Whether, indeed, any more than a neutrality be intended, even by this pompous armament, for which we are now required to provide, I maybe allowed to doubt; since the troops that are hired at so high a rate, are such as cannot act against the enemies of the queen of Hungary, without breach of the imperial constitutions.
It has been already justly observed in this debate, that when the emperour has obtained from the diet an aid of fifty months, that act is considered as an authentick recognition of his title; nor can any of the German princes afterwards make war against him, without subjecting his dominions to the imperial interdict, and losing the privileges of his sovereignty.
That the present emperour has already received this acknowledgment, and been confessed by his majesty, as elector of Hanover, to be legally invested with the imperial dignity, is well known; and, therefore, I cannot by any method of reasoning discover, nor have yet found any man able to inform me, why the troops of Hanover are chosen before those of any other nation, for a design which they cannot execute, without ruining their sovereign if they fail; and infringing the constitution of the empire, if they should happen to succeed?
I should, therefore, have imagined, that the assistance of the queen of Hungary was only pretended, and that the forces were only designed to breathe the air of the continent, and to display their scarlet at the expense of Britain, had not the noble lord who spoke third in this debate informed us, that they will in reality march into Germany; a design, my lords, so romantick, unseasonable, and dangerous, that though I cannot doubt it after such assurances, I should not have believed it on any other; a design which I hope every man, who regards the welfare of this kingdom, will indefatigably oppose, and which every Briton must wish that some lucky accident may frustrate.
To send an army into Germany, my lords, is to hazard our native country without necessity, without temptation, without prospect or possibility of advantage; it is to engage in a quarrel which has no relation to our dominions, or rights, or commerce; a quarrel from which, however it be decided, we can neither hope for any increase of our wealth, our force, or our influence; but which may involve us in a war without end, in which it will be difficult to obtain the victory, and in which we must yet either conquer or be undone.
Surely, my lords, an expedition like this was never undertaken before, without consulting the senate, and declaring the motives on which it was designed; surely never was any supply of this nature demanded, without some previous discoveries to this house of the importance of the service for which they were required to provide. On this occasion, my lords, all the councils of the government are covered by a cloud of affected secrecy, nor is any knowledge of our affairs to be gained, but from papers which are not to be regarded here, the printed votes of the other house.
I am always, my lords, inclined to suspect unusual secrecy, and to imagine, that men either conceal their measures, because they cannot defend them, or affect an appearance of concealing them, when in reality they have yet projected nothing, and draw the veil with uncommon care, only lest it should be discovered that there is nothing behind it; as when palaces are shown, those apartments which are empty, are carefully locked up.
To confess my opinion without reserve, I am not so much inclined to believe, that our ministers’ designs are bad, as that they design nothing; and suspect that this mighty army, so lavishly paid, and collected from such distant parts, is to regulate its motions by accident, and to wait without action, till some change in the state of Europe shall make it more easy for our ministers to form their scheme.
I hope, my lords, that by some accident more favourable than we have at present reason to expect, our German expedition will be retarded, till our ministers shall awaken from their present dream of delivering Europe from the French ambition, and of restoring the ancient greatness of the house of Austria. I hope every day, as it adds to their experience, will diminish that ardour which is generally the effect of imperfect views, which is commonly raised by partial considerations, and ends in inconsiderate undertakings. I hope they will in time think it no advantage to their fellow-subjects to be doomed to fight the battles of other nations, and to be called out into every field, where they shall happen to hear that blood is to be shed. I hope they will be taught, that the only business of Britain is commerce; and that while our ships pass unmolested, we may sit at ease, whatever be the designs or actions of the potentates on the continent; that none but naval power can endanger our safety, and that it is not necessary for us to inquire, how foreign territories are distributed, what family approaches to its extinction, or where a successour will be found to any other crown than that of Britain.
If these maxims were once generally understood, from how much perplexity would our councils be set free? how many thousands of our fellow-subjects would be preserved from slaughter? and how much would our wealth be increased, by saving those sums which are yearly squandered in idle expeditions, or in negotiations equally useless, and, perhaps, equally expensive? Had these principles been received by our forefathers, we might now have given laws to the world, and, perhaps, our posterity will, with equal reason, say, How happy, how great and formidable they should have been, had not we attempted to fix and to hold the balance of power, and neglected the interest of our country for the preservation of the house of Austria!
Thus, my lords, I have endeavoured to explain and enforce my opinion of the measures in which our ministers have engaged the nation; and hope that I shall not be accused of being influenced in my determinations by personal prejudices, nor of having changed my opinions with regard to publick affairs, in consequence of any change of the persons by whom they are conducted. For if my sentiments have ever been thought important enough to be retained in memory, I can, with the utmost confidence, appeal to all those who can recollect what I have formerly said, when the reestablishment of the house of Austria was the subject of our consultations; and defy the most rigorous and attentive examiner of my conduct, to prove, that there ever was a time in which I thought it necessary or expedient for the British nation to be entangled in disputes on the continent, or to employ her arms in regulating the pretensions of contending powers.
I was always of opinion, my lords, that peace is the most eligible state, and that the ease of security is to be preferred to the honour of victory. I always thought peace particularly necessary to a trading people; and as I have yet found no reason to alter my sentiments, and as auxiliaries cannot be of any use but in time of war, I shall endeavour to promote peace by joining in the motion.
Lord CHOLMONDELEY spoke to this effect: — My lords, notwithstanding the atrocious charges which have been urged with so much vehemence against the ministry; notwithstanding the folly and absurdity which some lords have imagined themselves to have discovered in the present measures, I cannot yet prevail upon myself, whatever may be my veneration for their integrity, or my confidence in their abilities, to approve the motion for which they so earnestly contend.
To comply with this motion, my lords, would be, in my opinion, to betray the general cause of mankind, to interrupt the success of the assertors of liberty, to give up all the continent, at once, to the house of Bourbon, to defeat all the measures of our ancestors and ourselves, and to invite the oppressors of mankind to extend their claims of universal dominion to the island of Britain.
Of the measures which we are now to consider, I think the defence at once obvious and unanswerable; and should advise, that instead of exerting an useless sagacity in uncertain conjectures on future events, or displaying unseasonable knowledge by the citation of authorities, or the recollection of ancient facts, every lord should attentively compare the state into which Europe was reduced soon after the death of the late emperour, with that in which it now appears; and inquire to what causes such sudden and important changes are to be ascribed. He will then easily discover the efficacy of the British measures; and be convinced, that nothing has been omitted which the interest of this nation required.
When
I hear it asked by the noble lords, what effects have been produced by our armaments and expenses? For what end auxiliaries are hired, and why our armies are transported into Flanders? I cannot but suspect, my lords, that this affectation of ignorance is only intended to irritate their opponents; that they suppress facts with which they are well acquainted, only that they may have an opportunity of giving vent to their passions, of displaying their imagination in artful reproaches, and exercising their eloquence in splendid declamations. I believe they hide what they know where to find, only to oblige others to the labour of producing it; and ask questions, not because they want or desire information, but because they hope to weary those whose stations condemn them to the task of answering them.
The effects, my lords, which the assistance given by us to the queen of Hungary have already produced, are the recovery of one kingdom, and the safety of the rest; the exclusion of the Spaniards from Italy on the one part, and on the other the confinement of them in it, without either the supplies for war, or the necessaries of life.
These, my lords, are surely great advantages; but these are not the greatest which we have reason to hope. Our vigour and resolution have at last animated the Dutch to suspend for a time their attention to trade and money, and to consider what they seldom much regard, the state of other nations; the most rich and powerful of their provinces have already determined to concur in the reestablishment of the house of Austria; and if the approbation of the rest be necessary, it is likely to be obtained by the same method of proceeding.
Thus, my lords, we have a prospect of doing that which the ministers of queen Anne, whose fidelity, wisdom, and address, have been so often and so invidiously commended, thought their greatest honour, and the strongest proof of their abilities. We may soon form another confederacy against the house of Bourbon, at a time when Louis the fourteenth is not at its head, at a time when it is exhausted by expensive projects; and when, therefore, it cannot make the same resistance as when it was before attacked.
By pursuing the scheme which is now formed, with steadiness and ardour, we may, perhaps, reinstate all those nations in their liberties, whom cowardice, or negligence, or credulity have, during the last century, delivered up to the ambition of France; we may confine that swelling monarchy, which has from year to year torn down the boundaries of its neighbours, within its ancient limits, and disable it for ages from giving any new alarms to mankind, and from making any other efforts for the acquisition of universal dominion; we may reestablish the house of Austria as the great barrier of the world, by which it is preserved on one part from being laid waste by the barbarity of the Turks, and on the other from being enslaved by politer tyrants, and overrun by the ambition of France.
Elevated with such success, and encouraged by such prospects, we ought surely, my lords, to press forward in a path, where we have hitherto found no difficulties, and which leads directly to solid peace and happiness, which no dangers or terrours can hereafter interrupt: we ought, instead of relaxing, to redouble our efforts; and to remember, that by exerting all our strength and all our influence for a short time, we shall not only secure ourselves and our posterity from insolence and oppression, but shall establish the tranquillity of the world, and promote the general felicity of the human species.
For these great purposes, my lords, are those auxiliaries retained, of which some lords now require the dismission; and those armies transported, which part of the nation is by false reports inclined to recall; but I hope that such unreasonable demands will not be gratified, and that the faith of treaties, the ties of friendship, the call of justice, and the expectations of our allies, will easily prevail upon your lordships to despise the murmurs of prejudice, and the outcries of faction.
Lord BATH replied to the following effect: — My lords, as I am far from thinking, that my advice or opinion can be of any use in this illustrious assembly, I should have listened in silence to this debate, important as it is, had I not thought it my duty to defend here what I approved in the council; and considered it as an act of cowardice and meanness to fall passively down the stream of popularity, and to suffer my reason and my integrity to be overborne by the noise of vulgar clamours, which have been raised against the measures of the government by the low arts of exaggeration, fallacious reasonings, and partial representations. It is not without concern, my lords, that even in this house I observe some inclination to gratify the prejudices of the people, and to confirm them in their contempt of the foreign troops, by the poor artifice of contemptuous language. To dispute about words, is, indeed, seldom useful; and when questions so weighty as these are before us, may be justly censured as improper. I shall, therefore, only observe that the term mercenaries, which is in the motion applied to the forces of Hanover, seems designed rather to affect the passions than influence the reason, and intended only to express a partiality which cannot be justified.
But it is far more necessary, my lords, to consider upon what motives the troops of Hanover were hired, than by what denomination they may most properly be called; and therefore I shall endeavour to explain the reasons which induced the ministry to retain them, and which, I suppose, have prevailed upon the commons to provide for their support.
It has been asked, why the troops of Hanover were preferred to those of any other nation? And it has been insinuated, that our determination was influenced by motives very different from that regard which every Briton owes to the interest of his native country. But to this imputation, however specious, and however popular, it may be with great security replied, that there was no preference, because there was no choice; that there was a necessity for hiring troops, and that no other troops were to be obtained; and whoever shall endeavour to invalidate this defence, must engage in an undertaking of which I can boldly affirm, that he will find it very difficult. He must show what power would have been able or willing to have furnished us with troops on this occasion; and I am confident, that whoever shall, with this design, take a deliberate survey of the several kingdoms and states of Europe, will find, that there is no other prince to whom we could have applied on this occasion, without greater inconveniencies than can reasonably be feared from the present stipulation with Hanover.
The reasons, indeed, for which this stipulation was made, appeared so strong, when it was considered in the council, that it was unanimously determined necessary; nor was the conclusion hastily made in an assembly of particular persons, who might be suspected of favouring it from private views, and of being convened on purpose to put it in execution: it was debated by a great number with great solemnity; nor can any man say, that he only yielded to what he found it in vain to oppose; for the consent given was not a tacit acquiescence, but a verbal approbation. So far was this part of our measures from being the advice of any single man, or transacted with that solicitous secrecy which is the usual refuge of bad designs.
It has been asserted, likewise, my lords, and with much greater appearance of justice, that this whole design has been formed and conducted without the concurrence or approbation of the senate; and that, therefore, it can be considered only as a private scheme to be executed at the publick expense, as a plan formed by the ministry to aggrandize or ingratiate themselves at the hazard of the nation.
But even this, my lords, is a misrepresentation, though a misrepresentation more artful, and more difficult to defeat; because, in order to the justification of our measures, it is necessary to take a review of past transactions, and to consider what was necessarily implied by former determinations of the senate.
The period, my lords, to which this consideration will necessarily carry us back, is the time at which, after the late tedious war, a peace was, on whatever terms, concluded with France. It is well known, that the confederates demanded, among other advantages, a cession of that part of Flanders, which had been for many years in the possession of Spain, and which opened a way by which the ambition of the house of Bourbon might make inroads at pleasure into the dominions of either the Austrians o
r Dutch. This they were immediately interested in preventing; and as we knew the necessity of preserving the equipoise of power, we likewise were remotely engaged to promote any measures by which it might be secured. In this demand, therefore, all the confederate powers naturally united, and by their united influence enforced compliance. But though it was easy, with no great profundity of political knowledge, to discover from whom these provinces should be taken away, to whom they should be given, was a question of more difficulty; since they might add to the power that had opportunities of improving them, such an increase of commerce and wealth as might defeat the end for which they were demanded, and destroy the balance of power, by transferring too much weight into another scale. And mankind has learned, my lords, by experience, that exorbitant power will always produce exorbitant pride; that very few, when they can oppress with security, will be contained within the bounds of equity by the restraints of morality or of religion; and that, therefore, the only method of establishing a lasting peace is to divide power so equally, that no party may have any certain prospect of advantage by making war upon another.
For this reason, my lords, it was apparently contrary to our interest to grant those provinces to those to whom, by their situation, they might have been most useful. Such countries, and such manufactures in the hands of a people versed, perhaps, beyond all others, both in the science and the stratagems of trade, and always watchful to improve every opportunity of increasing their riches, would have enabled them in a short time to purchase an interest in the councils of all the monarchs of the world, to have maintained fleets that might have covered the ocean, and to have obtained that universal dominion to which the French have so long aspired, and which it is, perhaps, more for the interest of mankind, that if slavery cannot be prevented, they should obtain, as they would, perhaps, use their power with more generosity.
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