But, my lords, it is not necessary to show the unreasonableness of the inference, because the assertion from which it is deduced cannot be proved. That the excessive use of distilled liquors cannot be prevented, is a very daring paradox, not only contrary to the experience of all past times, but of the present; for the law which is now to be repealed, did in a great degree produce the effects desired from it, till the execution of it was suspended, not by the inability of the magistrates, or obstinacy of the people, but by the artifice of ministers, who promoted the sale of spirits secretly, for the same reason which incites our present more daring politicians to establish the use of them by a law.
The defects of this law, for that it was defective cannot be denied, were in the manner of levying the duty; for had half the duty that was demanded from the unlicensed retailers, been required from the distiller, there had been no need of informations; nor had we been stunned with the dismal accounts of the rage and cruelty of the people, or the violent deaths of those who endeavoured to grow rich by commencing prosecutions. The duty had been regularly paid, the liquors had been made too dear for common use, and the name of spirits had been in a short time forgotten amongst us.
From this defect, my lords, arose all the difficulties and inconveniencies that have impeded the execution of the law, and prevented the effects that were expected from it, and by one amendment they might be all removed.
But instead of endeavouring to improve the efficacy of the remedy which was before proposed for this universal malady, we are now told, that it was too forcible to take effect, and that it only failed by the vigour of its operation. We are informed, that the work of reformation ought not to be despatched with too much expedition, that mankind cannot possibly be made virtuous at once, and that they must be drawn off from their habits by just degrees, without the violence of a sudden change.
What degrees the noble lord proposes to recommend, or what advantage he expects from allowing the people a longer time to confirm their habits, I am not able to discover. He appears to me rather to propose an experiment than a law, and rather to intend the improvement of policy, than the safety of the people.
This experiment is, indeed, of a very daring kind, in which not only the money but the lives of the people are hazarded: their money has, indeed, in all ages been subject to the caprices of statesmen, but their lives ought to be exempt from such dangerous practices, because, when once lost, they can never be recovered. By this bill, however, it is contrived to lay poison in the way of the people, poison which we know will be eagerly devoured by a fourth part of the nation, and will prove fatal to a great number of those that taste it; nor of this project is any defence made, but, that since the people love to swallow poison, it may be of advantage to the government to sell it.
It might not be improper, my lords, to publish to the people, by a formal proclamation, the benevolent intentions of their governours; and inform them, that licensed murderers are to be appointed, at whose shops they may infallibly be destroyed, without any danger of legal censures, provided they take care to use the poison prescribed by the government, and increase, by their death, the publick revenue.
That money only is desired from this bill, is not only obvious from the first perusal of it, but confessed even by those who defend it; but not one has continued to assert, that it will produce a reformation of manners, or recommended it otherwise than as an experiment.
For this reason, my lords, I still think my motion for postponing the bill very reasonable, nor do I make any scruple to confess that I propose, by postponing, only a more gentle and inoffensive method of dropping it, that some other way of raising the supplies may be attempted, or that the duty may be raised to three shillings a gallon; the lowest tax that can be laid with a design of reformation.
This method, my lords, or any other by which another bill may be procured, should be pursued; for whatever schemes the commons may substitute, the nation can suffer nothing by the change, they cannot raise money in any other manner, but with less injury to the publick; since the greatest calamity which wrong measures can possibly produce, is the propagation of wickedness, and the establishment of debauchery.
Lord BATH then spoke, in substance as follows: — My lords, that this bill is, with great propriety, called an experiment, I am ready to allow, but do not think the justness of that expression any forcible argument against it; because I know not any law that can be proposed for the same end, without equally deserving the same appellation.
All the schemes of government, my lords, have been perfected by slow degrees, and the defects of every regulation supplied by the wisdom of successive generations. No man has yet been found, whose discernment, however penetrating, has enabled him to discover all the consequences of a new law, nor to perceive all the fallacies that it includes, or all the inconveniencies that it may produce; the first essay of a new regulation is, therefore, only an experiment made, in some degree, at random, and to be rectified by subsequent observations; in making which, the most prudent conduct is only to take care that it may produce no ill consequences of great importance, before there may be an opportunity of reviewing it.
This maxim, my lords, is, in my opinion, strictly regarded in the present attempt, which in itself is an affair of very great perplexity. The health and virtue of the people are to be regarded on one part, and the continuance of a very gainful and extensive manufacture on the other; a manufacture by which only, or chiefly, the produce of our own nation is employed; and on which, therefore, the value of lands must very much depend.
Manufactures of this kind, my lords, ought never to be violently or suddenly suppressed. If they are pernicious to the nation in general, they are, at least, useful to a very great part, and to some, who have no other employment, necessary; and in the design of putting a stop to any detrimental trade, care is always to be taken that the inconvenience exceed not the benefit, and time be allowed for those that are engaged in it to withdraw to some other business, and for the commodities that are consumed by it, to be introduced at some other market, or directed to some other use.
These cautions are in this bill very judiciously observed. The trade, which all allow to administer supplies to debauchery, and fuel to diseases, will, by the provisions in this bill, sink away by degrees, and the health and virtue of the people will be preserved or restored without murmurs or commotions.
We must consider, likewise, my lords, the necessity of raising supplies, and the success with which they have hitherto been raised upon the scheme which is now under your consideration.
In examining the necessity of procuring supplies, I shall not expatiate upon the present danger of the liberties of all this part of the world; upon the distress of the house of Austria, the necessity of preserving the balance of power, or the apparent designs of the ancient and incessant disturbers of mankind, topicks which have been on former occasions sufficiently explained.
It is now only necessary to observe, that the state of our affairs requires expedition, and that a happy peace can only be expected from a successful war, and that war can only be made successful by vigour and despatch.
If by liberal grants of money, and ready concurrence in all necessary measures, we enable his majesty to raise a powerful army, there is no reason to doubt that a single campaign may procure peace, that it may establish the liberties of Europe, and raise our allies, who were so lately distressed, to their former greatness.
These supplies, my lords, which are so evidently necessary, may, by the method now proposed, be easily, speedily, and cheaply raised. Upon the security which this act will afford, large sums are already offered to the government at the low interest of three for a hundred, by those who, if the conditions of the loan are changed, will, perhaps, demand four in a few days, or raise money by a combination to the rate of five or six for a hundred; of which I would not remark how much it will embarrass the publick measures, or how much it will encourage our enemies to an obstinate resistance.
Such,
my lords, are the inconveniencies to be feared from rejecting this bill, or from postponing it; by which is plainly intended only a more gentle and tender manner of rejecting it, by hinting to the commons your disapprobation of it, and the necessity of sending up another, which you cannot do without hazarding the peace of the nation and the fate of the war.
The commons, who are not obliged to inquire what reception their bills find here, may perhaps not immediately prepare another, but suffer time to elapse, till necessity shall oblige us to comply with those measures which we cannot approve.
They may, likewise, by a kind of senatorial craft, elude all our precautions, and make the rejection of the bill ineffectual, as was once done, when a bill for a tax upon leather was rejected: the commons, determining not to be directed in the methods of raising money, sent up the same bill with only a small alteration of the title, to lay a duty upon tanned hides, which the lords were, for want of time, obliged to pass.
But, my lords, should the other house discover in this single instance, any uncommon degree of flexibility and complaisance, should they patiently endure the rejection of the bill, admit the validity of the reasons upon which your lordships have proceeded, and willingly engage in drawing up a new scheme for raising supplies; even upon this supposition, which is more favourable than can reasonably be formed, the business of the year will be very much perplexed, and the new bill hurried into a law without sufficient caution or deliberation.
The session is now, my lords, so far advanced, that many of the commons have retired into the country, whose advice and assistance may be necessary in the projection of a new money bill, so that the new bill must be formed in a short time, and by a thin house; and, indeed, the multiplicity of considerations necessary to another bill of this kind, is such, that I cannot think it prudent to advise or undertake it.
The committee on ways and means must strike out another scheme for a considerable impost, which, in the present state of the nation, is in itself no easy task. This scheme must be so adjusted as to be consistent with all the other taxes, which will require long consultations and accurate inquiries. It must then struggle, perhaps, through an obstinate and artful opposition, before it can pass through the forms of the other house; and, when it comes before your lordships, may be again opposed with no less zeal than the bill before us, and perhaps, likewise, with equal reason.
All these dangers and difficulties will be avoided by trying, for a single year, the experiment which is now proposed; and which, if that should fail, may be better adjusted in the time of leisure, which the beginning of the next session will undoubtedly afford; before which time I am afraid no amendment can possibly be made.
It has been proposed, indeed, by the noble lord, that three shillings should be laid upon every gallon of distilled liquors, which would undoubtedly lessen the consumption, but would at the same time destroy the trade; a trade from which large profits may be in time gained; since our distillers have now acquired such skill, that the most delicate palate cannot distinguish their liquors from those which foreigners import.
If the duty be raised to the height proposed, it must be allowed to be repaid for all that shall be exported; otherwise foreign nations will deprive us of this part of our trade; and it has been already shown, that by mock exportations the duty may be frequently evaded.
Thus, my lords, there will be difficulties on either hand; if a duty so high be paid, the manufacturer will be ruined; if it be evaded, the consumption will be lessened.
One inconvenience will easily be discovered to be the necessary consequence of any considerable advance of the price. We may be certain that an act of the senate will not moderate the passions, or alter the appetites of the people; and that they will not be less desirous of their usual gratifications, because they are denied them. The poor may, indeed, yield to necessity, unless they find themselves able to resist the law, or to evade it; but those who can afford to please their taste, or exalt their spirits at a greater expense, will still riot as before, but with this difference, that their excesses will produce no advantage to the publick.
If an additional duty of three shillings be laid upon every gallon of distilled liquors, the product of our own distillery will be dearer than those liquors which are imported from foreign parts; and, therefore, it cannot but be expected that the money which now circulates amongst us, will in a short time be clandestinely carried into other countries.
Such, my lords, will be the effect of those taxes which are so strongly recommended; and, therefore, they ought not to be imposed till all other methods of proceeding have been found ineffectual.
It is possible, indeed, that the regulation specified in this bill may not produce any beneficial effect, and that the present practice of debauchery may still continue among the people; but it is likewise possible that this tax may, by increasing the price, augment the revenue at the same time that it lessens the consumption.
This proposal has, by some lords, been treated as a paradox; but they certainly suspected it of falsehood, only for want of patience to form the calculations necessary in such disquisitions. The tax of the last year amounted to one hundred and seventy thousand pounds; this tax is now doubled, so that the same quantity will produce three hundred and forty thousand; but if one third less should be consumed, the present tax will amount to no more than two hundred and twenty thousand pounds; and when fifty thousand licenses are added, the revenue will gain an hundred thousand pounds, though one third part of the consumption should be hindered.
But, my lords, supposing no part of the consumption hindered, I cannot think that bill should be rejected, which, in a time of danger like the present, shall add to the publick revenue an annual income of more than two hundred thousand pounds, without lessening any manufacture, without burdening any useful or virtuous part of the nation, and without giving the least occasion to any murmurs among the people.
It is to be remembered, my lords, that whatever corruption shall prevail amongst us, it cannot be imputed to this bill, which did not make, but find the nation vitiated, and only turned their vices to publick advantage; so that if it produces any diminution of the sale of spirits, it is indisputably to be applauded as promoting virtue. If the sale of spirits still continues the same, it will deserve some degree of commendation, as it will, at least, not contribute to the increase of vice, and as it will augment the revenue without injuring the people; for how, my lords, can we be censured for only suffering the nation to continue in its former state?
Lord TALBOT then spoke in substance as follows: — My lords, if we consider the tendency of the argument used by the noble lord, the only argument on which he appears to lay any stress, it will prove, if it proves any thing, what cannot be admitted by your lordships, without bidding farewell to independency, and acknowledging that you are only the substitutes of a higher power.
It appears by the tenor of his reasoning, that he considers this house as only obliged, in questions relating to supplies, to ratify the determinations of the other; to submit implicitly to their dictates, and receive their sovereign commands, without daring either to refuse compliance, or delay it.
If we conjoin the reasoning of the noble lord who spoke last, with that of one who spoke before in favour of the bill, we shall be able to discover the full extent of our power on these occasions; the first was pleased to inform us, that though we were at liberty to examine the paragraphs of this bill, we had no right, at least no power to amend them; because in money bills, the commons left us no other choice than that of passing or rejecting them.
This, my lords, might have been thought a sufficient contraction of those privileges which your ancestors transmitted to you, and the commons needed to have desired no farther concessions from this assembly, since this was a publick confession of a subordinate state, and admitted either that part of our ancient rights had been given up, or that we were at present too much depressed to dare to assert them.
We might, however, still comfort ourselves wit
h the peaceful and uncontested possession of the alternative; we might still believe that what we could not approve we might reject, without irritating the formidable commons. But now, my lords, a new doctrine has been vented among us; we are told not only that we must not amend a money bill, but that it will be to no purpose to reject it; for that the other house will send it again without altering any thing but the title, and force it upon us, when there is no time for any other expedient.
If this, my lords, should be done, I know not how the bill might, at its second appearance, be received by other lords; for my part, I should vote immediately for rejecting it, without any alleviating or mollifying expedients. I should reject it, my lords, even on the last day of the session, without any regard to the pretended necessity of raising supplies, and without suffering myself to be terrified into compliance by the danger of the house of Austria; for though I think the balance of power on the continent necessary to be preserved at the hazard of a fleet or an army, I cannot think it of equal importance to us with the equipoise of our own government; nor can I conceive it my duty to enslave myself to secure the freedom of another.
The danger, therefore, of disgusting the commons, at this or any other juncture, shall never influence me to a tame resignation of the privileges of our own house; nor shall I willingly allow any force to arguments which are intended only to operate upon our fear; and, therefore, unless there shall appear some better plea in favour of this bill, I shall think it my duty to oppose it.
The other plea is the difficulty, or, in the style of the noble lord who spoke last, the impossibility of raising supplies by any other method. That it is not easy to raise supplies by any new tax, in a nation where almost all the necessaries of life are loaded with imposts, must be readily allowed; but that it is impossible, the folly of the people, which is at least equal to their poverty, will not suffer me to grant.
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