太宗问：你的六花阵画地多少？
李 靖答：在大规模检阅军队的地方画周长一千二百步的正方形，其方法是：区分为六阵，每阵各占地周长为四百步的正方，并将六阵分为东西两厢，中间空地一千二百 步作为教战的场所。我曾用士卒三万人进行教练，每阵五千人，其中以一阵演练驻营的方法，其余五阵演练方、圆、曲、直、锐各种阵形的变化，每阵变化五次，五 阵共变化二十五次。
太宗说：五行阵的意义如何？
李靖答：五行阵本来是根据用五种颜色代表五个方位而定的名称，方、圆、曲、直、锐是根据地形而定的五种阵形。军队如不熟习这五种阵形，怎么可以临敌作战呢!用兵是诡诈的，所以故意称为五行阵，以掩饰其诡诈和渲染术数相生相克的道理。其实军队的行动象水一样，是因地势而制约其奔流方向的，这就是五行阵的意义。
Question 2.12
Tang Taizong asked: “Did the strategy of ambush known as the ‘Pin Mu’ strategy exist in the ancient times?”
Li Jing answered: “The Pin Mu strategy originated from tradition; it is basically the same idea as Yin Yang. Fan Li once mentioned that ‘To revolt after the enemy’s attack, we need potential; for a preemptive attack against the enemy, we need edge and courage.[30] Take the edge of the enemy’s spirit and exert our fullest potential to conquer our enemy.’ This is the wonder of military strategy, about potential and edges. There is another saying of Fan Li: ‘Arranging the right formation as Pin and the left formation as Mu, the time to launch our operation depends on the situation.’ Therefore, the left and right side of the formation in battle, and the timing to launch a military operation varies according to the situation. Underneath are the changes of the indirect and direct methods. The left and right refer to human Yin and Yang (right refers to Yin while left refers to Yang); day and night refers to the sky’s Yin and Yang (night refers to Yin while day is Yang). Qi Fan refers to the varying of left and right or day and night Yin and Yang. If we are reluctant to make changes, then Yin Yang would be meaningless; how could we maintain the form of Pin Mu? Therefore the direct army is used to deceive our enemy, but not our indirect army. The army that wins victories is the indirect army, but not our direct army. This is the varying of indirect and direct armies.
“Ambushing does not solely refer to ambushing using the valleys and the surroundings. The real art of ambushing refers to the use of the indirect army as steady-going as the mountains; use the direct army as swift as the lightning. Although the enemy is in front of us, they are unable to determine the location of our indirect and direct armies. If we can apply these two methods to this level, what signs could then be determined?”
太宗问：李责力说的牝牡、方圆、伏兵之法，古时有吗？
李靖答：牝牡之法，出于世俗所传，其实就是阴阳的意思。我范蠡说：”后 发制人要用潜力，先发制人要用锐气；把敌人的锐气折到最低限度，把我们的潜力发挥到最大程度去消灭敌人。”这是亨家运用潜力和锐气的奥妙之处。范蠢又说： “布设右阵为牝，再左阵为牡，行动的早晚要顺乎天时。”就是说布阵的左右、行动的早晚是因情况而不同，这就在于奇正的变化了。左右是指人的阴阳，(右为 阴，左为阳)早晚是指天的阴阳，(晚为阴，早为阳)奇反是指左右、早晚相互变化的阴阳，如果固执不变，明阳就没有意义了，怎能守牝牡的形式呢。所以欺骗敌 人的，是用奇兵迷惑它，而不是我的正兵，战胜敌人的，是用正兵打击它，而不是我的奇兵，这就是奇正的相互变化。
伏兵，不仅指利用山谷草木设伏而言，所谓真正的伏兵，是说运用正兵象山岳那样稳重，运用奇兵象雷霆那样急剧，敌人虽在对面，亦无法判断我奇正之所在。如果运用奇正到这种程度，那里还有什么形迹可以看得出来呢。
Question 2.13
Tang Taizong asked: “The battle formations of the ‘Four Beasts’ (dragon, tiger, bird and snake) also use the four sounds: Shang, Yu, Wei and Jiao to represent it. What is the theory behind this?”
Li Jing answered: “This is an example of the deceit of military strategies.”
Tang Taizong asked: “Could it be abolished?”
Li Jing answered: “The reason to retain the names of the four beasts, and the design of the four sounds to represents the four beasts, is that if we abolish it, then there will be other, more deceitful ways.”
Tang Taizong asked: “What is the principle behind this?”
Li Jing answered: “Under the guise of the name of the formations of four beasts, are the sky, the land and the wind; then add Shang Jin, Yu Shui, Zhen Huo, Jiao Mu’s cooperation. All these exist in the ancient military strategies which mention deceit. Retaining its name would prevent the addition of other deceitful ways; abolishing it could lead to foolish people eager to battle, but who have no accurate ways to study anymore.”
After a long consideration, Tang Taizong said: “You must not leak this secret; keep it tight.”
太宗问：(龙、虎、鸟、蛇)四兽之阵，又用商、羽、微、角四音末代表它，这是什么道理？
李靖答：这是兵家诡诈的方法。
太宗问：可以废除吗？
李靖答：保存四兽的名称和代表四兽的四音正是为了废除它，如果果废而不用，其他诡计的方法就更多了。
太宗问：这是什么道理？
李靖答：假借[龙、虎、鸟、蛇〕四兽的阵名和天、地、风、的称号，再加上商金、羽水、徵火、角木的配合，这都是兵家自古来的说诈方法，保留其名，其他诡诈的方法不会再增加；废除它，驱使贪婪愚昧的人还有什么方法可施呢。
太宗考虑很久才说：你要保守秘密，不可泄露出去。
Question 2.14
Tang Taizong asked: “I doubt the way about using draconian laws in military orders, so that the army fears us more that the enemy. In the past, Emperor Guang Wu resisted Wang Mang’s large troop with a small one. The emperor didn’t use severe penalties. What is the cause of this?”[31]
Li Jing answered: “Military victories could be caused under totally different conditions; we could not use a single condition to deduce the outcome. For example, the victory of Chen Sheng and Wu Guang against the Qin Empire; can you say that the laws that were set by Chen Sheng and Wu Guang are even more stringent than Qin Empire’s? When Han Guang Wu launched military operations to unify China, it conformed to the hopes of the people who hated Wang Mang. Not to mention that both Wang Xun and Wang Yi did not understand military strategies; they could only boast about the size of their troops, therefore causing their own defeat. I follow what was told in Sun Tzu’s ‘Art of War’: ‘If you give punishment when the soldiers have not yet supported you, how could you make people support your cause? But when the soldiers have supported you, and the army is unable to execute punishment accordingly, they would rarely achieve success.”
Tang Taizong said: “The theory of Sun Tzu’s ‘Art of War’ is unlike Shang Shu.[32] Shang Shu mentioned: ‘If the dignity is more that the benevolence, the army could achieve victory; however when the benevolence exceeds dignity, the army could not succeed. What is the meaning of the statement?”
Li Jing answered: “We must place benevolence in front of dignity, use benevolence first and punishment next. The sequence should not be mistaken. If you give punishment first, making things up with benevolence will not help. Shang Shu’s saying of ‘weigh dignity more than benevolence’ means that, he who governs people should consider the importance of dignity, but it does not mean that it is an educating method. Therefore, the sayings of Sun Tzu should not ever change.”
太宗问：用严刑峻法，使三军怕我而不怕敌人的说法，我很怀疑。从前光武皇帝以孤军抵挡王莽百万之众，并没有使用严刑峻法，这是什么原因呢？
李�
�答：兵家胜败的条件千差万别，各有不同，不可用一种条件去推断。如陈胜、吴广击败秦军，能说是陈胜、吴广的刑法比秦二世更为严苛吗？汉光武起兵定天下，是因为顺应了人民怨恨王莽的心理，何况王寻、王邑又不懂兵法，只夸军队众多，所以自取失败。我按《孙子》说：”士卒尚未拥护。就使用刑罚。别人心不服：已经取得拥护而刑罚不能正确执行，这种军队就不能使用。”这是说，为将的必须先用恩爱和士卒建立良好的感情。然后才可以实施严历的刑罚，如果和士卒尚未建立良好的感情，便单纯使用严刑峻法，是很少能够成功的。
太宗说：[《孙子》听说的道理跟《尚书》不同，]《尚书》说：”威严超过仁爱，就可以成功；仁爱超过成严，就不会成功。”这是什么意思？
李靖答：先施仁爱，后用刑罚。次序不可颠倒。若是用弄罚，后用仁爱去补救，对事情就没有补益了。《尚书》说的[重威轻爱]，是指在事情发生以后告戒人要慎重考虑法令的威信，不是说以此作为事先的教育方法。所以孙子的说法是万世不能更改的。
Question 2.15
Tang Taizong said: “After you conquered Xiao Xian, all generals and commanders would have liked to confiscate the properties of Xiao Xian’s civil and military officials to reward the soldiers, and only you thought that it was inappropriate. You persuaded them by citing the allusion of Han Gao Zhu not killing Kuai Tong. After that, the people of Jiang Han were submissive. This incident really makes me think of what the ancients said about ‘Scholarly talent could earn the support of the army, while the martial talents could make the enemy submissive.’ I think you are the person being described.”
Li Jing said: “When Han Guang Wu conquered the Che Ju army, he rode into the Che Mei camp to examine the situation. He rode slowly, representing that he was not suspicious or fearful; therefore the Che Mei army said ‘King Siao has come to confide in us.’ His daring was due to his analysis of the character of the Che Mei people. He was, of course not going to go in there blindly, without analysis beforehand! Not long ago, when I conquered Tu Jue, I was commanding two types of armies: foreign and Han. I didn’t kill Yang Gan, but decapitated Zhuang Jia. I was just treating people honestly and fairly. Your Majesty is over confident of my abilities, and has promoted me to such a high position. I really dare not accept the compliment that I possess both scholarly and martial talents; it is too much of an honor.”
太宗说：你平定萧铣之后，各将领都想没收萧铣部下文武官员的家财以搞赏士卒，只有你认为不可，并引用了汉高祖不杀蒯通之事，加以说服。以后江汉人民果然归顺了。我因此想到古人说过：”文才能使士众拥护，武功能使敌人慑服”，可以说就是这样的人了。
李靖说：汉光武平定赤局军以后，乘马进入赤眉营中巡视检阅，按辔缓缓而行，[以 示对赤眉并无疑惧之心]，因而赤眉军说：萧王此来是推心置腹，开诚相见。这是由于事先判断赤眉的人情本不是坏的，岂是没有分析而轻率进入赤眉军营的呢！我 不久以前征讨突厥时，统率番汉两部人马，出塞千里，并末杀一”扬干”，斩一”庄贾”，也不过是推诚待人，大公无私罢了。陛下过分信任，把我提拔到这样高的 地位，如果说我是文武兼备实不敢当。
Question 2.16
Tang Taizong asked: “In the past, I sent Tang Jian as an envoy to Tu Jue, but you took the advantage at this time to conquer Tu Jue. There are people who said that you have made Tang Jian a ‘dead envoy’. I still have doubts on this; why did you did you pick that particular time?”
Li Jing bowed again and continued with answering: “Tang Jian and I assist Your Majesty together. I had already predicted that Tang Jian would be unable to persuade Tu Jue; therefore, I took the advantage for which Tu Jue had been slack. This was for the good of the country and all commoners; therefore, I couldn’t care about the private affairs between Tang Jian and myself. There were people who said I used Tang Jian as a sacrifice, but that was not my intention. According to Sun Tzu, the use of spies is not always the best strategy. I have given my comments on the last pages of the chapter about using spies: ‘The water that bears the boat is the same that swallows it.’ Or, if something is used correctly, it will be of benefit, and if used incorrectly, will do harm. Therefore there are people who use spies successfully, and there are people who don’t. If the ministers could assist the monarch early, be fair in solving the affairs of the state, be loyal and do their best as ministers - honest in giving opinions - with this, even the best spies would be of no use. The matter involving Tang Jian is just a private affair. Your Majesty has no need to be suspicious of this action.”
Tang Taizong said: “This is indeed true; the people who are not good cannot use spies. Is this something that can be done by a mediocre enemy? Even the Duke of Zhou could kill his relatives for a virtuous cause, not to mention an envoy; now I understand truly.”
太宗问：我从前派遣唐俭出使突厥，你却乘此袭击，大败突厥，有人说你这是把唐俭做了死间，我到现在尚有怀疑，究竟如何？
李靖再拜答：我与唐俭同在朝廷并肩辅佐君主，预料唐俭必然不能说服突厥，所以来突厥懈怠之际纵兵进攻它，这是为了消除自家大患，也顾不得保全与唐俭的私人小义了。有人说我把唐俭作为死间，这不是我的本意。按《孙子》用间之说最为下策，我在用间篇之末曾这样论述过：”水能载舟亦能覆舟，所以有用间成功的，也有因用间而失败的。假如为臣的从年轻时就辅佐君主，参与朝政公正无私，忠心耿耿能尽臣节，信实不欺，竭诚相见，这样虽有善于为间的人，又怎能发生作用呢？象唐俭这样的事乃是小义问题，陛下何必怀疑呢!
太宗说：确是这样，不是仁义兼备的人不能使用间谍，这岂是平庸小人所能做到的吗。周公尚又为大义而灭亲，何况对于一个使者呢。现在我明白无疑了。
Question 2.17
Tang Taizong asked: “In war, it is better to be the host and not the visitor in the land. It is better to win quickly, but not to engage in protracted battles. Why is this?”
Li Jing answered: “War is launched because we have no other option; therefore it is not beneficial to be the visitor to the land, and launch protracted wars. Sun Tzu’s ‘Art of War’ stated, ‘If we are transporting food on the journey, it signifies that the commoners are poor.’ This tries to explain the disadvantages of being the visitor in a war. Another saying is ‘The skillful soldier does not raise a second levy, neither are his supply-wagons loaded more than twice.’ His statement concluded that war should not be protracted. Analyzing the concept of the host and visitor force in war, it follows that it is possible that there could be a war that could turn the host force into the invaders, and vice versa.”
Tang Taizong said: “What is this based on?”
Li Jing answered: “The army must depend on the food supplies of its enemy. This is the way to change from being the invading force into the main force. ‘Make the full enemy hungry, make the strong enemy fatigued.’ Therefore, military operations should not rigidly stick to the concept of ‘main and invading forces’, and the speed of the operations. If we command the whole military operation correctly, we can always still achieve victory.”
Tang Taizong asked: “Are there cases of this which existed in the ancient times?”
Li Jing answered: “In the past, when the King of Yue was conquering Wu, he used the left and right army (hitting the drums at midnight) to attack. The army of Wu separated their troops for defense, but the King of Yue stopped hitting the drums and sneaked to attack the army of Wu with Yue’s middle army. This is also an example of changing from the invading force to the main force.
“When Shi Le was warring with Ji Dan, Ji Dan was bringing his army from the far side. Shi Le assigned Kong Chang as the striker to attack Ji Dan’s army, but Kong Chang retreat
ed purposefully, to lure Ji Dan’s army to chase them. Meanwhile, Shi Le arranged an ambush attack. They defeated Ji Dan’s army; this is a case of changing the strong enemy into a fatigued one. Such cases happened all the time in history.”
太宗问：用兵作战，贵为主，不贵为客；贵速胜，不贵特久，道理何在？
李靖答：兵是不得已才用的，故不宜为客和特久。《孙子》”运道运输粮食，则百姓贫困。”这是说为客的害处。又说：”不可征调两次，粮食不应输送三回。”这是总结了不可特久的经验。仔细分析主客的形势，从而有了变主为客，变客为主的方法。
太宗问：这是指什么说的？
李靖答：”军队取粮于敌”，就是变客为主；”敌饱能使它饿，敌佚能使他疲劳”，这就是变主为客。所以用兵作战不必拘泥主客、迟速，只要能指挥得当，就能取胜。
太宗问：古人有这种事例吗？
李靖答：从前越王勾践伐吴，用左右两军[末夜]击鼓进战，吴军分兵抵抗，越王用中军息鼓偷渡袭击，打败了吴军，这是变客为主的例子。石勒与姬澹作战，姬澹率兵远未，石勒派孔苌为前锋迎击姬澹的军队，孔苌故意退却，引诱澹军来追，石勒则用伏兵夹击，大败澹军，这是变劳为佚的例子。古人这种事例是很多的。
Question 2.18
Tang Taizong asked: “I have heard that caltrop and wooden fences were designed by Jiang Ziya himself. Is that true?”
Li Jing answered: “Yes, but that is just for the purpose of defending against the enemy’s attack. In battle, the main purpose is to defeat our enemy, but not only for the sole purpose of defending. The caltrop and wooden fence mentioned in Jiang Ziya’s ‘Liu Tao’ were just defending tools; they aren’t for use in attacks.”
Military Strategy Classics of Ancient China Page 53
