by Ying-shih Yü
he also showed some hesitancy in identifying Mind and Nature as one. There-
fore, he said that the two are originally indistinguishable. Nevertheless, since
they bear two diff er ent names, it is also permissible to distinguish the one from
the other. In the end, he reached the following formulation: “Where Mind arises,
Nature dis appears; where Mind dis appears, Nature emerges.” 86 Yet to fi rmly es-
tablish the identifi cation would entail a detailed knowledge of Jiao Hong’s views
of Mind and Nature, respectively, which are diffi
cult to obtain, owing to the frag-
mentary nature of his philosophical remarks. The author does write a great deal
about them. Unfortunately, as in the previous cases, his reconstructions are often
vitiated by his uncritical use of sources. Take, for example, his treatment of Jiao
Hong’s idea of “Mind.” The author attributes the following statements as char-
acteristically Jiao Hong’s: Mind “has neither a body nor location” and “is not a
thing which can be held or pointed to.” It is “without past or pres ent.” “The
human mind is the Dao . . . the world calls it Mind because there is nothing of
which it is not conscious” (214). But all of these quotes are from Yang Jian, a
leading disciple of Lu Xiangshan.87 The author also puts into Jiao Hong’s mouth
the following words: Mind “does not regard anything as external ( wuwai
)”
(214), which, again, turns out to be a sentence in an essay entitled “Xing Lun”
(A Discourse on Nature) by another Song scholar, Fan Jun, whose essay on
Mind was quoted by Zhu Xi.88
Confronted with such highly dubious reconstructions, I cannot possibly
bring myself to share the author’s confi dence that Jiao Hong was a “monist of
qi” according to his strict defi nition. Thus, out of the three cases of the author’s
own choosing, it is at least very doubtful whether two of them— Zhang Xuech-
eng and Jiao Hong— can be defi nitely established as having conceived li as li of
qi and identifi ed Mind with Nature. In that case, then, what evidence do we
have to assert that all three of them “participated in a monistic discursive prac-
tice”? Moreover, even if we can establish the fact that most monists of qi in the
late Ming were followers of the Lu- Wang school, there is still no basis either to
identify Jiao Hong as one of them or to place Dai Zhen of the middle Qing in
the Lu- Wang tradition. After all, not all that glitters is gold.
Suppose we accept the author’s view that Jiao Hong, Dai Zhen, and Zhang
Xuecheng were all monists of the Lu- Wang persuasion. We are still left with
the thorny question of what connections to make between this monism of qi
and “evidential research” as a learned movement. Logical connection? Histori-
cal connection? Or both? We cannot help asking the following questions: Why
did a “restructuring” in Neo- Confucian metaphysics and ontology necessarily
350 t h e in t e l le c t ua l wor l d of j i ao hong r e v isi t ed
lead to the rise of philology? Precisely in what way did this par tic u lar kind of
“monistic restructuring,” as the author insists, constitute the “context” in
which the Qing “evidential research” operated? Does this mean that in order to
be able to conduct “evidential research,” a scholar’s mind must fi rst be structur-
ally re oriented in terms of not only monism of qi but also “identifi cation of
Mind with Nature or li”? If so, why, with the sole exception of Dai Zhen, did
none of the mid- Qing “evidential” scholars show even the slightest interest in
Neo- Confucian metaphysics and ontology? On questions like these, which are
central to his thesis, the author is completely silent. Very recently, Irene Bloom
has written:
Many of the major Qing thinkers, including Wang Fuzhi (1619–1692) in
the seventeenth century, and Dai Zhen in the eigh teenth century, also
espoused a philosophy of qi, and it may well be argued that the philoso-
phy of qi was a necessary concomitant of, if not a precondition for, the
new style of evidential research in the Qing. But, whereas the philosophy
of qi was no doubt one of the under lying themes of Qing thought, and
clearly a concern of several of the most prominent Qing thinkers, it ap-
pears not to have been the active focus of interest and debate throughout
most of the period.89
Bloom has certainly put her fi n ger on the right spot when she won ders why the
philosophy of qi “appears not to have been the active focus of interest and de-
bate” in Qing intellectual history. She also exemplifi es the cautiousness and
sensitivity of an intellectual historian in being able to rein her horse to a halt on
the very edge of a precipice. The temptation to link philosophy of qi to “eviden-
tial research” is not easy to resist, but the fall from the precipice could be fatal.
not e s
1.
Romanizations have been changed to Pinyin in quotes from Professor Ch’ien’s
book.— Eds.
2.
Dominick LaCapra, “Rethinking Intellectual History and Reading Texts,” in Modern
Eu ro pean Intellectual History: Reappraisals and New Perspectives, ed. Dominick LaCapra
and Steven L. Kaplan (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1982), esp. pp. 78–85.
3.
Hayden White, “Method and Ideology in Intellectual History: The Case of Henry Ad-
ams,” in LaCapra and Kaplan, Modern Eu ro pean Intellectual History, 283.
4. Hans-
Georg
Gadamer,
Truth and Method (London: Sheed & Ward, 1975), 337.
5. Paul
Ricoeur,
Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences, ed. and trans. John B. Thompson
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 146.
6.
David Couzens Hoy, The Critical Circle, Lit er a ture, History, and Philosophical Hermeneutics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 77.
t h e in t e l le c t ua l wor l d of j i ao hong r e v isi t ed 351
7. Gadamer, Truth and Method, 273.
8. Mark Poster, “The Future According to Foucault: The Archaeology of Knowledge and In-
tellectual History,” in LaCapra and Kaplan, Modern Eu ro pean Intellectual History, 137.
9. Herbert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and
Hermeneutics, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), 16–17.
10.
Li Zhi, Xu fenshu
(Beijing: Zhonghua, 1959), 68.
11. Zhu Guozhen, Yongchuang xiaopin
(Shanghai: Zhonghua, 1959), juan 10: 216–
217. See also Joanna F. Handlin, Action in Late Ming Thought: The Re orientation of Lü
K’ un and Other Scholar- Offi
cials (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), 110.
12.
Yongchuang xiaopin, juan 16: 369.
13. Jiao Hong, Danyuan ji
, Jinling congshu,
, 13:18b (Taipei: Lixing shuju,
n.d.).
14.
Ibid., 28:12a– b.
15. Ibid., 16:6b.
16.
Chen Yuan
, Mingji dianqian Fojiao kao
(Beijing: Zhonghua,
1962), 118–126.
17. Han Shan dashi nianpu shushu
/> (Taipei: Guangwen, 1967), 10–15.
18.
Shen Defu
, Wanli yehuo bian
(Beijing: Zhonghua, 1959), juan 27:
687–688.
19.
Shen Zengzhi
, Hairi lou zhacong
(Shanghai: Zhonghua, 1962), 214.
20. Judith A. Berling, The Syncretic Religion of Lin Chao- en (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1980), 216.
21.
Ibid., 3.
22. Yu Songqing
, Ming- Qing bailian jiao yanjiu
(Chengdu: Sichuan
renmin, 1987), 49.
23. For this text, see ibid., 242. Liu Mi’s
view may be found in his Sanjiao pingxin lun
, in Taishô shinshu daizôkyo
, vol. 52, no. 2117, 781. Lin Zhao-en
also discussed this distinction. See Berling, The Syncretic Religion of Lin Chao- en, 201.
24. Quoted in Yu Songqing, Ming- Qing bailian jiao yanjiu, 242.
25. Wang Wencheng Gong quanshu
, SBCK, juan 34, nianpu, 959–960. For a
slightly diff er ent version, see Liu Ts’un- yan, “Taoist Self- Cultivation in Ming Thought,”
in Self and Society in Ming Thought, ed. Wm. Theodore de Bary and the Conference on
Ming Thought (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970), 316–317.
26. As late as the mid- seventeenth century, for instance, Fang Yizhi
(1610–1670) still
more or less followed the Three- Chamber meta phor in his version of Sanjiao heyi. See
Yü Ying- shih
, Fang Yizhi wanjie kao
, revised and expanded edition
(Taipei: Yunchen, 1986), 66.
27. Longxi Wang xiansheng quanji
(hereafter Longxi ji), in Jinshi hanji cong-
kan
, ed. Okada Takehiko
and Araki Kengo
(Taipei:
Guangwen, 1972 [reprint]), juan 17: 1316–1318.
28. For Li Zhi, see his “Sanjiao guiru shuo”
, in Xu fenshu, 77–78; for Lin Zhao-
en, see Sakai Tadao
, Chûgoku zensho no kenkyu
(Tokyo:
Kôbundô, 1960), esp. pp. 266–276.
352 t h e in t e l le c t ua l wor l d of j i ao hong r e v isi t ed
29. Longxi ji, juan 1: 133–135.
30. Ibid., juan 7: 508–510.
31. Xu fenshu, 1–2.
32. Wang Gen
was actually a radical anti- Buddhist. See his nianpu
, in Wang
xinzhai quanji
, Jinshi hanji congkan, 18.
33.
Huang Zongxi
, The Rec ords of Ming Scholars, ed. Julia Ching (Honolulu: Univer-
sity of Hawaii Press, 1987), 179.
34. Xu fenshu, 92.
35.
Longxi ji, juan 10: 923–929; also juan 4: 360–369.
36. Julia Ching, “Keng Ting- hsiang,” in Dictionary of Ming Biography, 1368– 1644, ed.
L. Carrington Goodrich and Chaoying Fang (New York: Columbia University Press,
1976), 719; Julia Ching, “Wang Chi,” in ibid., 1353.
37. See Wang Ji’s letter to Luo Hongxian
in Longxi ji, juan 10: 715, and Geng Dianx-
iang’s view in Huang Zongxi, MRXA, SBBY, 35:6b.
38. Fenshu (Beijing: Zhonghua, 1961), 45, and 121–122; Xu fenshu, 28–29.
39. Xu fenshu, 26.
40. Fenshu, 45, and 118; Xu fenshu, 26.
41.
Yuan chaoben Rizhi lu
, punctuated by Xu Wenshan
(Taipei: Min-
glun, 1970), 538. For modern views, see Rong Zhaozu
, Mingdai sixiangshi
(Taipei: Taiwan Kaiming, 1962 [reprint]), 235–237; Qian Mu
, “Lüelun
Wangxue liubian”
, in his Zhongguo xueshu sixiangshi luncong
(Taipei: Dongda, 1979), 7:161–162; Shimada Kenji
, Chugoku ni okeru
kindai shii no zasetsu
(Tokyo: Hebonsha, 1949), 297–299.
42. Danyuan ji, 48:13a.
43. Danyuan xuji, 10:25a– b.
44. Zhipan
, Fozu tongji
, in Daizōkyo
, vol. 49, no. 2035, 429.
45. Danyuan ji, 12:8a; Jiao Hong, Jiaoshi bicheng xuji (hereafter Bicheng xu), GXJBCS, 2:169.
46. Longxi ji, juan 7: 499; juan 17: 1318.
47. Fozu tongji, 429.
48. Luo Dajing
, Helin yulu
(Beijing: Zhonghua, 1983), 280.
49. Zhang Shangying, Hufa lun, Daizōkyo, vol. 52, no. 2114, 638.
50. ZYL, punctuated edition (Beijing: Zhonghua, 1986), 8:3015. The quoted words are from
Zheng Xing’s
preface to Zhang Shangying’s Hufa lun, dated 1171, 637.
51. Longxi ji, juan 3: 288–289.
52. Ibid., juan 3: 293; juan 6: 467–468.
53.
Danyuan ji, 23:15a– b.
54. Longxi ji, juan 6: 467–468.
55.
Dai Zhen
, MZS (Beijing: Zhonghua, 1961), 173–174.
56. Bicheng
, 4:102–105.
57.
Liang Qixiong
, Xunzi jianshi
(Hong Kong: Zhonghua, 1974), 62. I have
followed the translation by Derk Bodde in Fung Yu- lan, History of Chinese Philosophy
(Prince ton: Prince ton University Press, 1952), 1:281.
t h e in t e l le c t ua l wor l d of j i ao hong r e v isi t ed 353
58. Bicheng, 4:103. “Taking hold of the will and cultivating the qi” may be found in Mencius, 2A.2.
59. This wenji is an undated Ming edition in two juan and the letter, entitled “Yu Wang
Duxue disan shu”
, i.e., “Fu Guangxi Duxue Wang Jing suo shu qi san”
, may be found in juan 1: 51a–56b.
60. See, for example, 124n25; 234n280 and 282; 235n288; 236n291.
61.
Zhao Wensu Gong wenji, juan 1: 56a.
62. I owe the term “rage of coherence” to Peter Gay, “The Social History of Ideas: Ernst Cas-
sirer and After,” in The Critical Spirit: Essays in Honor of Herbert Marcuse, ed. Kurt H.
Wolff and Barrington Moore Jr. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1967), esp. pp. 114–117.
63. Mingdai sixiangshi, 264.
64. Danyuan xu, 5:11 a– b.
65. Bicheng xu, 2:187.
66. Ibid., 1:169.
67. Xutan zhiquan
( Luo Jinxi yulu)
(Taipei: Guangwen, 1967), juan, xu,
10b–11a.
68. Xutan zhiquan, juan, xu, 11a– b.
69. Danyuan ji, 47:1b.
70. Bicheng xu, 2:185.
71.
Danyuan ji, 49:2a– b.
72. Ibid., 47:9a.
73. Ibid., 49:2b, Bicheng xu, 1:151–152.
74. Ibid., 48:5b.
75. Quoted in Arthur O. Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being: A Study of the History of an Idea
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1957), 20.
76. Bicheng, 6:124–126; 6:127–128.
77. Ibid., 1:4. It seems inaccurate to say, as do Arthur W. Hummel and Chaoyang Fang, that
Jiao Hong “was unable to consult the book himself.” See Dictionary of Ming Biography,
11:1059.
78. Bicheng xu, 3:200. See also Gui Youguang, Zhenchuan xiansheng ji
, SBCK,
juan 1: 31. There are only a few minor discrepancies between Jiao Hong’s quotation and
the original text.
79. Bicheng xu, 3:210–211.
80. MZS, 161.
81.
Zhang Binglin, Guoxue lüeshuo
, lectures edited by Sun Shiyang
(Hong
Kong:
Xianggang huanqiu wenhua fuwushe, 1972), 157.
82. Hu Shih, “The Scientifi c Spirit and Method in Chinese Philosophy,” in The Chinese
Mind: Essentials of Chinese Philosophy and Culture, ed. Charles A. Moore (Honolulu: Uni-
versity of Hawaii Press, 1967), 118–127; Qian Mu, Zhuzi xin xue- an (Taipei: Sanmin,
1971), 5:296–341.
83. Yü Ying- shih
, Lishi yu sixiang
(Taipei: Lianjing, 1987 [twelfth print-
ing]), 101–102. For the original statement in En glish translation, see Irene Bloom, ed.
354 t h e in t e l le c t ua l wor l d of j i ao hong r e v isi t ed
and trans., Knowledge Painfully Acquired: The K’ un- chih chi, by Lo Ch’ in- shun (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), 143–145.
84. ZYL, 4:1259.
85. Danyuan ji, 48:8b.
86. Ibid., 49:3a; 6:4b and Bicheng, 1:15.
87. Bicheng xu, 1:156.
88. Bicheng xu, 4:213.
89. Bloom, Knowledge Painfully Acquired, 31–32.
14. Toward an Interpretation of the Intellectual Transition
in Seventeenth- Century China
This is a review article of The Unfolding of Neo- Confucianism (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1975), edited by William Theodore de Bary and
the Conference on Seventeenth- Century Chinese Thought.
The Unfolding of Neo- Confucianism (hereafter Unfolding) is a product of a
conference held at the Villa Serbelloni, Bellagio, Italy, in September 1970. This
book consists of thirteen essays, as follows: Araki Kengo, “Confucianism and
Buddhism in the Late Ming”; Pei-yi Wu, “The Spiritual Autobiography of Te-
ch’ing (Deqing)”; Kristin Yü Greenblatt, “Chu- hung (Zhuhong) and Lay Bud-
dhism in the Late Ming”; Wm. Theodore de Bary, “Neo- Confucian Cultivation
and the Seventeenth- Century ‘Enlightenment’ ”; Richard John Lynn, “Ortho-
doxy and Enlightenment: Wang Shih- chen’s (Shizhen) Theory of Poetry and Its
Antecedents”; Edward T. Ch’ien, “Chiao Hung (Jiao Hong) and the Revolt
Against Ch’eng- Chu (Cheng- Zhu) Orthodoxy”; T’ang Chun- i (Tang Junyi), “Liu
Tsung- chou’s (Zongzhou) Doctrine of Moral Mind and Practice and His Cri-
tique of Wang Yang- ming”; William S. Atwell, “From Education to Politics: The
Fu She”; Willard J. Peterson, “Fang I- chih (Yizhi): Western Learning and the
‘Investigation of Things’ ”; Ian McMorran, “Wang Fu- chih (Fuzhi) and the Neo-
Confucian Tradition”; Chung- ying Cheng, “Reason, Substance, and Human
Desires in Seventeenth- Century Neo- Confucianism”; Wei- ming Tu, “Yen Yüan
