136. From “Report of Special Senate Committee on Space and Astronautics on S. 3609,” quoted in Kalic, Presidents and Militarization of Space, 95.
137. See, e.g., E.L., “Barry Goldwater on Space: GOP Candidate Wants Military, Not Civilians, to Run Space Program,” Science 145 (July 31, 1964), 470–71; George B. Kistiakowsky, “Johnson or Goldwater—Two Scientists Explain Their Choice: The Case for Johnson,” Science 146 (Oct. 16, 1964), 380–82; NASA Historical Staff, Office of Policy Planning, Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1964: Chronology on Science, Technology and Policy (Washington, DC: NASA, 1964), 232–33, history.nasa.gov/AAchronologies/1964.pdf (accessed Apr. 25, 2017); Richard Dean Burns and Joseph M. Siracusa, A Global History of the Nuclear Arms Race: Weapons, Strategy, and Politics, 2 vols. (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger/ABC-CLIO, 2013), 379; Kalic, Presidents and Militarization of Space, 102–105.
138. The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution—the free hand in Southeast Asia—passed the House 416–0 and the Senate 88–2; see discussion in LaFeber, America, Russia, 251–52. See also Burns and Siracusa, Global History, 379–80: “[Johnson] poured considerable effort into reducing tensions between Washington and Moscow by pursuing measures that lessened the prospect of nuclear conflict. . . . Bureaucrats from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the State Department often fought Johnson’s arms control proposals; moreover, his policies often ran counter to the views of many Americans who endorsed more strident policies[, such as] the American Security Council.” For an overview of Johnson-era legislation, see Joseph A. Califano Jr., “Seeing Is Believing—The Enduring Legacy of Lyndon Johnson,” keynote address, centennial celebration, May 19, 2008, www.lbjlibrary.org/lyndon-baines-johnson/perspectives-and-essays/seeing-is-believing-the-enduring-legacy-of-lyndon-johnson (accessed Nov. 9, 2017).
139. As the very first Director of Defense Research and Engineering, Herbert York, wrote in Making Weapons, Talking Peace: “Unnecessary duplication was rife, and vicious interservice struggles over rules and missions were creating confusion.” Quoted in Moltz, Politics of Space Security, 95.
140. Burrows, This New Ocean, 238–41, 246. In addition, beginning in 1961, the Air Force found itself competing for primacy in space reconnaissance with the new National Reconnaissance Office and the Central Intelligence Agency.
141. Kalic, Presidents and Militarization of Space, 105–107. One source of opposition was the Critical Issues Council of the Republican Citizens Committee of the United States, which saw “no reason to believe that putting a man on the moon could contribute to our military strength” and urged a multinational rather than solely US lunar-landing program so as to share the prodigious costs.
142. The remaining one-quarter of federal space funding received by the military during the Johnson years went into programs both successful and aborted, including KEYHOLE and CORONA photoreconnaissance satellites; the Manned Orbiting Laboratory project, a nonwarfighting reconnaissance space station for the Air Force that was defunded well before achieving orbit; and the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program, set up by the National Reconnaissance Office. Satellites and heavy-lift booster rockets took up most of the money, while a much smaller amount went toward antisatellite weapons and ballistic missile defense, in tandem with the Soviets’ continuing work on bombardment satellites. Communications satellites were rapidly altering the way information could be transmitted and exchanged, and in 1968 a constellation of twenty-six US satellites called the Defense Satellite Communication System began operations—a mere half-decade after nineteen nations, including the United States, had formed the civilian International Telecommunications Satellite Consortium (Intelsat) and Bell Labs/AT&T had generated their first live television transmission via commercial satellite. See, e.g., Burrows, This New Ocean, 241–71; Kalic, Presidents and Militarization of Space, 101–102, 107, 110–11.
143. Moltz, Politics of Space Security, 143, 152–54.
144. Quoted in Kalic, Presidents and Militarization of Space, 117.
145. See, e.g., letter from Robert C. Seamons Jr., NASA Deputy Administrator, to James E. Webb, NASA Administrator, Feb. 25, 1967, and Statement by James E. Webb, Feb. 25, 1967, in NASA, “Report of Apollo 204 Review Board,” NASA-TM-84-105, Apr. 5, 1967, 3-57, 3-58, 3-61, history.nasa.gov/Apollo204/summary.pdf (accessed Nov. 11, 2017).
146. McDougall, Heavens and Earth, 344–45.
147. Kalic, Presidents and Militarization of Space, 109–114; McDougall, Heavens and Earth, 344–45.
148. Moltz, Politics of Space Security, 125–26. Moltz contends that the movement toward space agreements was bilateral, not unilateral. He describes the gradual movement toward US–Soviet space cooperation and arms deceleration that followed the signing of the Limited Test Ban Treaty as the emergence of “cooperative restraint.”
149. Lyndon B. Johnson, “Remarks at the Signing of the Treaty on Outer Space,” Jan. 27, 1967, Peters and Woolley, American Presidency Project, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=28205 (accessed Apr. 25, 2017). On February 7, 1967, the President transmitted the treaty to the Senate, which ratified it in late April. Urging ratification, Johnson addressed the senators: “Today, outer space is free. It is unscarred by conflict. No nation holds a concession there. It must remain this way. We of the United States do not acknowledge that there are landlords of outer space who can presume to bargain with the nations of the Earth on the price of access to this domain. We must not—and we need not—corrupt this great opportunity by bringing to it the very antagonism which we may, by courage, overcome and leave behind forever if we proceed with this joint adventure into this new realm.” Quoted in Kalic, Presidents and Militarization of Space, 115.
150. Mizin, “Non-Weaponization of Outer Space,” in Outer Space, ed. Arbatov and Dvorkin, 50–51. In 1985 the United States presented a “broad interpretation” of the treaty, asserting that it did not “prohibit the testing of BMD [ballistic missile defense] components in space” (57).
151. On a related 1994 UN resolution, Enlargement of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, the United States was the sole vote in opposition; there were no abstentions. See United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, “Documents and Resolutions Database,” www.unoosa.org/oosa/documents-and-resolutions/search.jspx?&view=resolutions (accessed Apr. 25, 2017).
152. Mizin, “Non-Weaponization of Outer Space,” 54–56; Tim Weiner, “Lies and Rigged ‘Star Wars’ Test Fooled the Kremlin, and Congress,” New York Times, Aug. 18, 1993; Sergei Oznobishchev, “Codes of Conduct for Outer Space,” in Outer Space, ed. Arbatov and Dvorkin, 69–77. Mizin’s assessment, shared by many, is that SDI “was really not only a grandiose new technological project to revamp the U.S. armed forces, but also a kind of active measure designed to lure the USSR into an exhausting competition that it was destined to lose” (56). For the Soviet submissions to the General Assembly, see documents A/36/192 (Aug. 20, 1981), A/38/194 (Aug. 23, 1983), and A/39/243 (Sept. 27, 1984) at “Documents by Symbol,” General Assembly of the United Nations, www.un.org/en/ga/documents/symbol.shtml (accessed Apr. 25, 2017).
153. Letter dated February 12, 2008, from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation and the Permanent Representative of China to the Conference on Disarmament, CD/1839 (incorporating Draft: Treaty on Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and of the Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects), UN Conference on Disarmament, Feb. 29, 2008, documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G08/604/02/PDF/G0860402.pdf. Letter dated Sept. 11, 2015, from the Permanent Representative of China to the Conference on Disarmament and the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Russian Federation addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference, CD/2042 (incorporating Follow-up comments by the Russian Federation and China on the analysis submitted by the United States of America of the updated Russian-Chinese draft PPWT), Conference on Disarmament, Sept. 14, 2015, documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G15/208/38/PDF/G1520838.pdf (accessed July 31, 2016; by Apr. 25, 2017, links were disabled).
154. Detlev Wolter, Commo
n Security in Outer Space and International Law (Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 2006), 157–58, www.files.ethz.ch/isn/122089/2006_CommonSecuritySpace_en.pdf; condensed version at Wolter, “Legal Foundations and Essential Treaty Elements for a System of Common Security in Outer Space,” Global Security Institute, 2007, www.worldacademy.org/files/System_of_Common_Security_in_Outer_Space.pdf (accessed Apr. 25, 2017).
155. Burton, “Daggers in the Air,” 147. Elaborating why the OST is the “high-water mark,” the author states that “the marked decline in the regard to the United Nations paid by the United States in recent years makes it unlikely that a significant repeat or extension of the Outer Space Treaty will be negotiated under the aegis of that body.”
156. Ratification by 105 member states as of January 1, 2017, www.unoosa.org/documents/pdf/spacelaw/treatystatus/AC105_C2_2017_CRP07E.pdf (accessed Nov. 13, 2017). Here the term “ratification” includes not only actual ratification but also what the UN calls acceptance, approval, accession, or succession. The status of international agreements relating to outer space is updated annually and is available through the United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs at www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/SpaceLaw/treatystatus/index.html.
157. Some statements of space doctrine do not mention the Outer Space Treaty or the existence of an international legal framework. For example, Space Operations: Air Force Doctrine Document 2-2, Aug. 23, 1998, lists in its “Suggested Readings” a UN website on the status of space treaties but does not otherwise discuss space law, www.globalsecurity.org/jhtml/jframe.html#http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/usaf/afdd/2-2/afdd2-2.pdf|||AFDD%202-2:%20Space%20Operations. Eight years later, the updated doctrine document includes multiple references to treaty provisions and space law (Space Operations: Air Force Doctrine Document 3-14, Nov. 27, 2006/July 28, 2011, www.globalsecurity.org/jhtml/jframe.html#http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/usaf/afdd/3-14/afdd3-14_2011.pdf|||AFDD%203-14:%20Space%20Operations). Other documents may briefly refer to legal compliance in extremely general terms—for example, the national space policy of the Barack Obama administration, dated June 28, 2010, at www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/whitehouse/national_space_policy_28june2010.pdf, which states, “All nations have the right to explore and use space for peaceful purposes, and for the benefit of all humanity, in accordance with international law,” but then hastens to note, in the following sentence, “Consistent with this principle, ‘peaceful purposes’ allows for space to be used for national and homeland security activities.”
On the other hand, the national space policy (unclassified) of the George W. Bush administration, dated Aug. 31, 2006, at history.nasa.gov/ostp_space_policy06.pdf, refers only to “treaty compliance” as it relates to the obligations of the Director of National Intelligence, and preemptively rules out any additional legal instruments: “The United States will oppose the development of new legal regimes or other restrictions that seek to prohibit or limit U.S. access to or use of space. Proposed arms control agreements or restrictions must not impair the rights of the United States to conduct research, development, testing, and operations or other activities in space for U.S. national interests.” The DoD’s Obama-era Quadrennial Defense Review 2014, archive.defense.gov/pubs/2014_Quadrennial_Defense_Review.pdf, by contrast, is more receptive to the development of additional agreements: “All of the Department’s [DoD’s] initiatives in space will continue to be underpinned by U.S. Government efforts to work with industry, allies, and other international partners to shape rules of the road in this domain,” although here, too, the very next sentence reasserts the centrality of conflict: “We will retain and strengthen our power projection capabilities so that we can deter conflict, and if deterrence fails, win decisively against aggressors” (20). (All accessed Apr. 26, 2017).
158. US Air Force, Space Operations: Air Force Doctrine Document 2.2, Nov. 27, 2006, 26–27, www.globalsecurity.org/jhtml/jframe.html#http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/usaf/afdd/2-2/afdd2-2-2006.pdf|||AFDD%202-2:%20Space%20Operations (accessed Apr. 26, 2017) .
159. Preston et al., Space Weapons Earth Wars, excludes from consideration a number of categories of weapons: those that pass through space without achieving orbit, those in space that simply improve the efficacy of ground-based weapons, cyberweapons dependent on space-based communications systems, and space-based weapons of use only against space-based targets. It also excludes classified weapons.
160. Preston et al., Space Weapons Earth Wars, 1.
161. I. F. Stone, “First Call for a Test Ban” (Nov. 1, 1954), in I. F. Stone, The Best of I. F. Stone (New York: PublicAffairs, 2006), 117.
162. Preston et al., Space Weapons Earth Wars, 2.
163. Preston et al., Space Weapons Earth Wars, 3, 94.
164. Preston et al., Space Weapons Earth Wars, 17–18, 37.
165. Johnson-Freese, Heavenly Ambitions, 6. The “highly intrusive forms” quote is from Nancy Gallagher and John D. Steinbruner, Reconsidering the Rules for Space Security (Cambridge, MA: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 2008), 2. Another military scholar, John J. Klein, in Space Warfare: Strategy, Principles and Policy (London and New York: Routledge, 2006)—part of Routledge’s Space Power and Politics series—acknowledges that while an aggressive US policy of space weaponization, “whether for offensive or defensive purposes,” would be useful in protecting national security, it would also paint the United States “as becoming more powerful too quickly” and could well lead to “collective attempt[s] to contest this space hegemony through diplomatic, economic, information, and perhaps even military endeavors.” Ultimately, “after the completion of any expensive multi-year weapons program there is no guarantee that national security and the ability to command space will be improved in the end” (145–46).
166. The USA supplied 33 percent of all arms transfers 2012–16; Russia was second, at 23 percent. Aude Fleurant, Pieter D. Wezeman, Siemon T. Wezeman, and Nan Tian, “Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2016,” fact sheet, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2, Feb. 2017, www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/Trends-in-international-arms-transfers-2016.pdf (accessed Apr. 27, 2017).
167. Preston et al., Space Weapons Earth Wars, 74–75.
168. There is an extensive literature on the shift in international law away from the venerable principle of cuius est solum eius est usque ad coelum et ad sidera, variously translated but, in essence, meaning “he who owns the land owns it up to the heavens and down to hell.” With the ascent of Sputnik, the issue of sovereignty up to the heavens shifted to the practical issue of where to establish the boundary between earth, sky, and outer space. See, for instance, Burton, “Daggers in the Air,” 143, 149–50, 153; Dolman, Astropolitik, 115–20; Philip W. Quigg, “Open Skies and Open Space,” Foreign Affairs 37:1 (Oct. 1958).
169. Preston et al., Space Weapons Earth Wars, 101–106.
170. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Vision 2020: America’s Military—Preparing for Tomorrow, Summer 2000. A headline elucidates the Joint Chiefs’ vision: “Dedicated individuals and innovative organizations transforming the joint force for the 21st century to achieve full spectrum dominance: Persuasive in peace; Decisive in war; Preeminent in any form of conflict” (58).
171. Scott A. Weston, “Examining Space Warfare: Scenarios, Risks, and US Policy Implications,” Air & Space Power Journal 23:1 (Spring 2009), 74, www.au.af.mil/au/afri/aspj/airchronicles/apj/apj09/spr09/weston.html (accessed May 3, 2017).
172. Moltz, Politics of Space Security, 119–21, 130–32. Starfish Prime was ninety times more powerful than “Little Boy” (Hiroshima) and seventy times more powerful than “Fat Man” (Nagasaki).
173. “Interview: Walter LaFeber, Historian,” American Experience, PBS, www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/features/interview/truman-lafeber/ (accessed Aug. 28, 2016).
174. James Forrestal, The Forrestal Diaries, quoted in LaFeber, America, Russia, 86; Mastny, Cold War, 49, 101, 123, 127.
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75. LaFeber, America, Russia, 27–28.
176. Reports of yield vary. Figures given here are from the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization, www.ctbto.org/nuclear-testing/ (accessed Apr. 27, 2017). The Soviet device detonated in October 1961 is called Tsar Bomba and was by far the largest-ever nuclear bomb, its power equivalent to about 3,800 Hiroshima-type bombs detonated simultaneously.
177. American Security Council, “Top-Level Civilian Committee Urges President Kennedy to Stop Geneva Test-Ban Negotiations, Resume Atomic Underground Tests,” press release, May 16, 1961, archive.org/stream/AmericanSecurityCouncil/American%20Security%20Council-2#page/n19/mode/2up (accessed Apr. 27, 2017).
178. Richard H. Kohn and Joseph P. Harahan, “U.S. Strategic Air Power, 1948–1962: Excerpts from an Interview with Generals Curtis E. LeMay, Leon W. Johnson, David A. Burchinal, and Jack J. Catton,” Int. Security 12:4 (Spring 1988), 85–86. Re “merciless,” William E. Burrows characterizes LeMay as a man “who never lost sight of the fact that his service’s core mission was destroying the enemy” (This New Ocean, 237).
179. National Security Council—Executive Secretary, “National Security Policy,” NSC 162/2; 2, 13, 19, 22. During the mid-1950s, key segments of both the Eisenhower and Khrushchev administrations contended that simultaneously increasing expenditures on nuclear weapons and cutting conventional forces was a sensible strategy, though key segments of the military disagreed. See Matthew Evangelista, “Cooperation Theory and Disarmament Negotiations in the 1950s,” World Politics 42: 4 (July 1990), 510–12.
180. Robert S. McNamara, “The Military Role of Nuclear Weapons: Perceptions and Misperceptions,” Foreign Affairs 62:1 (Fall 1983), 63. Montgomery’s statement comes from a speech to the Royal United Services Institute, London.
181. Scott Shane, “1950s U.S. Nuclear Target List Offers Chilling Insight,” New York Times, Dec. 22, 2015.
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