by James Johns
Australia and New Zealand preferred a fleet permanently based at Singapore to discourage Japanese aggression. London didn’t consider this to be within the realm of possibility, while both Australia and New Zealand had sent troops to support the British cause in North Africa. Consequently, their own strength to defend their Far East home territory was reduced. They had hoped for some reciprocal agreement in terms of a permanent naval force to protect their interest in the Far East. It would not happen.
In August 1940, at the height of the Battle of Britain, the British war cabinet concluded a long, detailed study of Singapore and its defenses. The conclusion was that Malaya and Singapore would have to do with what they had. No aid could be spared. This was information that would be incalculably valuable to Japan. Known as the COS (Chiefs of Staff) Far Eastern Appreciation, the study also included Britain’s intentions should Japan invade French Indochina, Thailand, or Hong Kong. The report confirmed that Britain, which was stretched so thinly in Europe, couldn’t support these colonies either, which would give Japan free reign to move into French Indochina. Much emphasis was put on keeping secret the conclusion that no help could be spared, and the decision was made that only one person in all the Far East should receive the report: Air Chief Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-Popham, who was the commander in chief of Far East operations based in Singapore. And in the interest of communications security, the decision was made to send the COS report by the merchant ship, the SS Automedon, a British passenger and cargo steamer. The Automedon set sail from Liverpool on September 24, 1940, destined for Singapore, Hong Kong, and Shanghai.
There is a great deal of speculation as to why the green top-secret pouch was sent via the Automedon. After all, Shenton Thomas, the governor of Singapore, had left Britain on a seaplane before the Automedon set sail. Further, Brooke-Popham, for whom the information was intended, did not leave Britain until October 27. And he was scheduled to arrive in Singapore several days before the Automedon was scheduled to arrive. The COS report had come out of the British war cabinet meetings of August 15, and had been available for over a month before it was dispatched on the Automedon, which would not reach Singapore until mid–November. To some, sailing through the Indian Ocean infested with German raiders hardly seemed like a safe method for transporting such sensitive information.
During its voyage through the Indian Ocean off the Nicobar Islands, the Automedon was sighted and boarded by crew members of a disguised German surface raider, the Atlantis. Although the secret information was packed in a weighted pouch with instructions to be thrown overboard so it would not be vulnerable to capture, its courier had been knocked unconscious, and the pouch was found after passengers and crew were taken prisoner. The Automedon was sunk and the contents of the secret pouch, confiscated by Atlantis crew members, were delivered to the German naval attaché in Tokyo. After the Tokyo attaché reviewed the documents, he sent them over to the Berlin naval staff who, in turn, presented them to the Japanese naval attaché in Berlin.
The Germans had seized a treasure trove of intelligence. Not only did the one pouch contain the military details of Britain’s inability to defend its colonies, new naval cipher tables, maps, charts, minefield information, and British Secret Service reports were found in the other top secret bags that were confiscated. Considering this “intelligence bonanza,”22 the Germans expressed surprise at Britain’s choice of transportation of such crucial and top-secret information. They could not understand why they would have risked sending such sensitive material on such a slow and aging vessel. But to risk sending the pouches along with high-profile government officials such as Thomas or Brooke-Popham, who may be targeted by the Germans, was out of the question.
When the British first heard of the sinking, they were confident that their secrets had gone to the bottom of the ocean. But two months later, word reached London that the mail and documents had, in fact, been seized by the Germans before they sunk the vessel. As far as this author knows, no further attempt was ever made to inform Singapore of the war cabinet’s decisions. Quite obviously, the colonies would never have sent troops to beef up Malaya for a one-way trip with no help coming from Mother Britain.
Secondly, one of Admiral Yamamoto’s chief concerns was not to have the Pearl Harbor attack fleet top-heavy, which would leave an insufficient battle force behind to meet any British reinforcements for Singapore. The capture of the Automedon, which sank on the same day, November 11, 1940, that the British attacked Taranto, had resolved that problem.
Chapter 4
* * *
Change of Command
January and February of 1941 introduced the new commands at Pearl Harbor. On February 1, 1941, Admiral Richardson was relieved of his command with the underlining reason that the fleet commander could not be at odds with the president. It may have been deeper than that. October 1940 had put the president in the middle of his re-election campaign for his third term. It had been necessary to defend all his actions and fend off the charges of the isolationists, and his patience or tolerance on many issues of which he had already made decisions were probably reaching their limit. Initially, Richardson had been personally convinced that he had perhaps influenced the president, so his firing came as a total surprise. Political decision versus military logic would always keep the country at a disadvantage during a shooting conflict. (It should be noted that Richardson had also maintained a three-hundred-mile air reconnaissance from Oahu that was discontinued at the direction of Admiral Stark, shortly before Richardson was fired.)
Another thorn in Richardson’s side was Admiral Walter Stratton Anderson, who may have been the one who would dispel any hope of Richardson’s rapport with the president. Anderson had held several senior commands, including a battleship and a division of cruisers, before being appointed the director of naval intelligence by the president in June 1939. After about a year and a half in that role, “Roosevelt personally promoted the director of naval intelligence, Captain Walter Anderson, to rear admiral.”1 With his new rank, Anderson was appointed commander of battleships, Pacific Fleet, assuming his new role at the end of January 1941, just before Admiral Richardson was replaced by Admiral Kimmel.
Meeting with Roosevelt several times a week in Roosevelt’s private office, Anderson felt he had had a special relationship with the president. However, he was not a favorite amongst his peers. One officer reported that the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) had been “a haven for the ignorant and well connected”2 while under the leadership of Anderson. Even Admiral Stark, whose hands were tied, would later apologize to Kimmel for Anderson’s appointment to Hawaii. In a letter to Kimmel, Stark explained, “The appointment was forced on us by the White House.”3
Anderson and the president were in full accord on the policy whereby Japan would be provoked into firing the first shot. He was now where he could best influence things in Hawaii in the way the president wanted them done.
Upon arrival in Hawaii, Admiral Anderson was offered quarters at Pearl Harbor, where most senior officers lived. But being aware that Japan would probably attack Pearl Harbor, he rented property many miles away, east of Diamond Head, where the sky above Pearl wasn’t even visible. He was at this remote location through the morning of December 7 while the battleships under his command were bearing the brunt of the attack.
Anderson attended the naval change of command in February, from Admiral Richardson to Admiral Kimmel, and over the next ten months, as the former chief of naval intelligence, he had at least the moral responsibility to inform Kimmel that Washington had been reading Japan’s Purple diplomatic code since the previous September. As Pacific theater veteran and writer Robert Stinnett pointed out, Anderson had been sent to Hawaii to act as “intelligence gatekeeper.”4 So he was apparently committed to the president to leave Kimmel in the dark.
Another incident in Hawaii found Admiral Anderson stepping out of his assignment as battleship commander and back into his previous role in intelligence. In early 1941, one of the most
notorious Japanese spies arrived in Honolulu. It was known that he would arrive by ship on March 24. His name was Ensign Takeo Yoshikawa, a young man in his twenties, and his undercover name was Tadashi Morimura. His ship, the Nitta Maru, arrived as expected and was met by undercover agents of the FBI and naval intelligence. In Honolulu, the FBI agent in charge, Robert Shivers, and his sixteen special agents would normally have observed Morimura’s activities. But on the first night of his arrival, Anderson told the FBI to stay away, stating that “the Navy would conduct the espionage investigation, not the FBI.”5 This directive carried the approval of FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover, with whom Anderson had cultivated a relationship during his naval intelligence days in Washington.
Left to right, front: General Short, Lord Louis Mountbatten, commander of Britain’s aircraft carrier HMS Illustrious, and Admiral Kimmel; rear: General Martin and Admiral Bellinger (Arizona Memorial).
With this directive, Anderson arranged Morimura’s complete freedom to do his work. Anderson was aware of the spy’s daily activities, including his communications with Tokyo, and in no way limited his endeavors. (Anderson would retire from the navy in 1946. By the time of his death in 1981 at the age of 100, he was the oldest living Naval Academy graduate.)
And why was Admiral Husband Kimmel chosen to take over for Admiral Richardson? Roosevelt had chosen him over many others who outranked Kimmel. And when he was temporarily promoted to full admiral and assigned to take command of the Pacific Fleet in early 1941, Kimmel had become one of the few four-star admirals at that time.
Certainly Kimmel had the credentials for the job. Having graduated from the Naval Academy in 1904, he had commanded several ships and staffs, and by 1937, was promoted to rear admiral. At this rank, he had served as commander of Cruiser Division 7 in 1938 and as commander of Cruisers, Battle Force in 1939. Described as “brilliant, energetic … a work horse”6 who expected as much of himself as he demanded from his men, Kimmel was highly respected by those who served under him. It is interesting to note that earlier in his career, Kimmel had served as an aide to Franklin Roosevelt while Roosevelt was the assistant secretary of the navy (1913–1920). Considering the outcome of Pearl Harbor and FDR’s subsequent treatment of Kimmel, one might question how that previous association had ended.
By February 1941, other changes in the top chain of naval command were also made. Besides Richardson’s being replaced by Kimmel, his counterpart commanding the Atlantic Fleet would be Rear Admiral Ernest King. King, in 1939, had been assigned to the General Board, the naval advisory board that consisted primarily of senior officers nearing the end of their careers. It was Admiral Stark who believed King’s abilities were being wasted on the board, and he appointed King as commander in chief of the Atlantic Fleet.
And on Oahu, the army was also getting a new commander. General Walter Short was being sent to take over the army garrison from General Herron, who was nearing retirement. Herron retired in 1941, but would be recalled in 1942 to serve on the Personnel Board.
During World War I, Short had served as a training officer with the First Infantry Division in France, and later during the war, he served in the training section of the Army General Staff. By 1920, he was promoted to major, worked in military intelligence for several years, as well as other training roles, and was promoted to brigadier general in 1936. After serving as commander of the First Infantry Division in 1939, Short was promoted to major general in 1940. Through his progressive roles, he became known as a very diplomatic and efficient leader who could work with other leaders to get the job done. It seems he was a highly suitable candidate when General Marshall called upon him to command the army’s Hawaiian Department. With this appointment, he was promoted to lieutenant general.
Considering the larger picture, the chain of command in Hawaii would not be a simple one. Because of later adverse publicity given to Kimmel and Short after the successful Japanese attack, the American public was left with the impression that they, and only they, made all the decisions. Yes and no. Kimmel was commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet (CINCPAC) berthed at Pearl Harbor. But Pearl Harbor itself was under the command of Rear Admiral Claude C. Bloch. Bloch, who had previously been commander of the Pacific Fleet, was now commander of the Fourteenth Naval District.
Prior to 1920, regional naval districts had been established to handle the administrative functions of coastal and shore activities of the navy, and the Fourteenth Naval District, among other Pacific islands, included Hawaii, Midway, and Wake Island. Bloch’s chain of command now included Kimmel and the Navy Department. In essence, Admiral Bloch was the landlord and Admiral Kimmel was the renter.
Nor did General Short hold any authority over Admiral Bloch. Naval aviation at Pearl Harbor, from combat planes to long-range patrol, all came under the command of Rear Admiral Patrick Bellinger. And Bellinger wore many hats. He was commander of Patrol Wings (PATWING) One and Two, responsible for the long-range air patrols from Oahu. But he was also commander of the Naval Base Defense Air Force, which was just on paper and only existed if and when the need arose. But in both of these positions, Bloch controlled at least part of his authority. In addition, Bellinger was Kimmel’s fleet air wing commander, but in this capacity, he also reported to San Diego. So Kimmel had to share this authority with the mainland. Now it gets complicated.
The actual air defense of the island was the responsibility of the army under the command of Short’s air commander, Major General Frederick L. Martin. Martin had taken over as commander of the Hawaiian Air Force in October 1940, and he worked closely with Admiral Bellinger to juggle the limited resources they had to work with. Although his responsibility was the defense of Hawaii itself, the long-range PBY (patrol bomber) protection was under the command of Bellinger. Martin and Bellinger would be the two to draft the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan that would be finalized in early 1941.
Jumping ahead to 1944, the Army Pearl Harbor Board would point out that Bellinger was subordinate to at least five different authorities, not including the army, and was the commander of the Navy Base Defense Air Force, which was actually the army’s responsibility. In the board’s opinion, Short’s command could only cooperate once they determined who it was that they were supposed to cooperate with. On this note, the Army Board concluded, “In this [naval] organization, in which there were two governing heads, Admirals Kimmel and Bloch, with whom General Short had to do business, and their respective staffs with whom Short’s staff had to deal, as well as the many-titled Admiral Bellinger with whom General Martin dealt, the problem of cooperation was made somewhat difficult.”7
It was now quite obvious that meeting an air attack was the most critical mission of the combined defense forces, with neither branch possessing nearly the hardware necessary for the job until the critical reinforcements would arrive. It would mean that both services would have to have a cooperation of unimaginable detail with only limited resources to work with.
By March of 1941, the army and navy would develop a plan that recognized the necessity to defeat an enemy force before it could reach the island, a task that the navy was ill equipped to perform with its PBYs. For this mission, the navy would borrow from the army whatever long-range bombers were available to be loaned, and those bombers would come under temporary command of the navy. Conversely, if the enemy should reach the island, the defense of which was an army responsibility (although it was insufficient to meet the requirement), the army would borrow fighters from the navy. This document or agreement was basically the result of the Bellinger-Martin collaboration.
The inauguration of the plan was April 11, 1941, with the official signing by Admiral Bloch as Pearl Harbor base commander and General Short as army garrison commander, with credit given to Rear Admiral Bellinger and Major General Martin as the authors. Its official title was the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan. A copy was forwarded to Washington at the end of March, and a lack of response would tend to indicate official approval. But in meeting the solution, t
hey first had to recognize the problem.
The situation as envisioned by Martin and Bellinger was that, because “[i]n the past Orange [Japan] has never preceded hostile actions by a declaration of war … an Orange fast raiding force might arrive in Hawaiian waters with no prior warning from our Intelligence Service,”8 which would most likely be accomplished with an air attack on Oahu. Bellinger and Martin also predicted that the attack would be launched from air carriers situated within three hundred miles of Hawaii. And they further predicted, “In a dawn air attack there is a high probability that it could be delivered as a complete surprise … and that it might find us in a condition of readiness under which pursuit would be slow to start.”9 This additional assessment was sent to Washington along with the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan.
But there were still many holes to be filled in, considering that at the time, neither branch really had anything of value to loan to the other. The army did have thirty-three obsolete Douglas B-18 Bolo short-range bombers that were of little value.10 They were worn out when they came to Hawaii, and at best, they had less than half the range of the navy PBYs.
More meetings, discussions, and refinements. Bloch had referred to the whole concept as a sort of “volunteer fire department.”11 All the aircraft and personnel would be involved in their daily training, but when the whistle blew, they were to drop everything and respond to the alarm. As one of Admiral Bloch’s officers explained, “You sounded an air-raid alarm, and all these planes, coming off these various forces, with their own duties, their own tasks, their own missions, they came over to Bellinger’s, and all the fighters went to Martin; and … all of Martin’s bombers came over for search and attack.”12
