There are, indeed, some hopes, my lords, that new measures, resolutely pursued, might yet repair the mischiefs of this absurd and cowardly conduct, and that by resolution and dexterity, the ambition of France might once more be disappointed. The king of Prussia appears, at length, convinced that he has not altogether pursued his real interest, and that his own family must fall in the ruin of the house of Austria. The king of Sardinia appears firm in his determination to adhere to the queen of Hungary, and has therefore refused a passage through his dominions to the Spanish troops. The States of Holland seem to have taken the alarm, and nothing but their distrust of our sincerity can hinder them from uniting against the house of Bourbon.
This distrust, my lords, we may probably remove, by reviving, on this occasion, our ancient forms of address, and declaring at once to his majesty, and to all the powers of Europe, that we are far from approving the late measures.
There is another reason why the short addresses of our ancestors may be preferred to the modern forms, in which a great number of particular facts are often comprehended. It is evident, that the addresses are presented, before there can be time to examine whether the facts contained in them are justly stated; and they must, therefore, lose their efficacy with the people, who are sufficiently sagacious to distinguish servile compliance from real approbation, and who will not easily mistake the incense of flattery for the tribute of gratitude.
With regard to the propriety of the address proposed to your lordships, which is, like others, only a repetition of the speech, there is, at least, one objection to it too important to be suppressed.
It is affirmed in the speech, in what particular words I cannot exactly remember, that since the death of the late German emperour, the interest of the queen of Hungary has been diligently and invariably promoted; an assertion which his majesty is too wise, too equitable, and too generous to have uttered, but at the persuasion of his ministers.
His majesty well knows, that no important assistance has been hitherto given to that unhappy princess; he knows that the twelve thousand men, who are said to have been raised for the defence of the empire, those mighty troops, by whose assistance the enemies of Austria were to be scattered, never marched beyond the territory of Hanover, nor left that blissful country for a single day. And is it probable that the queen would have preferred money for troops, had she not been informed that it would be more easily obtained?
Nor was even this pecuniary assistance, though compatible with the security of Hanover, granted her without reluctance and difficulty; of which no other proof is necessary, than the distance between the promise and the performance of it. The money, my lords, is not yet all paid, though the last payment was very lately fixed. Such is the assistance which the united influence of justice and compassion has yet procured from the court of Britain.
Our ministers have been, therefore, hitherto, my lords, so far from acting with vigour in favour of the house of Austria, that they have never solicited the court of Muscovy, almost the only court now independent on France, to engage in her defence. How wisely that mighty power distinguishes her real interest, and how ardently she pursues it, the whole world was convinced in her alliance with the late emperour; nor is it unlikely, that she might have been easily persuaded to have protected his daughter with equal zeal. But we never asked her alliance lest we should obtain it, and yet we boast of our good offices.
Our governours thought it more nearly concerned them to humble our merchants than to succour our allies, and therefore admitted the Spaniards into Italy; by which prudent conduct they dexterously at once gratified the house of Bourbon, embarrassed the queen of Hungary, and endangered the effects of the British merchants, lying at Leghorn; effects which were lately valued at six hundred thousand pounds, but which, by the seasonable arrival of the Spaniards, are happily reduced to half their price.
I hope, therefore, I need not urge to your lordships the necessity of confining our address to thanks and congratulations, because it is not necessary to say how inconsistent it must be thought with the dignity of this house to echo falsehood, and to countenance perfidy.
Then the duke of NEWCASTLE spoke to the following effect: — My lords, the manner in which the noble lord who spoke last expresses his sentiments, never fails to give pleasure, even where his arguments produce no conviction; and his eloquence always receives its praise, though it may sometimes be disappointed of its more important effects.
In the present debate, my lords, I have heard no argument, by which I am inclined to change the usual forms of address, or to reject the motion which has been made to us.
The address which has been proposed, is not, in my opinion, justly chargeable either with flattery to the ministers, or with disingenuity with respect to the people; nor can I discover in it any of those positions which have been represented so fallacious and dangerous. It contains only a general declaration of our gratitude, and an assertion of our zeal; a declaration and assertion to which I hope no lord in this assembly will be unwilling to subscribe.
As an inquiry into the propriety of this address has produced, whether necessarily or not, many observations on the present state of Europe, and many animadversions upon the late conduct, it cannot be improper for me to offer to your lordships my opinion of the measures which have been pursued by us, as well in the war with Spain, as with regard to the queen of Hungary, and to propose my conjectures concerning the events which may probably be produced by the distractions on the continent.
This deviation from the question before us, will at least be as easily pardoned in me as in the noble lords who have exhibited so gloomy a representation of our approaching condition, who have lamented the slavery with which they imagine all the states of Europe about to be harassed, and described the insolence and ravages of those oppressors to whom their apprehensions have already given the empire of the world. For surely, my lords, it is an endeavour no less laudable to dispel terrour, than to excite it; and he who brings us such accounts as we desire to receive, is generally listened to with indulgence, however unelegant may be his expressions, or however irregular his narration.
That the power of the family of Bourbon is arrived at a very dangerous and formidable extent; that it never was hitherto employed but to disturb the happiness of the universe; that the same schemes which our ancestors laboured so ardently and so successfully to destroy, are now formed afresh, and intended to be put in immediate execution; that the empire is designed to be held henceforward in dependence on France; and that the house of Austria, by which the common rights of mankind have been so long supported, is now marked out for destruction, is too evident to be contested.
It is allowed, my lords, that the power of the house of Austria, which there was once reason to dread, lest it might have been employed against us, is now almost extinguished; and that name, which has for so many ages filled the histories of Europe, is in danger of being forgotten. It is allowed, that the house of Austria cannot fall without exposing all those who have hitherto been supported by its alliance, to the utmost danger; and I need not add, that they ought, therefore, to assist it with the utmost expedition, and the most vigorous measures.
It may be suggested, my lords, that this assistance has been already delayed till it is become useless, that the utmost expedition will be too slow, and the most vigorous measures too weak to stop the torrent of the conquests of France: that the fatal blow will be struck, before we shall have an opportunity to ward it off, and that our regard for the house of Austria will be only compassion for the dead.
But these, my lords, I hope, are only the apprehensions of a mind overborne with sudden terrours, and perplexed by a confused survey of complicated danger; for if we consider more distinctly the powers which may be brought in opposition to France, we shall find no reason for despairing that we may once more stand up with success in defence of our religion and the liberty of mankind, and once more reduce those troublers of the world to the necessity of abandoning their destructive designs.
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p; The noble lord has already mentioned the present disposition of three powerful states, as a motive for vigorous resolutions, and a consideration that may, at least, preserve us from despair; and it is no small satisfaction to me to observe, that his penetration and experience incline him to hope upon the prospect of affairs as they now appear; because I doubt not but that hope will be improved into confidence, by the account which I can now give your lordships of the intention of another power, yet more formidable, to engage with us in the great design of repressing the insolence of France.
A treaty of alliance, my lords, has been for some time concerted with the emperour of Muscovy, and has been negotiated with such diligence, that it is now completed, and I doubt not but the last ratifications will arrive at this court in a few days; by which it will appear to your lordships, that the interest of this nation has been vigilantly regarded, and to our allies, that the faith of Britain has never yet been shaken. It will appear to the French, that they have precipitated their triumphs, that they have imagined themselves masters of nations by whom they will be in a short time driven back to their own confines, and that, perhaps, they have parcelled out kingdoms which they are never likely to possess.
It was affirmed, and with just discernment, that applications ought to be made to this powerful court, as the professed adversary of France; and if it was not hitherto known that their assistance had been assiduously solicited, our endeavours were kept secret only that their success might be more certain, and that they might surprise more powerfully by their effects.
Nor have the two other princes, which were mentioned by the noble lord, been forgotten, whose concurrence is at this time so necessary to us: and I doubt not but that the representations which have been made with all the force of truth, and all the zeal that is awakened by interest and by danger, will in time produce the effects for which they were intended; by convincing those princes that they endanger themselves by flattering the French ambition, that they are divesting themselves of that defence of which they will quickly regret the loss, and that they are only not attacked at present, that they may be destroyed more easily hereafter.
But it is always to be remembered, my lords, that in publick transactions, as in private life, interest acts with less force as it is at greater distance, and that the immediate motive will generally prevail. Futurity impairs the influence of the most important objects of consideration, even when it does not lessen their certainty; and with regard to events only probable, events which a thousand accidents may obviate, they are almost annihilated, with regard to the human mind, by being placed at a distance from us. Wherever imagination can exert its power, we easily dwell upon the most pleasing views, and flatter ourselves with those consequences, which though perhaps least to be expected, are most desired. Wherever different events may arise, which is the state of all human transactions, we naturally promote our hopes, and repress our fears; and in time so far deceive ourselves, as to quiet all our suspicions, lay all our terrours asleep, and believe what at first we only wished.
This, my lords, must be the delusion by which some states are induced to favour, and others to neglect the encroachments of France. Men are impolitick, as they are wicked; because they prefer the gratification of the present hour to the assurance of solid and permanent, but distant happiness. The French take advantage of this general weakness of the human mind, and by magnificent promises to one prince, and petty grants to another, reconcile them to their designs. Each finds that he shall gain more by contracting an alliance with them, than with another state which has no view besides that of preserving to every sovereign his just rights, and which, therefore, as it plunders none, will have nothing to bestow.
This, my lords, is the disadvantage under which our negotiators labour against those of France; we have no kingdoms to parcel out among those whose confederacy we solicit; we can promise them no superiority above the neighbouring princes which they do not now possess; we assume not the province of adjusting the boundaries of dominion, or of deciding contested titles: we promise only the preservation of quiet, and the establishment of safety.
But the French, my lords, oppose us with other arguments, arguments which, indeed, receive their force from folly and credulity; but what more powerful assistance can be desired? They promise not mere negative advantages, not an exemption from remote oppression, or an escape from slavery, which, as it was yet never felt, is very little dreaded; they offer an immediate augmentation of dominion, and an extension of power; they propose new tracts of commerce, and open new sources of wealth; they invite confederacies, not for defence, but for conquests; for conquests to be divided among the powers by whose union they shall be made.
Let it not, therefore, be objected, my lords, to our ministers, or our negotiators, that the French obtain more influence than they; that they are more easily listened to, or more readily believed: for while such is the condition of mankind, that what is desired is easily credited, while profit is more powerful than reason, the French eloquence will frequently prevail.
Whether, my lords, our seeming want of success in the war with Spain admits of as easy a solution, my degree of knowledge in military affairs, does not enable me to determine. An account of this part of our conduct is to be expected from the commissioners of the admiralty, by whom, I doubt not, but such reasons will be assigned for all the operations of our naval forces, and such vindications offered of all those measures, which have been hitherto imputed too precipitately to negligence, cowardice, or treachery, as will satisfy those who have been most vehement in their censures.
But because it does not seem to me very difficult to apologize for those miscarriages which have occasioned the loudest complaints, I will lay before your lordships what I have been able to collect from inquiry, or to conjecture from observation; and doubt not but it will easily appear, that nothing has been omitted from any apparent design of betraying our country, and that our ministers and commanders will deserve, at least, to be heard before they are condemned.
That great numbers of our trading vessels have been seized by the Spaniards, and that our commerce has, therefore, been very much embarrassed and interrupted, is sufficiently manifest; but to me, my lords, this appears one of the certain and necessary consequences of war, which are always to be expected, and to be set in our consultations against the advantages which we propose to obtain. It is as rational to expect, that of an army sent against our enemies, every man should return unhurt to his acquaintances, as that every merchant should see his ship and cargo sail safely into port.
If we examine, my lords, the late war, of which the conduct has been so lavishly applauded, in which the victories which we obtained have been so loudly celebrated, and which has been proposed to the imitation of all future ministers, it will appear, that our losses of the same kind were then very frequent, and, perhaps, not less complained of, though the murmurs are now forgotten, and the acclamations transmitted to posterity, because we naturally relate what has given us satisfaction, and suppress what we cannot recollect without uneasiness.
If we look farther backward, my lords, and inquire into the event of any other war in which we engaged since commerce has constituted so large a part of the interest of this nation, I doubt not but in proportion to our trade will be found our losses; and in all future wars, as in the present, I shall expect the same calamities and the same complaints. For the escape of any number of ships raises no transport, nor produces any gratitude; but the loss of a few will always give occasion to clamours and discontent. For vigilance, however diligent, can never produce more safety than will be naturally expected from our incontestable superiority at sea, by which a great part of the nation is so far deceived as to imagine, that because we cannot be conquered, we cannot be molested.
Nor do I see how it is possible to employ our power more effectually for the protection of our trade than by the method now pursued of covering the ocean with our fleets, and stationing our ships of war in every place where danger can be appre
hended. If it be urged, that the inefficacy of our measures is a sufficient proof of their impropriety, it will be proper to substitute another plan of operation, of which the success may be more probable. To me, my lords, the loss of some of our mercantile vessels shows only the disproportion between the number of our ships of war, and the extent of the sea, which is a region too vast to be completely garrisoned, and of which the frequenters must inevitably be subject to the sudden incursions of subtle rovers.
The disposition of our squadrons has been such, as was doubtless dictated by the most acute sagacity, and the most enlightened experience. The squadron which was appointed to guard our coasts has been ridiculed as an useless expense; and its frequent excursions and returns, without any memorable attempt, have given occasion to endless raillery, and incessant exclamations of wonder and contempt. But it is to be considered, my lords, that the enemies of this nation, either secret or declared, had powerful squadrons in many ports of the Mediterranean, which, had they known that our coasts were without defence, might have issued out on a sudden, and have appeared unexpectedly in our Channel, from whence they might have laid our towns in ruin, entered our docks, burnt up all our preparations for future expeditions, carried into slavery the inhabitants of our villages, and left the maritime provinces of this kingdom in a state of general desolation.
Out of this squadron, however necessary, there was yet a reinforcement of five ships ordered to assist Haddock, that he might be enabled to oppose the designs of the Spaniards, though assisted by their French confederates, whom it is known that he was so far from favouring, that he was stationed before Barcelona to block them up. Why he departed from that port, and upon what motives of policy, or maxims of war, he suffered the Spaniards to prosecute their scheme, he only is able to inform us.
That the Spaniards have not at least been spared by design, is evident from their sufferings in this war, which have been much greater than ours. Many of our ships have, indeed, been snatched up by the rapacity of private adventurers, whom the ardour of interest had made vigilant, and whose celerity of pursuit as well as flight, enables them to take the advantage of the situation of their own ports, and those of their friends. But as none of our ships have been denied convoys, I know not how the loss of them can be imputed to the ministry; and if any of those who sailed under the protection of ships of war have been lost, the commanders may be required to vindicate themselves from the charge of negligence or treachery.
Complete Works of Samuel Johnson Page 250
