by James Johns
Byrd had been asked to run for the presidency back in 1932, but instead, he chose to endorse Roosevelt and served on Roosevelt’s first presidential campaign. Known for his pay-as-you-go policy from his early days, Senator Byrd held a much more conservative view when it came to government spending. He was opposed to Roosevelt’s New Deal, so their relationship changed, and it was only fitting that he became the chairman of the Joint Committee on Reduction of Non-Essential Federal Expenditures in September 1941.
The president, of course, denied all of these charges made by Byrd and attempted to assure the nation that the senator was presenting a distorted description. But FDR was in a corner and had to admit that the figures referring to aircraft production were correct.
In his April 3, 1941, radio broadcast, House Minority Leader Joseph Martin, Jr. (R–MA) warned Americans of the necessity to police those who were charged with overseeing the nation’s budget, particularly in a time of impending war. Referring to the New Deal, which could result in “financial, political and social bankruptcy,”34 he also compared the current debt of $47 billion to that of $1.25 billion at the beginning of World War I,35 emphasizing, “We cannot tolerate extravagance or dishonesty. Racketeering must have no place in our national defense.”36 Alluding to “political henchmen with juicy contracts or luscious loans,”37 he cautioned that internal forces could be as destructive as external forces. “Events abroad must not be permitted to distract us from the vigilance required at home. Our greatest danger is still from insidious inside forces. That fact will be apparent to every American as we proceed with the defense program.”38 The man who would eventually oversee the investigation of mismanagement of government materials and funds was the man who would be the next president, Senator Harry Truman (D–MO).
In early 1941, following rumors of mismanagement in his home state of Missouri, Truman had reported back to Washington on apparent corruption at Fort Leonard Wood. He followed up with inspections of many other forts and defense plants. His report recommended what became the Senate Special Committee to Investigate the National Defense Program also known as the Truman Committee, headed by Truman himself. He held the lead role until he became vice-president in 1944. The end result of these investigations would save the U.S. taxpayer roughly $15 billion on everything from faulty hardware to improvements in methods of construction.39
In the competition for raw materials, big industry was getting the lion’s share, which left small industry desperately competing for what was left. In these so-called prosperous times, with the Depression seemingly far behind, it was still almost impossible for a company to stay in business unless there was a government contract involved. In addition, Donald Nelson had banned production of almost three hundred items not considered essential to the war effort. Included were items such as refrigerators, bicycles, and beer cans.
Americans had come to the realization that they had to see the emergency through, but were totally ignorant of the required sacrifices necessary to achieve it, which involved doing without things such as gasoline, coal, metal, and plastics. Wool, nylon, and dyes were just around the corner. At a press conference, FDR told reporters that Abraham Lincoln had faced the same situation in 1862 with his statement, “The fact is that the people have not yet made up their minds that we are at war with the South. They have not yet buckled down to a determination to fight this war through.”40
The increasing demands of war production provided the perfect opportunity for the labor unions, and by the spring of 1941, strikes were on the rise. The president’s demands to halt the strikes were of no avail. Hitler, having abolished the German unions years before, must have chuckled at the ability of one man to tie up the entire defense industry.
In August, the shipbuilders had struck the Federal Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Company in Kearney, New Jersey. In the end, the president had to seize the shipyard to get everyone back to work. The five major rail unions that moved the raw materials were threatening a strike for December 7.
In the race for raw materials, the unions continued to take advantage and organized strikes under the guise of fair wages for all. John L. Lewis, head of the United Mine Workers and other unions, seemed to have a hand on the pulse of the nation. Already branded as an isolationist, he knew when, amid other national distractions, to call strikes. In the midst of this national demand for raw materials, Lewis called yet another strike of fifty-three thousand mine workers in November who were supplying the steel industry.41 This strike was called off a week later when union members accepted an arbitration proposal made by the White House. Americans wanted to know who was running the country. Was it John Lewis or Franklin Roosevelt?
During the Depression, Lewis had supported President Herbert Hoover, but the longer the Depression went on, Lewis’s loyalties started to shift to Roosevelt. Through his influence with the CIO (Congress of Industrial Organizations), over $500,000 would be contributed to Roosevelt’s election campaign in 1936, which helped him win the presidential election by a landslide. Having Lewis at his side was a good thing for Roosevelt.42
John Lewis was the icon of organized labor. Getting involved in the coal mining industry after the turn of the century, he was the leading influence in establishing the CIO, and in turn, the United Steel Workers of America. As president of the CIO in 1937, Lewis and his affiliates convinced both General Motors and United States Steel, both nonunion organizations at the time, to sign collective-bargaining agreements. The agreements would establish the CIO’s strong competitive position against the American Federation of Labor (AFL). With 85 percent of the CIO, however, in favor of Roosevelt’s upcoming war, Lewis resigned from the CIO, taking his mine workers, the United Mine Workers of America, with him.
The downside for Roosevelt was that Lewis was also an isolationist. And by 1940, Lewis had no doubt Roosevelt was taking the country to war, making himself a major thorn in Roosevelt’s side. Violating the no-strike pledge by repeatedly calling his miners to strike, Lewis would continue to challenge Roosevelt throughout World War II, forcing the government to seize the mines to bring the workers back in. With all the production delays this caused, having John Lewis on the other side was not a good thing for Roosevelt.
The resulting trickle-down effect in weapons of war felt in the overseas commands forced the Hawaiian commanders to exert even more pressure on Washington. Kimmel complained that his entire complement of fighters representing three aircraft carriers, plus his shore-based navy and marine squadrons, amounted to but fifty-two aircraft, mainly Grumman F4Fs, with the balance obsolete. He also complained of a shortage of patrol vessels.
Most of what did arrive in Hawaii was just using the island as a stopping-off point for war machinery destined for the western Pacific. And Hawaii’s combat efficiency would actually be reduced because 25 percent of Kimmel’s overall strength was being transferred to the Atlantic in support of Lend-Lease. Training was being conducted by raw, green replacements from the States. And the shortage of equipment was complicating this training process.
Finally, by November 1941, the navy did receive the fifty-four new, much-needed PBY Catalina patrol bombers.43 These aircraft had a phenomenal four-thousand-mile range and were designated to Admiral Kimmel for protecting the fleet at sea because the fleet could not go to sea without this overhead and scouting protection. So the PBYs would only be available to Admiral Bellinger for island long-range patrol during the activation of the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan.
By comparison, the army was operating those thirty-three obsolete B-18 Bolo bombers with a range of only 690 miles. This meant that with pinpoint navigation and shallow turns on the return trip, the bomb-loaded B-18 could wander out, perhaps, 350 miles before turning back.44
General Short also had twelve B-17s of his own, but now he was faced with a new problem.45 The B-17s flying from the States and destined for the Philippines would take some of his flight crews with them, and the B-17s he did have would be stripped of parts to equip those going to the
Philippines. It wasn’t long before he was left with just the six B-17s for crew training. It will be recalled that the PBY’s main advantage was its long-range reconnaissance ability. The long-range bombing superiority fell on the twelve B-17s that would be loaned to the navy to implement the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, but now that capacity was cut in half.
Meanwhile, General Short would fall victim to a later charge that history would heap on him for which he held only partial responsibility. It was on November 5 that he issued the new alert system within his command, the new SOP (Standard Operating Procedure) that created three stages of alert. Until now, the army had traditionally had only one stage of alert. Even during the tenure of his predecessor, General Herron, an alert created a battle-stations atmosphere in which everyone dropped what he was doing and assumed a combat readiness posture. During the pre–1941 days, one category of alert fit the bill. But under the watch of Short, the island was caught in military expansion, material and equipment shortages, and urgent training required in preparation of war.
With espionage being a primary concern, it seemed like a reckless and ruinous squandering of valuable time to send the troops into the pineapple fields to guard against mythical dangers. And with one hundred fifty thousand first-, second-, and third-generation Japanese living in the islands, whose allegiance was questionable, and with the topography of the island leaving the military installations accessible to curious eyes, the idea of sabotage was not that of General Short’s alone.
Shortly before being relieved of his command, Admiral Richardson, in a January 24, 1941, study of the defenses of Pearl Harbor, had cautioned that sabotage was a greater threat than the likelihood of a submarine attack. And on at least two occasions, General Marshall had advised that sabotage would be Short’s “real peril.” The fear of sabotage in the United States was growing. For General Short, the answer seemed obvious: establish the three stages of alert as opposed to using just one.
Alert No. 1 called for posting sentries at likely targets of saboteurs: bridges, airfields, certain buildings, and the like. Alert No. 2 added air attack, manning the antiaircraft installations, issuing ammunition, and dispersing aircraft. Alert No. 3 was the main, all-out alert that anticipated an airborne or seaborne attack or an invasion that put the men at their battle stations and kept them there. The alert numbers would scale up, not down. History has wrongly criticized Short for being overly sabotage-conscious.
Now, with three different alerts, the army was more alert conscious, and there were increased numbers of alerts. But it doesn’t take long before too many alerts don’t alert to anything.
Late 1941 also brought a new commander to the Philippines. November 4 was a banner day when the arrival of Major General Lewis Brereton as Chief Far Eastern Air Force, replacing General Henry Clagett, was announced. Clagett, who had been ailing for some months from a combination of arthritis and malaria, was sent to Australia to temporarily command the U.S. forces there, and by 1943, he would return to the United States. Brereton’s arrival on a Pan American clipper was met by squadrons of P-35 and P-40 fighter aircraft flying in V formations. The clipper was almost two weeks late due to weather delays in Hawaii, Wake, and Guam.
General Brereton had been handpicked by General MacArthur, and similar to Hap Arnold, he, too, was one of the first military pilots of the U.S. Army. His flying days had started back in 1912 with Aeronautical Division, U.S. Signal Corps, the earliest predecessor to the Army Air Corps, as it was known in 1941.
Summoned to Washington in early October, Brereton had met with the air corps chief, General Hap Arnold, and his assistant chief of staff, Brigadier General Carl Spaatz, who filled Brereton in on his new role in the Philippines. During the preliminary meetings, Brereton learned that it was the intention of those in Washington to begin dispatching bombardment squadrons to the Philippines, in advance of the other, very badly needed defense armaments such as reconnaissance squadrons, fighter squadrons, and air warning systems. Considering it very risky, Brereton made it known to all he met with, including General Gerow, who headed up War Plans Division, and Chief of Staff General Marshall, that the bombardment squadrons should be held back until the other squadrons and air warning systems could be provided. In his October 5, 1941, diary entry, he confirmed, “After learning these facts, I told General Arnold I considered it extremely hazardous to place bomber forces in any sensitive area without first having provided the necessary fighter cover and air warning service. I strongly urged the necessity for providing air warning services and fighters before sending bombers to a location that was exceedingly vulnerable to surprise attack, as were the Philippines.”46 The risks were understood by all, but the plans would move ahead as they were. After all, per the opinion of MacArthur and many others in Washington, nothing was going to happen in the Philippines until at least April of the following year.
On his way to the Philippines, Brereton stopped off in Hawaii for a couple of days, where he met with the commanders and toured the facilities. He quickly picked up on the tension that was mounting due to lack of armaments. As he noted on October 22, “Apprehension was evident, not so much because anyone felt we were on the eve of war with Japan, as because insufficient attention had been given to provide even the minimum requirements for defense.”47 Similar to the concerns he had expressed in Washington, Brereton was “surprised and somewhat disappointed to note the incomplete preparations against air attacks, particularly the lack of adequate air warning equipment.”48 The consensus of the discussions he had with General Martin, Admiral Bellinger, and others, was that Japan’s initial attacks would likely involve Hawaii, the Panama Canal, or even the west coast of the United States, but that Hawaii was “the most probable.”49
Luzon
Upon landing in Manila Bay, Brereton called on MacArthur, who was ecstatic to hear that reinforcements (bombers) were on the way. In the wake of Brereton’s pessimistic briefings in Washington, he wondered if reinforcements would even get there in time. However, Brereton was equally delighted to hear from his new frontline commander that nothing would happen until at least next April. MacArthur assured his new air chief, “The mobilization and training schedule of the Philippine Department and of the Philippine Army was based on that assumption.”50 The Philippine Army had been inducted into U.S. service on August 15.
In November 1941, the army had established the Far East Air Force, predecessor of the Fifth Air Force. Brereton’s hand-carried orders to MacArthur stated that the FEAF would transition from a defensive posture to an offensive one, and that in the event of war, MacArthur would activate Rainbow 5, the basis of America’s war-plan strategy during World War II. Both elicited a smile.
Shortly after his arrival, General Brereton conducted a week-long inspection tour of the airfields in his command. Similar to the situation on Hawaii, what he saw was completely inadequate in so many aspects, from duty hours maintained, training schedules, lack of spare parts, and a borderline air warning service, to insufficient or undependable communications, most of which were commercial and all based on the “good old days.”51 The obvious result was a shake-up of command with many of General Clagett’s staff now becoming assistants in their former jobs. All fighter aircraft henceforth would be considered on alert and always gassed and armed, and 40 percent of all flight training would be at night.
Taking inventory of the aircraft available, Brereton found that the Far East Air Force consisted of only thirty-five B-17s, two squadrons of B-18s (medium bombers), seventy-two P-40 fighters, twenty-eight P-35 fighters, and two squadrons of fighters of the Philippine Air Force.52 Half the fighters were stationed at Nichols Field, and half were stationed at Clark Field. There were no spare parts for the P-40s and none whatsoever for the bombers. Overall, it was quite a dismal situation.
The P-35s fired thirty-caliber ammunition, as did the P-40Bs, while the newer P-40Ds and P-40Es fired fifty-caliber ammunition, but this was all incidental because most pilots had never fired any of the guns. Not o
nly was ammunition in short supply, but many aircraft had never been bore-sighted to align the guns to the pilots’ gun sights. This process required test ammunition, of which there was little or none allocated. All the USAFFE (U.S. Army Forces Far East) had on hand were 3.5 million rounds of fifty-caliber ammunition, as opposed to their estimated requirement of sixteen million rounds.53 The difference was promised to leave the States by March 1, 1942. For the bombers, it was the same. While some bombs were in short supply, others were nonexistent.
While many were unhappy with the changes made with Brereton’s arrival, others felt they were long overdue. The overall situation concerned Brereton even more than Washington’s decision to send the B-17s to the Philippines, where they would not have adequate fighter protection, and still more were on the way. The only airfield in all the Philippines capable of handling the heavy bombers was Clark Field, sixty miles north of Manila. The only other field was Del Monte, about six hundred miles to the south on the island of Mindanao, but that airfield was still under construction. The one highlight was that Del Monte’s existence was still unknown to the Japanese.
What would be Luzon’s only operable radar site was nearing completion at the Iba Airfield on the coast, some distance west of Clark Field. Few had any high hopes for the air warning service. It depended solely on local native volunteers who were inexperienced and poorly trained, and to collect their reports, an information center was established in Manila. This entire schedule was based on MacArthur’s assurances that nothing would happen until April of 1942.
