3. S. M. Amadae, Rationalising Capitalist Democracy: The Cold War Origins of Rational Choice Liberalism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), 3.
4. Martin Hollis and Robert Sugden, “Rationality in Action,” Mind 102, no. 405 (January 1993): 2.
5. Richard Swedberg, “Sociology and Game Theory: Contemporary and Historical Perspectives,” Theory and Society 30 (2001): 320.
6. William Riker, “The Entry of Game Theory into Political Science,” in Roy Weintraub, ed., Toward a History of Game Theory, 208–210 (see chap. 12, n. 19).
7. S. M. Amadae and Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, “The Rochester School: The Origins of Positive Political Theory,” Annual Review of Political Science 2 (1999): 276.
8. Ibid., 282, 291.
9. See Ronald Terchek, “Positive Political Theory and Heresthetics: The Axioms and Assumptions of William Riker,” The Political Science Reviewer, 1984, 62. Also on Riker see Albert Weale, “Social Choice versus Populism? An Interpretation of Riker’s Political Theory,” British Journal of Political Science 14, no. 3 (July 1984): 369–385; Iain McLean, “William H. Riker and the Invention of Heresthetic(s),” British Journal of Political Science 32, no. 3 (July 2002): 535–558.
10. Jonathan Cohn, “The Revenge of the Nerds: Irrational Exuberance: When Did Political Science Forget About Politics,” New Republic, October 15, 1999.
11. William Riker and Peter Ordeshook, An Introduction to Positive Political Theory (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1973), 24.
12. Richard Langlois, “Strategy as Economics versus Economics as Strategy,” Managerial and Decision Economics 24, no. 4 (June–July 2003): 287.
13. Donald P. Green and Ian Shapiro, Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory: A Critique of Applications in Political Science (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1996), X. One counterattack appeared in Jeffery Friedman, ed., “Rational Choice Theory and Politics,” Critical Review 9, no. 1–2 (1995).
14. Stephen Walt, “Rigor or Rigor Mortis? Rational Choice and Security Studies,” International Security 23, no. 4 (Spring 1999): 8.
15. Dennis Chong quoted in Cohn, The Revenge of the Nerds.
16. William A. Gamson, “A Theory of Coalition Formation,” American Sociological Review 26, no. 3 (June 1961): 373–382.
17. William Riker, The Theory of Political Coalitions (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1963).
18. William Riker, “Coalitions. I. The Study of Coalitions,” in David L. Sills, ed., International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, vol. 2 (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1968), 527. Cited in Swedberg, Sociology and Game Theory, 328.
19. Riker, Theory of Political Coalitions, 22.
20. Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965); Iain McLean, “Review Article: The Divided Legacy of Mancur Olson,” British Journal of Political Science 30, no. 4 (October 2000), 651–668.
21. Mancur Olson and Richard Zeckhauser, “An Economic Theory of Alliances,” The Review of Economics and Statistics 48, no. 3 (August 1966): 266–279.
22. Avinash K. Dixit and Barry J. Nalebuff, The Art of Strategy: A Game Theorist’s Guide to Success in Business and Life (New York: W. W. Norton, 2008), x.
23. Anatol Rapoport, Strategy and Conscience (New York: Harper & Row, 1964). For Schelling’s response, see his review in The American Economic Review, LV (December 1964), 1082–1088.
24. Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984), 177. The episode is covered in Mirowski, Machine Dreams: see Chapter 12, n. 11, 484–487.
25. Dennis Chong, Collective Action and the Civil Rights Movement (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 231–237.
26. Robert Jervis, “Realism, Game Theory and Cooperation,” World Politics 40, no. 3 (April 1988): 319. See also Robert Jervis, “Rational Deterrence: Theory and Evidence,” World Politics 41, no. 2 (January 1989): 183–207.
27. Herbert Simon, “Human Nature in Politics, The Dialogue of Psychology with Political Science,” American Political Science Review 79, no. 2 (June 1985): 302.
28. Albert Weale, “Social Choice versus Populism?”, 379.
29. William H. Riker, “The Heresthetics of Constitution-Making: The Presidency in 1787, with Comments on Determinism and Rational Choice,” The American Political Science Review 78, no. 1 (March 1984): 1–16.
30. Simon, “Human Nature in Politics,” 302.
31. Amadae and Bueno de Mesquita, “The Rochester School.”
32. William Riker, The Art of Political Manipulation (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1986), ix.
33. William Riker, The Strategy of Rhetoric (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1996), 4.
37 Beyond Rational Choice
1. Cited by Martin Hollis and Robert Sugden, “Rationality in Action,” Mind 102, no. 405 (January 1993): 3.
2. Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper & Row, 1957), 5.
3. Riker, The Theory of Political Coalitions, 20 (see chap. 36, n. 17).
4. See pp. 153–154.
5. Brian Forst and Judith Lucianovic, “The Prisoner’s Dilemma: Theory and Reality,” Journal of Criminal Justice 5 (1977): 55–64.
6. For example, Nalebuff and Brandenburger granted that the “simple textbooks present a view of ‘rational man’ that doesn’t apply very well to the mixed-up, real world of business. But that’s a problem with the textbooks.” For Nalebuff and Brandenburger, a rational person “does the best he can” depending on his perception, which is affected by the amount of information available and how he evaluates the various outcomes. This argued for remembering to look at a game from multiple perspectives. “To us,” they concluded, “the issue of whether people are rational or irrational is largely beside the point.” There is something refreshing about a book purporting to represent game theory to a wider business audience ducking so brazenly the fundamental conceptual issue that had shaped its methodology and potentially limited its application. Nalebuff and Brandenburger, Co-Opetition, 56–58.
7. Introduction in Jon Elster, ed., Rational Choice (New York: New York University Press, 1986), 16. Green and Shapiro, Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory, 20 (see chap. 36, n. 13) cite Elster to demonstrate the burdens strict criteria place on researchers. Elster was an early advocate for rational choice theory who later became disenchanted.
8. On the inability of individuals to manage formal reasoning and understand statistical methods, see John Conlisk, “Why Bounded Rationality?” Journal of Economic Literature 34, no. 2 (June 1996): 670.
9. Faruk Gul and Wolfgang Pesendorfer, “The Case for Mindless Economics,” in A. Caplin and A. Shotter, eds., Foundations of Positive and Normative Economics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).
10. Khurana, From Higher Aims to Higher Hands, see Chapter 32, n. 10, 284–285.
11. Herbert A. Simon, “A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 69, no. 1 (February 1955): 99–118. See also “Information Processing Models of Cognition,” Annual Review of Psychology 30, no. 3 (February 1979): 363–396. Herbert A. Simon and William G. Chase, “Skill in Chess,” American Scientist 61, no. 4 (July 1973): 394–403.
12. Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, “Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases,” Science 185, no. 4157 (September 1974): 1124. See also Daniel Kahneman, “A Perspective on Judgment and Choice: Mapping Bounded Rationality,” American Psychologist 56, no. 9 (September 2003): 697–720.
13. “IRRATIONALITY: Rethinking thinking,” The Economist, December 16, 1999, available at http://www.economist.com/node/268946.
14. Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, “The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice,” Science 211, no. 4481 (1981): 453–458; “Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions,” Journal of Business 59, no. 4, Part 2 (October 1986): S251–S278.
15. Richard H. Thaler, “Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice,” Journal of Economic Behavior an
d Organization 1, no. 1 (March 1980): 36–90; “Mental Accounting and Consumer Choice,” Marketing Science 4, no. 3 (Summer 1985): 199–214.
16. Joseph Henrich, Steven J. Heine, and Ara Norenzayan, “The Weirdest People in the World?” Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 2010, 1–75.
17. Chris D. Frith and Tania Singer, “The Role of Social Cognition in Decision Making,” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society 363, no. 1511 (December 2008): 3875–3886; Colin Camerer and Richard H. Thaler, “Ultimatums, Dictators and Manners,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 9, no. 2: 209–219; A. G. Sanfey, J. K. Rilling, J. A. Aronson, L. E. Nystrom, and J. D. Cohen, “The Neural Basis of Economic Decisionmaking in the Ultimatum Game,” Science 300, no. 5626 (2003): 1755–1758. For a survey, see Angela A. Stanton, Evolving Economics: Synthesis, April 26, 2006, Munich Personal RePEc Archive, Paper No. 767, posted November 7, 2007, available at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/767/.
18. Robert Forsythe, Joel L. Horowitz, N. E. Savin, and Martin Sefton, “Fairness in Simple Bargaining Experiments,” Game Economics Behavior 6 (1994): 347–369.
19. Elizabeth Hoffman, Kevin McCabe, and Vernon L. Smith, “Social Distance and Other-Regarding Behavior in Dictator Games,” American Economic Review 86, no. 3 (June 1996): 653–660.
20. Joseph Patrick Henrich et al., “‘Economic Man’ in Cross-Cultural Perspective: Behavioral Experiments in 15 Small-Scale Societies,” Behavioral Brain Science 28 (2005): 813.
21. Stanton, Evolving Economics, 10.
22. Martin A. Nowak and Karl Sigmund, “The Dynamics of Indirect Reciprocity,” Journal of Theoretical Biology 194 (1998): 561–574.
23. Altruistic punishment has been shown to have a vital role in maintaining cooperation in groups. See Herbert Gintis, “Strong Reciprocity and Human Sociality,” Journal of Theoretical Biology 206, no. 2 (September 2000): 169–179.
24. Mauricio R. Delgado, “Reward-Related Responses in the Human Striatum,” Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 1104 (May 2007): 70–88.
25. Fabrizio Ferraro, Jeffrey Pfeffer, and Robert I. Sutton, “Economics, Language and Assumptions: How Theories Can Become Self-Fulfilling,” The Academy of Management Review 30, no. 1 (January 2005): 14–16; Gerald Marwell and Ruth E. Ames, “Economists Free Ride, Does Anyone Else? Experiments on the Provision of Public Goods,” Journal of Public Economics 15 (1981): 295–310.
26. Dale T. Miller, “The Norm of Self-Interest,” American Psychologist 54, no. 12 (December 1999): 1055, cited in Ferraro et al., “Economics, Language and Assumptions,” 14.
27. “Economics Focus: To Have and to Hold,” The Economist, August 28, 2003, available at http://www.economist.com/node/2021010.
28. Alan G. Sanfey, “Social Decision-Making: Insights from Game Theory and Neuroscience,” Science 318 (2007): 598.
29. See Guido Möllering, “Inviting or Avoiding Deception Through Trust: Conceptual Exploration of an Ambivalent Relationship,” MPIfG Working Paper 08/1, 2008, 6.
30. Rachel Croson, “Deception in Economics Experiments,” in Caroline Gerschlager, ed., Deception in Markets: An Economic Analysis (London: Macmillan, 2005), 113.
31. Erving Goffman, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (New York: Doubleday, 1959), 83–84. Students of deception have sought to revive an old word paltering, which is defined as acting insincerely or misleadingly, creating a false impression through “fudging, twisting, shading, bending, stretching, slanting, exaggerating, distorting, whitewashing, and selective reporting.” Frederick Schauer and Richard Zeckhauser, “Paltering,” in Brooke Harrington, ed., Deception: From Ancient Empires to Internet Dating (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009), 39.
32. Uta Frith and Christopher D. Frith, “Development and Neurophysiology of Mentalizing,” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society, London 358, no. 1431 (March 2003): 459–473. Responses to another’s pain were found in the same area of the brain where individuals respond to their own pain. An individual’s own pain, however, would lead to an effort to do something about it, and this required the activation of other parts of the brain. It was perhaps a legacy of the evolutionary process that by looking at others, important clues could be discerned about what to feel. In the faces of others could be seen warnings of an impending danger. T. Singer, B. Seymour, J. O’Doherty, H. Kaube, R. J. Dolan, and C. D. Frith, “Empathy for Pain Involves the Affective but Not Sensory Components of Pain,” Science 303, no. 5661 (February 2004): 1157–1162; Vittorio Gallese, “The Manifold Nature of Interpersonal Relations: The Quest for a Common Mechanism,” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society, London 358, no. 1431 (March 2003): 517; Stephany D. Preston and Frank B. M. de-Waal, “Empathy: the Ultimate and Proximate Bases,” Behavioral and Brain Scences 25 (2002): 1.
33. R. P. Abelson, “Are Attitudes Necessary?” in B. T. King and E. McGinnies, eds., Attitudes, Conflict, and Social Change (New York: Academic Press, 1972), 19–32, cited in Ira J. Roseman and Stephen J. Read, “Psychologist at Play: Robert P. Abelson’s Life and Contributions to Psychological Science,” Perspectives on Psychological Science 2, no. 1 (2007): 86–97.
34. R. C. Schank and R. P. Abelson, Scripts, Plans, Goals and Understanding: An Inquiry into Human Knowledge Structures (Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, 1977).
35. R. P. Abelson, “Script Processing in Attitude Formation and Decision-making,” in J. S. Carroll and J. W. Payne, eds., Cognition and Social Behavior (Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, 1976).
36. M. Lyons, T. Caldwell, and S. Shultz, “Mind-Reading and Manipulation—Is Machiavellianism Related to Theory of Mind?” Journal of Evolutionary Psychology 8, no. 3 (September 2010): 261–274.
37. Mirowski, Machine Dreams, 424.
38. Alan Sanfey, “Social Decision-Making: Insights from Game Theory and Neuroscience,” Science 318, no. 5850 (October 2007): 598–602.
39. Stephen Walt, “Rigor or Rigor Mortis?” (see chap. 36, n. 14).
40. Jonah Lehrer, How We Decide (New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2009), 227.
41. George E. Marcus, “The Psychology of Emotion and Passion,” in David O. Sears, Leonie Huddy, and Robert Jervis, eds., Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 182–221.
42. The designations System 1 and System 2 come from Keith Stanovich and Richard West, “Individual Differences in Reasoning: Implications for the Rationality Debate,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (2000): 645–665. Daniel Kahneman has popularized the terms in his Thinking Fast and Slow (London: Penguin Books, 2011). J. St. B. T. Evans, “In Two Minds: Dual-Process Accounts of Reasoning,” Trends in Cognition Science 7, no. 10 (October 2003): 454–459; “Dual-Processing Accounts of Reasoning, Judgment and Social Cognition,” The Annual Review of Psychology 59 (January 2008): 255–278.
43. Andreas Glöckner and Cilia Witteman, “Beyond Dual-Process Models: A Categorisation of Processes Underlying Intuitive Judgement and Decision Making,” Thinking & Reasoning 16, no. 1 (2009): 1–25.
44. Daniel Kahneman, Thinking Fast and Slow, 42.
45. Alan G. Sanfey et al., “Social Decision-Making,” 598–602.
46. Colin F. Camerer and Robin M. Hogarth, “The Effect of Financial Incentives,” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 19, no. 1–3 (December 1999): 7–42.
47. Jennifer S. Lerner and Philip E. Tetlock, “Accounting for the Effects of Accountability,” Psychological Bulletin 125, no. 2 (March 1999): 255–275.
48. Daniel Kahneman, Peter P. Wakker, and Rakesh Sarin, “Back to Bentham? Explorations of Experienced Utility,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 112, no. 2 (May 1997): 375–405; Daniel Kahneman, “A Psychological Perspective on Economics,” American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings 93, no. 2 (May 2003): 162–168.
49. J. K. Rilling, A. L. Glenn, M. R. Jairam, G. Pagnoni, D. R. Goldsmith, H. A. Elfenbein, and S. O. Lilienfeld, “Neural Correlates of Social Cooperation and Noncooperation as a Function of Psychopathy,” Biological Psychiatry 61 (2007): 1260–1271.
50. Philip Tetlcok, E
xpert Political Judgement (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006), 23.
51. Alan N. Hampton, Peter Bossaerts, and John P. O’Doherty, “Neural Correlates of Mentalizing-Related Computations During Strategic Interactions in Humans,” The National Academy of Sciences of the USA 105, no. 18 (May 6, 2008): 6741–6746; Sanfey et al., Social Decision-Making, 598.
52. David Sally, “Dressing the Mind Properly for the Game,” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society London B 358, no. 1431 (March 2003): 583–592.
38 Stories and Scripts
1. Charles Lindblom, “The Science of ‘Muddling Through,’ ” Public Administration Review 19, no. 2 (Spring 1959): 79–88.
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