The lack of citizen manpower ensured that Carthaginian armies were recruited from foreign soldiers. Libyans provided probably the steadiest and most disciplined element in most armies. Their close formation infantry were equipped with long spears and round or oval shields, and wore helmets and probably linen cuirasses. Libyan cavalry were also close order troops armed with thrusting spears, trained to deliver a controlled, shock charge. The Libyans may well also have provided some of the infantry skirmishers, the lonchophoroi of Polybius, each armed with a small shield and bundle of javelins. The Numidian kingdoms were renowned for their superb light cavalry, who rode their small mounts without either bridle or saddle and harassed the enemy with volleys of javelins, avoiding close combat unless conditions were absolutely in their favour. Numidian armies also included infantry skirmishers equipped with javelins and the same round shield borne by the cavalry and it is possible that contingents of these troops were also sent to Punic forces. From Spain came both light and heavy infantry, whose normal dress was a white tunic with a purple border. The heavy infantry {scutati) fought as a dense phalanx, carried a long body shield and were armed with a heavy throwing spear and a sword, either the short, thrusting weapon which provided the model for the Roman gladius or the curved, slashing falcata. The light infantry (caetrati) carried a small round shield and several javelins. Gallic infantry fought in massed formation and carried shields and javelins, but relied on their long, slashing swords. Both Spaniards and Gauls also provided contingents of well-mounted and brave, if undisciplined, cavalry, whose primary tactic was the all-out charge. Body armour was very unusual amongst the tribal peoples of Europe, helmets only a little less uncommon. The warriors of these nations were characterized by classical authors as ferocious in the first charge, but easily tired and inclined to lose heart if things did not quickly go their way. There was some truth in this statement, but on other occasions these troops proved far more stubborn than this stereotype would allow.10
Our sources primarily speak of the components of Carthaginian armies as national groups. Only a very small detachment from a field army was ever likely to be composed of a single nationality and some armies were very mixed. Usually an effort was made not to rely too heavily on the peoples indigenous to the theatre of operations for fear of defection or desertion. Before his Italian expedition Hannibal sent a large contingent of Spanish troops to Africa, replacing them with units raised there. The Carthaginian high command provided the sole unifying force in each army.11
It is conventional to describe Punic armies as consisting of mercenaries, but this is a gross oversimplification, since these forces included soldiers raised in many different ways with a great variety of different motivations. Some contingents were not hired, but provided by allied kingdoms or states as part of their treaty obligations. This always seems to have been the case with the Numidian kingdoms, whose royal families enjoyed a fairly close relationship with the Carthaginian noble families, bonds that were sometimes strengthened by marriage alliances. Numidian contingents were usually led by their own princes. Similarly many of the tribes in Spain and Gaul were formally allied to Carthage and fielded contingents identical to their own tribal armies and commanded by their own chieftains. Again, there is some indication of Punic leaders forming strong connections with the native aristocracy, perhaps allowing them to exploit traditional patterns of loyalty. Hasdrubal certainly married a Spanish princess and it is possible that Hannibal also did so. It is clear that the Spanish tribes' loyalty focused on the Barcid family rather than the distant Carthage. Later, the tribes would similarly adhere to the Scipiones, rather than Rome, rebelling when it was rumoured that Scipio Africanus had left Spain.12
We do not know precisely how the Libyan units were raised. Some troops were probably provided by allied cities in a similar manner to the Numidians. Others may well have been formed by peasants conscripted from the great Carthaginian estates. This area was later to prove a very fertile recruiting area in the Roman Empire. Even the troops clearly hired as mercenaries were not all recruited in the same manner. In some cases these men were hired as a group, a leader or chieftain offering his own and his warband's services for hire. The leader received payment for his services and then supported, and distributed rewards amongst, his followers much as any chieftain would do. In the tribal societies of Europe there was a strong tradition of warriors seeking service with the leaders who could support and give them wealth and glory, for a martial reputation was highly valued wherever it was attained. The bond between such a chieftain and his followers was intensely personal. They fought for him and would just as happily fight with or against Carthage as their leader chose. We hear of one group of Gauls led by a chieftain who served several masters in succession and proved of dubious loyalty to each of them. The loyalty of such soldiers must have been significantly different from that of men who had been directly recruited and were directly paid by their Carthaginian leaders. Presumably some units in the army, especially those which included Roman and Italian deserters and escaped slaves, were of mixed nationality.13
Our sources rarely refer to the organization of the various contingents in Carthaginian armies, simply telling us where each nationality stood, so it is unclear whether any troops were organized into units of a set size. Livy makes reference to a unit of 500 Numidian cavalry, but this might simply have been one contingent and there is no indication that these horsemen fought in regular units. Another passage mentions 500 Libyan infantry at Saguntum in 218 and we also hear of 2,000 Gauls divided into three bands or units at the capture of Tarentum in 212, although it is uncertain whether these were permanent or temporary arrangements. Normally Gallic and sometimes Spanish troops fought in tribal contingents, each under their own leaders in much the same way that they would fight for their own people. However, at Cannae Hannibal's centre consisted of alternate units of Spaniards and Gauls, clearly breaking up any tribal structure they possessed. Polybius uses one of the terms he also employs for the Roman maniple of 120-160 men, and the same term was used by later authors for the cohort of 480 in the Late Republican and Imperial army. This makes it probable that these 'companies' consisted of a few hundred men, certainly less than a thousand.14
The mixture of contingents from different nationalities usually provided Carthaginian armies with a good balance of different troop types, with both close and loose order infantry and cavalry. Many of these contingents were of high quality, although their standard of discipline varied considerably. It was rare for troops whether serving as allies or for pay to fight without enthusiasm, and mutinies were uncommon. An additional element was provided by the fairly frequent use of war elephants who might well panic an enemy unused to them. The elephants employed were probably African Forest elephants, somewhat smaller than Indian elephants, but more amenable to training than today's African elephants. The elephant was the main weapon, using its bulk and strength to terrify or crush opposition, but Hellenistic armies also mounted towers on the animals' backs, from which crewmen hurled or fired missiles. There is no direct evidence indicating that Punic war elephants also carried towers, but Polybius' account of the Battle of Raphia in 217 BC implies that the African breed was capable of carrying the extra weight. The main danger with elephants was that they were inclined to panic and might then trample friend and foe indiscriminately. Hasdrubal is said to have equipped the drivers, or mahouts, with a hammer and a chisel-shaped blade, which they were supposed to drive into the animal's spine to kill it if threatened to stampede towards friendly troops.15
Carthaginian commanders usually had well-balanced forces at their disposal, but the difficulty lay in co-ordinating the movements of these disparate elements. Orders issued in Punic had to be translated into various languages in order to be conveyed to the soldiers. Carthaginian magistrates, such as the suffetes, did not hold military commands. Instead generals were appointed, although it is not clear precisely by whom, and usually held command on a semi-permanent basis until they were replaced
or for the duration of a conflict. Although not serving magistrates, it is clear that the commanders were drawn from the same social class who filled these offices and there is no reason to believe that ability, more than family connections and wealth, was the main reason for their selection. In the First Punic War the Carthaginians continued their traditionally harsh treatment of commanders who failed, several men being crucified for incompetence. In several cases this penalty was inflicted on them when they lost the confidence of the senior Punic officers under their command.
However, the long duration of the commands which they were given did mean that many Carthaginian commanders became highly experienced. The longer a general held command over an army the more efficient it tended to become. Gradually, the disparate elements composing it became accustomed to operating together, their leaders and the higher commander became familiar with each other and, at least to some extent, their languages. The army which Hannibal led into Italy in 218 was probably the finest Carthaginian army ever to take the field. Its efficiency was in part the result of its commander's ability as a leader, but was more the product of long years of hard campaigning in Spain under the leadership of Hamilcar, Hasdrubal and Hannibal himself. During this time its command structure had developed to a high level, and this, as well as its march discipline and ability to manoeuvre, was markedly superior to the Roman forces drawn up against it. The high quality of this army, around which he could more easily incorporate Gallic and subsequently Italian allies, allowed the genius of Hannibal to dazzle his opponents in the opening campaigns.
Hannibal's army was not a typical Carthaginian army. Indeed, it is doubtful whether there was such a thing, since each Punic force was unique. There is no suggestion that all generals sought to control and lead their forces in the same way. Their relationship with the different national contingents varied. Each individual army gradually developed a means of working together. Freshly raised contingents often failed to co-ordinate their actions on the battlefield effectively. Similarly, even experienced armies had problems when called upon to act in concert with each other. At Zama Hannibal's army includeed troops raised by three different commanders at different times. In the battle these were kept as clearly distinct bodies and failed to support each other well.16
Large numbers of mercenaries and allied contingents could be raised fairly quickly by the Carthaginians, whose economic resources were normally sufficient to do this. The quality of the individual soldiers and contingents hired in this way was usually good. However, it took some time and considerable care to turn such forces into efficient armies. This meant that an experienced army was a precious thing, difficult to replace, and so not to be lightly risked. Carthage was never able to field troops in anything like the quantities of the Romans. Also the difficulty of replacing a tried and tested army often encouraged a more tentative approach to campaigning on the part of Punic generals, who, with a few notable exceptions, tended to be far less aggressive than their Roman counterparts.
Rome
Later tradition held that Rome had been founded in 753. Many stories circulated concerning this event, but the most popular told of Romulus and Remus, the twin sons of Mars who were suckled by a she-wolf. Romulus founded the city, but killed his brother in a rage when the latter mocked his plans. A bandit chief whose followers were vagrants and outcasts forced to abduct women from the neighbouring Sabines when they wanted wives, Romulus was the first of Rome's seven kings, the last of whom was expelled in 509 when a Republic was founded. Whether there is any truth at all in these myths is impossible to say. Certainly Rome was at one stage a monarchy, and the Republic was probably created round about the traditional date. The archaeological record shows settlement in the area from the tenth century, but the villages in the area do not coalesce into something which could be termed a city until the sixth. The site was a good one, positioned at a natural crossing point of the River Tiber and with hilltops providing strong defensive positions. It also lay on several important trade routes, notably the via Salaria, or salt road, running from the coast into central Italy. Gradually Rome emerged as the dominant city in Latium, head of the Latin League. She managed to endure the onslaught of the Oscan-speaking peoples from the Apennines who swept through most of central Italy and overran Campania in the late fifth and early fourth centuries, and the Gallic tribes who simultaneously pressed down from the north. In 390 a Roman army was routed at the River Allia and the city sacked by a band of Gauls, but little permanent damage was inflicted and the check to Roman growth was only temporary.
In 338 the last great rebellion by the other Latin cities against Rome was
defeated after a hard struggle. The Roman settlement in the aftermath of this conflict set the pattern for and accelerated her absorption of the rest of Italy. Some territory was confiscated and used to establish colonies of Roman and Latin citizens. Many noble families from Campania, which had remained loyal to Rome, were given citizenship and incorporated into Rome's ruling elite. The Latin League was abolished and the Romans did not negotiate with the defeated cities collectively, but formed a separate alliance with each community. Each city was now tied directly to Rome and obliged to provide her with soldiers to serve with her armies. The status of these communities was clearly defined by law, so that some were given full Roman citizenship, others citizenship in every respect apart from the right to hold office or vote at Rome (civitessine suffragio), and others continued to be Latin citizens, but were allowed the rights of intermarriage and commerce with Roman citizens. Most of Campania received full citizenship and the fertile lands of this area added greatly to Rome's prosperity. In 312 construction began on the via Appia, the first great Roman road, which ran from Rome to Capua, providing a physical link with the new territory.17 The Roman willingness to extend its citizenship was something unique in the ancient world and a major factor in her eventual success. Unlike those in other cities, freed slaves at Rome received the full franchise and by the third century many members of the population, including some senatorial families, numbered freedmen amongst their ancestors. The Roman talent was to absorb others and make them loyal to her. For the first time, the settlement of 338 extended full citizenship to communities which were not native Latin-speakers. The allied cities lost their political independence, although they continued to manage their own internal affairs, but gained benefits from the bond with Rome. Their soldiers were called upon to fight Rome's wars, but they also profited from the spoils of the subsequent victories. Latin as well as Roman citizens were almost certainly included in the colonies established on captured lands. In the late fourth and early third centuries Roman expansion assumed great momentum. The Samnites, Etruscans and Gauls were all defeated, despite some Roman disasters, notably at the Caudine Forks in 321 when a Roman army surrendered to the Samnites. The cities of Magna Graecia - the 'Greater Greece' heavily colonized by Hellenic communities - were subdued, despite the intervention of King Pyrrhus of Epirus on behalf of the city of Tarentum. Pyrrhus' modern army with its pike phalanx of professional soldiers and its war elephants inflicted two heavy defeats on Roman armies, but was eventually beaten. What was especially notable about this conflict was the refusal of the Romans to negotiate with Pyrrhus after his victories. This was certainly a surprise to the king of Epirus, who expected all wars to end in a negotiated peace settlement in the way that was normal in the Hellenistic world. Rome continued to expand, turning defeated enemies into loyal, but clearly subordinate allies. As Rome expanded so too did her citizen population which, combined with her allies, gave Rome vast resources of military manpower, far greater than those of Carthage.18
The number of Roman citizens steadily increased, and by the third century BC many lived long distances away from Rome, but the political life of the State was still entirely conducted in the city. Only when physically present in Rome could a citizen vote or stand for office. There were three main Assemblies where the Roman People expressed its collective will. The Comitia Centuriata voted to decl
are war or accept a peace treaty, and elected the consuls, praetor and censors, the senior magistrates of the State. The Comitia Tributa elected most of the more junior magistrates and could pass legislation. The Concilium Plebis was very similar, but excluded members of the numerically small patrician class. In these assemblies the People could only vote for or against a proposal, and there was no opportunity for debate or for an ordinary citizen to present a counter proposal. In all three the opinion of the wealthier citizens tended to predominate. This was especially true of the Comitia Centuriata, where the voting structure was based upon archaic military organization. The more prosperous citizens voted first and had fewer members in each voting-group or century, in the same way that they had once provided the cavalry and the most heavily armed infantry, who had the most prominent role in wartime. The senior class of the old heavy infantry, together with the even wealthier cavalrymen, totalled 88 out of the 193 centuries composing the assembly, not far short of a majority. It is always important to remember that Popular support, most of all in consular elections, always meant that a man had the favour of the bulk of the prosperous citizens at Rome and not simply the poor. The ten tribunes of the plebs had originally been created to defend the plebeians against aristocratic and especially patrician oppression, but by this time they were normally young senators at an early phase in their career. Potentially the powers of this office were considerable, since they presided over the Concilium Plebis and could present motions to it. Tribunes also possessed the right to veto any measure brought by another magistrate, however senior.
The Fall of Carthage Page 4
