Why had the invasion been mounted in the first place? It is clear that the Romans saw this expedition as a way of putting further pressure on Carthage. At least since the fall of Agrigentum and the Roman decision to attempt the expulsion of the Carthaginians from the whole of Sicily, the war had become an open struggle between Rome and Carthage. The limited objectives of the early phases of the war, assistance to the Mamertines and gaining control of the Straits of Messina, had passed into the background. The Carthaginians might eventually have been driven from Sicily by the piecemeal capture of each of their strongholds, but this was an enterprise which would take many years to achieve, and considerable effort could be wasted when captured cities were retaken or betrayed to the enemy. Once the conflict had become an open war between Rome and
Carthage, then it would only end when one or the other side conceded defeat. The Roman invasion of North Africa was an attempt to apply sufficient pressure to force Carthage to do just that, and it is notable that it was the Romans who decided to escalate the conflict in this way. Our sources are apt to blame Regulus for excessive pride in offering terms that were too harsh to be acceptable to the Carthaginians, but it is unlikely that any other Roman commander would have been markedly more lenient. The Romans demanded that their enemies admit that they had been utterly defeated and accept terms reflecting this. It is the first clear reflection we have of the Roman attitude to warfare discussed in an earlier chapter. Roman wars ended only when the enemy ceased to be a threat by admitting total defeat and accepting their future as a subordinate ally. The only alternative was for the Romans themselves to suffer such a defeat. The Carthaginians' attitude to warfare was far less determined, for they, in accordance with Hellenistic practices, expected a war to be ended with a negotiated treaty which reflected the actual balance of power. They did not anticipate the total destruction of an enemy's capacity to do future harm to them, still less that such terms would be imposed on them. Whether they or Regulus in fact initiated the negotiations, it is notable that the Carthaginians were willing to seek peace terms when the enemy had the upper hand in the conflict. The contrast to the Roman attitude when Pyrrhus had defeated them in two battles, or Hannibal had inflicted a string of disasters, is most striking. Both generals sent ambassadors to Rome and could not understand when the Senate refused even to speak to them unless they, the victors, conceded defeat. The relentless Roman attitude to warfare was one of their greatest assets in the wars with Carthage.
Sicily 258-241 BC
The Carthaginian cause was resurgent in the late 250s, but the territory they controlled in Sicily had been steadily reduced to little more than an enclave in the north-western corner of the island. In 254 the combined Roman army and fleet took Panormus, one of the largest of the cities still loyal to Carthage. Polybius tells us that, whilst the two sides were frequently camped less than a mile apart for months on end, the Romans refused to risk battle or leave the high ground, such was their terror of the elephants. However, the Carthaginians made no attempt to copy Regulus' daring assault on the enemy army in its camp. The Romans took a few more cities, notably Lipara and Thermae, the latter having been lost when Hamilcar surprised their Sicilian allies, but this was a fairly poor return for the efforts of the two consular armies which were sent to Sicily most years.
The pace of their conquest of Sicily had certainly slowed. When one of the consular armies withdrew late in 250, the current Carthaginian commander, Hasdrubal, advanced from Lilybaeum against the other which was occupying the city of Panormus. The Romans were there to protect the local population against raids whilst they harvested their crops, since an inability to defend allies would swiftly lead to defections to the enemy. This was especially true given the fairly recent capture of the city. Yet the Roman commander, Lucius Caecilius Metellus, deliberately kept his troops within the fortifications, feigning a reluctance to fight in an attempt to lure the Carthaginians into an unfavourable position. Hasdrubal readily took the bait, since the recent campaigns in Sicily can only have led him to despise the Romans' lack of spirit, and in an effort to demonstrate to Rome's allies the impotence of her soldiers, advanced right up to the city walls.28
It was a bad position, for Hasdrubal had to cross a river to approach the city and this severely restricted his ability to manoeuvre and would make it difficult to retreat. Metellus had made careful preparations. The inhabitants of the city had been tasked with stockpiling missiles by the city walls, and part of the Roman light infantry were stationed on the walls ready to employ this ammunition. The main body of velites were sent out to harass the advance elements of the Punic army as they crossed the river, forcing them to deploy into battle formation. A ditch had been dug close to the walls, and the velites were ordered to withdraw and shelter in this if hard pressed. They were given specific orders to concentrate their missiles on the elephants if the opportunity arose. Metellus kept his maniples of heavy infantry waiting inside a gate facing the left of the Punic army, ready to sally out. The Roman commander was also careful to provide a steady stream of reinforcements to the skirmishers fighting outside, and it is probable that some maniples were used in this way to provide a semblance of a fighting line outside the city. The Carthaginians were still not faced with serious opposition to their entire army and Hasdrubal let himself be drawn further into an escalating action, which he was not controlling, as his main line advanced against the thin Roman one. The elephant crews, eager to live up to their high reputation, charged and easily punched through the weak Roman forces, pursuing them back towards the city. The velites followed their orders and withdrew to the trench, still bombarding with missiles the elephants, who also came under a barrage from the walls. Wounded elephants panicked and began a stampede back towards their own army, creating widespread disorder. Metellus saw the opportunity and gave the order for the waiting column to charge out of the gate. Struck unexpectedly by a flank attack, the Carthaginian disorder turned into a rout. Heavy casualties were inflicted, although no reliable figures have been preserved and the claims of 20,000 or 30,000 dead in later sources do not seem plausible. The elephants suffered especially badly, ten being captured immediately and the rest subsequently, but it is unclear whether all 140 which he tells us were landed in Sicily after the defeat of Regulus were present. Diodorus claimed that a total of sixty were killed or taken, but Zonaras says 120 were taken and Pliny the Elder, writing in the first century AD, gives the far larger figures of 140-142. One story claims that Metellus offered the captured drivers their freedom if they would control the beasts, which were later shipped to Rome to be killed in celebratory games. Diodorus tells us that drunkenness amongst the Carthaginians' Gallic mercenaries was a major factor in the rout, but this is probably no more than a stereotypical tale of barbarian intemperance.29
This was the last massed land action of the war, although it scarcely warrants being classed as a pitched battle and it may be that our accounts exaggerate its scale. Its importance was undoubted, for the victory restored confidence to the Roman armies in Sicily and to the Senate. A major effort was planned for the next campaigning season in 250. Cities remained the key to Sicily, and the war continued to be dominated by sieges. Two strong cities with good port facilities remained in Carthaginian hands, Lilybaeum and Drepana which lay about 15 miles apart (120 stades). The Romans decided to attack Lilybaeum with both consular armies supported by a large fleet, a total of around 110,000 men according to Diodorus. The technical skills of the Roman forces had gready improved since Agrigentum, for from the beginning they planned the construction of siegeworks to carry battering rams up against the walls of Lilybaeum and open breaches through which the assaulting infantry could charge. Again one suspects that much of this knowledge may have been provided and learned from experts provided by Hiero. This was the first siege to rival the complex affairs of the wars of the Hellenistic world, with attacker and defender each thinking up counter-measures, responding in turn to the other's initiative. The garrison commander, Himilco,
mounted a very active defence, his 10,000 mercenaries tunnelling under the attacker's works to undermine them, and launching vigorous sallies in an effort to put them to the torch. Roman casualties were heavy both from enemy action and privation. Carthaginian forces, including the cavalry from Lilybaeum which had been evacuated by sea early in the siege as unnecessary mouths to feed, raided the Roman lines of communication. The Roman fleet experienced great difficulty in maintaining a blockade around the harbour as we shall see in the next chapter. Finally, the labour of many weeks was destroyed by fire when a strong wind aided the incendiary efforts of a group of Greek mercenaries in the garrison. An earlier attempt by some mercenary officers to betray the city had been thwarted by another officer, the Greek Alexon, leaving the Romans no other option but to starve the defenders into submission. Despite staggering naval disasters in 249 and the small chance of success when they lacked control of the sea, the Romans persevered with the blockade throughout the remainder of the war. The Carthaginians lacked sufficient land forces to break the siege.30
It is in the last years of the war in Sicily that the most famous of all the Carthaginian generals of this conflict appeared on the scene, Hamilcar Barca. His name was a suitably dramatic one, probably derived from the Semitic word for lightning-, or perhaps sword-, flash, but his greatest achievements were to come after the war with Rome and it is doubtful whether he would have received so much attention had he not been the father of Hannibal. Nevertheless, Polybius considered him the ablest commander on either side throughout the first conflict. By the time that he landed in Sicily in 247 the Carthaginians had been hemmed into a small enclave. He established himself on a hill called Hercte not far from Panormus, a secure base with command of a good anchorage. For three years he skirmished with the Roman forces near the city, winning minor victories, but not achieving anything in the longer term. Then in 244 he withdrew at night and sailed to Eryx near Drepana. The Romans had captured the abandoned town in 248, installing a garrison there and on the mountain's summit. Hamilcar captured the town in a surprise attack, cutting off the force on the summit, which was occupying the Temple of Venus, from the main Roman forces at the foot of the mountain. He managed to maintain this position and besiege this force for the remaining years of the war, again winning minor successes in the frequent raiding and skirmishing pursued by both sides.31
Hamilcar achieved little during his operations in Sicily, but it is probable that he lacked the resources to do much more and certainly did not have enough troops to defeat the Romans in open battle. It is distinctly possible that by this time the Carthaginians were directing more resources to their campaigns against the indigenous peoples of North Africa. With a power other than Rome, the prolongation of the struggle in Sicily and the avoidance of defeat may eventually have persuaded them to negotiate a peace acceptable to Carthage. In the end the land operations in Sicily became almost an irrelevance and the war was decided at sea. It is to the naval side of the First Punic War that we must now turn.
CHAPTER 4
The War at Sea
THE FIRST PUNIC WAR was the greatest naval conflict of antiquity. The resources both sides lavished on their fleets were truly enormous, and their losses in men and material were staggeringly huge. If our sources are correct, then the battle of Ecnomus in 256 may have involved more people than any other sea battle in history. Sea battles were more common than major land actions during the war and ultimately proved decisive. Polybius marvelled at the scale of the naval war, but even more at the speed with which the Romans, who, he claims, had never before built a warship, adapted to the sea and created a navy able to defeat Carthage with its long maritime tradition. The early years of the naval conflict witnessed a spectacular, and almost unbroken, string of Roman successes over an enemy whose ships were better constructed and crews far more skilful. When the war ended in 241, Rome had replaced Carthage as the unchallenged seapower in the western Mediterranean. The navies created during the war made possible the later victories over Carthage and the Hellenistic kingdoms.1
It was not true that the Romans had no experience at all of constructing and manning warships before 260, but Polybius' exaggeration was pardonable. There had been little need for warships of any size during Rome's steady conquest of Italy, for even those enemies who possessed a navy could be reached and defeated on land by the legions. In 311 the Romans created a board of two officials, the duoviri navales classis ornandae reficiendaeque causa with responsibility for construction and maintenance of warships. Each duumvir seems to have commanded a squadron of ten ships, which were probably triremes. Little is recorded of their activities, although one squadron was defeated with dismissive ease by Tarentine ships in 282. Although certainty is impossible in this poorly documented period, it seems that the fledgling Roman navy was disbanded after the defeat of Tarentum. Instead the Romans chose to rely on ships supplied and crewed by those of her allies with a maritime tradition, notably the Greek cities of southern Italy. As we have seen it was in ships provided by the allies, notably Tarentum, Naples and Locri, that Appius Claudius crossed to Sicily in 264. This was essentially an extension of the traditional Roman reliance on allied military support, save that these cities, known as the socii navalesy provided ships rather than soldiers. It is worth recalling that the 278 treaty with Carthage had provided for the possibility of Punic ships providing support for the legions. In 267 the number of quaestors was doubled from four to eight, the new magistrates being known as the quaestores classici. It is possible that one of the responsibilities of these men was the regulation of the naval allies, and each may have been responsible for the communities in a particular region of Italy. It is impossible to know just how many ships Rome's allies were capable of providing, but it is unlikely that either in overall numbers or in ship size they would have been capable of challenging Punic mastery, of the sea. Allied ships had difficulty both in transporting the Roman armies to Sicily and in supplying them there during the early years of the war in the face of Carthaginian naval activity. The role of the naval allies remained strictly subordinate to the land armies, which still formed the main effort in any Roman campaign.2
Therefore, the Senate's decision to construct and man a fleet of 100 quinqueremes and twenty triremes, with the intention of directly confronting the Carthaginian fleet, marked a major change in Roman practice. Polybius claims that the decision was made after the fall of Agrigentum encouraged the Romans to extend their war aims beyond the protection of the Mamertines and attempt to expel the Carthaginians entirely from Sicily. It is possible that there had been some advocates of constructing a fleet before 261. A very late source credits Valerius Messala, the consul of 263, with first realizing that a fleet was essential for ultimate victory in the war, but it is uncertain whether this tradition is accurate, or simply a later invention by a family eager to glorify its ancestors. A strong naval capability was clearly essential for the total subjugation of Sicily. Despite the acquisition of Syracuse as a base, it was still difficult for the Romans to supply, maintain, and reinforce their armies in Sicily when the sea routes were dominated by the Punic fleet. Ships were also essential if the Romans were to blockade cities with their own ports into submission, since otherwise the garrisons would be easily re-supplied by sea. Finally, it must have been clear that the Carthaginians' main strength was, and always had been, their fleet. The defeat of this fleet would inevitably be a major blow to Carthage, more so than the destruction of its mercenary armies, and would therefore be a major contribution towards forcing her to submit. This appears to be another example of a Roman decision to escalate the conflict in an effort to achieve a decisive result.3
Naval Warfare in the Third Century BC
In general the ancient sources are far less informative about operations at sea than on land. The problem is made worse by the essentially alien nature of oared warships to us. Maritime archaeology has started to provide some information, although wrecks of warships rather than merchantmen are exceptionally u
ncommon, and much has been learnt by reconstruction. Nevertheless there remain numerous gaps in our understanding of the construction and maintenance of classical galleys, and the strategic and tactical uses of fleets. An indication of this is our uncertainty as to the precise design of the quinquereme, the standard warship of the Punic Wars.
The great naval battles of the fifth century, when the Greeks had defeated the Persian invaders, and Athens and Sparta had vied for dominance, were fought and won by fleets of triremes. The evidence for this type of ship is relatively good, much of it coming from the literature and epigraphy of classical Athens and the excavations of the shipyards in the Piraeus harbour. The full-scale reconstruction of an Athenian trireme in the 1980s AD and its extensive sea trials vastly increased our knowledge. The trireme, or 'three', derived its name from the basic rowing group of three men. Each man sat at a different level and operated an oar 14 feet (c. 4 m) or so in length, those of the upper row projecting from an outrigger. Considerable skill was required in each oarsman for the successful functioning of the ship. Long and sleek, the Athenian trireme was about 120 feet (36.5 m) in length and just under 20 feet (6 m) across at its widest. It carried a crew of about 200, around 30 of whom were deck crew, officers and marines, and the remainder rowers. In trials the reconstructed version reached speeds of 8 knots and could maintain a steady 4 knots for hours on end, with half the rowers resting at any one time. Turns through 180 degrees were completed in a distance equivalent to two and a half ship lengths. These speeds were achieved despite the comparative inexperience of the modern crew and their use of oars which were probably heavier than the originals. Under sail the trireme was able to achieve 8 knots in a favourable breeze. All in all the performance of the reconstructed trireme was remarkably good and challenged many past assumptions about ancient naval warfare.4
The Fall of Carthage Page 12
