Many improvements came through serendipity rather than research. The sandbox, essential for ensuring that the wheels could grip on slippery rails, was invented, bizarrely, as a result of a biblical-scale plague of grass-hoppers in Pennsylvania in 1836, which caused the trains of the Camden & Amboy to slip on their squashed bodies. Crews of men armed with brooms swept the rails in front of the trains, but their efforts were insufficient. Then some bright spark hit upon the idea of filling a box with sand and feeding it down gently in front of the driving wheels: “It worked wonderfully well and since then no American locomotive has been without a sandbox.”23 The sandbox seems to have been one of those inventions that was developed simultaneously on both sides of the Atlantic, since many European railroads adopted them at the same time.
If the locomotives were improving rapidly, so were the rails and the track bed. The early tracks, designed for light coaches pulled by horses, were inadequate for the weight of the iron horses that were rapidly taking over from their equine equivalents and had to undergo rapid improvement. The early “strap-iron” rails, which were wooden and covered by a thin sheet of metal, could not withstand the pressure of heavy trains. Rather disturbingly, passengers could find themselves confronted by a swirling piece of metal as the iron broke loose, forming “snakeheads” that were, on occasion, long enough to break through the floors of passing coaches, unsurprisingly causing panic. The solution was the all-iron T-rail, initially imported from Britain but later produced locally, though, remarkably, some of the smaller railroads operating light locomotives, notably in the South, used strap-iron rails until the Civil War. According to American legend, it was John Stevens’s son Robert, the president of the Camden & Amboy, who first thought of developing the T-shaped rail that is now universal on railroads across the world, but in all likelihood he was probably merely copying the example of Britain, where such rails had already been in use. Indeed, Stevens ordered a supply of these rails from Britain, which were laid on the Camden & Amboy in 1832. The early T-rails were remarkably light and weak by modern standards, their weight per foot being perhaps a quarter of that normally used today and consequently prone to cracks and breaks.
The track bed, too, required innovative thinking. Granite was tried because of its stability and hardness, but this very lack of resilience made for a rough ride, which harmed the rolling stock, and it also proved susceptible to damage from frost. A number of early lines were mounted on piles, but this method, too, was found to be unsatisfactory because of the lack of stability. As we will see in the next chapter, the ever-struggling Erie Railroad wasted more than $1 million (perhaps thirty times that amount in today’s money) on a failed experiment with piling. Instead, all railroads gradually turned to the method of track-bed construction that has largely survived, with remarkably little change, through to this day. First, after the route is prepared through grading, ballast—chunky gravel—is laid to absorb the impact of the passing trains, and then ties (sleepers in Britain) are placed at right angles to the direction of the train and used as a base for the rails. Remarkably, modern track laid for high-speed rail lines today still uses ballast and consequently would be quite recognizable in appearance to the railroad builders of the mid-nineteenth century, the only obvious difference being the electrification equipment.
Despite their initial reliance on British imports, American railroads were, right from the start, very different in style and technology from their European counterparts—not only in the design of the locomotives but also in the way the railroads themselves were built. As previously mentioned, keeping costs down was paramount. Wherever possible, expensive digging and tunneling were avoided, and station buildings were minimal, being constructed of freely available timber. Ballast, which was expensive to quarry and transport, was used sparingly, and bridges were put up in the characteristic perilous-looking trestle style. The philosophy was simple— and very different from the approach that prevailed in Europe: get the track laid and the locomotives built, and start running trains as quickly as possible to start generating income, even if that means cutting corners that push up operating costs. Improvements could be made later, once the line started making a profit. In the event, this placed a great burden on many railroads toward the end of the nineteenth century because of the need to improve the infrastructure on heavily used routes. Crucially, the lower initial expense ensured that railroads could be built for around the same price as canals, though comparisons are difficult, as the costs of both varied quite dramatically. For example, according to George Rogers Taylor, the early lines in New York that later formed the New York Central cost around $30,000 per mile, whereas the more solidly built Boston & Lowell in Massachusetts came out at $71,000. At the other end of the scale, there was the Georgia Railroad at just $17,000 per mile (thanks, of course, to slave labor). Canals showed similarly wide variations in construction costs, ranging from $20,000 per mile to as much as $80,000.24
The price difference between US and European railroads was significant, helped by the far lower land and labor costs and the advantage of “eminent domain” granted to the railroads. One statistic illustrating this is particularly telling. By 1850, the United States had built an impressive twenty-six thousand miles of railroad but just eleven miles of tunnel, whereas the UK, with just one-third as many miles of track, had built nearly eighty miles of tunnel, seven times the length in America. And that in a country that is by no means as mountainous or hilly as America.
This remarkable difference did not go unnoticed. European visitors to the United States tended to be either impressed or horrified by the ability of the Americans to build their railroads so cheaply and still make a profit given the sparse traffic. A Captain Douglas Galton of the Royal Engineers, who made a comparison between British and American railroads after a trip across the Atlantic in 1856, concluded, “In a rapidly developing new country, capital is dear. Hence a rough and ready cheap railway although it entails increased cost for maintenance is preferable to a more finished and expensive line.” Given that there were fewer trains on the US railroads, this was a trade-off that the early promoters were happy to make, given their perennial shortage of capital. As traffic increased, they were able to generate more capital to improve the railroads, making them more similar to their European counterparts, but they still remained distinctive. Galton highlighted other ways in which the US railroads kept costs down, noting that although American railroads ran fewer trains, this ensured that they were better filled and therefore earned more revenue per mile. The paucity of traffic meant that there was no need for sophisticated signaling equipment and that the numerous level crossings could be left ungated and unmanned, keeping labor costs lower. Overall, fewer workers were employed per mile of railroad in the United States than in the UK. Galton concluded that the American system was in general “well adapted to the wants of the country.”25
Cheapness of construction may have had much to recommend it in these early days, but there would be a heavy price to pay later in terms of passenger safety, which would, in turn, contribute to the American people’s disillusionment with their railroads. In the short term, however, the low costs encouraged a railroad boom during which, until it was briefly cut short by the panic of 1837, “some two hundred lines had been chartered, taking the savings of thousands of investors, many of whom had never seen a railroad track or a steam locomotive.”26 Of course, not all of these charters resulted in the construction of any track, but by the end of the railroad age’s first full decade, there was a total of more than twenty-seven hundred miles of line.27 Virtually all these early railroads were single track, and many still used horses for all or part of their traction. However, in view of the primitive nature of the available technology and the arduous nature of the construction methods, the rapid spread of the iron road represented an astonishing achievement.
Having built a railroad, the question then was how best to run it. One of the early decisions made in Britain was that the railroad should be a vertica
lly integrated operation—in other words, the railroad company would control the line that it had built by not only providing the locomotives and the track, but also determining the timetable and regulating the operations. There had been some initial moves to operate lines in the same manner as canals or turnpikes. For instance, the Stockton & Darlington allowed anyone to use the railroad provided they had the right equipment. But there were compelling reasons not to use that approach. Unlike a turnpike, a railroad has only a limited capacity, determined by factors such as the speed of the trains, the length of the single track, the signaling arrangements, the power of the locomotives, and so on. Allowing all comers onto the tracks inevitably resulted in problems and inefficiencies. The lessons of the Stockton & Darlington, with its occasional fisticuffs between drivers of trains facing each other on the single track, had been learned. A free-for-all was clearly no way to run a railroad, and in Britain no other railroad followed the example of the Stockton & Darlington. Consequently, virtually every American railroad also adopted the system of operating its own trains and providing the locomotives, though private wagons and cars were normally allowed.
All this represented progress, but the railroads remained crude in many respects. Early US railroads were simple in layout but faced considerable operational difficulties over long distances with single tracks and no telegraph, combined with unreliable machinery. Brakes were fitted only to the cars and had to be applied by conductors or brakemen in each one. The chains linking the cars meant they crashed into each other when the train braked and were wont to break if acceleration was too rough. Signaling was for the most part nonexistent, until the lines became busier and accidents forced a change of policy, as we will see later. Solutions were basic. The Georgia Railroad, for instance, solved the problem of the clash of signaling by running trains in each direction on alternate days.
The railroad companies were a true ragbag of outfits, ranging from, literally, one-horse companies carrying coal out of a mine to longer lines stretching into the backcountry, though only three, all interestingly in the South—the Wilmington & Raleigh Railroad in North Carolina and two in Georgia, the Georgia Railroad & Banking Company and the Central Railroad & Banking Company—could boast more than a hundred miles of track in 1840. The names of these pioneering lines embraced the prosaically ambitious, such as the Western Railroad of Massachusetts and the Central Railroad of Michigan; the romantically parochial two-and-a-half-mile Mine Hill & Schuylkill Haven and the slightly longer Palmyra & Jacksonburgh; and the formidable-sounding Tuscarora & Cold Run Tunnel & Railroad Company. America’s early railroads were a hodgepodge of disconnected lines serving a few major towns or specific mines and in no way represented a network. Some did have ambitions, invariably unrealistic ones, which they often demonstrated by adding the words & Western to their company name—and later, as they progressed west, & Pacific28—to signal their intent. However, for the most part the early promoters did not have a vision of a national rail network, or even one that extended very far beyond their immediate locality: “This technology [of railroads] was more or less in place by the end of the 1830s but the psychology wasn’t. Most early promoters looked upon the railroad as a feeder to waterways or a means of serving the needs of a local community.”29
Locally, though, the railroads were welcomed by one and all. The arrival of the iron road was a cause for celebration, and the railroad companies would invariably try to build on that goodwill by outfitting a special train for the local notables and throwing a party for the residents. Brass bands, fireworks, and lavish banquets were held for their benefit, an early example of public relations, which could be said to have been invented by the railroads. There was no shortage of attempts to capitalize on the event. Local potters and glass blowers would hastily produce commemorative china and glassware, often, to save themselves the services of a designer, using the same much-copied pattern showing a basic engine of the early teapot design hauling a single car and with the singularly unoriginal motto “God Speed Thee.” In what would turn out to be presciently accurate reporting, local newspapers would print laudatory articles representing the event as epoch making. There was negative coverage too, often focusing on the potential dangers of the railroad, since many of these early lines went down the main street, already full of horses, carts, and pedestrians, many of whom were utterly unaware of the perils posed by even a slow-moving locomotive. But the railroad was greeted by most people with open arms: “Generally, though, when the iron horse made its first appearance, the reception was one of breathless expectation and delight. The backers and planners of all the early railroads saw to it that their first demonstration runs were occasions of festivity.”30
In general, these early railroads did not change the American way of life. They might allow travel to the nearest big town and allow some produce to be taken farther, but they were in no sense a national network. The next couple of decades, however, would change all that, as the beast of the iron road was finally unleashed—with extraordinary consequences for America.
3
THE RAILROADS TAKE HOLD
In the twenty years running up to the outbreak of the Civil War in 1861, the railroads became an unstoppable force, conquering the whole of the Eastern Seaboard and making major inroads westward. From an experimental technology with a precarious base, railroads became mainstream and ubiquitous, sweeping through the country with the support of the population. The love affair was becoming a marriage, a symbiotic relationship that was to last almost a century. In the words of Ralph Waldo Emerson, “Americans take to this contrivance, the railroad, as if it were the cradle in which they were born.”1
The impact of such a major invention took time to sink in. At the beginning, the railroad was “mostly an object of awe, excitement and mild trepidation.”2 It was unclear whether the railroads were merely a novel form of amusement, a grandiose fairground ride, or an invention that would change people’s way of life. By the start of the 1840s, everything needed to build railroads quickly and cheaply was coming together—the technology, the labor, the financing, and the legal framework. Galvanized by its promotion funded by a combination of private and public money, and now supported by just about everybody apart from those whose vested interests were directly threatened by the spread of the new technology, railroad fever spread dramatically across America. The brief financial downturn caused by the panic of 1837 proved to be barely a hiccup in the onward march of the iron horse. Although the subsequent downturn following the panic finished off dozens of putative rail schemes, some of which would never have been viable anyway, and delayed many others, the railroads recovered far more quickly than the rest of the economy, and indeed helped to stimulate the subsequent boom. The panic, though, caused rather longer-term damage in terms of the creditworthiness of both states and railroads, since several states, notably Pennsylvania, Indiana, and Michigan, defaulted on their debts as a result of the panic, making it more difficult for future railroads to raise funds for investment. Manufacturers suffered, too, with several bankruptcies, a list that would have included Baldwin but for the leniency of his creditors and his foresight in entering into partnership with several other manufacturers to spread the risk in what was a difficult business.
Initially, “few Americans thought of the railroad as being a harbinger of an industrial revolution or of any drastic change in the social order.” Quite the opposite. The Boston & Lowell, for example, was “built because people in Lowell wanted ready access to Boston [and] the same kind of need had given birth to the Camden & Amboy, the Philadelphia, Germantown & Norristown, the New York & Harlem, the Pearson & Hudson River Railroad . . . and so on.”3 The early railroad promoters, like the inventors of the World Wide Web, could not have had any notion of the dramatic changes that their conception would bring about. Their initial philosophy was parochial, but, by the mid-1840s, as the number and extent of the railroads spread, and the notion of the iron road as a unifying national force took hold, they developed a wi
der, more ambitious vision of its potential. There was no central plan. In contrast to the growth of the railroads in a number of European countries, where governments dictated the shape of the network in accordance with a central plan, in America there was no such scheme. In the United States, the emphasis on states’ rights—the assumption that power resides primarily with the states rather than the federal government—would never have allowed that, but several states that funded or supported railroads strongly influenced their routes. Indeed, government of all levels by and large made a point of keeping out of the railroads, which was to have implications for safety and passenger comfort.
New England enjoyed much of the postpanic growth. Indeed, for a brief period, its capital, Boston, could boast of being the best-connected city in America. By 1850, it was possible to travel from Boston to most of the cities of Massachusetts, as well as north to Portland, Maine, and even to Montreal in Canada and west to Albany, in New York State, and down to New York City itself. The majority of railroad lines, however, were still relatively short. Longer journeys required a complex series of interchanges and— since stations belonging to different companies were invariably and, at times deliberately, built well apart—the occasional trudge or carriage ride through towns.
Even America’s first truly long-distance railroad,4 the Erie, had its origins as much in local interests as regional or national considerations. The line, conceived as a link between the Hudson River and Lake Erie, or in other words, like the Erie Canal, as a connection between the Atlantic Ocean and the Great Lakes, was inevitably opposed by canal owners. Support from local people, however, enabled the promoters to overcome these narrow interests. According to railroad historian George Douglas, “Numerous communities along the way, communities that had no transportation at all, created such an uproar that the canal interests had to back down and allow the Erie Railroad to be chartered.” It was to be a direct rival to the highly profitable Erie Canal, whose owners did manage to ensure that several restrictions were placed on the railroad to protect the canal’s interests.
The Great Railroad Revolution Page 8
