The personalities of Alger and Commanding General Miles exacerbated the inherent difficulties in the command structure. Affable yet egotistical, Alger knew little about modern warfare, while Miles’s vanity, political ambitions, and desire to control Army operations made him ill-suited for his position. Alger and Miles quarreled incessantly, and McKinley learned to distrust them. For professional advice, the president initially turned to Schofield, who had retired in 1895, but increasingly relied on Adjutant General Henry C. Corbin. Discreet and committed to civilian control, Corbin became the president’s de facto chief of staff, assisting him with decisions that Alger and Miles should have made but did not.
Spain was poorly prepared for war, both militarily and psychologically. It had a large army, with 150,000 regulars in Cuba, 8,000 in Puerto Rico, 20,000 in the Philippines, and another 150,000 at home, but the figures were deceptive. Hard fighting against Cuban and Filipino revolutionaries, plus the debilitating effects of tropical diseases, had drained the colonial forces. The home army could not be deployed unless Spain controlled the seas, and its navy was small, in serious disrepair, and lacked trained crews. In the Atlantic, Spain kept part of its navy at Cadiz and assembled a squadron, commanded by Admiral Pascual de Cervera, at the Cape Verde Islands. Its destination was the Caribbean, but each of America’s battleships was capable of single-handedly defeating the squadron. In the Philippines, Spain had another antique squadron, commanded by Admiral Patricio Montojo. Many Spanish statesmen and officers were pessimistic, knowing they had little chance to win. At best, they hoped for a gallant and resourceful defeat.
The initial strategic principle for United States military preparations was that the war would be mainly a naval conflict, with little Army activity. The Navy would destroy enemy squadrons and merchant shipping, and perhaps bombard or blockade Spanish cities and colonies. No one contemplated dispatching large expeditionary armies to invade Spain or to conquer its colonies, although almost everyone assumed that the Army would send small forces to aid the Cubans. The Army’s paramount duty would probably be manning the coastal fortifications against possible enemy raids. The disposition of a $50 million military appropriation, approved by Congress on March 9, reflected strategic thinking: The Navy received three-fifths of the funds.
With their share of the appropriation, Long and Assistant Secretary of the Navy Theodore Roosevelt readied the naval forces. Orders went out for commanders to retain men whose enlistments were about to expire, and the Navy stockpiled ammunition and fuel. The Navy Department ordered the battleship Oregon from the Pacific coast to the Caribbean. Rear Admiral Horace Eban received orders to prepare for the mobilization of a “mosquito flotilla” (later called the Auxiliary Naval Force) manned by the naval militia, which provided 4,000 officers and men during the war. The Navy also purchased or chartered warships and suitable merchant vessels and pleasure boats. In late February, Roosevelt sent orders to the European and Asiatic Squadron commanders to prepare for war. Finally, in March Long established a three-man Naval War Board, which included Mahan, to give him strategic advice.
All of these preparations had a sharp focus, for beginning in the mid-1890s the Navy had developed war plans against Spain. At Luce’s suggestion, the Naval War College began studying the strategic implications of a war with Spain, and in 1896 Lieutenant William W. Kimball completed a document titled “War with Spain.” Although several subsequent plans materialized, the basic features of the Kimball plan remained intact. Kimball assumed that the war would be fought to achieve independence for Cuba, that the U.S. did not contemplate major territorial acquisitions, and that command of the sea would determine the outcome. The main objective should be Spanish forces in and around Cuba, with attacks on the Philippines and Puerto Rico being secondary. Only if these assaults against the Spanish empire failed to achieve results would the Navy shift its attention to the Iberian peninsula. Kimball envisioned limited land operations only in the Caribbean, where the Army would assist Cuban rebels and perhaps attack Havana and occupy Puerto Rico. However, expeditionary forces would not be dispatched until the Navy had gained mastery in the Atlantic.
Acting in accordance with these plans, modified by public concern for coastal protection, Long and Roosevelt deployed the Navy in five squadrons. The Asiatic Squadron, commanded by George Dewey, was at Hong Kong poised to descend on the Philippines. A Northern Patrol Squadron guarded the waters between Maine and the Delaware capes, the Auxiliary Naval Force watched numerous ports, and a Flying Squadron, based at Hampton Roads under Winfield Scott Schley, provided additional protection for the east coast. The bulk of the North Atlantic Squadron was at Key West under the command of William T. Sampson. On April 23 Sampson began a blockade of Cuba, initially concentrating on Havana, other points on the northwest coast, and Cienfuegos on the south shore, in order to prevent Spain from resupplying and reinforcing its largest troop concentration on the island. Almost all naval leaders opposed the division of the Atlantic fleet, wanting it concentrated for blockade duty and to defeat a Spanish naval relief expedition in a decisive battle. As one officer complained, the fragmentation “was the badge of democracy, the sop to the quaking laymen whose knowledge of strategy derived solely from their terror of a sudden attack by Cervera.”
Compared to the Navy’s preparations, the Army’s initial mobilization was chaotic. One problem was the diffusion of responsibility within the War Department. A second difficulty was that the Army lacked the money and streamlined procedures for advance preparations. The Army spent most of its share of the $50 million appropriation to improve the coastal fortifications. Only small amounts went to the Medical, Quartermaster, and Signal Departments. With their meager allotment, these departments began to stockpile supplies, but congressional regulations choked their activities in red tape. The Army’s greatest handicap was the belief that it would need only about 100,000 men under professional command to serve as a compact striking force for its limited overseas missions. The War Department assumed that once the Navy controlled the Caribbean, it would send a small force to secure a Cuban beachhead and perhaps dispatch smaller forces to attack other Spanish possessions. If these measures did not secure peace, then the Army might attack Havana with 50,000 men.
To meet the contingencies, the Army had Representative John A.T. Hull introduce a bill in Congress. Intended as a permanent reform, the Hull bill proposed an expansible 104,000-man Army that would eliminate the need for state manpower. The National Guard would simply garrison coastal defenses and serve as a manpower pool. Eastern Guardsmen supported the measure, but unfortunately for the Army’s hopes for a modest but orderly mobilization, inland Guardsmen protested. Joined by southern Democrats, Populists who feared the Army, and a few regular officers with technical objections to the legislation, they defeated the Hull bill. Bowing to this strong indication that any manpower legislation must fully utilize the Guard, the administration introduced a new bill to create a volunteer army. Passed on April 22, the law permitted the president to limit an initial call-up of volunteers to National Guard members, with state quotas based on population. McKinley could appoint all volunteer staff officers and general officers, but governors would appoint lesser officers. The law also forbade states from sending new regiments into federal service under a second call unless their existing units were at full strength. With their position secure, Guardsmen did not oppose an April 26 law establishing a 65,700-man regular Army. New recruits would augment existing units and serve only for the duration of the war. As usual, the regular Army could not compete against volunteer service and remained below authorized strength.
Despite the necessity of mobilizing state volunteer regiments, the Army achieved some success in establishing an Upton-styled federally controlled volunteer force. The April 22 law authorized 3,000 federal volunteers (three cavalry regiments). Subsequent legislation established a 3,500-man brigade of federal Volunteer Engineers, a 10,000-man force of Volunteer Infantry (ten regiments in all) with presumed immunity to t
ropical diseases and known as the “Immunes,” and a Volunteer Signal Corps. The most famous of these federal volunteer units was the 1st United States Volunteer Cavalry, popularly known as the Rough Riders. Its commander was Colonel Leonard Wood, and its lieutenant colonel was Roosevelt, who resigned from the Navy Department. Combining the regulars and the state and federal volunteers, the Army contained 11,108 officers and 263,609 men when the war ended. All of the new troops were to be discharged upon the proclamation of peace, leaving just the 28,000-man prewar Army.
Manpower mobilization began before anyone had a clear idea of how many troops would actually be needed, and it was on a far larger scale than the War Department anticipated. Expecting McKinley to call out 60,000 Guardsmen, Army planners were shocked on April 23 when he called for 125,000! The president wanted to avoid Lincoln’s mistake of mobilizing too few troops at the outset and hoped that the spectacle of an arming host might break Spain’s will to resist. More important, the 125,000 figure was close to existing National Guard strength. Calling out fewer troops would alienate those Guardsmen unable to volunteer, dampening martial enthusiasm and courting political disaster. In late May, with most of the initial 125,000 men in the service, McKinley called for another 75,000 volunteers, 40,000 of whom were used to fill existing regiments.
Miles proposed that volunteers remain in state camps for prolonged training, but this was impractical. Too few regulars were available to supervise training at scattered locations, troops and officers needed practice in large-scale management and maneuver, and the War Department was anxious to avoid the “disturbing influences of home locality” that interrupted serious preparations. The War Department had already ordered the regular Army concentrated at Tampa and Camp Thomas at Chickamauga Park, Tennessee; and now as fast as volunteers could be sworn into federal service (as individuals, not as units, to bypass the constitutional uncertainty about overseas service), they moved to large camps. Many joined the regulars’ encampments, while others moved to San Francisco, Key West, New Orleans, Mobile, and Camp Alger near Washington. As the Army concentrated, the War Department completed its command structure, organizing seven corps, each commanded by a major general. In June it created an eighth corps.
As in past wars, manpower mobilization preceded logistical mobilization. Combined with the magnitude of the call-up and the Guard’s lack of readiness, the emphasis on men over material created difficulties for the supply bureaus. Assurances from state and Guard officials led federal authorities to believe Guardsmen would have basic drill and musketry skills and would be equipped by the states. But the states and Guard failed to fulfill their promises. On the average, one-third to one-half of the men in peacetime Guard units refused to enlist or failed their physical examinations. The Guard regiments filling the volunteer army contained many new recruits “who fancied they were soldiers because they could get across a level piece of ground without stepping on their own feet.” Volunteers were also unequipped, streaming into the camps without basic items such as tents and mess kits. What equipment they had was broken or obsolete. Ill-prepared in almost every respect, save for typical volunteer enthusiasm, 125,000 men arrived within six weeks of McKinley’s call.
The National Guard mobilization temporarily overwhelmed the Army’s supply capacity. Confusion should not have been unexpected, since the bureaus were geared to supply only the small peacetime Army. Moreover, line officers and civilian policymakers had not consulted the chiefs regarding mobilization plans. In coping with the crisis, the bureaus encountered fundamental problems, none of them the War Department’s fault. It took time for government arsenals and private industries to retool to manufacture large orders for specialized equipment. The number of regular staff officers was inadequate, and many newly appointed volunteer staff officers did not arrive at the camps until midsummer, requiring additional weeks to learn their jobs. Cumbersome procedures for making contracts and regulating funds, which Congress had designed to prevent peacetime fraud, inhibited the bureaus’ wartime efforts. One crippling procedural difficulty was the bureaus’ reliance on requisitions from unit commanders before forwarding supplies, which precipitated a flood of paperwork and caused interminable delays. Poor transportation facilities hindered distribution. Camps lacked adequate sidings, resulting in railroad traffic jams. A mid-1890s government economy drive had forced the Army to sell its six-mule wagons, which it now needed to move material in the sprawling camps. Finally, the bureaus’ task of simultaneously preparing small expeditions and a large volunteer force was difficult, especially since policymakers gave them no guidance on which had priority.
The War Department struggled rather successfully to overcome the logistical problems. Alger met daily with the bureau chiefs to coordinate activities and pressed for freer spending and the suspension of restricting rules. The bureaus improvised, and when one expedient failed, they tried another. Everyone labored long hours, somehow getting done what needed to get done. Chaos yielded to order, system, and purpose as arsenals and industries geared up, new staff officers learned the ropes, red tape got snipped, and transportation snarls were disentangled. Within three months material mobilization caught up with manpower mobilization. Meanwhile, the War Department also launched expeditions on opposite sides of the globe. Considering the conditions prevailing in April and May, its achievement in equipping a quarter of a million men was remarkable. Unfortunately for Alger, the administration dispatched the expeditionary forces before the mobilization crisis had been resolved and before the improvements became apparent. Thus, to the press and public, which were caught up in the muckraking of the Progressive era, bungling and inefficiency seemed the War Department’s hallmarks.
The Spanish-American War, 1898
George Dewey hoped to attend West Point, but no vacancy was available so he went to Annapolis. Neither Civil War service nor his postwar duties distinguished him from dozens of other officers. Although he idolized Farragut, four decades of naval life gave him no opportunity to emulate his hero. One thing Dewey did was to acquire powerful friends, such as Theodore Roosevelt and Senator Redfield Proctor. His political connections gained him command of the Asiatic Squadron, which was at Hong Kong when Roosevelt’s late-February message warned Dewey to prepare for war. On April 24, when McKinley sanctioned an attack on Manila, Dewey was ready.
With orders to destroy the Spanish fleet, Dewey entered Manila Bay before dawn on May 1. His squadron had far greater firepower than Montojo’s ships, which lay at anchor off the Cavite naval base. Just as light was breaking, Dewey gave the order to fire, and in the next few hours the Asiatic Squadron demolished Spanish sea power in the Pacific with naval-review efficiency. The next day the Cavite garrison surrendered, but Spanish forces still held Manila and the rest of the Philippines. Naval power, said Dewey, could “reach no further ashore. For tenure of the land you must have the man with a rifle.” Alerted to Dewey’s predicament, the McKinley administration devised plans to send 5,000 volunteers to the Philippines.
Meanwhile, as a virtual hysteria of Dewey hero worship swept the country, strategic attention shifted from the Far East to the Caribbean, where, as in the Philippines, naval action prepared the way for Army operations. Gloomily expecting total destruction, on April 29 Cervera left the Cape Verde Islands, heading west. Thinking that Cervera would steam to San Juan, Sampson proceeded there with the bulk of his squadron. But the Spanish admiral, learning of Sampson’s movements, went to Martinique and Curaçao before steaming to Santiago Bay. By June 1 Sampson’s squadron, united with the Flying Squadron, had clamped a blockade on Santiago harbor. Although bottled up, Cervera’s ships constituted a fleet-in-being that restrained other American land and sea operations for fear they might escape. With orders not to risk his armored vessels against land batteries, Sampson could not go in and attack Cervera: Spanish forts guarded the harbor mouth, and two lines of electrical mines blocked the channel, which was so tortuous that ships could enter it only in single file. Another option was to sink a ship
in the channel so that the Spaniards could not come out. Sampson tried, but the effort failed. A third course of action was to rely on Army assistance, which the Navy requested. If troops captured the forts, the Navy could sweep up the mines and venture into the harbor. While awaiting the Army’s arrival, the Navy maintained a tight blockade. To establish a nearby coaling base, Sampson sent a battalion of Marines to seize Guantanamo Bay. Aided by eighty Cuban insurgents, they captured it after four days of sporadic combat in mid-June, the first fighting by Americans on Cuban soil.
Before it received the Navy’s request, the Army’s strategic planning evolved through two stages. Initial strategy was to supply the Cubans and annoy the Spanish with small incursions. On April 29 the War Department ordered Major General William R. Shafter to Tampa, where he assumed command of the nearly all-regular 5th Corps. He was to organize a brief reconnaissance in force to the south side of Cuba, designed to carry arms and supplies to Gomez. This strategy avoided a large commitment during the rainy yellow fever season and did not make undue demands on the volunteer army. But Cervera’s departure from the Cape Verdes forced cancellation of the reconnaissance, and in its second stage Army strategy focused on Cuba’s north coast. With McKinley anxious to exert pressure on Spain, a White House conference on May 2 recommended attacking Havana with 50,000 men no later than mid-June, without regard for the rainy season. Shafter continued preparations for this new task. However, reacting to the Navy’s need for assistance, another war council again modified Army strategy, deciding on May 26 to send the 5th Corps to Santiago.
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