CHAPTER 8
Cannae and the Crisis for Rome
ON 2 AUGUST 216, Hannibal won his greatest victory in the plain (north of the small, hilltop town of Cannae in southern Italy. By the end of the day his outnumbered mercenaries had enveloped and massacred the greater part of the largest army Rome had ever fielded, turning this into one of the bloodiest battles ever fought, rivalling even the industrialized slaughter of the twentieth century. For the Romans Cannae became the yardstick by which other defeats were measured, never surpassed and only once or twice equalled in the next six centuries. Cannae remains one of the most famous battles ever fought, frequentiy alluded to in modern military writing, and Hannibal's tactics are still taught in the military academies where today's officers are trained. The UN commander in the Gulf War, General Norman Schwartzkopf, claimed to have employed principles based on study of Hannibal's campaigns and Cannae in particular in the planning and control of his own brief and devastatingly effective campaign. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the disciplines of Ancient History and Archaeology were overwhelmingly dominated by German scholarship, and it was perhaps a reflection of this that the study of ancient warfare was taken very seriously by the Prussian and German military. Von Schlieffen, the architect of the plan for the invasion of France in AD 1914, was obsessed with Cannae, studying it in incredible detail throughout his life, and attempting in his war plan to achieve just such a total victory. Cannae became the shorthand term for a complete success for many German generals. In AD 1941, as Rommel drove the British army back towards Tobruk, he wrote in his diary that 'a new Cannae is being prepared', and a year or so later in December 1942 during the Stalingrad campaign, the commander of the 6th Panzer Division produced a boastful report of a successful day's fighting around the obscure village of Pakhlebin, calling the engagement 'the Cannae of Pakhlebin'.1 Yet in spite of having fought 'the perfect battle' Hannibal ultimately lost the war and, having achieved no other victories as great as this, but still undefeated in battle, was forced to evacuate Italy twelve years later. How and why the Romans were able to survive this disaster is the theme of this chapter.
Cannae, August 216 BC
If we are to understand the Cannae campaign and the battle itself, we must constantly remind ourselves that at the time no one could have guessed at its outcome and that, even during the battle itself, there were several stages when things might have turned against Hannibal for all the brilliance of his tactics. Livy's account of the preliminaries to the battle is dominated by a sense of impending disaster, as once again an impulsive Roman commander recklessly led the army to defeat, ignoring the advice of his more experienced colleague. The sense of inevitable catastrophe pervading the narrative is utterly false.
The Roman Senate had resolved on mounting a major effort for the campaigning season in 216. The magistrates for the year were a distinguished group, with one of the consuls and three out of four praetors all having held the consulship before, whilst the other consul and all the praetors had held the praetorship in an earlier year. For the first time ever each consul was given a double-sized army of four legions which were expected to fight together. In 225 the consuls had also each commanded four legions, but the participation of both armies in the battle of Telamon had been coincidental. The legions themselves were each to be larger than normal, expanding to the size the Romans felt appropriate for the current crisis, so that each mustered 5,000 infantry as well as the usual complement of 300 horsemen. We do not know the size of the allied alae attached to each army, but can safely assume that their infantry were roughly equal in number to the Roman foot, whilst their cavalry was more numerous. Sometimes the unprecedentedly large size of this army has been doubted, especially since Livy mentions that there were a variety of traditions about the number of troops enrolled in this year. However, Polybius clearly believed that there were eight legions in the united army of the two consuls and there is no good reason to doubt him. This was not the only Roman army to be fielded in this year. In addition to the forces in Spain and Sicily, an army of two legions was sent north to face the tribes of Cisalpine Gaul which remained in open rebellion. This expedition was commanded by Lucius Postumius Albinus, who had been twice consul in 234 and 229 and was now probably nearly 60 years old.2
The incoming consuls given command of this, the largest army Rome had ever put into the field, were Caius Terentius Varro and Lucius Aemilius Paullus. The latter was the grandfather of Scipio Aemilianus and therefore receives a very favourable treatment from Polybius and all subsequent historians. This was his second consulship, as in 219 he had fought successfully against the Illyrians and celebrated a triumph, although he seems to have been involved in the scandal associated with the campaign which had led to the retirement from politics of his colleague, Marcus Livius Salinator. Paullus was to fall in battle, but, unlike Flaminius, he was a member of a wealthy and well-established aristocratic family, who were more than capable of defending his reputation in later years. A convenient scapegoat was found in the person of his colleague, who survived the fighting, but was a new man and vulnerable to the propaganda of such powerful families. Varro's descendants continued to gain membership of the Senate, but none had distinguished careers and the family never gained admittance to the core of senatorial families who dominated the senior magistracies till the end of the Republic.
Livy portrays Varro as a demagogue much like Flaminius. This conforms with his theme that it was the radical, popular politicians who caused most of the disasters to befall the state, when the mob ignored the wise leadership of the experienced aristocrats in the Senate. He tells us that Varro's family was undistinguished, that it was said his father was a butcher. Such an accusation is typical of the exaggerated invective that was a normal feature of Roman political debate and should not be taken seriously. Varro is supposed to have been one of the main supporters of Metilius' bill to grant Minucius equal power to Fabius Maximus the year before, but otherwise, even by Livy's account, his career had not been a radical one. As with Flaminius, he must have had considerable support from the wealthier classes in the Comitia Centuriata to have won election to the consulship. Livy even claims that he was the sole choice of the Assembly at the election, which strongly attests to his popularity, and that he actually presided over the vote to appoint his colleague. His success also makes it certain that he possessed considerable support amongst his fellow senators and, given that the presiding magistrate could do much to influence the outcome of an election, it is unlikely that he and his fellow consul were hostile to each other. There is no good reason to accept Livy's depiction of Aemilius Paullus as an adherent of Fabius' strategy of avoiding battle. It is not even certain that Fabius himself believed this to be the right way to proceed in the spring of 216, and that he continued this strategy in the years after Cannae does not necessarily mean that he advocated it before this disaster.3
Even if Fabius still advocated his policy of delay, then the plans of the Senate for the campaigning season of 216 make it clear that he was in a minority, and that they expected a direct confrontation with Hannibal. Fabius' six-month dictatorship had given the State time to recover from the defeats at Trebia and Trasimene. His army of four legions was relatively well-trained and had won some minor successes, even if part of it had also been defeated under Minucius. To this force they added four new and less experienced legions, so that around 80,000 infantry and 6,000 cavalry would face Hannibal's 40,000 foot and 10,000 horse. A continuation of Fabius' strategy did not require such a large force and concentrating so many soldiers and mounts greatly increased the problems of supply. Morale was good both in the population as a whole and amongst the soldiers, who were eager for battle. Many senators and their sons were serving either as tribunes, in the cavalry or on the commanders' staffs. One of the tribunes was the former Master of Horse, Minucius. The allied soldiers in particular were desperate to fight and avenge the devastation Hannibal's progress had wrought on Italian fields. Polybius claims t
hat the Senate told Paullus to seek battle and attributes a speech to him in which he explained to the soldiers the reasons for Hannibal's recent victories and assured them that the enemy would not be able to stand up to the combined might of both consular armies. In Polybius' version, Varro and Paullus did not disagree over whether or not to fight a battle, but instead over when and where to do so.4
At the opening of the campaigning season in 216, Hannibal was still at his winter base at Gerunium in Apulia, watched warily by the army commanded by Geminus and Regulus. Both of these men had their power extended as proconsuls for this year, but it is not clear whether Regulus remained with the army for the coming campaign. Livy claims that he gained permission to return to Roman on the grounds of age and infirmity, and certainly Polybius' statement that he was killed is untrue, since he became censor in 214. Once the crops had ripened enough to make foraging possible, Hannibal led his army south. The proconsuls followed him at a safe distance and sent repeated messages to the Senate asking for instructions, explaining that they could not close with the enemy without being forced to fight a battle. This was plausible enough, since the country the armies were marching through was open and fairly flat. Hannibal pressed on and captured the ruined stronghold of Cannae, which was still in use as a Roman supply depot.5
It is not certain when the new consuls arrived and the two parts of the army were joined together. Polybius implies that this was not until after Hannibal had taken Cannae, less than a week before the battle, whereas
Livy tells of their arrival before he had left Gerunium. Polybius' account is probably to be preferred, not only because of the implausibility of much of Livy's account of Hannibal's withdrawal, but also because the difficulties of feeding such a large army make it unlikely that the Roman force remained concentrated for such a long period. Further uncertainty exists over the precise location of the battlefield, chiefly with regard to which side of the River Aufidius it was fought on. We do not know what the course of the river was in the third century, but it is clear that this differed from its present-day line. Although some authorities have placed the battle to the north - the term is used loosely, the river actually running from south-west to north-east - on what is normally referred to as the left bank, it is an easier reading of our best sources to locate the fighting on the south, or right bank, assuming that the river's course originally lay further away from the hillock of Cannae itself. Such a positioning makes the movements of both armies more intelligible and will be followed here.6
The Romans advanced carefully in pursuit of Hannibal, having learned from Flaminius' failure to scout properly before Trasimene. They seem to have come along the coastal plain, perhaps to avoid having to pass any suitable ambush positions. On the day they came into sight of the enemy army, they stopped and camped 6 miles away. The Romans were to the east on the flat and open plain which rims down - there is a very slight gradient -to the sea. The consuls held command of the army on alternate days, the normal practice on the rare occasions both consuls operated together, but one which Fabius had refused to adopt with Minucius in the previous year. Paullus is supposed to have advised against advancing directly on the enemy in this country which favoured Hannibal's more numerous cavalry, but the next day was Varro's turn to command and he decided to press on. As the Romans marched across the plain, the column was attacked by Hannibal's cavalry and light infantry and thrown into some disorder before the Romans formed up part of their forces to drive the enemy back. The Roman velites and cavalry fought with formed maniples of legionaries in close support, giving them an edge over the opposition. Skirmishing lasted till nightfall, and it is doubtful that the Romans had covered many miles by the time they made camp. The next day Paullus continued the advance and brought the army up to camp by the river bank, only a couple of miles from Hannibal's position.
Polybius claims that Paullus still did not like the ground, but felt that the armies were now too close together for the Romans to disengage safely. It may be that Polybius was simply trying to shift the blame for the defeat onto Varro, but the difficulty of withdrawing in the face of the enemy was genuine. The Romans would be vulnerable as they withdrew across the open plain and anyway such a retreat would have had a demoralizing effect on the soldiers. It should never be forgotten that the legions at this time were not composed of the highly disciplined, professional soldiers of later years, but were still a volunteer militia of citizens who looked forward to returning to civilian life as soon as the campaign was over and the threat to their State ended. At the moment the army was enthusiastic, confident in its own numbers and encouraged by the promises of its leaders and the victories in the skirmishes over the winter. If their commanders appeared to lack a belief in victory and decided to flee from the enemy who was freely devastating Roman and allied fields, then the army's spirit would begin to drop. Apart from the risk of lowering morale, there was another pressing reason for the army to seek an early battle. Feeding so many men was an immensely difficult and never-ending problem, made far worse by the loss of the supplies at Cannae. If the campaign were prolonged, then the two consuls would be forced to divide their forces in order to keep men and horses fed. Paullus divided his army and sent the smaller portion across the Aufidius into a separate camp with the express intention of protecting the foraging parties which were to be sent out on this side of the river.7
Hannibal faced similar problems, made far worse by his lack of any immediate source of supplies beyond what his soldiers could forage or capture. Livy claims that immediately prior to the battle the situation had got so bad that many of his mercenaries, and particularly the Spanish contingents, were contemplating desertion. Hannibal is even supposed to have considered making a run for Gaul with his senior officers and cavalry, although his desperation may simply be another attempt to emphasize the wisdom of Fabius' strategy if only it had been followed. The capture of Cannae was only a temporary solution to his army's requirements and with the Romans so close he could no longer risk spreading his army out into detachments to forage. Both sides thus needed to seek battle in the immediate future if supply problems were not to put pressure on them to retreat or disperse, both of which would put them in danger. Yet the size of the Roman army was daunting and one of Hannibal's officers, a certain Gisgo, is supposed to have commented on their superiority. The general is said to have looked solemn and then quipped that whilst there may be a lot of Romans over there, there is not one called Gisgo, prompting a burst of laughter, perhaps forced, nervous, sycophantic, or a mixture of all three, from his assembled staff.8
Several days followed during which the armies stared at each other and skirmished in the usual way. Though both sides were eager to fight a battle, neither wanted to provoke one until they felt ready. By this time Hannibal had moved on from the hilltop citadel of Cannae itself and crossed the river, camping on the same side as the larger Roman camp. The most likely location for his camp is the high ground on which the modern village of San Ferdinando di Puglia now lies. On the next day, 31 July, the Carthaginian army was ordered to prepare for battle, cleaning their armour and sharpening the blades of their weapons. On 1 August Hannibal's army marched out to deploy on the open plain in front of the ridge. This was Paullus' day of command, but his only move was to deploy strong covering forces in front of both of the Roman camps. Hannibal seems to have been content with giving his soldiers this demonstration of Roman timidity. Numidian light horsemen crossed the river and rode up to harass the slaves gathering water for the smaller camp. Paullus remained on the defensive and Hannibal made no further moves to force a battle.9
The Roman commander's reluctance to fight in the open plain is understandable given Hannibal's marked superiority in cavalry, but Polybius tells us that his soldiers resented his passive behaviour, a natural mixture of enthusiasm and nervousness making them long to get the anticipated battle over with. Varro is supposed to have been similarly roused by the sight of
Numidian cavalry riding up to the Roman camp, a
nd when he took over command of the army on the next day, decided to give battle. However, he did not plan to do so under the same circumstances which his colleague had just refused, but across the river on the narrower plain north of Cannae itself. Livy claims that he issued the orders without even bothering to consult Paullus, but this is extremely unlikely and not claimed by Polybius. It may be that Paullus did not believe it wise to fight, but this would then make his willingness to close with the enemy in the first place rather strange, and it is distinctly probable that he agreed with Varro's decision. One scholar has even suggested the ingenious and attractive theory that the battle was actually fought on Paullus' day of command, but this is impossible to prove and it is safer to stick with our sources.10
Early on the morning of 2 August, Varro had the red vexillum, the square Roman flag carried by the consul's bodyguard, displayed outside his tent in the traditional signal for battle. It is probable that orders had been issued to the tribunes during the night, giving them time to prepare their men, for just after dawn the army began to march out of the larger camp and cross the river. Joining the troops from the smaller camp, the Romans formed a single line of battle with its right flank resting on the river. This vital position was held by the Roman cavalry who should have been 2,400 strong if all eight legions had their full complement of horsemen. The left flank, resting against the hill of Cannae itself, was held by the Latin and allied cavalry who composed the remainder of the army's 6,000 horse, and were thus probably around 3,600 strong. The alae were normally supposed to supply three times as many horsemen as the legions, but the lower proportion at Cannae may have been a result of the heavy losses suffered by Centenius' force the year before. However, it is equally possible that some of the legions were below strength in horsemen, in which case the allied contingent would have been larger.
The Fall of Carthage Page 26
