To the measures which are now pursued, were there no other arguments to be alleged against them, I should think it, my lords, a sufficient objection that they are unnecessary, and that this is not a time for political experiments, or for wanton expenses. I should think, that the present distresses of the publick ought to restrain your lordships from approving any steps by which our burdens may be made more heavy, burdens under which we are already sinking, and which a peace of more than twenty years has not contributed to lighten.
But that they are unnecessary, my lords, is the weakest allegation that can be offered; for they are such as tend not only to obstruct the advancement of more advantageous designs, but to bring upon us the heaviest calamities; they will not only hinder us from increasing our strength, but will sink us to the greatest degree of weakness; they will not only impoverish us for the present, which may be sometimes the effect of useful and beneficial designs, but may depress us below a possibility of recovery, and reduce us to receive laws from some foreign power.
This is, indeed, a dreadful prospect; but what other can arise to us from a war with France, with the most wealthy empire of the universe, of which we were sufficiently shown the strength in the late war, by the resistance which all the surrounding nations found it able to make against their united efforts, and which the debts that they then contracted, and the towns that were then destroyed, will not easily suffer them to forget. Of this empire, my lords, thus powerful, thus formidable, neither the dominions are contracted, nor the trade impaired, nor the inhabitants diminished. The French armies are no less numerous than under their late mighty monarch, their territories are increased by new acquisitions, their trade has long been promoted by the destruction of ours, and their wealth has been, by consequence, increased. They have not, my lords, like this unhappy nation, been exhausted by temporary expedients and useless armaments; they have not harassed their merchants to aggrandize the court, nor thrown away the opportunities which this interval of quiet has afforded them, in the struggles of faction; they have not been multiplying officers to betray the people, and taxing the people to support their oppressors; but have with equal policy, diligence, and success, recovered the losses which they then sustained, and enabled themselves to make another stand against a general confederacy.
Against this empire, my lords, are we now to be engaged in a war, without trade, and without money, loaded with debts, and harassed with exactions; for what consequences can be expected from sending our troops into the frontier towns, but that the French will charge us with beginning hostilities, and declare war against us, or attack us without a declaration; and that we shall be obliged to stand alone against the whole power of the house of Bourbon, while all our ancient allies stand at a distance spiritless and intimidated, or, perhaps, secretly incite our enemies against us, in hopes of sharing our plunder, or of rising on our ruin.
I know it has been alleged, and alleged with such a degree of confidence, as it is reasonable to hope nothing could produce but a consciousness of truth, that the Dutch have already consented to assist us; nor is it without regret, that I find myself obliged to declare, that this assertion is nothing more than one of those transient visions with which it has been for a long time the custom of British ministers to delude the people, to pacify their clamours, and lull them in security; one of those artifices from which nothing more is expected, than that it shall operate upon the nation, till the circumstances of our affairs furnish out another, which is likewise, in a short time, to be exploded only to make way for new falsehoods in a perpetual succession.
Such, my lords, is the art of government discovered by the wonderful sagacity of modern statesmen; who have found out, that it is easier to palliate than to cure; and that the people maybe quieted by political soporificks, while diseases are preying upon them, while their strength decays, and their vitals are consumed.
That these falsehoods prevail upon mankind, and that after the discovery of one cheat, another equally gross is patiently borne, cannot but raise the wonder of a man who views the world at a distance, and who has not opportunities of inquiring into the various motives of action or belief. Such an one would be inclined to think us a nation of fools, that must be stilled with rattles, or amused with baubles; and would readily conclude, that our ministers were obliged to practise such fallacies, because they could not prevail upon us by motives adapted to reasonable beings.
But if we reflect, my lords, upon the different principles upon which reports like these are propagated and opposed, it will easily be discovered that their success is not to be imputed either to superiour art on one side, or uncommon weakness on the other. It is well known that they are promoted by men hired for that purpose with large salaries, or beneficial employments, and that they can be opposed only from a desire of detecting falsehood, and advancing the publick happiness: it is apparent that those who invent, those who circulate, and, perhaps, part of those who counterfeit belief of them, are incited by the prospect of private advantage, and immediate profit; and that those who stop them in their career by contradiction and objections, can propose no other benefit to themselves, than that which they shall receive in common with every other member of the community; and, therefore, whoever has sufficiently observed mankind, to discover the reason for which self-interest has in almost all ages prevailed over publick spirit, will be able to see why reports like these are not always suppressed by seasonable detections.
A minister ought not to flatter himself that he has always deceived those who appear to credit his representations; their silence is not so often the effect of credulity, as of cowardice or indolence. Many are overborne by the pomp of great offices, and others who distinguish more clearly, and judge with greater freedom, are contented to enjoy their own reflections, without reproving those whom they despair to reform.
This report of the engagement of the Dutch in our measures, shall, however, furnish our ministers with no opportunity of boasting their address, nor shall it pass any longer without contradiction; for I shall, without any scruple, affirm in the presence of this august assembly, that the Dutch have hitherto appeared absolutely neutral; that they have not shown any approbation of our measures, nor any inclination to assist us in them. I know, my lords, how disagreeable this assertion may be to those, whose interest it is that mankind should believe them of no less importance in the eyes of foreign powers than in their own, and should imagine that the remotest nations of the world are influenced by their motions, and directed by their counsels; but however they may resent this declaration, I defy them to confute it, and now call upon them to show that the Dutch have engaged in any measure for the support of the queen of Hungary.
The late augmentation of twenty thousand men, which may possibly be mentioned as a proof of their intention, shows nothing but that they pursue their own interest with their usual prudence and attention, and with such as it is to be wished that our ministers would condescend to learn from them; and that they are too wise to suffer the towns from which the Austrians have, by our persuasions, withdrawn their troops to fall into the hands of the French. They have, therefore, substituted new garrisons, but seem to have no regard to the interest of the queen of Hungary, nor any other view than that of providing for their own security, waiting the event of the war, and laying hold of any advantage that may accidentally be offered them.
It may be urged farther by those who are desirous to deceive others, or willing to be deceived themselves, that the province of Holland has passed a vote for assisting the queen of Hungary with twenty thousand men; but if it be remembered, my lords, that this must be the general act of the United States, and that every province has its own particular views to gratify, and its own interest to reconcile with the general good, it may be very reasonably suspected, that this assistance is yet rather the object of hope than expectation; it may justly be feared, that before so many various dispositions will unite, and such different schemes will be made consistent, the house of Austria may be extinguished,
that our forces may be destroyed, and Germany enslaved by the French. Then, my lords, what will remain, but that we shall curse that folly that involved us in distant quarrels, and that temerity which sent us out to oppose a power which we could not withstand; and which incited us to waste that treasure in foreign countries, which we may quickly want for the defence of our own?
It must be, indeed, confessed, that if an estimate is to be made of our condition, from the conduct of our ministers, the fear of exhausting our treasure must be merely panick, and the precepts of frugality which other states have grown great by observing, are to be absolutely unnecessary. It may reasonably be imagined that we have some secret mine, or hidden repository of gold, which no degree of extravagance can drain, and which may for ever supply the most lavish expenses without diminution.
For upon what other supposition, my lords, can any man attempt a defence of the contract, by which we have obtained for one campaign the service of the troops of Hanover? What but the confidence of funds that can never be deficient, could influence them to conclude a stipulation, by which levy-money is to be paid for troops of which not a single regiment was raised for our service, or on the present occasion; which were established for the security of the electorate of Hanover, and would have been maintained, though we had not engaged in the affairs of the continent.
What were the reasons which induced our ministry to employ the forces of Hanover, it is, perhaps, not necessary to inquire. The only motive that ought to have influenced them, was the prospect of obtaining them upon cheap terms; for, my lords, if the troops of Hanover cannot be obtained, but at the same expense with those of Britain, I am not able to discover why they should be preferred. I have never heard, my lords, any uncommon instances of Hanoverian courage, that should incline us to trust the cause of Europe rather to that nation than to our own; and am inclined to believe, that Britain is able to produce men equal in all military virtues to any native of that happy country; a country which, though it was thought worthy to be secured by a neutrality, when all the neighbouring provinces were exposed to the ravages of war, I have never heard celebrated for any peculiar excellencies; and of which I cannot but observe, that it was indebted for its security rather to the precaution of its prince, than the bravery of its inhabitants.
This demand of levy-money shocks every Briton yet more strongly, on considering by whom it is required; required by that family whom we have raised from a petty dominion, for which homage was paid to a superiour power; and which was, perhaps, only suffered to retain the appearance of a separate sovereignty, because it was not worth the labour and expense of an invasion; because it would neither increase riches nor titles, nor gratify either avarice or ambition; by a family whom, from want and weakness, we have exalted to a throne, from whence, with virtue equal to their power, they may issue their mandates to the remotest parts of the earth, may prescribe the course of war in distant empires, and dictate terms of peace to half the monarchs of the globe.
I should imagine, my lords, that when a king of the house of Hanover surveys his navies, reviews his troops, or examines his revenue, beholds the splendour of his court, or contemplates the extent of his dominions, he cannot but sometimes, however unwillingly, compare his present state with that of his ancestors; and that when he gives audience to the ambassadours of princes, who, perhaps, never heard of Hanover, and directs the payment of sums, by the smallest of which all his ancient inheritance would be dearly purchased; and reflects, as surely he sometimes will, that all these honours and riches, this reverence from foreign powers, and his domestick splendour, are the gratuitous and voluntary gifts of the mighty people of Britain, he should find his heart overflowing with unlimited gratitude, and should be ready to sacrifice to the happiness of his benefactors, not only every petty interest, or accidental inclination, but even his repose, his safety, or his life; that he should be ready to ease them of every burden before they complained, and to aid them with all his power before they requested his assistance; that he should consider his little territories as only a contemptible province to his British empire, a kind of nursery for troops to be employed without harassing his more valuable subjects.
It might be at least hoped, my lords, that the princes of the house of Hanover might have the same regard to this nation as to kings from whom they never received any benefit, and whom they ought in reality always to have considered as enemies, yet even from such levy-money was not always required; or if required, was not always received.
There was once a time, my lords, before any of this race wore the crown of Britain; when the great French monarch, Lewis the fourteenth, being under a necessity of hiring auxiliary troops, applied to the duke of Hanover, as a prince whose necessities would naturally incline him to set the lives of his subjects at a cheap rate. The duke, pleased with an opportunity of trafficking with so wealthy a monarch, readily promised a supply of troops; and demanded levy-money to be paid him, that he might be enabled to raise them. But Hanoverian reputation was not then raised so high, as that the French king should trust him with his money. Lewis suspected, and made no scruple of declaring his suspicion, that the demand of levy-money was only a pretence to obtain a sum which would never afterwards be repaid, and for which no troops would be obtained; and therefore, with his usual prudence insisted, that the troops should first march, and then be paid. Thus for some time the treaty was at a stand; but the king being equally in want of men, as the duke of money, and perceiving, perhaps, that it was really impracticable for so indigent a prince to raise troops without some pecuniary assistance, offered him at length a small sum, which was gladly accepted, though much below the original demand. The troops were engaged in the service of France; and the duke of Hanover thought himself happy in being able to amuse himself at his leisure with the rattle of money.
Such, my lords, were the conditions on which the troops of Hanover were furnished in former times; and surely what could then be produced by the love of money, or the awe of a superiour power, might now be expected as the effect of gratitude and kindness.
But not to dwell any longer, my lords, upon particular circumstances of measures, of which the whole scheme is contrary to the apparent interest of this empire, I shall not inquire farther, why auxiliaries are employed on this occasion rather than Britons, rather than those whose bravery is celebrated to the most distant corners of the earth; why, if mercenaries are necessary, those of Hanover are preferred to others: or why, if they are, indeed, preferable, they are now to be hired at a higher rate than at any former time? It appears to me of far more importance to undermine the foundation, than to batter the superstructure of our present system of politicks; and of greater use to inquire, why we have engaged in a war on the continent, than why we carry it on with ridiculous profusion.
It appears to me, my lords, that there are many reasons which, with the same circumstances, would have withheld any nation but this from such a dangerous interposition. The Dutch, we see, are content to look on without action, though they are more interested in the event, and less embarrassed on any other side. We are already engaged in a war, of which no man can foresee the conclusion; but which cannot be ended unsuccessfully, without the utmost danger to our most important interests; and which yet has hitherto produced only losses and disgrace, has impoverished our merchants, and intimidated our soldiers. Whether these losses are the effects of weakness or treachery, is a question which I am not ambitious of endeavouring to decide, and of which the decision is, indeed, by no means necessary in the present debate; since if we are too weak to struggle with Spain, unassisted as she is, and embarrassed with different views, I need not say what will be our condition, when the whole house of Bourbon shall be combined against us; when that nation which stood alone for so many years against the united efforts of Europe, shall attack us, exhausted with taxes, enervated with corruption, and disunited from all allies. Whether the troops of Hanover will assist us at that time, I cannot determine. Perhaps, in the destruction of the British d
ominions, it may be thought expedient to secure a more valuable and important country by a timely neutrality; but if we have any auxiliaries from thence, we must then necessarily obtain them upon cheaper terms.
If our inactivity in the European seas, and our ill success in those of America be, as it is generally suspected, the consequence of perfidious counsels, and private machinations; if our fleets are sent out with orders to make no attempt against our enemies, or our admirals commanded to retreat before them; surely no higher degree of madness can be imagined, than that of provoking new enemies before we have experienced a change of counsels, and found reason to place in our ministers and statesmen that confidence which war absolutely requires.
Complete Works of Samuel Johnson Page 281
