by Peter Watson
Critics might argue that, insofar as its relation to science is concerned, the twentieth century has been no different from the nineteenth or the eighteenth; that we are simply seeing the maturation of a process that began even earlier with Copernicus and Francis Bacon. That is true up to a point, but the twentieth century has been different from the nineteenth and earlier centuries in three crucial respects. First, a hundred-plus years ago science was much more a disparate set of disciplines, and not yet concerned with fundamentals. John Dalton, for example, had inferred the existence of the atom early in the nineteenth century, but no one had come close to identifying such an entity or had the remotest idea how it might be configured. It is, however, a distinguishing mark of twentieth-century science that not only has the river of discovery (to use John Maddox’s term) become a flood but that many fundamental discoveries have been made, in physics, cosmology, chemistry, geology, biology, palaeontology, archaeology, and psychology.4 And it is one of the more remarkable coincidences of history that most of these fundamental concepts – the electron, the gene, the quantum, and the unconscious – were identified either in or around 1900.
The second sense in which the twentieth century has been different from earlier times lies in the fact that various fields of inquiry – all those mentioned above plus mathematics, anthropology, history, genetics and linguistics – are now coming together powerfully, convincingly, to tell one story about the natural world. This story, this one story, as we shall see, includes the evolution of the universe, of the earth itself, its continents and oceans, the origins of life, the peopling of the globe, and the development of different races, with their differing civilisations. Underlying this story, and giving it a framework, is the process of evolution. As late as 1996 Daniel Dennett, the American philosopher, was still describing Darwin’s notion of evolution as ‘the best idea, ever.’5 It was only in 1900 that the experiments of Hugo de Vries, Carl Correns, and Erich Tschermak, recapitulating and rediscovering the work of the Benedictine monk Gregor Mendel on the breeding rules of peas, explained how Darwin’s idea might work at the individual level and opened up a huge new area of scientific (not to mention philosophical) activity. Thus, in a real sense, I hold in this book that evolution by natural selection is just as much a twentieth – as a nineteenth – century theory.
The third sense in which the twentieth century is different scientifically from earlier eras lies in the realm of psychology. As Roger Smith has pointed out, the twentieth century was a psychological age, in which the self became privatised and the public realm – the crucial realm of political action on behalf of the public good – was left relatively vacant.6 Man looked inside himself in ways he hadn’t been able to before. The decline of formal religion and the rise of individualism made the century feel differently from earlier ones.
Earlier on I used the phrase ‘coming to terms with’ science, and by that I meant that besides the advances that science itself made, forcing themselves on people, the various other disciplines, other modes of thought or ways of doing things, adjusted and responded but could not ignore science. Many of the developments in the visual arts – cubism, surrealism, futurism, constructivism, even abstraction itself – involved responses to science (or what their practitioners thought was science). Writers from Joseph Conrad, D. H. Lawrence, Marcel Proust, Thomas Mann, and T. S. Eliot to Franz Kafka, Virginia Woolf, and James Joyce, to mention only a few, all acknowledged a debt to Charles Darwin or Albert Einstein or Sigmund Freud, or some combination of them. In music and modern dance, the influence of atomic physics and of anthropology has been admitted (not least by Arnold Schoenberg), while the phrase ‘electronic music’ speaks for itself. In jurisprudence, architecture, religion, education, in economics and the organisation of work, the findings and the methodology of science have proved indispensable.
The discipline of history is particularly important in this context because while science has had a direct impact on how historians write, and what they write about, history has itself been evolving. One of the great debates in historiography is over how events move forward. One school of thought has it that ‘great men’ are mostly what matter, that the decisions of people in power can bring about significant shifts in world events and mentalities. Others believe that economic and commercial matters force change by promoting the interests of certain classes within the overall population.7 In the twentieth century, the actions of Stalin and Hitler in particular would certainly seem to suggest that ‘great’ men are vital to historical events. But the second half of the century was dominated by thermonuclear weapons, and can one say that any single person, great or otherwise, was really responsible for the bomb? No. In fact, I would suggest that we are living at a time of change, a crossover time in more ways than one, when what we have viewed as the causes of social movement in the past – great men or economic factors playing on social classes – are both being superseded as the engine of social development. That new engine is science.
There is another aspect of science that I find particularly refreshing. It has no real agenda. What I mean is that by its very nature science cannot be forced in any particular direction. The necessarily open nature of science (notwithstanding the secret work carried out in the Cold War and in some commercial laboratories) ensures that there can only ever be a democracy of intellect in this, perhaps the most important of human activities. What is encouraging about science is that it is not only powerful as a way of discovering things, politically important things as well as intellectually stimulating things, but it has now become important as metaphor. To succeed, to progress, the world must be open, endlessly modifiable, unprejudiced. Science thus has a moral authority as well as an intellectual authority. This is not always accepted.
I do not want to give the impression that this book is all about science, because it isn’t. But in this introduction I wish to draw attention to two other important philosophical effects that science has had in the twentieth century. The first concerns technology. The advances in technology are one of the most obvious fruits of science, but too often the philosophical consequences are overlooked. Rather than offer universal solutions to the human condition of the kind promised by most religions and some political theorists, science looks out on the world piecemeal and pragmatically. Technology addresses specific issues and provides the individual with greater control and/or freedom in some particular aspect of life (the mobile phone, the portable computer, the contraceptive pill). Not everyone will find ‘the gadget’ a suitably philosophical response to the great dilemmas of alienation, or ennui. I contend that it is.
The final sense in which science is important philosophically is probably the most important and certainly the most contentious. At the end of the century it is becoming clearer that we are living through a period of rapid change in the evolution of knowledge itself, and a case can be made that the advances in scientific knowledge have not been matched by comparable advances in the arts. There will be those who argue that such a comparison is wrongheaded and meaningless, that artistic culture – creative, imaginative, intuitive, and instinctive knowledge – is not and never can be cumulative as science is. I believe there are two answers to this. One answer is that the charge is false; there is a sense in which artistic culture is cumulative. I think the philosopher Roger Scruton put it well in a recent book. ‘Originality,’ he said, ‘is not an attempt to capture attention come what may, or to shock or disturb in order to shut out competition from the world. The most original works of art may be genial applications of a well-known vocabulary…. What makes them original is not their defiance of the past or their rude assault on settled expectations, but the element of surprise with which they invest the forms and repertoire of a tradition. Without tradition, originality cannot exist: for it is only against a tradition that it becomes perceivable.’8 This is similar to what Walter Pater in the nineteenth century called ‘the wounds of experience’; that in order to know what is new, you need to know what has gone before. Othe
rwise you risk just repeating earlier triumphs, going round in decorous circles. The fragmentation of the arts and humanities in the twentieth century has often revealed itself as an obsession with novelty for its own sake, rather than originality that expands on what we already know and accept.
The second answer draws its strength precisely from the additive nature of science. It is a cumulative story, because later results modify earlier ones, thereby increasing its authority. That is part of the point of science, and as a result the arts and humanities, it seems to me, have been to an extent overwhelmed and overtaken by the sciences in the twentieth century, in a way quite unlike anything that happened in the nineteenth century or before. A hundred years ago writers such as Hugo von Hofmannsthal, Friedrich Nietzsche, Henri Bergson, and Thomas Mann could seriously hope to say something about the human condition that rivalled the scientific understanding then at hand. The same may be said about Richard Wagner, Johannes Brahms, Claude Monet, or Edouard Manet. As we shall see in chapter I, in Max Planck’s family in Germany at the turn of the century the humanities were regarded as a superior form of knowledge (and the Plancks were not atypical). Is that true any longer? The arts and humanities have always reflected the society they are part of, but over the last one hundred years, they have spoken with less and less confidence.9
A great deal has been written about modernism as a response to the new and alienating late-nineteenth-century world of large cities, fleeting encounters, grim industrialism, and unprecedented squalor. Equally important, and maybe more so, was the modernist response to science per se, rather than to the technology and the social consequences it spawned. Many aspects of twentieth-century science – relativity, quantum theory, atomic theory, symbolic logic, stochastic processes, hormones, accessory food factors (vitamins) – are, or were at the time they were discovered, quite difficult. I believe that the difficulty of much of modern science has been detrimental to the arts. Put simply, artists have avoided engagement with most (I emphasise most) sciences. One of the consequences of this, as will become clearer towards the end of the book, is the rise of what John Brockman calls ‘the third culture,’ a reference to C. P. Snow’s idea of the Two Cultures – literary culture and science – at odds with one another.10 For Brockman the third culture consists of a new kind of philosophy, a natural philosophy of man’s place in the world, in the universe, written predominantly by physicists and biologists, people best placed now to make such assessments. This, for me at any rate, is one measure of the evolution in knowledge forms. It is a central message of the book.
I repeat here what I touched on in the preface: The Modern Mind is but one person’s version of twentieth-century thought. Even so, the scope of the book is ambitious, and I have had to be extremely selective in my use of material. There are some issues I have had to leave out more or less entirely. I would dearly have loved to have included an entire chapter on the intellectual consequences of the Holocaust. It certainly deserves something like the treatment Paul Fussell and Jay Winter have given to the intellectual consequences of World War I (see chapter 9). It would have fitted in well at the point where Hannah Arendt covered Adolf Eichmann’s trial in Jerusalem in 1963. A case could be made for including the achievements of Henry Ford, and the moving assembly line, so influential in all our lives, or of Charlie Chaplin, one of the first great stars of the art form born at the turn of the century. But strictly speaking these were cultural advances, rather than intellectual, and so were reluctantly omitted. The subject of statistics has, mainly through the technical design of experiments, led to many conclusions and inferences that would otherwise have been impossible. Daniel Bell kindly alerted me to this fact, and it is not his fault that I didn’t follow it up. At one stage I planned a section on the universities, not just the great institutions like Cambridge, Harvard, Göttingen, or the Imperial Five in Japan, but the great specialist installations like Woods Hole, Scripps, Cern, or Akademgorodok, Russia’s science city. And I initially planned to visit the offices of Nature, Science, the New York Review of Books, the Nobel Foundation, some of the great university presses, to report on the excitement of such enterprises. Then there are the great mosque-libraries of the Arab world, in Tunisia Egypt, Yemen. All fascinating, but the book would have doubled in length, and weight.
One of the pleasures in writing this book, in addition to having an excuse to read all the works one should have read years ago, and rereading so many others, was the tours I did make of universities, meeting with writers, scientists, philosophers, filmmakers, academics, and others whose works feature in these pages. In all cases my methodology was similar. During the course of conversations that on occasion lasted for three hours or more, I would ask my interlocutor what in his/her opinion were the three most important ideas in his/her field in the twentieth century. Some people provided five ideas, while others plumped for just one. In economics three experts, two of them Nobel Prize winners, overlapped to the point where they suggested just four ideas between them, when they could have given nine.
The book is a narrative. One way of looking at the achievement of twentieth-century thought is to view it as the uncovering of the greatest narrative there is. Accordingly, most of the chapters move forward in time: I think of these as longitudinal or ‘vertical’ chapters. A few, however, are ‘horizontal’ or latitudinal. They are chapter I, on the year 1900; chapter 2, on Vienna at the turn of the century and the ‘halfway house’ character of its thought; chapter 8, on the miraculous year of 1913; chapter 9, on the intellectual consequences of World War I; chapter 23, on Jean-Paul Sartre’s Paris. Here, the forward march of ideas is slowed down, and simultaneous developments, sometimes in the same place, are considered in detail. This is partly because that is what happened; but I hope readers will also find the change of pace welcome. I hope too that readers will find helpful the printing of key names and concepts in bold type. In a big book like this one, chapter titles may not be enough of a guide.
The four parts into which the text is divided do seem to reflect definite changes in sensibility. In part 1 I have reversed the argument in Frank Kermode’s The Sense of an Ending (1967).11 In fiction particularly, says Kermode, the way plots end – and the concordance they show with the events that precede them – constitutes a fundamental aspect of human nature, a way of making sense of the world. First we had angels – myths – going on forever; then tragedy; most recently perpetual crisis. Part I, on the contrary, reflects my belief that in all areas of life – physics, biology, painting, music, philosophy, film, architecture, transport – the beginning of the century heralded a feeling of new ground being broken, new stories to be told, and therefore new endings to be imagined. Not everyone was optimistic about the changes taking place, but sheer newness is very much a defining idea of this epoch. This belief continued until World War I.
Although chapter 9 specifically considers the intellectual consequences of World War I, there is a sense in which all of part 2, ‘Spengler to Animal Farm: Civilisations and Their Discontents’, might also be regarded in the same way. One does not have to agree with the arguments of Freud’s 1931 book, which bore the title Civilisation and Its Discontents, to accept that his phrase summed up the mood of an entire generation.
Part 3 reflects a quite different sensibility, at once more optimistic than the prewar period, perhaps the most positive moment of the positive hour, when in the West – or rather the non-Communist world – liberal social engineering seemed possible. One of the more curious aspects of twentieth-century history is that World War I sparked so much pessimism, whereas World War II had the opposite effect.
It is too soon to tell whether the sensibility that determines part 4 and is known as post-modernism represents as much of a break as some say. There are those who see it as simply an addendum to modernism, but in the sense in which it promises an era of post-Western thought, and even post-scientific thought (see pages 755–56), it may yet prove to be a far more radical break with the past. This is still to be resol
ved. If we are entering a postscientific age (and I for one am sceptical), then the new millennium will see as radical a break as any that has occurred since Darwin produced ‘the greatest idea, ever.’
PART ONE
FREUD TO WITTGENSTEIN
The Sense of a Beginning
1
DISTURBING THE PEACE
The year 1900 A.D. need not have been remarkable. Centuries are man-made conventions after all, and although people may think in terms of tens and hundreds and thousands, nature doesn’t. She surrenders her secrets piecemeal and, so far as we know, at random. Moreover, for many people around the world, the year 1900 A.D. meant little. It was a Christian date and therefore not strictly relevant to any of the inhabitants of Africa, the Americas, Asia, or the Middle East. Nevertheless, the year that the West chose to call 1900 was an unusual year by any standard. So far as intellectual developments – the subject of this book – were concerned, four very different kinds of breakthrough were reported, each one offering a startling reappraisal of the world and man’s place within it. And these new ideas were fundamental, changing the landscape dramatically.
The twentieth century was less than a week old when, on Saturday, 6 January, in Vienna, Austria, there appeared a review of a book that would totally revise the way man thought about himself. Technically, the book had been published the previous November, in Leipzig as well as Vienna, but it bore the date 1900, and the review was the first anyone had heard of it. The book was entitled The Interpretation of Dreams, and its author was a forty-four-year-old Jewish doctor from Freiberg in Moravia, called Sigmund Freud.1 Freud, the eldest of eight children, was outwardly a conventional man. He believed passionately in punctuality. He wore suits made of English cloth, cut from material chosen by his wife. Very self-confident as a young man, he once quipped that ‘the good impression of my tailor matters to me as much as that of my professor.’2 A lover of fresh air and a keen amateur mountaineer, he was nevertheless a ‘relentless’ cigar smoker.3 Hanns Sachs, one of his disciples and a friend with whom he went mushrooming (a favourite pastime), recalled ‘deep set and piercing eyes and a finely shaped forehead, remarkably high at the temples.’4 However, what drew the attention of friends and critics alike was not the eyes themselves but the look that shone out from them. According to his biographer Giovanni Costigan, ‘There was something baffling in this look – compounded partly of intellectual suffering, partly of distrust, partly of resentment.’5
