by Tom Clancy
This order had been a formal follow-through on Cal Waller's informal instructions during his 20 February visit that we should not conduct any battles that could provoke a strategic decision (that would get ground forces so involved it would set off a clamor for the beginning of the entire ground war in the United States). At that point, a couple of days before the attack, there was still a possibility that the ground war would be called off.
Why is all that important? Because this restraint and my own interpretation tied our hands for cross-border operations with Apaches (although we had in fact conducted one with our 11th Aviation Brigade earlier in February). Both the 1st Armored and the 3rd Armored Divisions, for example, had well-thought-out plans to send their Apaches into Iraq. Though I had gotten excellent briefings from both division commanders on both operations and had no hesitation about executing the plans, the restraint put any such plans on hold.
The 3rd AD wanted to go after artillery that was about fifty kilometers from the border in their assigned zone. Because this artillery was also in range of the 1st INF breach, the attack would help out the Big Red One as well. We were having difficulty getting TAC air to go after the artillery, and we couldn't reach it with our own artillery, so I had talked to Butch Funk about using our Apaches. Soon after that, Colonel Mike Burke, the aviation brigade commander, put together a plan to go after the artillery, and I told Butch to execute. But then I got the instructions from Third Army to restrain, and the attack had to be put off. (On G-Day, I authorized Butch to conduct the attack that night.)
Meanwhile, Ron Griffith wanted to conduct an armed reconnaissance with Apaches in front of the 1st Armored Division out to a depth of some sixty or seventy kilometers to confirm, as we thought, that parts of a brigade of the 26th Division were out there trying to refuse the Iraqi west flank. He also wanted a better assessment of the difficult terrain through which the division would have to travel for fifty kilometers just north of the border. The confirmation of that intelligence on the enemy and terrain would allow Griffith to fix and bypass the Iraqi force (and the Apaches could take out some Iraqis on their own as well), and also speed Ron's advance toward al-Busayyah. I had to disapprove Ron's plan for the same reason. (As with Butch, I gave the OK to Ron to execute on G-Day after the restraints came off.)
Though the reasoning behind this Third Army restraint made complete sense to me, it is still an illustration of the fits and starts that last-minute diplomatic maneuvering cause in military operations. As uncomfortable as this may be for commanders, we all better get used to it. More recent diplomatic maneuvering at the last minute forestalled our airborne assault in Haiti.
If I had known that our attack was going to be moved up from G+1 to G-Day, my decisions on the twenty-third would have been much different, and I would have put the corps into a much more aggressive posture on the twenty-fourth. In particular, I would have hit the Iraqis hard with our own aviation for a few days before our ground units attacked. You can turn some operations off and on in a short period of time; but not most of them.
0830 VII CORPS TAC CP
After we landed at the TAC CP, I went immediately inside the tent extensions behind the M577s. The weather was still good for flying, but the wind was picking up. The temperature was in the low forties.
Inside the TAC there was a roughly twenty-by-fifteen-foot "floor" of sand with three M577s on one end and two on the other. Four vertical poles and long horizontal tube steel poles held the canvas up to a height of about seven feet. Behind each M577 was a small work area for that section, usually consisting of a green, wooden two-by-three-foot collapsible field desk with field telephones. There was the ever-present, never-shut-down coffeepot working away nearby as well as the steady hum of the generators. At the rear of the G-3 M577 were two desks, one for me with my own phones and one for the G-3. In front of those desks was a situation map, 1:250 000 scale, over which you could put separate sheets of heavy acetate, each annotated with information, such as enemy, engineers, fire support, air defense, etc. Enemy and friendly locations were posted using one-by-two-inch pieces of acetate with adhesive on the back (cut out and posted by hand). Since they were not to scale, you had to interpolate. An enemy brigade unit sticker might cover twice the area they actually occupied on the ground. Same for our own units. Worse, the glue tended to dry out, so on occasion the stickers fell from the map. When you picked them up, you hoped you put them back where they belonged. Reports came in via radio, fax, telephone, or teletype, then the info got posted on the maps by our NCOs. It was far from high-tech, and a reminder that even today, war on the ground and at the front was done by hand.
The team in there was hard at work. We had been at it for two months, and were a smooth-running operation. I was pleased with what we had done and confident we were up to the task of commanding what was potentially a five-division multi-national corps of 1,584 tanks and a total of close to 50,000 vehicles on the move.
After I walked in and said good morning to the troops, I sat down on the gray metal folding chair behind my field desk and turned my attention to Stan Cherrie's update. Though I had already gotten most of what I needed at the main CP, information on our own units' operations was usually more current at the TAC — they were closer to the units than the main CP and had direct line-of-sight communications — so that is what I focused on. I paid attention to our own early movements, because I wanted them to go right and to build an early momentum of success. I did not anticipate any problems, but you can never discount chance. In other words, though I was still confident, I was also still wary.
1ST INF DIVISION. In order to make room for our artillery far enough forward to range the Iraqi artillery, at 0538, the division attacked into the Iraqi 26th Division security zone, with 1st and 2nd Brigades on line, and one in reserve. By 0930, they had reached Phase Line Kansas without enemy contact, and were set to begin the breach the next day.
2ND ACR. The regiment had moved out toward Busch at 0630, with 4th Squadron (Aviation) in front and the 2nd and 3rd Squadrons following side by side on the ground. At this point, Don Holder had three squadrons forward (one air and two ground) and one (the 1st) back (on the ground). By 0708, the 4th Squadron had engaged six unidentified enemy vehicles with MLRS, and was reporting empty fighting positions. At 0812, P Troop (Aviation) had engaged six enemy infantry about twenty kilometers into Iraq. At 0910, the regiment received enemy artillery fire and quickly silenced it with counter-battery fire. By 1117, the entire regiment was across the border berm, clearing the way for follow-on divisions.
1ST AD AND 3RD AD. Both divisions had been moving forward into the area now vacated by the 2nd ACR and were preparing for the next day's attack by cutting additional holes in the double ten- or twelve-foot-high hard sand border berm. First AD had two brigades forward and one back, and their roughly 8,000 vehicles stretched about eighty kilometers to the rear. Third AD was in a column of brigades, and their own 8,000 vehicles stretched over 100 kilometers to the rear.
BRITISH. The British were beginning to load their heavy armored vehicles on Heavy Equipment Transporters. Today they would move those HETS the seventy or eighty kilometers from their position, called "Ray,"[24] forward to a location just behind the border. From here they would be ready to move through the cleared breach just after dark on G+1. Rupert Smith wanted to do this in order to conserve wear and tear on his vehicles and to save them for the fight. (The British were genuinely concerned about breakdowns of the Challenger tank. As it turned out, Challenger performed much better than expected.)
LOGISTICS. Our logisticians were assembling the over 400 fuel vehicles and other support required to establish the corps's Log Base Nelligen. Those vehicles and soldiers were to go from Log Base Echo 100 kilometers forward through the 1st INF Division breach and into the open desert just to its north to set up a 1.2 million-gallon fuel-storage capability on the ground. There they would refuel the attacking enveloping force after that force had used the fuel in their own vehicles and the rese
rves carried on their own assigned trucks. South of the breach would be another fuel site (called Buckeye) with a similar capacity, also requiring 400-plus fuel vehicles, which would fuel the breach operation and be available for the British should they need it.
ENGINEERS. Our engineers were up front with each of the attacking units where they would break holes in the border berm with bulldozers or Armored Combat Engineer (ACE) vehicles. They also would fire mine-clearing line charges (MICLIC) into the Iraqi minefields to clear lanes for follow-on tanks equipped with mine plows and rollers.
Colonel Sam Raines, CO of the 7th Engineer Brigade, captured in his journal a lot of what we were all thinking: "Looking in the faces of my soldiers, I see some fear; but overwhelmingly I see determination and seriousness. These are the same faces that were in landing craft off Omaha Beach, 6 June 1944, on Iwo Jima, at Pork Chop Hill, the base of Hamburger Hill, or in a C-141 aircraft just prior to the airborne drop on Grenada. It is a serious, anxious look, no horse-play, just pure professional dedication to the task at hand. In every heart there are prayers… All of us are now wearing cumbersome chemical protection suits and rubber boots over our regular uniforms. They are uncomfortable, very hot; and the charcoal filter lining turns hands, face, and neck sooty black… We live in the miserable chemical suits for several days."
207TH MI BRIGADE. To ensure we had continuous coverage as we attacked north, then east, Colonel John Smith, CO 207th, had formed Task Force Sand Hawk to move his UAV platoon closer to the Iraqi border. The next day they displaced forward into the 1st CAV sector to operate off a 188-by-60-foot aluminum runway built by the 527th Engineer battalion. There they flew a total of fifteen missions, totaling just under sixty-one hours (ten further missions were canceled because of bad weather, and one aircraft crashed and was destroyed). Their contribution was important, for they located for attack Iraqi artillery battalions, FROG batteries, infantry trench lines, and other targets. And the UAV platoon also would capture 303 prisoners. Because I had concerns that the platoon needed some firepower (there was nothing between them and the Iraqis), I had ordered them to be provided with a platoon of tanks (3rd Platoon, Company B, 3rd Battalion, 77th Armor, from the 8th Infantry Division).[25] Our soldiers and leaders did all this after getting them in theater just three weeks earlier, with no prior experience with UAVs. It was remarkable, and a great tribute to our soldiers and leaders.
After Stan's update, I was satisfied that we were doing what we had planned and that, as I read the Iraqis, no adjustments were necessary so far. I planned to stay at the TAC a little while longer, then go visit commanders, starting with Don Holder in Iraq and working my way around. I wanted to confirm what I had just heard, see it with my own eyes, and get the face-to-face judgments of my commanders.
Meanwhile a lot was going on in the theater outside of VII Corps, but I knew very little about it at the time. Tom Clancy now brings us up to date on some of these events.
ATTACK
On G-Day, at 0400, on a front running from the Gulf to about 400 kilometers deep into the desert, a force of 620,000 soldiers, Marines, and airmen from close to forty different nations took part in launching the most massive attack since World War II against an Iraqi force of approximately 540,000 men.
• In the Gulf near Kuwait, a Marine amphibious group thrust toward the coast, threatening the seaborne invasion for which the Iraqis had prepared mightily… and that never came.
• The Saudi-led Arab JFC-East force attacked up the coastal highway toward Kuwait City.
• Just to their west, in the Kuwaiti boot heel, Lieutenant General Walt Boomer's two divisions, the 1st and 2nd Marines, started their breaching operations into the Iraqi minefields and other static defenses a few kilometers inside Kuwait. The 1st CAV's "Tiger" Brigade (as part of the 2nd Marine Division, on the west flank of the Marine attack) followed close behind, to give the Marines additional heavy M1A1 punch. (The Marines also had a battalion of M1A1s.)
• To their west, the Egyptian-led JFC-North continued to prepare to launch their 25 February attack into the Iraqi security zone.
• To their west, in VII Corps, the 1st CAV, now under CENTCOM command, continued their deception into the Ruqi Pocket.
• To their west, 1st INF attacked into the Iraqi security zone, to take out reconnaissance and observation posts, and the 2nd ACR moved twenty kilometers into Iraq to their west.
• And, finally, to their west, XVIII Corps launched their attack toward the Euphrates with their light infantry and air assault elements.
There were three initial phases to Gary Luck's attack plan to cut off the RGFC escape routes and supply corridors along Highway 8:
First, elements of Major General Peay's 101st Airborne Division were to airlift to an objective about 150 kilometers from their launch point and set up there what was known as FOB (Forward Operating Base) Cobra, which would be their logistics and operational anchor for their second phase.
Second, the next day, another helicopter assault by the 101st would establish an airhead near the Euphrates.
Third, Major General Barry McCaffrey's 24th MECH and 3rd ACR would drive east of the 101st, toward Highway 8.
Meanwhile, on the western flank of XVIII Corps, the French division, beefed up by the 2nd Brigade of the 82nd Airborne and the American 18th Field Artillery Brigade, attacked toward Objective Rochambeau, fifty kilometers into Iraq. When that was taken, they were to move on toward Objective White, the town of as-Salman, and the airfield north of town.
To say that all of these attacks went well is an understatement. The Iraqi frontline defenses crumbled. The fearsome Iraqi defensive barriers proved to be far less fearsome than everyone believed, or dared to hope for (though they still weren't easy, and there were casualties and deaths). Some Iraqi troops and entire Iraqi units surrendered without a fight, while others fought back. Predictions of U.S. casualties into the tens of thousands never happened. No chemical or biological attacks were detected. Such a result had been far from a sure thing only hours before.
By 1800 on the twenty-fourth, the two Marine divisions had advanced through the two Iraqi defensive belts. The 1st Marine Division had gone about forty kilometers, and the 2nd, on the west, had gone twenty kilometers. As the official Marine Corps history states: "During the night of 24–25 February, both divisions assumed defensive postures…
"In the early afternoon, Lieutenant General Walter Boomer received a call from General Schwarzkopf concerning the allied main attack with VII Corps and the Joint Forces Command-North immediately to MARCENT's left" — i.e., to the left of the Marine divisions. "The Marines' speedy progress caused Schwarzkopf to worry aloud about possible exposure of I MEF's left flank once they became abreast of Manaquish, where the border turned due west… General Boomer recommended that the main attack begin as soon as possible. Shortly after this conversation, General Schwarzkopf ordered the main attack to commence. Although ARCENT's VII Corps crossed its line of departure at 1500, the Joint Forces Command-North attack on MARCENT'S left was delayed until after 1800. It stopped just inside their breach for the night."
Thus, the wheels were set in motion for an early attack by VII Corps — much, as it turned out, to Fred Franks's surprise.
EARLY ATTACK SUNDAY 24 FEBRUARY VII CORPS TAC CP
At 0930, John Yeosock called.
"Fred, John, CINC wants to know if you can attack early."
"Say again." I was not sure I heard this right.
"The Marines have been having success, and the CINC does not want to wait until tomorrow to attack. He wants to know if we can go early, today."
I was genuinely surprised — shocked maybe was more accurate. We had considered every other possibility except this. In a flash, my brain went from the reflective, intensely focused, get-ready pace of a moment before to "warp-speed" active. Before I replied to John, dozens of thoughts flashed through my head, along with dozens more about what I would have to do to make it all happen.
What is the CINC really as
king? was the first mental question. I quickly concluded that it wasn't actually "Can you attack early?" but "How soon can you attack?" I quickly ruled out telling John we could not do it, because I had no doubt that we could.
Other questions shot through my head.
What about unit positions in relation to one another? Would they have to move? What about artillery preparations, logistics (especially fuel), the British move forward, and the orders already disseminated and rehearsed? And how would an early attack affect day and night operations, and operations forty-eight hours from now?
I told myself, Whatever you do, keep it simple. I knew that success early on in an attack builds its own momentum. I had seen that many times before. So, given this go-early situation, I did not need to put additional barriers in front of the corps by making some sudden change of plan. If we could simply back everything up to today that we had planned to do tomorrow at BMNT, then that would be the best way to do it.
All this raced through my brain in nanoseconds. OK, I decided, keep it simple and continue with what we've already set in motion, but with some major time and tactical adjustments. Now I had to see whether that was possible.
