With this view, as your lordships have already been informed, the Hanoverian troops will march into the empire; nor has their march been hitherto delayed, either because there was yet no regular scheme projected, or because they were obliged to wait for the permission of the king of Prussia, or because they intended only to amuse Europe with an empty show: they were detained, my lords, in Flanders, because it was believed that they were more useful there than they would be in any other place, because they at once encouraged the states, alarmed the French, defended the Low Countries, and kept the communication open between the queen’s dominions and those of her allies. Nor were these advantages, my lords, chimerical, and such as are only suggested by a warm imagination; for it is evident that by keeping their station in those countries they have changed the state of the war, that they have protected the queen of Hungary from being oppressed by a new army of French, and given her an opportunity of establishing herself in the possession of Bavaria; that the French forces, instead of being sent either to the assistance of the king of Spain against the king of Sardinia, or of the emperour, for the recovery of those dominions which he has lost by an implicit confidence in their alliance, have been necessarily drawn down to the opposite extremity of their dominions, where they are of no use either to their own country, or to their confederates. The united troops of Britain and Hanover, therefore, carried on the war, by living at ease in their quarters in Flanders, more efficaciously than if they had marched immediately into Bavaria or Bohemia.
Thus, my lords, I have endeavoured to show the justice of our designs, and the usefulness of the measures by which we have endeavoured to execute them; and doubt not but your lordships will, upon considering the arguments which have been urged on either side, and those which your own reflections will suggest, allow that it was not only just but necessary to take into our pay the troops of Hanover, for the support of the Pragmatick sanction, and the preservation of the house of Austria; and that since the same reasons which induced the government to hire them, still make it necessary to retain them, you will prefer the general happiness of Europe, the observation of publick faith, and the security of our own liberties and those of our posterity, to a small alleviation of our present expenses, and unanimously reject a motion, which has no other tendency than to resign the world into the hands of the French, and purchase a short and dependant tranquillity by the loss of all those blessings which make life desirable.
Lord LONSDALE spoke next to the following effect: — My lords, notwithstanding the confidence with which the late measures of the government have been defended by their authors, I am not yet set free from the scruples which my own observations had raised, and which have been strengthened by the assertions of those noble lords, who have spoken in vindication of the motion.
Many of the objections which have been raised and enforced with all the power of argument, have yet remained unanswered, or those answers which have been offered are such as leave the argument in its full strength. Many of the assertions which have been produced seem the effects of hope rather than conviction, and we are rather told what we are to hope from future measures, than what advantages we have received from the past.
I am, indeed, one of those whom it will be difficult to convince of the propriety of engaging in a new war, when we are unsuccessful in that which we have already undertaken, and of provoking a more powerful enemy, when all our attempts are baffled by a weaker; and cannot yet set myself free from the apprehension of new defeats and new disgraces from the arms of France, after having long seen how little we are able to punish the insolence of Spain. I cannot but fear that by an ill-timed and useless opposition to schemes which, however destructive or unjust, we cannot obviate, we shall subject ourselves to numberless calamities, that the ocean will be covered with new fleets of privateers, that our commerce will be interrupted in every part of the world, and that we shall only provoke France to seize what she would at least have spared some time longer.
But, my lords, if it be granted, that the Pragmatick sanction is obligatory to us, though it is violated by every other power; that we should labour to reduce the powers of Europe to an equipoise, whenever accident or folly produces any alteration of the balance; and that we are now not to preserve the house of Austria from falling, but raise it from the dust, and restore it to its ancient splendour, even at the hazard of a war with that power which now gives laws to all the western nations; yet it will not surely be asserted, that we ought to be without limits, that we ought to preserve the house of Austria, not only by the danger of our own country, but by its certain ruin, and endeavour to avert the possibility of slavery, by subjecting ourselves to miseries more severe than the utmost arrogance of conquest, or the most cruel wantonness of tyranny, would inflict upon us.
I have observed, that many lords have expressed in this debate an uncommon ardour for the support of the queen of Hungary; nor is it without pleasure, that I see the most laudable of all motives, justice and compassion, operate in this great assembly with so much force. May your lordships always continue to stand the great advocates for publick faith, and the patrons of true greatness in distress; may magnanimity always gain your regard, and calamity find shelter under your protection.
I, likewise, my lords, desire to be remembered among those who reverence the virtues and pity the miseries of this illustrious princess, who look with detestation on those who have invaded the dominions which they had obliged themselves by solemn treaties to defend, and who have taken advantage of the general confederacy against her, to enrich themselves with her spoils, who have insulted her distress and aggravated her misfortunes.
But, my lords, while I feel all these sentiments of compassion for the queen of Hungary, I have not yet been able to forget, that my own country claims a nearer regard; that I am obliged both by interest and duty to preserve myself and my posterity, and my fellow-subjects, from those miseries which I lament; when they happen to others, however distant, I cannot but remember, that I am not to save another from destruction by destroying myself, nor to rescue Austria by the ruin of Britain.
Though I am, therefore, my lords, not unwilling to assist the queen of Hungary, I think it necessary to fix the limits of our regard, to inquire how far we may proceed with safety, and what expenses the nation can bear, and how those expenses may be best employed. The danger of the queen of Hungary ought not to have an effect which would be reproachful, even if the danger was our own. It ought not so far to engross our faculties as to hinder us from attending to every other object. The man who runs into a greater evil to avoid a less, evidently shows that he is defective either in prudence or in courage; that either he wants the natural power of distinguishing, or that his dread of an approaching, or his impatience of a present evil, has taken it away.
Let us, therefore, examine, my lords, the measures with which those who are intrusted with the administration of publick affairs, would persuade us to concur, and inquire whether they are such as can be approved by us without danger to our country. Let us consider, my lords, yet more nearly, whether they are not such as we ourselves could not be prevailed upon even to regard as the object of deliberation, were we not dazzled on one part by glaring prospects of triumphs and honours, of the reduction of France, and the rescue of the world; of the propagation of liberty, and the defence of religion; and intimidated on the other by the view of approaching calamities, the cruelties of persecution, and the hardships of slavery.
All the arts of exaggeration, my lords, have been practised to reconcile us to the measures which are now proposed, and, indeed, all are necessary; for the expenses to which we are about to condemn this nation, are such as it is not able to bear, and to which no lord in this house would consent, were he calm enough to number the sums.
To prove the truth of this assertion, one question is necessary. Is any lord in this assembly willing to assist the queen of Hungary at the expense of sixteen hundred thousand a year? I think the universal silence of this assembly is a sufficien
t proof, that no one is willing; I will, however, repeat my question. Is any lord in this assembly willing that this nation should assist the queen of Hungary at the annual expense of sixteen hundred thousand pounds? The house is, as I expected, still silent, and, therefore, I may now safely proceed upon the supposition of an unanimous negative. Nor does any thing remain in order to evince the impropriety of the measures which we are about to pursue, but that every lord may reckon up the sum required for the support of those troops. Let him take a view of our military estimates, and he will quickly be convinced, how much we are condemned to suffer in this cause. He will find, that we are about not only to remit yearly into a foreign country more than a million and a half of money, but to hazard the lives of multitudes of our fellow-subjects, in a quarrel which at most affects us but remotely; that we are about to incur as auxiliaries an expense greater than that which the principals sustain.
The sum which I have mentioned, my lords, enormous as it may appear, is by no means exaggerated beyond the truth. Whoever shall examine the common military estimates, will easily be convinced, that the forces which we now maintain upon the continent cannot be supported at less expense; and that we are, therefore, about to exhaust our country in a distant quarrel, and to lavish our blood and treasure with useless profusion.
This profusion, my lords, is useless, at least useless to any other end, than an ostentatious display of our forces, and our riches; not because the balance of power is irrecoverably destroyed, not because it is contrary to the natural interest of an island to engage in wars on the continent, nor because we shall lose more by the diminution of our commerce, than we shall gain by an annual victory. It is useless, not because the power of France has by long negligence been suffered to swell beyond all opposition, nor because the queen of Hungary ought not to be assisted at the hazard of this kingdom, though all these reasons are of importance enough to claim our consideration. It is useless, my lords, because the queen of Hungary may be assisted more powerfully, at less charge; because a third part of this sum will enable her to raise, and to maintain, a greater body of men than have now been sent her.
Nor will the troops which she may be thus enabled to raise, my lords, be only more numerous, but more likely to prosecute the war with ardour; and to conclude it, therefore, with success. They will fight for the preservation of their own country, they will draw their swords to defend their houses and their estates, their wives and their children from the rage of tyrants and invaders; they will enter the field as men who cannot leave it to their enemies, without resigning all that makes life valuable; and who will, therefore, more willingly die than turn their backs.
It may reasonably be imagined, my lords, that the queen will place more confidence in such forces, than in troops which are to fight only for honour or for pay; and that she will expect from the affection of her own subjects, a degree of zeal and constancy which she cannot hope to excite in foreigners; and that she will think herself more secure in the protection of those whose fidelity she may secure by the solemnity of an oath, than those who have no particular regard for her person, nor any obligations to support her government.
It is no inconsiderable motive to this method of assisting our ally, that we shall entirely take away from France all pretences of hostilities or resentment, since we shall not attack her troops or invade her frontiers, but only furnish the queen of Hungary with money, without directing her how to apply it. I am far, my lords, from being so much intimidated by the late increase of the French greatness, as to imagine, that no limits can be set to their ambition. I am far from despairing, that the queen of Hungary alone, supported by us with pecuniary assistance, may be able to reduce them to solicitations for peace by driving them out of her dominions, and pursuing them into their own. But as the chance of war is always uncertain, it is surely most prudent to choose such a conduct as may exempt us from danger in all events; and since we are not certain of conquering the French, it is, in my opinion, most eligible not to provoke them, because we cannot be conquered without ruin.
This method is yet eligible on another account; by proceeding with frugality, we shall gain time to observe the progress of the war, and watch the appearance of any favourable opportunity, without exhausting ourselves so far as to be made unable to improve them.
The time, my lords, at which we shall be thus exhausted, at which we shall be reduced to an absolute inability to raise an army or equip a fleet, is not at a great distance. If our late profusion be for a short time continued, we shall quickly have drained the last remains of the wealth of our country. We have long gone on from year to year, raising taxes and contracting debts; and unless the riches of Britain are absolutely unlimited, must in a short time reduce them to nothing. Our expenses are not all, indeed, equally destructive; some, though the method of raising them be vexatious and oppressive, do not much impoverish the nation, because they are refunded by the extravagance and luxury of those who are retained in the pay of the court; but foreign wars threaten immediate destruction, since the money that is spent in distant countries can never fall back into its former channels, but is dissipated on the continent, and irrecoverably lost.
When this consideration is present to my mind, and, on this occasion, no man who has any regard for himself or his posterity can omit it, I cannot but think with horrour on a vote by which such prodigious sums are wafted into another region: I cannot but tremble at the sound of a tax for the support of a foreign war, and think a French army landed on our coasts not much more to be dreaded than the annual payment to which we appear now to be condemned, and from which nothing can preserve us but the address which is now proposed.
By what arguments the commons were persuaded, or by what motives incited to vote a supply for the support of this mercenary force, I have not yet heard; nor, as a member of this house, my lords, was it necessary for me to inquire. Their authority, though mentioned with so much solemnity on this occasion, is to have no influence on our determinations. If they are mistaken, it is more necessary for us to inquire with uncommon caution. If they are corrupt, it is more necessary for us to preserve our integrity. If we are to comply blindly with their decisions, our knowledge and experience are of no benefit to our country, we only waste time in useless solemnities, and may be once more declared useless to the publick.
The commons, my lords, do not imagine themselves, nor are imagined by the nation, to constitute the legislature. The people, when any uncommon heat prevails in the other house, disturbs their debates, and overrules their determinations, have been long accustomed to expect redress and security from our calmer counsels; and have considered this house as the place where reason and justice may be heard, when, by clamour and uproar, they are driven from the other. On this occasion, my lords, every Briton fixes his eye upon us, and every man who has sagacity enough to discover the dismal approach of publick poverty, now supplicates your lordships, by agreeing to this address, to preserve him from it.
Then the SPEAKER spoke to the following purport: — My lords, having very attentively observed the whole progress of this important debate, and considered with the utmost impartiality the arguments which have been made use of on each side, I cannot think the question before us doubtful or difficult; and hope that I may promote a speedy decision of it by recapitulating what has been already urged, that the debate may be considered at one view, and by adding some observations which have arisen to my own thoughts on this occasion.
At the first view of the question before us, in its present state, no man can find any reasons for prejudice in favour of the address proposed. This house is, indeed, yet divided, and many lords have spoken on each side with great force and with great address; but the authority of the other house, added to the numbers which have already declared in this for the support of the foreign troops, is sufficient to turn the balance, in the opinion of any man who contents himself to judge by the first appearance of things; and must incline him to imagine that position at least more probable, which is rati
fied by the determination of one house, and yet undecided by the other.
I know, my lords, what may be objected to these observations on the other house, and readily agree with the noble lord, that our determinations ought not to be influenced by theirs. But on this occasion, I introduce their decision not as the decrees of legislators, but as the result of the consideration of wise men; and in this sense it may be no less reasonable to quote the determination of the commons, than to introduce the opinion of any private man whose knowledge or experience give his opinion a claim to our regard.
Nor do I mention the weight of authority on one side as sufficient to influence the private determination of any in this great assembly. It is the privilege and the duty of every man, who possesses a seat in the highest council of his country, to make use of his own eyes and his own understanding, to reject those arguments of which he cannot find the force, whatever effect they may have upon others, and to discharge the great trust conferred upon him by consulting no conscience but his own.
Yet, though we are by no means to suffer the determinations of other men to repress our inquiries, we may certainly make use of them to assist them; we may very properly, therefore, inquire the reasons that induced the other house to approve those bills which are brought before them, since it is not likely that their consent was obtained without arguments, at least probable, though they are not to be by us considered as conclusive upon their authority. The chief advantage which the publick receives from a legislature formed of several distinct powers, is, that all laws must pass through many deliberations of assemblies independent on each other, of which, if the one be agitated by faction or distracted by divisions, it may be hoped that the other will be calm and united, and of which it can hardly be feared that they can at any time concur in measures apparently destructive to the commonwealth.
Complete Works of Samuel Johnson Page 291
