by Peter Brune
Against this frightening and rapid deterioration in the economic, political and military scene in Europe and Asia, the development of the Singapore Base had continued to proceed at a disjointed and pedestrian pace. By 1931, eight idle years had passed since Britain had decided to retain her fleet in Europe and build a new naval base in the Far East. Japan’s expansion in China caused the British Chiefs of Staff to strongly advocate the abandonment of the ‘ten-year rule’ which had, they rightly maintained, inhibited Britain’s ability to defend its Far Eastern interests. Although in March 1932 the Committee of Imperial Defence accepted their recommendation, the Government, immersed in the economic crisis, duly informed them that this should not be misconstrued as a pledge for greater funding.
But the initial problem was not just funding but the well-worn debate between the British services as to the emphasis of that spending. Kirby, in The War Against Japan:
In December 1931 a sub-committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence, presided over by Mr. Stanley Baldwin, had been set up to examine the question of coast defences and the security of defended ports throughout the Empire, with special reference to the employment of air forces in that particular role . . .
The Service Ministries reiterated the views they had expressed in 1925–26.10
The recommendations by the Baldwin Committee in May 1932, and subsequently approved by the British Government, need further attention. First, as in 1925–26, the fixed gun was chosen as the main prevention against an attack from the sea; second, the plane was acknowledged as an important addition to those guns, and further, as a potent means of offensive action; and last, the RAF was to ‘take part in all aspects of the defence of the Singapore Base, including fighter defence and offensive action against ships’.11 The first recommendation clearly portrays the expectation at the time that any attack on Singapore would be a direct seaborne one, that is, that a landward assault via the Malay Peninsula was still not contemplated. Hence the ongoing reliance upon fixed guns. The second is self-evident. But the third point sadly depicts the ongoing lack of cooperation and joint planning, and petty interservice rivalry.
It was now decided, with some sense of urgency, to build the naval base and the first stage of Singapore’s fixed defences, which were to be completed by 1936–37. The construction of the graving dock at the naval base was put to tender and the necessary infrastructure for a skilled labour force—accommodation, workshops and ammunition storage—was undertaken. In planning to protect Singapore Island from an amphibious landing, the fixed defences were concentrated in two areas. The first was near the east coast at Changi (Changi Fire Command) and would consist of three 15-inch, three 9.2-inch and eight 6-inch guns; while the second was Faber Fire Command, situated in the south and west with two 15-inch, three 9.2-inch and ten 6-inch guns. These sites provided for excellent observation posts from Changi Hill and Mount Faber respectively. Their share of big guns, smaller weapons for close defence and modern communications adequately covered the entrances to the naval base via the Johore Strait and Singapore’s commercial port at Keppel Harbour.12 This work was completed in 1939.
While the Admiralty was thus engaged, the Air Ministry set about constructing airfields on Singapore Island at Tengah, about thirteen kilometres northwest of Singapore City; at Sembawang, about two kilometres south of the navy base; and at Seletar, about five kilometres east of Sembawang.
As the political and military turmoil of the mid-1930s was unravelling, a new General Officer Commanding Singapore was appointed. Major-General William Dobbie, a man known for his ‘straightforwardness and simplicity of character, based on his strong religious beliefs’,13 assumed command in August 1936. Born in Madras (Chennai) on 12 July 1879, Dobbie had been educated in England and qualified for a military career at the Royal Military Academy Woolwich, and the Royal School of Military Engineering at Chatham. He had seen service during the Boer War and the First World War.
It is at this point that a key character—and a controversial one—enters our story. Shortly after Dobbie’s appointment, Colonel Arthur Percival was appointed as General Staff Officer, Grade 1 (GSO1) to HQ Malaya Command. Percival had had a distinguished career. Born at Aspenden, Hertfordshire on Boxing Day 1887, Percival attended Bengeo School before proceeding to Rugby School (1901–06), where he was a member of the cadet and rifle corps.14 He began his working life for Naylor, Benzon and Company, in the City of London, which was ‘one of the 40 or so London firms of iron ore dealers trading to support the still massive British iron and steel industry’.15 Lionel Wigmore, in The Japanese Thrust:
. . . Percival had been commissioned at the age of 26 upon the outbreak of the 1914–1918 War, in which he rose to command a battalion, then to temporary command of the 54th Brigade, and won three decorations [MC, DSO and Bar]. His service between the wars included four years (1925–29) with the West African Frontier Force . . .
He had the unusual distinction of having graduated not only at the Army Staff College at Camberley but at the Naval Staff College, and having attended a course at the Imperial Defence College. This had made him a member of a relatively small group from which senior commanders and chiefs of the general staff were customarily drawn.16
Wigmore described Percival as ‘unassuming, considerate, and conciliatory’,17 while a more recent English historian, Peter Elphick, describes him as ‘something of an athlete, yet his appearance belied the fact. He was tall and of slight build. He had a soft voice, and his most obvious facial characteristic was a pair of protruding upper teeth . . .’18 General Key, who served under Percival during the Malayan Campaign, acknowledged that he ‘did not have a dynamic style of command’,19 but stated that Percival was ‘as straight as a die with a very good brain’.20
Upon his arrival in Singapore, Dobbie was faced with a multitude of problems. The first was the growing realisation that the defence of Singapore and its naval base now depended on defence in depth, that is, the possibility that the Malay Peninsula might be used by the Japanese to attack Singapore ‘through the back door’. Dobbie and Percival ordered an extensive reconnaissance of the peninsula and planned an exercise to assess the possibility of the Japanese conducting an amphibious landing during the north-east monsoon (October–March) of 1936–37. This proved that not only was the landing quite feasible, but that the poor visibility during this period would impede British air reconnaissance. Consequently, Percival requested before his departure for England that he be permitted to submit an appreciation from the Japanese view of an invasion of Malaya. Dobbie consented.21 Kirby, in The War Against Japan:
This appreciation drew attention to the fact that before launching an attack the Japanese would be likely to establish advanced air bases in Siam, and pointed out the possibility of their making landings on the mainland. Among the landing places mentioned as possibilities were Singora and Patani in Siam and Kota Bharu [sic] in Malaya . . . in such circumstances the security of the Naval Base was dependent on the defence of northern Malaya and Johore . . .22
Here we have a GOC in Singapore in July 1938, three years and five months before the Japanese invasion of Malaya, warning that the likely Japanese approach to the capture of the base and island would come from landings in Siam and in Johore; that the assault was highly probable during the north-east monsoon, whereby the enemy would have the potential for at least a partial screen in his approach; and that the jungle in Johore was not impenetrable. Further, Percival noted that in their war in China, the Japanese were using significant numbers of sophisticated landing craft; had built landing ships to transport them; had integrated the use of tanks in these operations; and were constructing 18-knot merchant ships which could be used for such operations in addition to their obvious use.23 As GSO1 to Dobbie, this was Percival’s appreciation, and subsequent events were to prove that it was professionally undertaken, detailed and, above all, accurate. Moreover, the appreciation was undertaken on the ground and the assertion that the timing of an invasion might be during the north-eas
t monsoon had been put to a practical test.
When Percival left his appointment to head home to England, he was instructed by Dobbie to present the appreciation to the War Office. However, the appreciation was nothing new, in the sense that during the 1930s the Directing Staff and students at the Imperial Defence College had repeatedly turned their minds during war games to the likely methodology of a Japanese attack in the Far East.24 The students were further ordered to predict this scenario against the neutrality of the United States. Their conclusions, in the light of future events, are illuminating. Kirby, in The War Against Japan:
Year after year the students, as the result of examining Japanese military history, came to the conclusion that she would attack without a previous declaration of war during the north-east monsoon and would effect a landing or landings well to the north of Singapore in southern Siam or northern Malaya with the object of gaining control of existing airfields . . . and then advance southwards . . . along the main road and railway.25
Also, as Kirby has pointed out, the students’ appreciations were always available to the service ministries. As to the notion that the Japanese might attack before a formal declaration of war, this had a precedent: they had done so on 8 February 1904, when the Imperial Japanese Navy had attacked the Russian Fleet at Port Arthur.
On the basis of the appreciation, Dobbie advocated two initiatives: the first was planned to complement the existing beach defences and those for Singapore City by the construction of a defensive line of pillboxes in Johore; and the second was a significant build-up of the garrison in Singapore to enhance the potential to deploy additional troops in Malaya.
In siting his proposed defensive line of pillboxes, Dobbie saw the need to place them far enough north to put Japanese artillery out of range of the naval base and the reservoir and pipeline which produced about 40 per cent of Singapore’s water supply. He therefore envisaged a defensive line starting at the Johore River and running to Kota Tinggi and thence south-west to the western coast at Pontian Besar. This defensive line had been astutely devised. On its eastern extremity it had the Johore River as a natural barrier; to the north-east there was coastal swamp, which made an outflanking eastern coastal landing unlikely. Due in part to a slight curve in the line before reaching the western position of Pontian Besar on the west coast, and due to the fact that the distance from that town to the southern tip of the peninsula further limited an enemy outflanking movement (to the rear of the line), it also made an enemy coastal landing in the west unlikely. The proposed defences also had the potential for ample assembly points, with cover, to stage counterattacks. Dobbie planned to use army engineers in the construction of the defensive works and sought the cooperation of the rubber companies to build the roads at cost price. He sought £250 000 for the construction of the line. Dobbie was later granted the conservative sum of £60 000 for the task of the construction of defences on Singapore Island, Penang and his proposed line in Johore. In the end, he was only able to allocate £23 000 to the Johore Line, and as a result, it was destined to run no further than a short distance west of Kota Tinggi. Another rational initiative to defend the vital ground of southern Johore in the defence of Singapore had been lost through negligence, apathy and a resulting lack of funding.
The second of Dobbie’s recommendations was for an increase in the size of the army. At the time, there were two British battalions and artillery and engineer units in Singapore, and one Indian battalion and two reserve units in Malaya: the Straits Settlements Volunteer Force (SSVF) and the Federated Malay States Volunteer Force (FMSVF). The fact that both units were undermanned, poorly trained and poorly funded was a fair reflection of the civil government’s commitment in both policy and spending. Each of these units was funded by a budgetary system that operated on a fixed revenue for some years at a time, which made no allowance for the rapidly changing defence climate, and further, the civilians were not taxed and were concerned that increases in defence spending would instigate taxation.26
Many of the British civilians in Singapore and Malaya had not experienced the First World War and, sheltered away from Europe and its political climate, had enjoyed and still wanted to enjoy their commercial and lifestyle pursuits. According to Percival’s biographer, it appeared to Percival that the colonial administration, ‘instead of adjudicating between the competing priorities of defence and commerce, saw its role exclusively as that of protecting the latter against the former’.27 It was crystal clear to both Dobbie and Percival that the main priority of the civil administration was the preservation of the economic and commercial life of Singapore and Malaya. Business was, as always, to come first and the likelihood of war in Singapore and Malaya in 1937 seemed remote. After all, through the ignorant eyes of the local population, there was a seemingly impressive naval base taking shape right under many of their noses, and they were reassured by the potential British naval presence which had ruled the waves for hundreds of years. As a result of Dobbie’s plan, however, the War Office did retain the Indian Army battalion that was due for relief while the training and establishment of the volunteer battalions was in progress.
The threat from within was another issue Dobbie faced during his tenure in Singapore. Concerned at the Japanese presence in Malaya, he requested the posting of a defence security officer from MI5. At this time the Japanese owned one of the principal iron ore mines in Malaya and transported their ore to Japan in Japanese ships; they owned numerous rubber plantations, particularly abundant in Johore, some of which were run by ‘retired Japanese officers’;28 there was a considerable Japanese ownership of photographic and barber shops, a number of fishing boats which operated out of Singapore and plied their business up and down the peninsula; there was the odd brothel; and, as Sergeant Jack De Loas of the 2/19th Battalion AIF was later to discover, an undercover Japanese major played a fair game of tennis before hostilities began.29 The Japanese were thus well placed to gather comprehensive military intelligence throughout Malaya.
The British officer posted to Singapore as the defence security officer was Colonel Francis Hayley Bell. Briefed in London before his work began in Singapore in October 1936, Hayley Bell was directly responsible to Colonel Vernon Kell, who was Head of MI5 in London, and not General Dobbie.30 Hayley Bell was 58 years of age, attractive and ‘a splendid man, courageous but impetuous . . .’.31
Not long after his arrival in Singapore, Hayley Bell called on the Governor, Sir Shenton Thomas, to present his credentials. He was in for a shock. According to Hayley Bell’s daughter, her father came home from the meeting with the Governor to proclaim that when the subject of Japan came up, Thomas had said that only a fool would think Japan would want Singapore.32 And worse was to follow.
Just preceding Hayley Bell’s arrival in Singapore, Major Kenneth Morgan had been appointed as the first head of the Japanese Section of the Singapore Special Branch. Morgan did not impress Percival. Clifford Kinvig, Percival’s biographer:
Morgan was an odd man, sickly, secretive and paranoid, who steadfastly refused to share his intelligence with the Services . . . In Percival’s view Morgan had ‘an eccentric mentality, ill-balanced judgement, muddled thought, lack of general common knowledge and uncalled for reticence . . .’, and was ‘not fitted for the appointment he holds’.33
Malaya Command, the RAF and the Royal Navy had their own intelligence operation: the Joint Intelligence Bureau. From early 1937 Major Herbert Vinden was the Malaya Command representative in that bureau.
It would seem that Vinden’s endeavours formed the intelligence basis for the excellent appreciation written by Percival for Dobbie. Vinden was the officer who had tested the potential of an enemy landing during the northeast monsoon. He not only landed ‘on several beaches from a dinghy and came close inshore all the way along the coast,’34 but discovered that ‘several thousand Chinese [illegal immigrants] landed on the east coast every year’35 during this period. Vinden had therefore not only personally tested the potential of a Japanese lan
ding during the monsoon, but had discovered that the Chinese had been employing this procedure for years. He also travelled to Singora in Siam and noted the excellent harbour and facilities which were ‘suitable for the establishment of an invasion base.’36
In his subsequent appreciation of enemy intentions, Vinden accurately forecast the Japanese landing points and subsequent advance down the Malay Peninsula. He further predicted that the operation would not occur until Britain was immersed in a European war, and that Japan would attack without a declaration of war.37
Morgan’s contribution seems more clouded—apart from some useful work in the deportation of some enemy agents and the instigation of contacts elsewhere in the Far East.
Hayley Bell’s work in the period 1936–39 was so thorough and so relevant—and controversial—that it cost him his job. He criticised the continuity and standard of successive military leaders and their subordinates in Singapore, asserting that their tenure was too short, causing ever-changing plans and disjointed responses to those plans. Furthermore, he reported that they did not travel widely enough during their tenure to learn about the countries they had to defend.
But Hayley Bell’s most damning indictment of the security structure in Singapore came when he, in cooperation with Vinden and other interested officers, conducted an exercise to test the security of vital installations in Singapore. They were able to ‘blow up’ the naval base graving dock; ‘destroy’ the aviation fuel stocks on the island; ‘sink’ the moored fleet of RAF flying boats near RAF HQ; ‘wipe out’ the telephone exchange; and ‘demolish’ the lighting and power supplies to Singapore. Hayley Bell later commented that the navy took stock after the exercise, but that the ‘challenged civil utilities slumber on’.38 To add further insult to a growing range of injuries, Hayley Bell further asserted that the Thais were in close accord with the Japanese, which deeply offended Sir Josiah Crosby, the British Minister in Bangkok. The civil utilities may have ‘slumbered on’, but the Governor, General Bond (who had succeeded General Dobbie) and Crosby were incensed. Using their not inconsiderable collective influence, they succeeded in having Hayley Bell sent back to England in May 1939. Here was one of the most competent prewar officers engaged in the sad saga of Singapore’s defence, who was removed for displaying energy, acumen and common sense. The grandfather of the British actress Hayley Mills, Colonel Hayley Bell died in 1944, having seen many of his predictions materialise.
