The Christian Democrats: Prittie, Konrad Adenauer, 288–291.
Clay’s limited job description: Smith, Lucius D. Clay, 654.
The State Department’s Martin Hillenbrand: Gelb, The Berlin Wall, 246.
Clay had launched: http://www.uniprotokolle.de/Lexikon/Berliner_Luftbrücke.html.
The East German newspaper: Washington Post, 09/18/1961; Taylor, The Berlin Wall: A World Divided, 263–265.
At age twenty-one: Interview with Albrecht Peter Roos, Berlin, October 13, 2008.
As a result of August 13: Honoré M. Catudal, Steinstücken: A Study in Cold War Politics. New York: Vantage Press, 1971, 15.
East German authorities threatened: New York Times, 09/22/1961; 09/23/1961; Washington Post, 09/22/1961; 09/23/1961; Catudal, Kennedy and the Berlin Wall Crisis, 139–135; Smyser, Kennedy and the Berlin Wall, 131.
Without divulging his plans: Catudal, Steinstücken, 15–16, 106.
General Clay spent: Smith, Defense of Berlin, 309–310; Interview with Vern Pike, Washington, D.C., November 17, 2008.
By coincidence, European Commander: Catudal, Kennedy and the Berlin Wall Crisis, 133–134.
A few days later, U.S. troops: Interview with Vern Pike, Washington, D.C., November 17, 2008.
They included the president’s brother: Frank Saunders, Torn Lace Curtain. New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1982, 82–85.
Larry Newman: Hersh, Dark Side of Camelot, 226–230, 237–246.
Kennedy’s public approval ratings: JFKL, Elie Abel OH, March 18, 1970, 3–4; Detroit News, September 23, 1961.
On Sunday, Kennedy landed: Beschloss, The Crisis Years, 312–313; Schlesinger, Robert Kennedy and His Times, 500–501.
Following Salinger’s instructions: Pierre Salinger, With Kennedy. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1966, 191–192.
Khrushchev had told Sulzberger: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence, Lot 77 D 163. Also printed in Cyrus L. Sulzberger, The Last of the Giants. New York: Macmillan, 1970, 801–802.
Taking a deep breath: Sulzberger, The Last of the Giants, 788–806; C. L. Sulzberger, “Khrushchev Says in Interview He Is Ready to Meet Kennedy,” New York Times, 09/08/1961.
Khrushchev also wanted to influence: Salinger, With Kennedy, 192; Fursenko and Naftali, Khrushchev’s Cold War, 390, 397.
Kennedy called Salinger at 1:00 a.m.: Beschloss, Crisis Years, 314–315; Salinger. With Kennedy, 192–194.
Though Kennedy and Khrushchev had agreed: Fursenko and Naftali, Khrushchev’s Cold War, 395.
Kennedy reviewed his UN speech: Christian Science Monitor, 09/26/1961.
The president had been agonizing: Smith, The Defense of Berlin, 314; New York Times, 09/26/1961, 09/29/1961; Christian Science Monitor, 10/09/1961; Washington Post, 10/11/1961.
Kennedy needed to retake: Ralph G. Martin, A Hero of Our Time: An Intimate Story of the Kennedy Years. New York: Macmillan, 1983, 661; Sidey, JFK, 245.
“A nuclear disaster”: “Text of Kennedy Speech to U.N. Assembly,” Wall Street Journal, 09/26/1961; “Kennedy Meets Presidential Test, Shows Nobility of Thought, Concilliatory Mood,” Washington Post, 09/26/1961. For text of speech: http://www.jfklibrary.org/Historical+Resources/Archives/Reference+Desk/Speeches/JFK/003POF03UnitedNations09251961.htm.
Perhaps most telling was East German: Smith, The Defense of Berlin, 314; Neues Deutschland, 09/26/1961.
West German editorialists: Bild-Zeitung, 09/26/1961.
West German Foreign Minister: Smith, The Defense of Berlin, 314.
Adenauer’s fears: AVP-RF, Memcon, Kuznetsov, Meeting with Kroll, 3-64-746, August 29, 1961; Fursenko and Naftali, Khrushchev’s Cold War, 389.
In the Berliner Morgenpost: Berliner Morgenpost, 09/26/1961.
The New York Times columnist: Smith, The Defense of Berlin, 313.
So Marshal Konev dispatched: Smith, The Defense of Berlin, 315.
On September 27, General Clarke: Smith, The Defense of Berlin, 315.
Clay had ordered army: Raymond L. Garthoff, “Berlin 1961: The Record Corrected,”
Foreign Policy, no. 84 (Fall 1991), 142–156; Freedman, Kennedy’s Wars, 90; Donald P. Steury, “On the Front Lines of the Cold War: The Intelligence War in Berlin,” presented at “Berlin: The Intelligence War, 1945–1961.” Conference at the Teufelsberg and the Alliierten Museum, September 10–12, 1999; excerpts from conference speeches and panel discussions: Ambassador Raymond Garthoff on the tank confrontation of October 1961; retrieved from https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/summer00/art01.html.
17. NUCLEAR POKER
“In a certain sense”: FRUS, 1961–1963, vol. VI, Kennedy–Khrushchev Exchanges, Doc. 21, Letter from Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy, Moscow, September 29, 1961; Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163; also JFKL, NSF, Countries Series, USSR, Khrushchev Correspondence.
“Our confidence in”: Address by Roswell L. Gilpatric, Deputy Secretary of Defense, before the Business Council at the Homestead, Hot Springs, Virginia, October 21, 1961, 9:00 p.m. (EST), 10:00 p.m. (EDT): http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB56/BerlinC6.pdf; “Our Real Strength,” Time, 10/27/1961.
Carrying two folded newspapers: Salinger, With Kennedy, 198–199.
The man who: FRUS, 1961–1963, vol. VI, Kennedy–Khrushchev Exchanges, Doc. 21, Letter from Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy, September 29, 1961.
Salinger was struck: Salinger, With Kennedy, 199.
Khrushchev also said he was willing: FRUS, 1961–1963, vol. XIV, Berlin Crisis, 1961–1962, Doc. 137.
Apart from opening his new channel: Fursenko and Naftali, Khrushchev’s Cold War, 396.
Khrushchev had also warned Ulbricht: SED Archives, IfGA, ZPA, J IV 2/202/130, Letter from Khrushchev to Ulbricht, January 28, 1961, in Harrison, “Ulbricht and the Concrete ‘Rose,’” CWIHP Working Paper No. 5, 131, Appendix J.
Adenauer’s concerns: FRUS, 1961–1963, vol. XIV, Berlin Crisis, 1961–1962, Doc. 147, Memo from President Kennedy to Secretary of State Rusk, Berlin Negotiations, Washington, September 12, 1961.
One matter was certain: Quoted in James N. Giglio, The Presidency of John F. Kennedy. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2006, 2nd ed., 82; O’Brien, JFK, 552; Sidey, JFK, 218.
Kennedy considered reaching out: Sorensen, Kennedy, 553.
In a letter dated October 16: FRUS, 1961–1963, vol. VI, Kennedy–Khrushchev Exchanges, Doc. 22, Letter from President Kennedy to Chairman Khrushchev, Hyannis Port, October 16, 1961; Thomas Fensch, ed., Top Secret: The Kennedy–Khrushchev Letters. The Woodlands, TX: New Century Books, 2001, 69–81.
The numbers were a reflection: New York Times, 10/16/1961, 10/17/1961, 10/18/1961; Slusser, The Berlin Crisis of 1961, 294.
The Palace of Congresses was unique: Washington Post, 10/18/1961.
Time magazine assessed: “Communists: The Khrushchev Code,” Time, 10/20/1961.
Though he owed his position: Beschloss, The Crisis Years, 44, 53, 461, 583; Fursenko and Naftali, Khrushchev’s Cold War, 202.
It seemed to party colleague Pyotr Demichev: Taubman, Khrushchev, 514.
Still, Khrushchev looked leaner: See for Khrushchev’s entire speech at the opening session of the 22nd Party Congress: The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, 13, no. 49 (1962); New York Times, 10/18/1961, 10/19/1961, 10/22/1961.
During an otherwise genial: David Talbot, Brothers: The Hidden History of the Kennedy Years. New York: Free Press, 2007, 75; New York Post, 11/08/1961; New York Times, 11/05/1961.
By the time the plan: Carl Kaysen to General Maxwell Taylor, Military Representative to the President, “Strategic Air Planning and Berlin,” September 5, 1961, Top Secret. Source: National Archives, Record Group 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Records of Maxwell Taylor: http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB56/BerlinC1.pdf; also see FRUS, 1961–1963, vol. VIII, National Security Policy, Doc. 43, Memo from the President’s Military Representative (Taylor) t
o President Kennedy, Strategic Air Planning and Berlin, Washington, September 19, 1961.
Kaysen conceded the need: Carl Kaysen to General Maxwell Taylor, Military Representative to the President, “Strategic Air Planning and Berlin,” September 5, 1961, Top Secret, excised copy, with cover memoranda to Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Lyman Lemnizer, Released to National Security Archive, National Archives, Record Group 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB56/BerlinC1.pdf.
In a White House that: Fred Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983, 299–300; Marcus G. Raskin, Being and Doing. New York: Random House, 1971, 62–63.
Kennedy didn’t have the same misgivings: Memo from General Maxwell Taylor to General Lemnitzer, September 19, 1961, enclosing memo on “Strategic Air Planning,” Top Secret. Source: National Archives, Record Group 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Records of Maxwell Taylor, Box 34, Memorandums for the President, 1961. http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB56/BerlinC3.pdf.
The following day’s National Security Council: FRUS, 1961–1963, vol. VIII, National Security Policy, Doc. 44, Memo of Conference with President Kennedy, Washington, September 20, 1961.
Power had directed the firebombing: Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon, 246; Scott D. Sagan, The Limits of Safety: Organization, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993, 150; U.S. Air Force, General Horace M. Wade OH, October 10–12, 1978, 307–308, K239.0512–1105, Air Force Historical Research Center; JFKL, NSF, Memo Bundy to Kennedy, January 30, 1961, Box 313.
Martin Hillenbrand, director: JFKL, Martin J. Hillenbrand OH, Interviewed by Paul P. Sweet, American Consul General, Stuttgart, August 26, 1964, 8; Martin J. Hillenbrand, Power and Morals. New York: Columbia University Press, 1949, 30.
Cool and rational, at age fifty-four Nitze: See Nitze himself in the foreword to William R. Smyser, From Yalta to Berlin: The Cold War Struggle over Germany. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999, xiv–xv; Strobe Talbott, The Master of the Game: Paul Nitze and the Nuclear Peace. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1988, 37, 70, 72–73.
As Truman’s chief of policy: Paul H. Nitze, with Ann M. Smith and Steven I. Rearden, From Hiroshima to Glasnost: At the Center of Decisions—A Memoir. New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1989, 91–92; Talbott, Master of the Game, 52, 58, 112.
Like Acheson, Nitze considered: David Callahan, Dangerous Capabilities: Paul Nitze and the Cold War. New York: HarperCollins, 1990, 216–218.
On August 13, Nitze: Callahan, Dangerous Capabilities, 223; Nitze, From Hiroshima to Glasnost, 199–200.
To safeguard Berlin access: Nitze, From Hiroshima to Glasnost, 202–204; FRUS, 1961–1963, vol. XIV, Berlin Crisis, 1961–1962, Doc. 173, Minutes of Meeting, Berlin Build-up and Contingency Planning, Washington, October 10, 1961; Doc. 185, Enclosure, U.S. Policy on Military Actions in a Berlin Conflict, Washington, October 20, 1961.
The Washington Post reported on efforts: Washington Post, New York Times, Tagesspiegel, Der Kurier, 10/29/1961; Christian Science Monitor, 09/05/1961; New York Times, 09/17/1961.
Time magazine ran: Time, 10/20/1961.
It seemed that only Macmillan: Macmillan, Pointing the Way, 1959–1961, 398–403; Nigel J. Ashton, Kennedy, Macmillan and the Cold War: The Irony of Interdependence. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002, 60–61.
With the Allies deeply at odds: FRUS, 1961–1963, vol. XIV, Berlin Crisis, 1961–1962, Doc. 184, Minutes of Meeting, Washington, October 20, 1961; also JFKL, NSF, Memo of Meeting, Washington, October 20, 1961, 10 a.m., Meetings with the President, Top Secret, drafted by Bundy.
As so often: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Box 34, Items for Cables to Taylor; in FRUS, 1961–1963, vol. XIV, Berlin Crisis, 1961–1962, Doc. 184.
A few hours after the meeting: FRUS, 1961–1963, vol. XIV, Berlin Crisis, 1961–1962, Doc. 185, Letter from President Kennedy to the Supreme Commander, Allied Powers Europe (Norstad) and Enclosure, U.S. Policy on Military Actions in a Berlin Conflict, Washington, October 20, 1961.
Bruce said that through Kennedy’s: FRUS, 1961–1963, vol. XIV, Berlin Crisis, 1961–1962, Doc. 183, Telegram from the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State, London, October 20, 1961, 4 p.m.
It was an unlikely audience: Beschloss, The Crisis Years, 329; Benjamin C. Bradlee, Conversations with Kennedy. New York: W.W. Norton, 1975, 230.
Knowing nothing of the Bolshakov: Wyden, Wall, 258.
“We have responded immediately”: Address by Roswell L. Gilpatric, Deputy Secretary of Defense, before the Business Council at the Homestead, Hot Springs, Virginia, October 21, 1961: http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB56/BerlinC6.pdf; “Gilpatric Warns U.S. Can Destroy Atom Aggressor,” New York Times, 10/22/1961; “Our Real Strength,” Time, 10/27/1961.
Khrushchev would later recall that Konev: Nikita S. Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers, 459.
18. SHOWDOWN AT CHECKPOINT CHARLIE
“I do not believe”: FRUS, 1961–1963, vol. XIV, Berlin Crisis, 1961–1962, Doc. 181, Letter from the President’s Special Representative in Berlin (Clay) to President Kennedy, Berlin, October 18, 1961.
“In the nature of things”: FRUS, 1961–1963, vol. XIV, Berlin Crisis, 1961–1962, Doc. 193, Telegram from the Department of State to the Mission at Berlin, Washington, October 26, 1961, 8:11 p.m.; Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/10-2661.
E. Allan Lightner Jr.: Slusser, The Berlin Crisis of 1961, 377–378; Smith, The Defense of Berlin, 319–320.
Lightner knew there was a slim chance: Bruce W. Menning, “The Berlin Crisis of 1961 from the Perspective of the Soviet General Staff,” in William W. Epley, ed., International Cold War Military Records and History. Proceedings of the International Conference on Cold War Military Records and History held in Washington, D.C., March 21–26, 1994, 10–13; Smyser, Kennedy and the Berlin Wall, 135; Gerhard Wettig, Chruschtschows Berlin-Krise 1958 bis 1963: Drohpolitik und Mauerbau. Munich and Berlin: R. Oldenbourg, 192.
Ulbricht had apparently approved: Cate, The Ides of August, 476; Slusser, The Berlin Crisis of 1961, 353–358.
Encouraged by Clay: FRUS, 1961–1963, vol. XIV, Berlin Crisis, 1961–1962, Doc. 189, Telegram from the Mission at Berlin to the Department of State, Berlin, October 24, 1961, 1 p.m., drafted by Lightner.
Clay disagreed: FRUS, 1961–1963, vol. XIV, Berlin Crisis, 1961–1962, Doc. 181, Letter from the President’s Special Representative in Berlin (Clay) to President Kennedy, Berlin, October 18, 1961; Smith, Lucius D. Clay, 642–643; 651–654; JFKL, Lucius D. Clay OH, July 1, 1964.
Unlike Clay, Lightner: Cate, The Ides of August, 476; Smith, The Defense of Berlin, 319; Raymond L. Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations From Nixon to Reagan. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1994; Smith, Lucius D. Clay, 659; HSTL, E. Allan Lightner OH, October 26, 1973.
Lightner told friends: Interview with Vern Pike, Washington, D.C., November 17, 2008; Gelb, The Berlin Wall, 250–253; HSTL, E. Allan Lightner OH, October 26, 1973.
As that night’s script: FRUS, 1961–1963, vol. XIV, Berlin Crisis, 1961–1962, Doc. 186, Telegram from the Mission at Berlin to the Department of State, Berlin, October 23, 1961, 2 p.m.; Cate, The Ides of August, 476–480.
“Look,” Lightner said to the policeman: Cate, The Ides of August, 477.
About then, four American tanks: “U.S. Protests to Soviet,” New York Times, 10/24/1961.
By the time Lightner’s VW: The Atlantic Times, October 2005: William R. Smyser, “Tanks at Checkpoint Charlie. In October 1961, the World Faced a War”: http://www.atlantic-times.com/archive_detail.php?recordID=319; Cate, The Ides of August, 479–480, 484.
Once East German radio: Cate, The Ides of August, 479–480; Howard Trivers, Three Crises in American Foreign Affairs and a Continuing Revolution, 41–44.
Back in Washington, Kennedy: Ashton, Kennedy, Macmillan and the Cold War, 62; Reeves, Kennedy: Profile of Power, 249; Norman Gelb,
The Berlin Wall: Kennedy, Khrushchev, and a Showdown in the Heart of Europe. New York: Dorset Press, 1986, 253; Smyser, Kennedy and the Berlin Wall, 137.
National Security Advisor Bundy had warned: Ann Tusa, The Last Division: A History of Berlin, 1945–1989. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1997, 330; JFKL, NSF, Memo from Bundy to the President, August 28, 1961, Box 86, Berlin; Wyden, Wall, 264.
Though in his letter Clay: FRUS, 1961–1963, vol. XIV, Berlin Crisis, 1961–1962, Doc. 181, Letter from the President’s Special Representative in Berlin (Clay) to President Kennedy, Berlin, October 18, 1961; also in JFKL, NSF, Germany, Berlin, General Clay, Top Secret.
What followed was the general’s resignation: Smith, Lucius D. Clay, 662–663.
At a time when Kennedy badly wanted: Frédéric Bozo, Two Strategies for Europe: De Gaulle, the United States, and the Atlantic Alliance. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001, 70, 71; Ashton, Kennedy, Macmillan and the Cold War, 62.
De Gaulle had disapproved: Charles de Gaulle, Lettres, notes et carnets (1961–1963). Paris: Plon, 1986, 155–158; William R. Smyser, “Zwischen Erleichterung und Konfrontation. Die Reaktionen der USA und der UdSSR auf den Mauerbau,” in Hans-Hermann Hertle, Konrad Hugo Jarausch, and Christoph Klessmann, eds., Mauerbau und Mauerfall: Ursachen—Verlauf—Auswirkungen. Berlin: Christoph Links, 2002, 147–158 (151).
As harsh as it was, de Gaulle’s letter: JFKL, POF, De Gaulle–Kennedy Letter Exchange, Box 116A.
Despite two months of U.S. diplomatic: FRUS, 1961–1963, vol. XIV, Berlin Crisis, 1961–1962, Doc. 176, Telegram 1025 from the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany, Washington, October 13, 1961; a similar letter was sent to de Gaulle: Telegram 2136 to Paris, October 13, 1961, in Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/10-1361.
With that as prelude: Cornelius Ryan, The Longest Day: June 6, 1944. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994, 107.
De Gaulle told Gavin: FRUS, 1961–1963, vol. XIV, Berlin Crisis, 1961–1962, Doc. 187, Telegram from the Embassy in France to the Department of State, Paris, October 23, 1961.
Emboldened by the success: FRUS, 1961–1963, vol. XIV, Berlin Crisis, 1961–1962, Doc. 189, Telegram from the Mission at Berlin to the Department of State, Berlin, October 24, 1961, 1 p.m.
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