by James Johns
For her mastery of the Pacific, Japan would have to deal with her first three obstacles. There was the British naval base at Singapore, which would require Japan to attack through the back door, landing in Thailand, Kra Isthmus, and pushing through the length of Malaya. There was the American sea and now air (B-17) strength poised to strike in the Philippines. And finally, there was the great U.S. naval base at Pearl Harbor. The key to success was to strike all three at once, negating each one’s ability to go to the aid of another.
Timing was the key. Singapore would be hit by an air strike, and ground forces would cross into the north end of the Malay frontier with Thailand. Manila and American airfields on Luzon would be attacked from Formosa, some five hundred miles to the north. But nothing must happen prematurely that could warn Hawaii before the strike force could hit Pearl Harbor. Everything was to start in Asia, timed to dawn in Hawaii. With Pearl Harbor being the greatest distance, timing was essential.
For the mission itself, the main objectives at Pearl Harbor would be the carriers and the battleships, and secondly, the airfields from which the Americans could retaliate in the air. There had been discussion of actually occupying the island, but that was ruled out because of the logistical problem of supporting it once it fell into Japanese hands. In addition, the slower speed of the transports and the larger fleet of Japan’s attack force headed toward Hawaii would increase the likelihood of detection. The only guarantee of sinking the ships at Pearl Harbor would be aerial torpedoes as the British action at Taranto, Italy, in November 1940 had demonstrated. Pearl Harbor offered no long, low approaches from which to ensure hits. The shallow water, similar to the Taranto harbor, also posed the problem of the torpedoes hitting the bottom. So, the Japanese set out to resolve both problems.
First, the torpedoes were fitted with fins that would prevent them from passing under the ships, and then the torpedo bomber pilots set out to master short, low approaches. During training exercises, the pilots found that by getting as close to the target as possible, releasing the torpedoes virtually at water level, and then banking sharply to avoid hitting the target, they could score eight out of ten attempts. A potentially successful strategy if torpedo nets were not employed in the harbor.
The last decision for the Kido Butai attack force was its route across the Pacific. There were two main courses under consideration. The southerly, more direct route would place the attack force in the proximity of well-traveled sea lanes and would risk detection. The northerly course would be longer, but it would offer better security from detection. And although refueling at sea in the rough winter waters also offered a challenge, detection was the primary concern. So the northerly route was the final choice.
Japanese reviews of the potential success of the Pearl Harbor attack were mixed. The High Command, or General Staff, gave the attack at Pearl Harbor a 40 percent chance of success. And although Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo, who would command the air fleet, personally thought that an attack on Pearl Harbor would bring strong retaliation, he was not replaced because Admiral Yamamoto, commander of the combined fleet, considered that such an action could affect the morale of the whole operation.
Oddly enough, the Americans had already proven that a surprise attack could be accomplished. Ten years before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, it was successfully attacked in a mock army-navy exercise in early February 1932. Dispatched from California, the Saratoga and the Lexington launched one hundred fifty-two aircraft, approximately one hundred miles north of Oahu, on a Sunday morning.22 Although the attack was expected, low clouds covered the approaches to the airfields during the dawn attack that successfully took the defenders by surprise.
Commander Minoru Genda, one of the actual masterminds of the Pearl Harbor attack, had reasoned that if twenty-one British biplanes could put the three Italian capital ships out of commission at Taranto, then two hundred modern war planes should be able to dismantle the entire U.S. Fleet. Genda, known for his aerobatic flying talent, had previously headed up the team known as Genda’s Flying Circus, one of Japan’s public relations efforts to promote naval aviation.
Along with Commander Genda, another key planner of the attack on Pearl Harbor was Admiral Osami Nagano. Considered an expert on the United States, he had served as naval attaché in Washington during the early 1920s. He also represented Japan at various naval conferences, including the London Naval Conferences of 1930 and 1935–36, all aimed at disarmament. In the late 1930s, he served as naval minister and commander in chief of fleet, and by April 1941, he was appointed naval chief of staff. It was in this capacity that he gave the ultimate command to launch the attack on Pearl Harbor.
Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, who would command the entire operation against Pearl Harbor, had been opposed to Japan’s invasion of China in 1931 as well as the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy. As such, many believed his career would be over when General Tojo became prime minister of Japan in October 1941. Yamamoto was highly respected by his men, and due to his popularity within the fleet, as well as his close relationship with the imperial family, Yamamoto remained as commander in chief of Combined Fleet. Known for his direct approach, he understood the risks Japan was taking by waging war on the United States, admitting that any victory would be limited to the amount of time that their oil resources held out. And despite some disagreement on naval strategy, Yamamoto would successfully lead his fleet across the Pacific.
Commanding the air fleet of the Kido Butai would be Admiral Chuichi Nagumo. Having studied naval warfare both in Europe and in the United States, Nagumo would eventually be promoted to vice admiral in 1939, and in 1941, he was appointed commander in chief of the First Air Fleet, Japan’s aircraft-carrier force. Some claimed that he was not up to the task, relying too much on old-school tactics and perhaps being physically unfit. After the attack on Pearl Harbor, he would be criticized for not launching a third attack to destroy the fuel storage and repair facilities at Pearl Harbor.
And finally, commanding the Japanese pilots would be Commander Mitsuo Fuchida, the naval bomber aviator responsible for coordinating the entire aerial attack itself. It is interesting to note the course Fuchida’s life would take after the war. A true warrior, Fuchida had argued unsuccessfully with Nagumo to launch a third attack on Pearl Harbor. But even with his two successful attacks, he would become such a national hero that he was granted a meeting with Emperor Hirohito. Fuchida had even helped to plan the attack on Midway, and by 1945, he was promoted to air operations officer of the Imperial Navy.
But after the war, he became a farmer, and in 1950, Fuchida met Sergeant Jacob DeShazer. DeShazer, one of Doolittle’s Raiders who had participated in the bombing of Nagoya, was subsequently captured and held prisoner in Japan for the next forty months. In 1948, DeShazer returned to Japan as a missionary, and a couple of years after that, he met Fuchida. The two became friends and shortly thereafter, Fuchida converted to Christianity. For the next twenty-five years, Fuchida, the famous warrior known for his effective leadership in the devastating attack on Pearl Harbor, would spread the message of peace and forgiveness throughout Japan and other Asian countries.
Another key player in the early December attacks against the United States and Great Britain was Vice Admiral Mineichi Koga, commander of the China Area Fleet. He would lead the attack on Hong Kong on December 8. And after Admiral Yamamoto’s death in April 1943, he would be assigned commander in chief of Combined Fleet.
While Japanese naval commanders were putting together their attack plans for Pearl Harbor, the Hawaiian commanders were trying to decide how best to defend the islands with what little they had. Hawaii’s defense depended largely on her early warning, which was dependent on her eighty-one long-range patrol aircraft, the PBYs, under the command of Rear Admiral Patrick Bellinger.23 Bellinger had been promoted to rear admiral in 1940 when he was put in command of Patrol Wing 2 on Hawaii, and on December 7, he would be one of the officers to sound the alarm, “Air Raid, Pearl Harbor—This is no drill
.”
Bellinger’s aircraft consisted of twenty-seven old PBYs and fifty-four new PBYs that had just arrived in November.24 The new ones were experiencing the shakedown problems of new aircraft, which were accented by the maintenance problem of no spare parts. Bellinger and Kimmel spent many hours discussing how best to utilize the aircraft. They had two options. They could do a minimum of flying so they could keep some in the air at all times, or they could maintain 100 percent coverage of the island until all would break down. Critics of Kimmel believe he should have chosen the latter.
To alleviate the shortage of reconnaissance aircraft, General Short might have offered his six B-17s to the navy for their patrol. But with Hawaii’s only intelligence from Washington advising that any attack would be on Malay, Kra, or the Philippines with Manila as the priority, it didn’t seem logical to discontinue critical training of crews for the Philippines to add what little he could to distant patrol. And when Admiral Kimmel pleaded for as many long-range submarines as he could get, Washington met his request by informing him that he would now lose some of his best subs to Admiral Hart’s Asiatic Fleet. Clearly, the Japanese would have the upper hand unless additional reinforcements were provided by Washington.
Chapter 3
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The World Stage
At the close of World War I, world leaders met at the Paris Peace Conference to establish peace terms for those countries defeated in the war, and to establish the first international organization aimed at maintaining world peace. The conference concluded their meetings in January of 1920, at which time the League of Nations was born.
Another attempt at maintaining world peace, particularly focused on the Pacific and East Asia, resulted in the Washington Naval Conference of 1921–22, the first conference of its kind aimed at arms control. Initiated by President Warren Harding, the conference consisted of representatives from nine countries: the United States, Great Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy, Portugal, Japan, and China. While each country had her respective list of demands, restraining Japanese naval expansion in the western Pacific, where so many resources were at risk, was at the top of the agenda. A ten-year agreement was reached that placed naval tonnage restrictions on the conference members by addressing limitations on new manufacturing and by scrapping existing ships.
Japan had been one of the founding members of the League of Nations, and Germany was admitted to the League in 1926. The concept of banishing war altogether seemed a reality in 1928 when the League members met in Paris and signed the Kellogg-Briand Pact. Both Japan and Germany signed the Pact, and although the United States was not a member of the League of Nations, it did support the Pact.
The Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 was established as a nonaggression pact in which the signatories agreed to settle their international disputes by peaceful means. Eventually, over sixty countries would sign the agreement. But it did not bring about the intended effect because countries would simply wage war without declaring war.
By 1932, the League of Nations hosted fifty-seven members. Although Costa Rica would withdraw in 1925 and Brazil in 1926, it would not be until 1933 that others would follow. Japan and Germany would be next.
One of the events that precipitated Japan’s exit from the League was the publication of the Lytton Report in 1932, commissioned by the League of Nations. Representatives from five countries, the United States, Great Britain, Germany, Italy, and France, had been sent to Manchuria to investigate the Mukden incident of 1931. Japan had bombed the railway at Mukden, which essentially opened up their invasion of Manchuria. One of the conclusions of the report was that Japan had not acted in self-defense. And anticipating the criticism of the report and condemnation by the League of Nations, Japan’s representative, Yosuke Matsuoka, walked out in February 1933, later formalizing Japan’s withdrawal from the League in March 1933.
By the mid–1930s, Japan was also becoming disillusioned with treaties established by the Washington Naval Treaty. Although her representatives attended the 1930 and 1936 follow-up conferences held in London, Japan, among other participants, was not happy with the limitations and withdrew from the London Conference of 1936, which defeated the initial purposes of the arms-control efforts. And by the 1939 outbreak of war in Europe, any treaties arising from the conferences were dissolved.
After the Japanese marched into Manchuria in 1931, Henry Stimson, then the secretary of state, had suggested that the most effective way to express the Americans’ total abhorrence, and to perhaps discourage further Japanese moves into Asia, would be to impose economic sanctions on Japan. Stimson’s boss, however, did not agree with him. President Herbert Hoover overtly countered the suggestion, advising his cabinet members that “economic and military sanctions are roads to war.”1 Eventually, Stimson would get his wish. Exactly ten years later, serving as secretary of war, he would find President Roosevelt eager to do just that, announcing the sanctions of Japanese exports to the public on July 25, 1941. After all, FDR’s victory at the polls in 1932 had been largely in defiance of Hoover’s breaking up the Bonus Marchers’ encampment in Washington, D.C. Many of the adult voters at the time had been veterans of World War I and sympathetic to the cause.
But meanwhile, the Japanese were at that time unimpressed. When the League of Nations finally condemned Japan’s occupation of China in the spring of 1933, the Japanese simply walked out and sent in their resignation. Adolf Hitler, now in power in Germany, sent in the German resignation a few months later, and the League of Nations started to fall apart.
After World War I, the strong feeling of isolationism in the United States prompted Congress to reject membership in the League of Nations. Perhaps to pacify the strong Republican isolationist Congress of the 1920s and ’30s, FDR would comment that he personally was against American involvement in the League. Between 1935 and 1937, Congress forced on FDR’s Democratic administration the Neutrality Acts, whereby trade or loans to belligerent nations were prohibited, and all exports to those nations had to be paid for in cash before leaving American docks. Opinion polls were solidly for noninvolvement in foreign affairs.
In 1936, Japan had joined with Germany to form the Anti-Comintern Pact, followed by Italy in 1937. Hitler, already alluding to the master race, justified Japan’s membership by claiming that Japanese blood contained the same qualities as those of Nordic ethnicity. The actual pact was an interesting line-up for future events. The five-year pact was a political statement that recognized Communism as the world’s chief enemy of peace, and it was designed to provide diplomatic and economic aid in any war with Russia or to nations wrestling with international Communist parties. Hungary and Spain joined in 1939 and the pact was renewed in November 1941. Japan’s interest in this pact was twofold.
First, it strengthened Germany’s position against Japan’s traditional enemy, Russia. Second, Germany contemplated that it would distract Britain from Asian affairs that would affect her colonies.
Just a few months later, in the midst of Stalin’s reorganization of Soviet army leadership in the summer of 1937, roughly thirty-five thousand officers were arrested or executed, and many simply disappeared.2 This purge included three of the five marshals and thirteen of the fifteen army commanders.
Following Japan’s start of war with China at the Marco Polo Bridge outside of Peiping in July 1937, the Japanese made some gestures toward settlement, but by August, Chiang Kai-shek had committed China to fight. In October of 1937, FDR made his famous “Quarantine Speech” concerning lawless and aggressor nations. After the Rape of Nanking in December 1937, public sentiment in the United States demanded tougher sanctions against the Japanese. And the following July, the State Department imposed its “moral embargo” of 1938 on the export of airplanes to Japan as a first step toward peaceful persuasion. But the war in China continued, and additional embargoes were imposed in 1939 that “extended to materials essential to airplane manufacture and to plans, plants, and technical information for the production of high-
quality aviation gasoline.”3
The point was well taken in newspapers and magazines, showing the body of a lifeless Chinese woman holding her dead baby still clutched in her arms. The accompanying statement reminded the reader that the bomb that helped make this aggression possible was paid for by the American purchase of Japanese goods. The media proclaimed that every pair of silk stockings was a clip of rifle bullets. If Americans abhorred Japan’s brutality in China, they could no more buy Japanese goods than they could help load a Japanese plane with bombs to be dropped on a helpless Chinese village. Readers were reminded that in order to buy raw materials abroad, Japan had to sell goods abroad, and it was the Americans who were buying the lion’s share of the most critical item in Japan’s foreign trade, raw silk. Advertisements went so far as to admonish American women for their fondness of silk stockings. Wasn’t the sentiment for the Chinese people more important? Certainly, American women did not want the blood of Chinese people on their stockings. As pro–Chinese organizations and grassroots movements pushed for the boycott of Japanese goods, women resorted to wearing stockings made of cotton and rayon.
President Roosevelt started testing the waters of the American people’s sentiment in one of his “fireside chats” on the radio, suggesting that since Japan’s unabated war in China was made possible at least in part by American exports to Japan, maybe now was the time to start exercising sanctions on Japan. That speech was met in the United States with riots, demonstrations, and protests on such a scale that FDR actually had to back down. Americans were still so entrenched in the post–World War I isolationism that they would have no part of the president provoking another nation. This did not go unnoticed in Japan. It only further convinced them that Americans had no taste for war.
