by Ying-shih Yü
other and yet slightly diff er ent. Could it be that the “attending”
( shi) twice referred
to in the Shiji was quite close to “kneeling” ( gui)? This awaits further investigation.
Regarding the diff erence between zuo and gui, see in detail the essay “On Gui (Kneel-
ing), Zuo (Sitting), and Bai (Saluting),” in Zhu Xi
, Zhu Wengong wenji
,
juan 68.
7.
In 1957, a batch of Western Han murals was discovered at Luoyang (Henan Province).
Guo Moruo deci ded that one of them depicted the Hung Men Banquet. See Guo Moruo,
“Luoyang Hanmu bihua shitan”
, KG 2 (1964). For an illustration,
see “A Report on the Excavation of the Murals in Western Han Tombs at Luoyang” in
t h e s e at ing or der at t h e hong m e n b a n q ue t 133
the same issue, 107–125, and plate 2 in the section on illustrations. In my judgment, al-
though the mural resembles a banquet in a military camp, many diffi
culties will be
encountered if one is to point directly at it and assert that it is a repre sen ta tion of the
Hong Men Banquet. I have briefl y touched on this in my chapter on “Han China” in Food
in Chinese Culture, so I shall not repeat that information here. See K. C. Chang, ed., Food in
Chinese Culture: Anthropological and Historical Perspectives (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1977), chap. 2, “Han China.”
7. Individualism and the Neo- Daoist Movement
in Wei- Jin China
Both “individualism” and “holism” are Western concepts whose introduc-
tion into Chinese intellectual discourse is a matter of only recent historical
development.1 This does not mean, however, that as categories of analy sis these
two concepts are totally inapplicable to the study of early Chinese thought. As a
matter of fact, we fi nd in the long history of Chinese po liti cal and social thought
a wide range of views that can be legitimately characterized as either holistic or
individualistic. In this study, the Neo- Daoist movement since the end of the Han
dynasty will be explored as an example of one type of Chinese individualism.
C R I S I S I N S O C I A L R E L AT I O N S H I P S
AT T H E E N D O F T H E H A N
Throughout the Han Period (202 b.c.e.– 8 c.e. and 25–220 c.e.), the central is-
sue in Chinese po liti cal and social thinking was the prob lem of collective life at
vari ous levels. The prob lem of the individual, which had fi gured prominently
in classical thought in pre- Qin times, ceased to be a matter of major concern to
the Han- dynasty Chinese theorists. As a result, the best- known Chinese theory
of social relationships— the so- called three bonds and six rules ( sangang liuji
)— reached its defi nitive formulation during this period. The “three
bonds” refers to the relationships between ruler and subject, father and son,
indi v idua l is m a nd t h e ne o - daois t m ov e m e n t 135
and husband and wife, whereas the “six rules” pertain to those between pater-
nal uncles, elder and younger brothers, other relatives of the same surname,
maternal uncles, teachers, and friends. What is meant by these “bonds” and
“rules”? The Bohu tongde lun
(White Tiger Hall Discussions) pro-
vides the following answer: “A bond gives orderliness; a rule regulates. What is
greater is the bond; what is smaller is the rule. They serve to order and regulate
(the relations between) superiors and inferiors, and to arrange and adjust the
way of mankind.”2 As the quotation makes apparent, the theory is exclusively
concerned with the establishment of order in all social groups, from family to
state. Though unmistakably Legalist in origin, the idea of the “three bonds”
was nevertheless fully incorporated into Han Confucian ideology.3 Under Le-
galist infl uence, Han Confucianism also systematically developed the li
(rites; rituals) in a way similar to the development of the Legalist fa
(laws).
What ever the diff erences may have been between the li and the law, there can
be little doubt that during the Han Period they both functioned, each in its own
way, as external constraints on the individual. Li and law later became so closely
associated that by 94 c.e., the Han Commandant of Justice could even charac-
terize the two as “the outside and the inside of the same thing.” 4
If we take the Han Period to be essentially an age of collectivism, then the
end of the Han dynasty witnessed the rise of individualism. As a matter of fact,
the period from the end of the second century to the early de cades of the fourth
century was the only epoch in Chinese history in which individualism fl our-
ished, not only in the realm of thought but also in the world of action. To under-
stand this impor tant historical development, we must begin our account with
the profound social and intellectual crisis that began at the end of the Han
dynasty.
The crisis took place primarily in the realm of social relationships in some
radical circles of the elite class and may best be described as dissolution of the
“three bonds.” Let us fi rst examine the ruler– subject relationship. By the sec-
ond half of the second century c.e., there were indications that the idea of uni-
versal kingship was under fi re. In 164 when Emperor Huan
of Han made
an imperial visit to Yunmeng (in modern Hubei), he attracted a large crowd
from the neighborhood. There was, however, one old man from Hanyin who
continued to work in the fi eld as if nothing was happening. Surprised, a mem-
ber of the imperial entourage asked the old man why he alone showed no inter-
est in looking at the emperor. The old man said:
May I ask: What is our purpose in establishing the Son of Heaven? To
bring order to the world? Or to bring chaos to it? Do we establish the Son
of Heaven with the hope that he would treat us with paternal love? Or
must we enslave the whole world in order to provide the needs of the Son
of Heaven? Formerly, the sage- kings, in governing the world, had only
thatched huts for shelter. Nevertheless, the people lived in peace. Now,
136 indi v idua l is m a nd t h e ne o - daois t m ov e m e n t
look at your ruler. He forces the people to work hard so that he can live in
self- indulgence and enjoy leisurely trips without limit. I am ashamed for
you. Yet you have the nerve to ask me to look up to him with reverence.5
This passage immediately raises the question of the legitimacy of universal
kingship. Here the authority to rule is based not on the idea of the “Mandate of
Heaven,” but on the Daoist theory of the state of nature. Thus, when a ruler
fails to fulfi ll the obligations of his part, he has violated the contract and dis-
qualifi ed himself from the throne. The view of the old man from Hanyin, there-
fore, not only alludes to the disintegration of po liti cal order but also anticipates
the type of anarchism that was to dominate Chinese po liti cal thinking in the
next two centuries, as exemplifi ed particularly by the ideas of Ruan Ji
(210–263) and Bao Jingyan
(fourth century c.e.).
In his famous “Daren xiansheng sheng zhuan” (Biography
of the great man),
Ruan Ji says:
For there were no rulers and every thing was in order; there were no offi
-
cials and every matter went well. . . . Once rulers were instituted, oppres-
sions arose; once offi
cials were appointed, robbery began. Detached and
apart, they instituted the rites and the laws by which to impose the bonds
on the common people. . . . The utmost of Heaven, Earth, and the myriad
things are exhausted in order to supply their insatiable sensual desires.6
There can be little doubt that this anarchist declaration was a culmination of
the line of thinking implicit in the words of the old man from Hanyin.7 Later,
Bao Jingyan further developed the anarchist theme by undermining the tradi-
tional theoretical foundations of po liti cal order. He was the fi rst thinker to
openly challenge the myth of the Mandate of Heaven. Po liti cal order was not
imposed on man by Heaven. Rather, it arose from the simple fact that “the
strong suppressed the weak until the weak submitted to them; the clever out-
smarted the stupid until the stupid served them.” Following the ideas of early
Daoists, especially Zhuangzi
, he described the joys of the state of nature as
follows: “In remote antiquity, rulers and subjects did not exist. Wells were dug
for drinking, and fi elds tilled for food. At sunrise, the people went out to work; at
sunset, they came home to rest. Movement was free and without restriction, and
desires did not go unfulfi lled. Competition and planning were unknown, as were
honor and disgrace.” 8 Here Bao Jingyan clearly placed freedom of the individual
above social order.
From the second century to the fourth, it may be noted, this type of anar-
chistic thought gained currency in China. In the Liezi, there is a Utopian coun-
try called “Utmost North,” where “old and young live as equals and no one is
ruler or subject.”9 The most celebrated Utopia in Chinese lit er a ture, Tao Qian’s
(372–427) Peach- Blossom Spring, is also a community characterized by
indi v idua l is m a nd t h e ne o - daois t m ov e m e n t 137
the absence of the ruler– subject relationship, as was rightly observed by Wang
Anshi
(1021–1086) long ago.10 It was on account of this authority crisis
that conservatives such as Guo Xiang
(d. 312 c.e.), Ge Hong
(253?–333?),
and Yuan Hong
(328–376) found it necessary to come to the defense of
po liti cal order. In their view, a community without a ruler would inevitably end
in either chaos or disintegration.11 The fact of the defense itself testifi es to the
great popularity, and hence the great danger, of anarchist ideas during this
period.12
On the other hand, universal kingship was experiencing a crisis not only as
an idea but also as an institution. The reference to the Han emperor as “your
ruler” by the old man from Hanyin suggests that in his view, no ruler– subject
relationship ever existed between the emperor and himself. That such a view
gained considerable currency in China at the end of the Han should occasion
no surprise, for by the second century c.e., the ruler– subject bond had ac-
quired, in actual practice, a particularized, personal character. To illustrate this
point, let me proff er one in ter est ing example. In 199 c.e., Liu Biao
, the
overlord of Jingzhou, deci ded to send a local assistant named Han Song
to
the imperial court as his personal envoy, but Han said to Liu:
When one commits oneself to a ruler– subject relationship, one is bound
by it till death. Since I have pledged my allegiance to you, I place myself
completely in your ser vice even at the risk of my life. . . . Now Your Excel-
lency sends me to the capital. Should it so happen that the Emperor off ers
me a position which I cannot decline, then I would become His Majesty’s
subject and Your Excellency’s former subordinate. As a man owes his
primary loyalty to the ruler he is currently serving, I am afraid that my
duty would then require me to obey His Majesty’s orders. Therefore, I
would no longer be able to devote my life to Your Excellency.13
Han Song’s words show clearly that by the end of the Han, a man did not take
the emperor as his ruler until he actually accepted the latter’s offi
cial appoint-
ment. Thus, the ruler– subject relationship in second- century China, like the
feudal lord– serf bond in medieval Germanic culture, became essentially per-
sonal in nature.14 At any given time, a man had only one par tic u lar ruler to
serve, and it made no diff erence whether the ruler was an emperor or a local
lord. This new development is further illustrated by the following, widely circu-
lated saying of the time: “When a family has served a lord for two generations,
they regard him as their master ( zhu ), and for three generations, they regard
him as their ruler ( jun
).”15 All of these examples point to the conclusion that
the emperor had ceased to be perceived as a universal king.
An equally profound crisis was also taking place in familial relationships.
First of all, the idea of xiao , or fi lial piety, being interpreted in purely biologi-
cal terms was seriously questioned by late Han scholars. Taking up an argument
138 indi v idua l is m a nd t h e ne o - daois t m ov e m e n t
fi rst formulated by the critical thinker Wang Chong
(27–ca. 100 c.e.),
Kong Rong
(153–208 c.e.), a descendant of Confucius, reportedly made the
following startling remarks about the parent– child relationship: “Why should
there exist a special kind of affi
nity between father and son? Originally, the
father merely intended to satisfy his desire. What exactly is the relationship be-
tween mother and son? A son in his mother’s womb is no diff er ent from a
thing in a bottle. Once the thing comes out of the bottle, the two become sepa-
rate and are no longer related.”16 Later, when Ruan Ji was told that a man had
murdered his mother, he immediately remarked, “It is conceivable that some-
one would kill his father, but this man has indeed gone too far by killing his
mother!”17 Such radical ideas may well have refl ected, to a considerable extent,
a real crisis in the father– son relationship. At any rate, it had become proverbial
by the end of the Han that “ those who have been recommended to offi
ce on the
merit of fi lial piety often turn out to live separately from their fathers.”18
There were signs that the husband– wife relationship was also undergoing a
fundamental change during the Wei- Jin Period. To begin with, it is impor tant
to point out that like the idea of fi lial piety, the traditional view that de
, or
virtue, was the most essential quality in women also became subject to dispute.
Xun Can
, who lived in the fi rst quarter of the third century, startled his
contemporaries with the unorthodox view that “a woman’s virtue is not worth
praising; her beauty should be considered the most impor tant thing.”19 As a
matter of fact, elite women during this period generally disregarded the Confu-
cian rules of propriety. Instead of devoting themselves exclusively to house hold
work, they now became actively involved in society. For instance, in about 194,
when Xiahou Dun
, governor of Chenliu, gave an offi
cial banquet in
honor of his newly appointed subordinate, Wei Zhen
, the invitation also
included Wei’s wife. Wei, however, being a conservative, criticized the practice
as “the custom of an age of de cadence that does not agree with the established
ritual ( li ).”20 This “custom” persisted and spread over the next two centuries,
however. Writing in the early years of the fourth century, Ge Hong complained
that women of his day no longer attended to their house hold duties. Instead,
they were busy taking part in all kinds of social gatherings, especially informal,
mixed parties at which they enjoyed conversation, drinking, and music in the
com pany of men. Moreover, it even became fash ion able among friends to greet
the host’s wife in the inner chamber ( ru shi shi qi
).21 The new lifestyle
of elite women of the period is best described in the offi
cial history of the Jin
dynasty:
With their makeup and hair- dress and fi ne clothing, they depend entirely
on maids and servants to do for them; they know nothing of women’s
work in the tasks of silk and linen making, nor of the house hold work of
preparing foods and wines. They marry prematurely; they act just as they
indi v idua l is m a nd t h e ne o - daois t m ov e m e n t 139
feel. Consequently, they admit no shame for licentious transgressions,
and have no compunctions about displaying the fault of jealousy. Their
fathers and older brothers do not reproach them, nor does the world con-
demn them.22
T H E D I S C O V E R Y O F T H E I N D I V I D U A L
The foregoing discussion of the po liti cal and social crisis provides us with the
historical background against which the rise of individualism during the Wei-
Jin Period may be evaluated. In his well- known study of the development of the
individual in Re nais sance Italy, Jacob Burckhardt points out that in the Middle
Ages, “man was conscious of himself only as a member of race, people, party,
