentment of the nation is sufficiently obvious; but surely, in a virtuous and benevolent mind, the first sentiments that would have arisen on that occasion, would not have been motions of anger, but of gratitude. A whole nation was condemned to slavery, their remonstrances were neglected, their petitions ridiculed, and their detestation of tyranny treated as disaffection to the established government; and yet the author of this horrid scheme riots in affluence, and triumphs in authority, and without fear, as without shame, lifts up his head with confidence and security.
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