12. Clifford J. Rogers, “The Vegetian ‘Science of Warfare’ in the Middle Ages,” Journal of Medieval Military History 1 (2003): 1–19; Stephen Morillo, “Battle Seeking: The Contexts and Limits of Vegetian Strategy,” Journal of Medieval Military History 1 (2003): 21–41; John Gillingham, “Up with Orthodoxy: In Defense of Vegetian Warfare,” Journal of Medieval Military History 2 (2004): 149–158.
13. Heuser, Evolution of Srategy, 90.
14. Anne Curry, “The Hundred Years War, 1337–1453,” in John Andreas Olsen and Colin Gray, eds., The Practice of Strategy: From Alexander the Great to the Present (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 100.
15. Jan Willem Honig, “Reappraising Late Medieval Strategy: The Example of the 1415 Agincourt Campaign,” War in History 19, no. 2 (2012): 123–151.
16. James Q. Whitman, The Verdict of Battle: The Law of Victory and the Making of Modern War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012).
17. William Shakespeare, Henry VI, Part 3, 3.2.
18. Victoria Kahn, Machiavellian Rhetoric: From the Counterreformation to Milton (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), 40.
19. Niccolo Machiavelli, Art of War, edited by Christopher Lynch (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), 97–98. See also Lynch’s interpretative essay in this volume and Felix Gilbert, “Machiavelli: The Renaissance of the Art of War,” in Peter Paret, ed., Makers of Modern Strategy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986).
20. Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince, translated and with an introduction by George Bull (London: Penguin Books, 1961), 96.
21. Ibid., 99–101.
22. Ibid., 66.
5 Satan’s Strategy
1. Dennis Danielson, “Milton’s Arminianism and Paradise Lost,” in J. Martin Evans, ed., John Milton: Twentieth-Century Perspectives (London: Routledge, 2002), 127.
2. John Milton, Paradise Lost, edited by Gordon Tesket (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2005), III, 98–99.
3. Job 1:7.
4. John Carey, “Milton’s Satan,” in Dennis Danielson, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Milton (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 160–174.
5. Revelation 12:7–9.
6. William Blake, The Marriage of Heaven and Hell (1790–1793).
7. Milton, Paradise Lost, I, 645–647.
8. Gary D. Hamilton, “Milton’s Defensive God: A Reappraisal,” Studies in Philosophy 69, no. 1 (January 1972): 87–100.
9. Victoria Ann Kahn, Machiavellian Rhetoric: From Counter Reformation to Milton (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), 209.
10. Milton, Paradise Lost, V, 787–788, 794–802.
11. Amy Boesky, “Milton’s Heaven and the Model of the English Utopia,” Studies in English Literature, 1500–1900 36, no. 1 (Winter 1996): 91–110.
12. Milton, Paradise Lost, VI, 701–703, 741, 787, 813.
13. Ibid., I, 124, 258–259, 263, 159–160.
14. Antony Jay, Management and Machiavelli (London: Penguin Books, 1967), 27.
15. Milton, Paradise Lost, II, 60–62, 129–130, 190–91, 208–211, 239–244, 269–273, 296–298, 284–286, 379–380, 345–348, 354–358.
16. Ibid., IX, 465–475, 375–378, 1149–1152.
17. Ibid., XII, 537–551, 569–570.
18. Barbara Kiefer Lewalski, “Paradise Lost and Milton’s Politics,” in Evans, ed., John Milton, 150.
19. Barbara Riebling, “Milton on Machiavelli: Representations of the State in Paradise Lost,” Renaissance Quarterly 49, no. 3 (Autumn, 1996): 573–597.
20. Carey, “Milton’s Satan,” 165.
21. Hobbes, Leviathan, I. xiii.
22. Charles Edelman, Shakespeare’s Military Language: A Dictionary (London: Athlone Press, 2000), 343.
23. A Dictionary of the English Language: A Digital Edition of the 1755 Classic by Samuel Johnson, edited by Brandi Besalke, http://johnsonsdictionaryonline.com/.
6 The New Science of Strategy
1. Martin van Creveld, Command in War (Harvard, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), 18.
2. R. R. Palmer, “Frederick the Great, Guibert, Bulow: From Dynastic to National War,” in Peter Paret, Gordon A. Craig, and Felix Gilbert, eds., Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), 91.
3. Edward Luttwak, Strategy (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1987), 239–240.
4. Beatrice Heuser, The Strategy Makers: Thoughts on War and Society from Machiavelli to Clausewitz (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2009), 1–2; Beatrice Heuser, The Evolution of Strategy (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 4–5.
5. Azar Gat, The Origins of Military Thought: From the Enlightenment to Clausewitz (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), Chapter 2. See R. R. Palmer, “Frederick the Great, Guibert, Bülow: From Dynastic to National War,” in Paret et al., Makers of Modern Strategy.
6. Palmer, “Frederick the Great,” 107.
7. Heuser, The Strategy Makers, 3; Hew Strachan, “The Lost Meaning of Strategy,” Survival 47, no. 3 (August 2005): 35; J-P. Charnay in André Corvisier, ed., A Dictionary of Military History and the Art of War, English edition edited by John Childs (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), 769.
8. All the definitions come from the Oxford English Dictionary.
9. From “The History of the Late War in Germany” (1766) cited by Michael Howard, Studies in War & Peace (London: Temple Smith, 1970), 21.
10. Peter Paret, Clausewitz and the State: The Man, His Theories and His Times (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983), 91.
11. Whitman, The Verdict of Battle, 155. “The Instruction of Fredrick the Great for His Generals, 1747,” is found in Roots of Strategy: The Five Greatest Military Classics of All Time (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1985).
12. Napoleon’s Military Maxims, edited and annotated by William E. Cairnes (New York: Dover Publications, 2004).
13. Major-General Petr Chuikevich, quoted in Dominic Lieven, Russia Against Napoleon: The Battle for Europe 1807–1814 (London: Allen Lane, 2009), 131.
14. Lieven, Russia Against Napoleon, 198.
15. Alexander Mikaberidze, The Battle of Borodino: Napoleon Against Kutuzov (London: Pen & Sword, 2007), 161, 162.
7 Clausewitz
1. Carl von Clausewitz, The Campaign of 1812 in Russia (London: Greenhill Books, 1992), 184.
2. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), Book IV, Chapter 12, p. 267.
3. Gat, The Origins of Military Thought (see chap. 6, n. 5).
4. John Shy, “Jomini,” in Paret et al., Makers of Modern Strategy, 143–185 (see chap. 6, n. 2).
5. Antoine Henri de Jomini, The Art of War (London: Greenhill Books, 1992).
6. “Jomini and the Classical Tradition in Military Thought,” in Howard, Studies in War & Peace (see chap. 6, n. 9), 31.
7. Jomini, The Art of War, 69.
8. Shy, “Jomini,” 152, 157, 160, 146.
9. Gat, The Origins of Military Thought, 114, 122.
10. For a useful discussion on the relationship between the two, see Christopher Bassford, “Jomini and Clausewitz: Their Interaction,” February 1993, http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/Bassford/Jomini/JOMINIX.htm.
11. Clausewitz, On War, 136.
12. Hew Strachan, “Strategy and Contingency,” International Affairs 87, no. 6 (2011): 1289.
13. Martin Kitchen, “The Political History of Clausewitz,” Journal of Strategic Studies 11, vol. 1 (March 1988): 27–30.
14. B. H. Liddell Hart, Strategy: The Indirect Approach (London: Faber and Faber, 1968); Martin Van Creveld, The Transformation of War (New York: The Free Press, 1991); John Keegan, A History of Warfare (London: Hutchinson, 1993).
15. Jan Willem Honig, “Clausewitz’s On War: Problems of Text and Translation,” in Hew Strachan and Andrews Herberg-Rothe, eds., Clausewitz in the Twenty-First Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007
), 57–73. For biography, see Paret, Clausewitz and the State (see chap. 6, n. 10); Michael Howard, Clausewitz (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983); Hew Strachan, Clausewitz’s On War: A Biography (New York: Grove/Atlantic Press, 2008). On historical context, see Azar Gat, A History of Military Thought (see chap. 6, n. 5). On influence, see Beatrice Heuser, Reading Clausewitz (London: Pimlico, 2002).
16. Christopher Bassford, “The Primacy of Policy and the ‘Trinity’ in Clausewitz’s Mature Thought,” in Hew Strachan and Andreas Herberg-Rothe, eds., Clausewitz in the Twenty-First Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 74–90; Christopher Bassford, “The Strange Persistence of Trinitarian Warfare,” in Ralph Rotte and Christoph Schwarz, eds., War and Strategy (New York: Nova Science, 2011), 45–54.
17. Clausewitz, On War, Book 1, Chapter 1, 89.
18. Antulio Echevarria, Clausewitz and Contemporary War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 96.
19. On War, Book 1, Chapter 7, 119–120.
20. Ibid., Book 3, Chapter 7, 177.
21. Terence Holmes uses this stress on planning to challenge the view that Clausewitz was preoccupied only with the chaotic and unpredictable. The point is that the potential chaos and unpredictability set the challenge for the general. This is why Clausewitz argued for cautious strategies. Holmes notes the reasons why plans may go awry, of which the most important would be a failure to anticipate the enemy’s moves correctly, and that when the original plans do not work new ones will be needed. It is setting up a straw man to counter a claim that Clausewitz opposed all planning, because clearly the logistical and command issues posed by the great armies of the time demanded planning. Better to view the strategic challenge as drawing up plans that took account of the problems of friction and unpredictable enemies but would not necessarily solve them. Terence Holmes, “Planning versus Chaos in Clausewitz’s On War,” The Journal of Strategic Studies 30, no. 1 (2007): 129–151.
22. On War, Book 2, Chapter 1, 128, Book 3, Chapter 1, 177.
23. Ibid., Book 1, Chapter 6, 117–118.
24. Paret, “Clausewitz,” in M akers of Modern Strategy, 203.
25. On War, Book 1, Chapter 7, 120.
26. Ibid., Book 5, Chapter 3, 282; Book 3, Chapter 8, 195; Chapter 10, 202–203; Book 7, Chapter 22, 566, 572.
27. Ibid., Book 6, Chapter 1, 357; Chapter 2, 360; Chapter 5, 370.
28. Clausewitz, On War, 596, 485. Antulio J. Echevarria II, “Clausewitz’s Center of Gravity: It’s Not What We Thought,” Naval War College Review LVI, no. 1 (Winter 2003): 108–123.
29. Clausewitz, On War, Book 8, Chapter 6, 603. See Hugh Smith, “The Womb of War.”
30. Clausewitz, On War, Book 8, Chapter 8, 617–637.
31. Strachan, Clausewitz’s On War, 163.
32. “Clausewitz, unfinished note, presumably written in 1830,” in On War, 31. Note this date is now put at 1827. See also Clifford J. Rogers, “Clausewitz, Genius, and the Rules,” The Journal of Military History 66 (October 2002): 1167–1176.
33. Clausewitz, On War, Book 1, Chapter 1, 87.
34. Ibid., Book 1, Chapter 1, 81.
35. Strachan, Clausewitz’s On War, 179.
36. Brian Bond, The Pursuit of Victory: From Napoleon to Saddam Hussein (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 47.
8 The False Science
1. Michael Howard, War and the Liberal Conscience (London: Maurice Temple Smith, 1978), 37–42.
2. Cited in Ibid., 48–49.
3. Clausewitz, On War, Book 1, Chapter 2, 90. See Thomas Waldman, War, Clausewitz and the Trinity (London: Ashgate, 2012), Chapter 6.
4. Leo Tolstoy, War and Peace, translated by Louise and Aylmer Maude (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), 829.
5. Isaiah Berlin, The Hedgehog and the Fox (Chicago: Ivan Dee, 1978). The title, which is now the best remembered aspect of the book, comes from a quote from the Greek poet Archilocus: “The fox knows many things, but the hedgehog knows one big thing.”
6. W. Gallie, Philosophers of Peace and War: Kant, Clausewitz, Marx, Engels and Tolstoy (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 114.
7. Tolstoy, War and Peace, 1285.
8. Ibid., 688.
9. Lieven, Russia Against Napoleon, 527.
10. Berlin, The Hedgehog and the Fox, 20.
11. Gary Saul Morson, “War and Peace,” in Donna Tussing Orwin, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Tolstoy (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 65–79.
12. Michael D. Krause, “Moltke and the Origins of the Operational Level of War,” in Michael D. Krause and R. Cody Phillip, eds., Historical Perspectives of the Operational Art (Center of Military History, United States Army, Washington, DC, 2005), 118, 130.
13. Gunther E. Rothenberg, “Moltke, Schlieffen, and the Doctrine of Strategic Envelopment,” in Paret, ed., Makers of Modern Strategy, 298 (see chap. 6, n. 2).
14. See Helmuth von Moltke, “Doctrines of War,” in Lawrence Freedman, ed., War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 220–221.
15. Echevarria, Clausewitz and Contemporary War, p.142 (see chap. 7, n. 18).
16. Hajo Holborn, “The Prusso-German School: Moltke and the Rise of the General Staff,” in Paret, ed., Makers of Modern Strategy, 288.
17. Rothenberg, “Moltke, Schlieffen, and the Doctrine of Strategic Envelopment,” 305.
18. John Stone, Military Strategy: The Politics and Technique of War (London: Continuum, 2011), 43–47.
19. Krause, “Moltke and the Origins of the Operational Level of War,” 142.
20. Walter Goerlitz, The German General Staff (New York: Praeger, 1953), 92. Cited by Justin Kelly and Mike Brennan, Alien: How Operational Art Devoured Strategy (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, 2009), 24.
9 Annihilation or Exhaustion
1. Gordon Craig, “Delbrück: The Military Historian,” in Paret, ed., Makers of Modern Strategy, 326–353 (see chap. 6, n. 2).
2. Azar Gat, The Development of Military Thought: The Nineteenth Century (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), 106–107.
3. Quote from Mahan in Russell F. Weigley, “American Strategy from Its Beginnings through the First World War,” in Paret, ed., Makers of Modern Strategy, 415.
4. Donald Stoker, The Grand Design: Strategy and the U.S. Civil War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 78–79.
5. David Herbert Donald, Lincoln (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995), 389, 499; Stoker, The Grand Design, 229–230.
6. Stoker, The Grand Design, 405.
7. Weigley, “American Strategy,” 432–433.
8. Stoker, The Grand Design, 232.
9. Azar Gat, The Development of Military Thought, 144–145.
10. Ardant du Picq, “Battle Studies,” in Curtis Brown, ed., Roots of Strategy, Book 2 (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1987), 153; Robert A. Nye, The Origins of Crowd Psychology: Gustave Le Bon and the Crisis of Mass Democracy in the Third Republic (London: Sage, 1974).
11. Craig, “Delbrück: The Military Historian,” 312.
12. The debate has largely been conducted in the pages of the journal War in History. Terence Zuber has been conducting a lonely but vigorous campaign, against the deep skepticism of other historians, to assert that there was no Schlieffen Plan. Terence Zuber, “The Schlieffen Plan Reconsidered,” War in History VI (1999): 262–305. The argument is developed fully in his Inventing the Schlieffen Plan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). For some responses, see Terence Holmes, “The Reluctant March on Paris: A Reply to Terence Zuber’s ‘The Schlieffen Plan Reconsidered,’” War in History VIII (2001): 208–232. A. Mombauer, “Of War Plan and War Guilt: The Debate Surrounding the Schlieffen Plan,” Journal of Strategic Studies XXVIII (2005): 857–858; R. T. Foley, “The Real Schlieffen Plan,” War in History XIII (2006): 91–115; Gerhard P. Groß, “There Was a Schlieffen Plan: New Sources on the History of German Military Planning,” War in History XV (2008): 389–431.
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