There is only one case, my lords, in which, by the common course of proceedings, any regard is had to mere belief; and this evidence is only accepted on that occasion, because no other can possibly be obtained. When any claim is to be determined by written evidences, of which, in order to prove their validity, it is necessary to inquire by whom they were drawn or signed; those who are acquainted with the writing of a dead person, are admitted to deliver, upon oath, their belief that the writing ascribed to him, was or was not his; but such secondary witnesses are never called, when the person can be produced whose hand is to be proved.
There is yet another reason for which it is improper to admit such evidence as this bill has a tendency to promote. It is well known, that in all the courts of common law, the person accused is in some degree secured from the danger of being overborne by false accusations, by the penalty which may be inflicted upon witnesses discovered to be perjured; but in the method of examination now proposed, a method unknown to the constitution, no such security can be obtained, for there is no provision made by the laws for the punishment of a man who shall give false evidence before a committee of the house of commons.
It may likewise be observed, that this bill wants one of the most essential properties of a law, perspicuity and determinate meaning; here is an indemnity promised to those who shall discover all that they know, remember, or believe. A very extensive demand, and which may, therefore, be liable to more fallacies and evasions than can be immediately enumerated or detected. For how can any one prove that he has a claim to the indemnity? He may, indeed, make some discoveries, but whether he does not conceal something, who can determine? May not such reserves be suspected, when his answers shall not satisfy the expectations of his interrogators? And may not that suspicion deprive him of the benefit of the act? May not a man, from want of memory, or presence of mind, omit something at his examination which he may appear afterwards to have known? And since no human being has the power of distinguishing exactly between faults and frailties, may not the defect of his memory be charged on him as a criminal suppression of a known fact? And may not he be left to suffer the consequences of his own confession? Will not the bill give an apparent opportunity for partiality? And will not life and death, liberty and imprisonment, be placed in the hands of a committee of the commons? May they not be easily satisfied with informations of one man, and incessantly press another to farther discoveries? May they not call some men, notoriously criminal, to examination, only to secure them from punishment, and set them out of the reach of justice; and extort from others such answers as may best promote their views, by declaring themselves unsatisfied with the extent of their testimony? And will not this be an extortion of evidence equivalent to the methods practised in the most despotick governments, and the most barbarous nations?
It has always been the praise of this house to pay an equal regard to justice and to mercy, and to follow, without partiality, the direction of reason, and the light of truth; and how consistently with this character, which it ought to be our highest ambition to maintain, we can ratify the present bill, your lordships are this day to consider. It is to be inquired, whether to suppose a man guilty, only because some guilt is suspected, be agreeable to justice; and whether it be rational before there is any proof of a crime, to point out the criminal.
We are to consider, my lords, whether it is not unjust to hear, against any man, an evidence who is hired to accuse him, and hired with a reward which he cannot receive without confessing himself a man unworthy of belief. It is to be inquired, whether the evidence of a man who declares only what he believes, ought to be admitted, when the nature of the crimes allows stronger proof; and whether any man ought to be examined where he cannot be punished if he be found perjured.
A natural and just regard to our own rights, on the preservation of which the continuance of the constitution must depend, ought to, alarm us at the appearance of any attempt to invade them; and the necessity of known forms of justice, ought to incite us to the prevention of any innovation in the methods of prosecuting offenders.
For my own part, my lords, I cannot approve either the principles or form of the bill. I think it necessary to proceed by known precedents, when there is no immediate danger that requires extraordinary measures, of which I am far from being convinced that they are necessary on the present occasion. I think that the certainty of a crime ought to precede the prosecution of a criminal, and I see that there is, in the present case, no crime attempted to be proved. The commons have, in my opinion, already exceeded their privileges, and I would not willingly confirm their new claims. For these reasons, my lords, I openly declare, that I cannot agree to the bill’s being read a second time.
Lord TALBOT spoke next, to this effect: — My lords, so high is my veneration for this great assembly, that it is never without the utmost efforts of resolution that I can prevail upon myself to give my sentiments upon any question that is the subject of debate, however strong may be my conviction, or however ardent my zeal.
But in a very particular degree do I distrust my own abilities, when I find my opinion contrary to that of the noble lord who has now spoken; and it is no common perplexity to be reduced to the difficult choice of either suppressing my thoughts, or exposing them to so disadvantageous a contrast.
Yet, since such is my present state, that I cannot avoid a declaration of my thoughts on this question, without being condemned in my own breast as a deserter of my country, nor utter them without the danger of becoming contemptible in the eyes of your lordships; I will, however, follow my conscience, rather than my interest; and though I should lose any part of my little reputation, I shall find an ample recompense from the consciousness that I lost it in the discharge of my duty, on an occasion which requires from every good man the hazard of his life.
The arguments of the noble lord have had upon me an effect which they never, perhaps, produced on any part of his audience before; they have confirmed me in the contrary opinion to that which he has endeavoured to maintain. It has been remarked, that in some encounters, not to be put to flight is to obtain the victory; and, in a controversy with the noble lord, not to be convinced by him, is to receive a sufficient proof that the cause in which he is engaged is not to be defended by wit, eloquence, or learning.
On the present question, my lords, as on all others, he has produced all that can be urged, either from the knowledge of past ages, or experience of the present; all that the scholar or the statesman can supply has been accumulated, one argument has been added to another, and all the powers of a great capacity have been employed, only to show that right and wrong cannot be confounded, and that fallacy can never strike with the force of truth.
When I survey the arguments of the noble lord, disrobed of those ornaments which his imagination has so liberally bestowed upon them, I am surprised at the momentary effect which they had upon my mind, and which they could not have produced had they been clothed in the language of any other person.
For when I recollect, singly, the particular positions upon which his opinion seems to be founded, I do not find them by any means uncontrovertible; some of them seem at best uncertain, and some evidently mistaken.
That there is no apparent crime committed, and that, therefore, no legal inquiry can be made after the criminal, I cannot hear without astonishment. Is our commerce ruined, are our troops destroyed, are the morals of the people vitiated, is the senate crowded with dependants, are our fleets disarmed, our allies betrayed, and our enemies supported without a crime? Was there no certainty of any crime committed, when it was moved to petition his majesty to dismiss this person from his councils for ever.
It has been observed, my lords, that nothing but a sight of the dead body can warrant a pursuit after the murderer; but this is a concession sufficient for the present purpose; for if, upon the sight of a murdered person, the murderer may lawfully be inquired after, and those who are reasonably suspected detained and examined; with equal reason, my lords, may t
he survey of a ruined nation, a nation oppressed with burdensome taxes, devoured by the caterpillars of a standing army, sunk into contempt in every foreign court, and repining at the daily decay of its commerce, and the daily multiplication of its oppressors, incite us to an inquiry after the author of its miseries.
It is asserted, that no man ought to be called into question for any crime, who is not suspected of having committed it. This, my lords, is a rule not only reasonable in itself, but so naturally observed, that I believe it was never yet broken; and am certain, no man will be charged with the violation of it, for accusing this person as an enemy to his country.
But he that declares his suspicion, may be called upon to discover upon what facts it is founded; nor will this part of the law produce any difficulty in the present case; for as every man in the nation suspects this person of the most enormous crimes, every man can produce sufficient arguments to justify his opinion.
On all other occasions, my lords, publick fame is allowed some weight: that any man is universally accounted wicked, will add strength to the testimony brought against him for any particular offence; and it is at least a sufficient reason for calling any man to examination, that a crime is committed, and he is generally reported to be the author of it.
That this is the state of the person into whose conduct the commons are now inquiring; that he is censured by every man in the kingdom, whose sentiments are not repressed by visible influence; that he has no friends but those who have sold their integrity for the plunder of the publick; and that all who are not enemies to their country, have, for many years, incessantly struggled to drag him down from the pinnacle of power, and expose him to that punishment which he has so long deserved, and so long defied, is evident beyond contradiction.
Let it not, therefore, be urged, my lords, that there is no certainty of a crime which is proved to the conviction of every honest mind; let it not be said that it is unreasonable to suspect this man, whom the voice of the people, a voice always to be reverenced, has so long condemned.
The method of procuring evidence against him by an act of indemnity has been represented by the noble lord as not agreeable to justice or to law: in the knowledge of the law I am far from imagining myself able to contend with him; but I think it may not be improper to observe, that a person of the highest eminence in that profession, whose long study and great abilities give his decisions an uncommon claim to authority and veneration, and who was always considered in this house with the highest regard, appears to have entertained a very different opinion.
It was declared by him, without the least restriction, that all means were lawful which tended to the discovery of truth; and, therefore, the publick may justly expect that extraordinary methods should be used upon occasions of uncommon importance.
Nor does this expedient appear to me very remote from the daily practice of promising pardon to thieves, on condition that they will make discoveries by which their confederates may be brought to justice.
If we examine only the equity of this procedure, without regard to the examples of former times, it appears to me easily defensible; for what can be more rational than to break a confederacy of wretches combined for the destruction of the happiness of mankind, by dividing their interest, and making use, for the publick good, of that regard for their own safety, which has swallowed up every other principle of action?
It is admitted that wickedness ought to be punished, and it is universally known that punishment must be preceded by detection; any method, therefore, that promotes the discovery of crimes may be considered as advantageous to the publick.
As there is no wickedness of which the pernicious consequences are more extensive, there is none which ought more diligently to be prevented, or more severely punished, than that of those men who have dared to abuse the power which their country has put into their hands; but how they can be convicted by any other means than those which are now proposed, I confess myself unable to discover; for by a very small degree of artifice, a man invested with power may make every witness a partner of his guilt, and no man will be able to accuse him, without betraying himself. In the present case it is evident, that the person of whose actions the bill now before us is designed to produce a more perfect discovery, has been combined with others in illegal measures, in measures which their own security obliges them to conceal, and which, therefore, the interest of the publick demands to be divulged.
That Paxton has distributed large sums for purposes which he dares not discover, we are informed by the reports of the secret committee; and I suppose every body suspects that they were distributed as rewards for services which the nation thinks not very meritorious, and I believe no man will ask what reason can be alleged for such suspicions.
But since it may be possibly suggested that Paxton expended these sums contrary to his master’s direction, or without his knowledge, it may be demanded, whether such an assertion would not be an apparent proof of a very criminal degree of negligence in a man intrusted with the care of the publick treasure?
Thus, my lords, it appears in my opinion evident, that either he has concurred in measures which his servile agent, the mercenary tool of wickedness, is afraid to confess, or that he has stood by, negligent of his trust, and suffered the treasure of the nation to be squandered by the meanest wretches without account.
That the latter part of the accusation is undoubtedly just, the report of the commons cannot but convince us. It appears that for near eight years, Paxton was so high in confidence, that no account was demanded from him; he bestowed pensions at pleasure; he was surrounded, like his master, by his idolaters; and after the fatigue of cringing in one place, had an opportunity of purchasing the taxes of the nation, the gratification of tyranny in another.
I presume, my lords, that no man dares assert such a flagrant neglect of so important an office, to be not criminal in a very high degree; to steal in private houses that which is received in trust, is felony by the statutes of our country; and surely the wealth of the publick ought not to be less secured than that of individuals, nor ought he that connives at robbery to be treated with more lenity than the robber.
Therefore, my lords, as I cannot but approve of the bill, I move that it may be read a second time; and I hope the reasons which I have offered, when joined with others, which I expect to hear from lords of a greater experience, knowledge, and capacity, will induce your lordships to be of the same opinion.
Lord HERVEY spoke next, to this effect: — My lords, as the bill now before us is of a new kind, upon an occasion no less new, I have endeavoured to bestow upon it a proportionate degree of attention, and have considered it in all the lights in which I could place it; I have, in my imagination, connected with it all the circumstances with which it is accompanied, and all the consequences that it may produce either to the present age, or to futurity; but the longer I reflect upon it, the more firmly am I determined to oppose it; nor has deliberation any other effect, than to crowd my thoughts with new arguments against it, and to heighten dislike to detestation.
It must, my lords, immediately occur to every man, at the first mention of the method of proceeding now proposed, that it is such as nothing but extreme necessity can vindicate; that the noble person against whom it is contrived, must be a monster burdensome to the world; that his crimes must be at once publick and enormous, and that he has been already condemned by all maxims of justice, though he has had the subtilty to escape by some unforeseen defect in the forms of law. It might be imagined, my lords, that there were the most evident marks of guilt in the conduct of the man thus censured, that he fled from the justice of his country, that he had openly suborned witnesses in his favour, or had, by some artifice certainly known, obstructed the evidence that was to have been brought against him. It might at least be reasonably conceived, that his crimes were of such a kind as might in their own nature easily be concealed, and that, therefore, some extraordinary measures were necessary for the discovery of wickedness which lay ou
t of the reach of common inquiry.
But, my lords, none of these circumstances can be now alleged; for there is no certainty of any crime committed, nor any appearance of consciousness or fear in the person accused, who sets his enemies at defiance in full security, and declines no legal trial of his past actions; of which it ought to be observed, that they have, by the nature of his employments, been so publick, that they may easily be examined without recourse to a new law to facilitate discoveries.
The bill, therefore, is, my lords, at least unnecessary, and an innovation not necessary ought always to be rejected, because no man can foresee all the consequences of new measures, or can know what evils they may create, or what subsequent changes they may introduce. The alteration of one part of a system naturally requires the alteration of another.
But, my lords, that there is no necessity for this law now proposed, is not the strongest argument that may be brought against it, for there is in reality a necessity that it should be rejected. Justice and humanity are necessarily to be supported, without which no society can subsist, nor the life or property of any man be enjoyed with security: and neither justice nor humanity can truly be said to reside, where a law like this has met with approbation.
My lords, to prosecute any man by such methods, is to overbear him by the violence of power, to take from him all the securities of innocence, and divest him of all the means of self-defence. It is to hire against him those whose testimonies ought not to be admitted, if they were voluntarily produced, and of which, surely, nothing will be farther necessary to annihilate the validity, than to observe that they are the depositions of men who are villains by their own confession, and of whom the nation sees, that they may save their lives by a bold accusation, whether true or false.
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