Complete Works of Xenophon (Illustrated) (Delphi Ancient Classics)

by Xenophon

  You must also have taken steps to enlist the services of spies before the outbreak of war. Some of these should be citizens of neutral states, and some merchants, since all states invariably welcome the importer of merchandise. Sham deserters, too, have their use on occasions. [8] Still, you must never neglect to post guards through reliance on spies; on the contrary, your precautions must at all times be as complete as when you have information that the enemy is approaching. For even if the spies are entirely reliable, it is difficult to report at the critical moment, since many things happen in war to hinder them. [9]

  The advance of cavalry is less likely to be detected by the enemy if orders are not given by a herald or in writing beforehand, but passed along. Accordingly, for this purpose, too, that the order to advance may be given by word of mouth, it is well to post fileleaders, and half file-leaders behind them, so that each may pass the word to as few men as possible. Thus, too, the half file-leaders will wheel and extend the line without confusion, whenever there is occasion to do so. [10]

  When it is necessary to keep a look out, I am all in favour of the plan of having hidden outposts and guards. For these serve at once as guards to protect your friends and snares to trap the enemy. [11] And the men, being unseen, are more secure themselves and at the same time more formidable to the enemy. For the enemy, conscious that there are outposts somewhere, but ignorant of their whereabouts and their strength, feels nervous and is forced to suspect every possible position; whereas visible outposts show them where danger lies and where all is safe. [12] Besides, if you conceal your outposts, you will have the chance of luring the enemy into an ambush by placing a few guards in the open to screen the hidden men. Occasionally, too, a cunning trap may be laid by posting a second body of exposed guards behind the men in hiding; for this plan may prove as deceptive to the enemy as the one just referred to. [13]

  A prudent commander will never take risks unnecessarily, except when it is clear beforehand that he will have the advantage of the enemy. To play into the enemy’s hand may fairly be considered treachery to one’s allies rather than courage. [14] Another sound principle is to go for any position where the enemy is weak, even if it is a long way off, since hard work is less dangerous than a struggle against superior forces. [15] But if the enemy places himself somewhere between yourself and fortresses friendly to you, then it is proper to attack him, even if he is greatly superior, on that side where your presence is unsuspected, or on both flanks at once, for when one part of your force is retiring, a charge on the opposite flank will flurry the enemy and rescue your friends. [16]

  It is an old maxim that, in attempting to discover what the enemy is about, it is well to employ spies. But the best plan of all, in my opinion, is for the commander himself to watch the enemy from some safe coign of vantage, if possible, and take notice of his mistakes. [17] And when anything can be filched by cunning, you should send likely men to steal it; and when anything may be seized you should despatch troops to seize it. If the enemy is marching on some objective and a part of his force weaker than your own separates from the main body or straggles carelessly, the chance must not be missed; the hunter, however, must always be stronger than the hunted. [18]

  You can see the point of this if you consider. Even wild creatures less intelligent than man, such as hawks, will grab unguarded plunder and get away into a place of safety before they can be caught: wolves, again, prey on anything left unprotected and steal things lying in holes and corners; and if a dog does pursue and overtake him, [19] the wolf, if stronger than the dog, attacks him; or if weaker, snatches away the prize and makes off. Moreover, when a pack of wolves feels no fear of a convoy, they arrange themselves so that some shall drive off the convoy, and others seize the plunder; and thus they get their food. [20] Well, if wild beasts show such sagacity, surely any man may be expected to show more wisdom than creatures that are themselves taken by the skill of man.

  5. Every horseman should know at what distance a horse can overtake a man on foot, and how much start a slow horse needs to escape from a fast one. A cavalry commander should also be able to judge of the ground where infantry has an advantage over cavalry and where cavalry has an advantage over infantry. [2] He must also have sufficient ingenuity to make a small company of horse look large, and conversely, to make a large one look small; to seem to be absent when present, and present when absent; to know how to deceive, not merely how to steal the enemy’s possessions, but also how to conceal his own force and fall on the enemy unexpectedly. [3] Another neat ruse is to create a scare among the enemy when your own position is precarious, so that he may not attack, and to put him in good heart, when it is strong, so that he may make an attempt. Thus you are least likely to come to harm yourself and most likely to catch the enemy tripping. [4]

  That I may not seem to demand impossibilities, I will add a solution of the problems that seem most puzzling. Success in an attempt to pursue or retreat depends on experience of horses and their powers. But how are you to get this experience? By watching the friendly encounters of the sham fights and noticing what condition the horses are in after the pursuits and flights. [5]

  When your object is to make the number of your cavalry look large, first take it for an axiom, if possible, not to attempt the ruse when you are near the enemy: for distance gives safety and increases the illusion. Secondly you must know that horses look many when crowded, owing to the animal’s size, but are easily counted when scattered. [6] Another way of exaggerating the apparent strength of your force is to arm the grooms with lances or even imitation lances, and put them between the cavalrymen, whether you display the cavalry at the halt or wheel it into line. Thus the bulk of the company is bound to look denser and more massive. [7]

  On the other hand, if your object is to make a large number look small, then, assuming that your ground affords cover, you can obviously conceal your cavalry by having part in the open and part hidden. If, however, the whole of the ground is exposed, you must form the files into rows and wheel, leaving a gap between each two rows; and the men in each file who are next the enemy must hold their lances upright, while the rest keep theirs low down out of sight. [8]

  The means to employ for scaring the enemy are false ambuscades, false reliefs and false information. An enemy’s confidence is greatest when he is told that the other side is in difficulties and is preoccupied. [9]

  But given these instructions, a man must himself invent a ruse to meet every emergency as it occurs. For there is really nothing more profitable in war than deception. [10] Even children are successful deceivers when they play “Guess the number”; they will hold up a counter or two and make believe that they have got a fist-full, and seem to hold up few when they are holding many; so surely men can play similar tricks when they are intent on deceiving in earnest. [11] And on thinking over the successes gained in war you will find that most of them, and these the greatest, have been won with the aid of deception. For these reasons either you should not essay to command, or you should pray to heaven that your equipment may include this qualification, and you should contrive on your own part to possess it. [12]

  For those near the sea two effective ruses are, to strike on land while fitting out ships, and to attack by sea while ostensibly planning a land attack. [13]

  Another duty of a cavalry commander is to demonstrate to the city the weakness of cavalry destitute of infantry as compared with cavalry that has infantry attached to it. Further, having got his infantry, a cavalry commander should make use of it. A mounted man being much higher than a man on foot, infantry may be hidden away not only among the cavalry but in the rear as well. [14]

  For the practical application of these devices and any others you may contrive for the undoing of your foes by force or craft, I counsel you to work with God, so that, the gods being propitious, fortune too may favour you. [15]

  Another ruse that proves highly effective at times is to feign excess of caution and reluctance to take risks. For this pretence often
lures the enemy into making a more fatal blunder through want of caution. Or once come to be thought venturesome, and you can give the enemy trouble by merely sitting still and pretending that you are on the point of doing something.

  6. However, no man can mould anything to his mind unless the stuff in which he proposes to work lies ready to obey the artist’s will. No more can you make anything of men, unless, by God’s help, they are ready to regard their commander with friendly feelings and to think him wiser than themselves in the conduct of operations against the enemy. [2]

  Now the feeling of loyalty will naturally be fostered when the commander is kind to his men, and obviously takes care that they have victuals, and that they are safe in retreat and well protected when at rest. [3] In the garrisons he must show an interest in fodder, tents, water, firewood, and all other supplies: he must show that he thinks ahead and keeps his eyes open for the sake of his men. And when he is doing well the chief’s best policy is to give them a share in his good things. [4]

  To put it shortly, a commander is least likely to incur the contempt of his men if he shows himself more capable than they of doing whatever he requires of them. [5] He must therefore practise every detail of horsemanship — mounting and the rest, — that they may see their commander able to take a ditch without a spill, clear a wall, leap down from a bank and throw a javelin skilfully. For all these feats are so many stepping stones to their respect. [6] If they know him also to be a master of tactics and able to put them in the way of getting the better of the enemy; and if besides, they are certain that he will never lead them against an enemy recklessly or without the gods’ approval or in defiance of the sacrifices, all these conditions increase the men’s readiness to obey their commander.

  7. Every commander, then, should have intelligence. The Athenian cavalry commander, however, should excel greatly both in the observance of his duty to the gods and in the qualities of a warrior, seeing that he has on his borders rivals in the shape of cavalry as numerous as his and large forces of infantry. [2] And if he attempts to invade the enemy’s country without the other armed forces of the state, he will have to take his chance with the cavalry only against both arms. Or if the enemy invades Athenian territory, in the first place, he will certainly not fail to bring with him other cavalry besides his own and infantry in addition, whose numbers he reckons to be more than a match for all the Athenians put together. [3] Now provided that the whole of the city’s levies turn out against such a host in defence of their country, the prospects are good. For our cavalrymen, God helping, will be the better, if proper care is taken of them, and our heavy infantry will not be inferior in numbers, and I may add, they will be in as good condition and will show the keener spirit, if only, with God’s help, they are trained on the right lines. And, remember, the Athenians are quite as proud of their ancestry as the Boeotians. [4] But if the city falls back on her navy, and is content to keep her walls intact, as in the days when the Lacedaemonians invaded us with all the Greeks to help them, and if she expects her cavalry to protect all that lies outside the walls, and to take its chance unaided against her foes, — why then, I suppose, we need first the strong arm of the gods to aid us, and in the second place it is essential that our cavalry commander should be masterly. For much sagacity is called for in coping with a greatly superior force, and abundance of courage when the call comes. [5]

  I take it, he must also be able to stand hard work. For if he should elect to take his chance against the army confronting him — an army that not even the whole state is prepared to stand up to — it is evident that he would be entirely at the mercy of the stronger and incapable of doing anything. [6] But should he guard whatever lies outside the walls with a force that will be just sufficient to keep an eye on the enemy and to remove into safety from as great a distance as possible property that needs saving, — and a large force is not necessary for this: a small force can keep a look-out as well as a large one, and when it comes to guarding and removing the property of friends, men who have no confidence in themselves or their horses will meet the case, because Fear, it seems, is a [7] formidable member of a guard — well, it may perhaps be a sound plan to draw on these men for his guards. But if he imagines that the number remaining over and above the guard constitutes an army, he will find it too small; for it will be utterly inadequate to risk a conflict in the open. Let him use these men as raiders, and he will probably have a force quite sufficient for this purpose. [8] His business, it seems to me, is to watch for any blunder on the enemy’s part without showing himself, keeping men constantly on the alert and ready to strike. [9] It happens that, the greater is the number of soldiers, the more they are apt to blunder. Either they scatter deliberately in search of provisions, or they are so careless of order on the march that some get too far ahead, while others lag too far behind. [10] So he must not let such blunders go unpunished, or the whole country will be occupied; only he must take good care to retire the moment he has struck, without giving time for the main supports to arrive on the scene. [11]

  An army on the march often comes to roads where large numbers have no advantage over small. In crossing rivers, again, a man with his wits about him may dog the enemy’s steps without danger and regulate according to his will the number of the enemy that he chooses to attack. [12] Sometimes it is proper to tackle the enemy while his troops are at breakfast or supper or when they are turning out of bed. For at all these moments soldiers are without arms, infantry for a shorter and cavalry for a longer time. [13] Pickets and outposts, however, should be the mark of incessant plots, these being invariably weak in numbers and sometimes remote from their main force. [14] But when the enemy has learned to take due precautions against such attacks, it is proper, with God’s help, to enter his country stealthily after ascertaining his strength at various points and the position of his outposts. For no booty that you can capture is so fine as a patrol. [15] Besides, patrols are easily deceived, for they pursue a handful of men at sight, believing that to be their special duty. You must see, however, that your line of retreat does not lead you straight into the enemy’s supports.

  8. It is clear, however, that no troops will be able to inflict loss on a much stronger army with impunity, unless they are so superior in the practical application of horsemanship to war that they show like experts contending with amateurs. [2] This superiority can be attained first and foremost if your marauding bands are so thoroughly drilled in riding that they can stand the hard work of a campaign. For both horses and men that are carelessly trained in this respect will naturally be like women struggling with men. [3] On the contrary, those that are taught and accustomed to jump ditches, leap walls, spring up banks, leap down from heights without a spill, and gallop down steep places, will be as superior to the men and horses that lack this training as birds to beasts. Moreover, those that have their feet well hardened will differ on rough ground from the tender-footed as widely as the sound from the lame. And those that are familiar with the locality, compared with those to whom it is unfamiliar, will differ in the advance and retreat as much as men with eyes differ from the blind. [4]

  It should also be realised that horses, to be well fettled, must be well fed and thoroughly exercised, so as to do their work without suffering from heaves. And since bits and saddle-cloths are fastened with straps, a cavalry leader must never be short of them, for at a trifling expense he will make men in difficulties efficient. [5]

  In case anyone feels that his troubles will be endless if his duty requires him to practise horsemanship in this way, let him reflect that men in training for gymnastic contests face troubles far more numerous and exacting than the most strenuous votaries of horsemanship. [6] For most gymnastic exercises are carried out with sweat and drudgery, but nearly all equestrian exercises are pleasant work. For if it is true that any man would like to fly, no action of man bears a closer resemblance to flying. [7] And, remember, it is far more glorious to win a victory in war than in a boxing match, because, whereas the s
tate as well as the victor has a considerable share in this glory, for a victory in war the gods generally crown states with happiness as well. For my part, therefore, I know not why any art should be more assiduously cultivated than the arts of war. [8] It should be noticed that a long apprenticeship to toil enables sea-pirates to live at the expense of much stronger folk. On land, too, pillage, though not for those who reap what they have sown, is the natural resource of men who are deprived of food. For either men must work or they must eat the fruits of other men’s labour: else it is a problem how to live and to obtain peace. [9]

  If you charge a superior force, you must remember never to leave behind you ground difficult for horses. For a fall in retreat and a fall in pursuit are very different things. [10]

  I want to add a word of warning against another error. Some men, when they suppose themselves to be stronger than the enemy whom they are going to attack, take an utterly inadequate force with them. The consequence is that they are apt to incur the loss they expected to inflict. Or, when they know themselves to be weaker than the enemy, they use all their available strength in the attack. [11] The right procedure, in my opinion, is just the opposite: when the commander expects to win, he should not hesitate to use the whole of his strength: for an overwhelming victory never yet was followed by remorse. [12] But when he tries conclusions with a much stronger force, knowing beforehand that he is bound to retreat when he has done his best, I hold that it is far better in such a case to throw a small part of his strength into the attack than the whole of it; only horses and men alike should be his very best. For such a force will be able to achieve something and to retreat with less risk. [13] But when he has thrown the whole of his strength into an attack on a stronger force, and wants to retire, the men on the slowest mounts are bound to be taken prisoners; others to be thrown through lack of horsemanship; and others to be cut off owing to inequalities in the ground, since it is hard to find a wide expanse of country entirely to your liking. [14] Moreover, owing to their numbers they will collide and hinder and hurt one another frequently. But good horses and men will contrive to escape, especially if you manage to scare the pursuers by using your reserves. [15] Sham ambuscades, too, are helpful for this purpose. It is also useful to discover on what quarter your friends may suddenly reveal themselves in a safe position and make the pursuit slower. [16] Then again it is obvious that in point of endurance and speed the advantage is much more likely to rest with a small than with a large force. I do not mean that mere paucity of numbers will increase the men’s powers of endurance and add to their speed; but it is easier to find few men than many who will take proper care of their horses and will practise the art of horsemanship intelligently on their own account. [17]