3.
Picard & Picard (1987), pp. 56-124, Lancel (1995), pp. 78-102.
4.
Exploration & colonization, see Picard & Picard (1987), pp. 91-100, Lancel (1995), pp. 100-109; the Neapolis of fourth-century Carthage, 141-2.
5.
Lancel (1995), pp. 269-88; Agathocles, Diodorus Siculus 20. 8. 3-4.
6.
Contrast Picard & Picard (1987), pp. 125-81 with the more up to date view in Lancel (1995), pp. 111-21.
7.
Pyrrhus' lost manual, Plutarch, Pyrrhus 8; on Hellenistic warfare in general see F. Adcock, The Greek and Macedonian Art of War (Berkeley, 1957).
8.
On ship construction and naval warfare see chapter 5; for Carthage's harbour see Lancel (1995), pp. 172-8, H. Hurst, 'Excavations at Carthage, 1977-8', Antiquaries' Journal 59 (1979), pp. 19-.9.
10 Lonchophoroi, e.g. Polybius 3. 72. 3, 83. 3, 84. 14; for a discussion of the poor evidence
for Punic armies see J. Lazenby, Hannibal's War (Warminster, 1978), pp. 14-16; for an
interesting discussion of Gallic, Spanish and other tribal contingents in Hannibal's army
see L. Rawlings, 'Celts, Spaniards, and Samnites: Warriors in a Soldiers' War', in
T. Cornell, B. Rankov & P. Sabin, The Second Punic War. A Reappraisal British Institute of Classical Studies Supplement 67 (London, 1996), pp. 81-95. D. Head, Armies of the Macedonian and Punic Wars attempts to reconstruct Punic equipment and organization in some detail, but many of his conclusions are highly conjectural.
1.
Exchange of troops in 218, Polybius 3. 33. 5-16. Note the difficulties in communicating with each other in the rebellious army during the Mercenary War, Polybius 1. 67. 3-13, 69. 9-13.
2.
Marriage alliances between Punic aristocrats and Numidian royalty, e.g. Polybius 1. 78. 1-9, Livy 29. 23. 2-8; in Spain, DS 25. 12, Livy 24. 51. 7, Silius Italicus 3. 97,106.
3.
Autaritus' Gauls, Polybius 2. 7. 6-11.
4.
500 Numidians, Livy 26. 38. 11-14; Libyans at Saguntum, Livy 21. 11. 8; Gauls at Tarentum, Polybius 8. 30. 1; speirai at Cannae, Polybius 3. 114. 4, cf. 6. 24. 5.
5.
For war elephants in general see H. Scullard, The Elephant in the Greek and Roman World (London, 1974); Raphia, see Polybius 5. 84. 2-7.
6.
See chapter 12.
7.
A good recent survey of early Roman history is T. Cornell, The Beginnings of Rome (London, 1995).
8.
On this period see Cornell (1995), pp. 345-68, & S. Oakley, The Roman Conquest of Italy', in J. Rich & G. Shipley, War and Society in the Roman World (London, 1993), pp. 9-37; refusal to negotiate with Pyrrhus, Plutarch, Pyrrhus 18-20.
9.
On aristocratic funerals see Polybius 6. 53-4.
10.
Factions dominate most modern accounts of the Punic Wars, e.g. B. Caven, The Punic Wars (London, 1980), pp. 20, 83-4, and to a lesser extent Lazenby (1978), pp. 4,108. H. Scullard, Roman politics 220-150 BC (London, 1951) represents an extreme form of this view.
11.
Polybius' famous description, Polybius 6. 11-19, 43-58, and F. Walbank, A Historical
Commentary on Polybius [3 vols] (Oxford, 1970), pp. 673-97, 724-746. For Roman politics in general see M. Gelzer, The Roman 'Nobility (London, 1968), M. Crawford, The Roman Republic (Glasgow, 1978), P. Brunt, Social Conflicts in the Roman Republic (London, 1978), pp. 1-73, F. Millar, The political character of the Classical Roman Republic', Journal of Roman Studies 74 (1984), pp. 1-19, and T. Wiseman (ed.), Roman Political Life 90 BC-AD 69 (Exeter, 1985).
22 For a good introduction to the development of the Roman army see L. Keppie, The
Making of the Roman Army (London, 1984), E. Gabba, Republican Rome: The Army
and Allies (Berkeley, 1976), A. Goldsworthy, Roman Warfare (London, 2000),
F. Adcock, The Roman Art of War under the Republic (Cambridge, 1960), and
E. Rawson, 'The literary sources for the pre-Marian Roman Army', Papers of the British
School at Rome 39 (1971), pp. 13-31.
1.
Polybius 6. 19-42, and Walbank 1 (1970) pp. 697-723.
1.
Polybius 11. 23. 1, 33,1, and Walbank 2 (1970), p. 302. See also M. Bell, Tactical Reform in the Roman Republican Army', Historia 14 (1965), pp. 404-22.
2.
On the find of a probable Roman scutum see W. Kimmig, 'Ein Keltenschild aus Aegypten', Germania 24 (1940), pp. 106-111. For Roman equipment in general see
P. Connolly, Greece and Rome at War (London, 1981), pp. 129-42, and 'Pilum, gladius and pugio in the Late Republic', Journal of Roman Military Equipment Studies 8 (1997), pp. 41-57, and M. Bishop & J. Coulston, Roman Military Equipment (London, 1993), pp. 48-64.
1.
Polybius 2. 33. 4 records an occasion in 224 when the hastati were given the triarii's spears, indicating that the former normally carried another weapon, presumably the pilum. On the pilum see Bishop & Coulston (1993), pp. 48-50.
2.
For the 'reform' of 211, see the unconvincing arguments in M. Samuels, 'The Reality of Cannae', Militargeschichtliche Mitteilungen 47 (1990), pp. 7-31.
3.
Cato's grandfather, Plutarch, Cato 1; on the saddle see P. Connolly, 'The Roman Saddle', in M. Dawson (ed.), Roman Military Equipment: The Accoutrements of War, BAR 336 (Oxford, 1987), pp. 7-27.
4.
Sentries sleeping on guard, Polybius 6. 35. 6-37. 6, Livy 44. 33; punishments in general, Polybius 6. 37. 7-38. 4.
5.
This decision-making process is implicit in our narrative accounts, and explicit in Vegetius 3. 1.
6.
Telamon, Polybius 2. 24-31, esp. 27. 1-6.
7.
E.g. Spurius Ligustinus mentioned in Livy 42. 34.
8.
For the importance of virtus see N. Rosenstein, Imperatores Victi (Berkeley, 1990), pp. 114-51.
9.
Space allocated to each legionary, Polybius 18. 30. 5-8, Vegetius 3. 14,15, and discussion in A. Goldsworthy, The Roman Army at War, 100 BC-AD 200 (Oxford, 1996), pp.179-80.
10.
Roman armies ambushed, e.g. Polybius 2. 25, 3. 118, Livy 38. 40-1, & chapter 7. Livy noted that in 193 a consul sent out scouts even though he was marching in daylight, which implies that this was not normal, Livy 35. 4. For accidental encounters see Polybius 2. 27-8, 3. 61, 65, Livy 31. 33, Polybius 18. 19. For military intelligence in general see M. Austin & B. Rankov, Exploratio (London, 1995).
11.
Delays before battle, see Polybius 3. 89-90,110-113, 10. 38-9, 11. 21, 14. 8, Livy 34. 46, 38. 20, and esp. Livy 37. 38-9; armies camped near each other for long periods without fighting, see Polybius 1. 19, 57-8, Appian Iberica 11. 65; strategems to cover
withdrawal when in close contact with the enemy, Polybius 2. 25, 3. 68, 93-4, Livy 31. 38-9.
1.
Forming up Roman armies, Polybius 3. 72,113, 6. 31, Livy 34. 46, 40. 31, 40. 48, 41. 26; Punic armies also apparently using the processional method, Polybius 3. 113. 6, 11. 22; Macedonians at Cynoscephalae, Polybius 18. 22-5; confusion in deploying a Spanish army in haste in 195, Livy 35. 14; references to Roman tribunes being closely involved in deployment, Polybius 11. 22. 4, Livy 44. 36.
2.
For the role of optiones see M. Speidel, The Framework of an Imperial Legion. The fifth Annual Caerleon Lecture (Cardiff, 1992), pp. 24-6.
3.
For a detailed discussion of this issue see Goldsworthy (1996), pp. 138-40.
4.
For a stylized account of the line system see Livy 8. 8. esp. 9-13. For a discussion of infantry combat in this period, see P. Sabin, 'The mechanics of battle in the Second Punic War', in Cornell, Rankov and Sabin (1996), pp. 59-79, esp. 64-73 and for the Roman tactical system see P. Sabin, 'The Multiple Line System in Republican Roman Armies', Journal of Roman Studies (forthcoming). For a detailed discussion on combat
in a slightly later period see Goldsworthy (1996), pp. 171-247; on the role of the commander see Goldsworthy (1996), pp. 116-70.
5.
See chapters 7 and 8.
Chapter 2
1.
Thucydides 1, esp. 1. 23, 89-117.
1.
Polybius 1. 7. 1-5. See F. Walbank, A Historical Commentary on Polybius 1 (Oxford, 1970), pp. 52-3 for a discussion of the chronology.
2.
Polybius 1. 7. 6-13. Dionysius of Halicarnassus 20. 4 claims that the garrison was installed to defend the city against the Bruttians.
3.
Appian, Samnite History 9.3.
4.
Polybius 1. 8. 3-9. 8. For the chronology of Hiero's career see Walbank 1 (1970), pp. 54-5. See Diodorus Siculus 22. 13 for an account of the action at the River Longanus.
5.
Polybius 1. 10. 1-2; Hannibal's deception of Hiero, Diodorus Siculus 22. 13; inevitability of Carthaginian conquest of Sicily once they controlled Messana, Polybius 1. 10. 7-8, Zonaras 8. 8. For discussion of the war's causes see J. Lazenby, The First Punic War (London, 1996), pp. 31-42, B. Caven, The Punic Wars (London, 1980), pp. 8-16, Walbank 1 (1970), pp. 56-63.
6.
Polybius 1. 10. 3-9.
7.
Polybius 1. 11. 1-3. See also Walbank 1, p. 62, Lazenby (1996), p. 39. For a detailed discussion of the process involved see J. Rich, Declaring war in the Roman Republic in the period of transmarine expansion (Collection Latomus 149, Brussels, 1976).
8.
The Philinus treaty, Polybius 3. 26. 2-5; Polybius' account of the three preserved treaties, 3. 22-26, cf. Livy 7. 27. 2,9. 43. 26, Periochae 13, and Diodorus Siculus 16. 91. 1; Livy's 306 treaty, Per. 14. For discussion of these see Walbank 1 (1970), p. 337-56, Lazenby (1996), pp. 31-5; Caven (1980), pp. 15-16, and S. Lancel, Carthage (Paris, 1995), pp. 86-8, 362, both favour accepting Philinus' treaty. For a recent discussion of relations betweeen Rome and Carthage see R. Palmer, Rome and Carthage at Peace. Historia Einzelschriften Heft. 113 (Stuttgart, 1997). On the incident at Tarentum see Livy Per. 14, Zonaras 8. 6, Orosius 4. 3. 1-2.
10 Dio 11. l-A, Zonaras 8. 8.
1.
For Defensive Imperialism see T. Mommsen, The History of Rome (trans. M. W. P. Dickson) (London, 1877-80), T. Frank, Roman Imperialism (New York, 1914), M. Holleaux, Rome, la Grke et Us monarchies hellenistiques au Hie siecle avant J.C. (273-205) (Paris, 1921), E. Badian, Roman Imperialism in the Late Republic (Oxford, 1968), R. M. Errington, The Dawn of Empire: Rome's Rise to World Power (London, 1971).
2.
For the economic motives for Roman imperialism see M. K. Hopkins, Conquerors and Slaves (Cambridge, 1978); the strongest argument for the Roman political and social systems encouraging aggression is W. V. Harris, War and Imperialism in Republican Rome 327-70 BC (Oxford, 1979), esp. pp. 9-104. For a more balanced view see J. Rich, Tear, greed and glory: the causes of Roman war-making in the middle Republic', in
J. Rich & G. Shipley, War and Society in the Roman World (London, 1993), pp. 38-68, where he comments on the varying intensity of Roman war-making.
1.
Harris (1979), pp. 183-5.
1.
Polybius 1. 11. 3-11; the request for ships from the allies, Polybius 1. 20. 13-14. The story of C. Claudius, Dio 11. 5-10, Zonaras 8. 8-9.
2.
See Lazenby (1996), pp. 43-6 for criticism of this tradition. The loss of the Carthaginian quinquereme, Polybius 1. 20. 15; Hanno's threat, Dio 11. 9, Zonaras 8. 9; Diodorus' account of the negotiations, 23. 1. 4.
3.
Polybius 1.11. 9-12. 4,14. 1-8; on the defeat of the Roman cavalry, Zonaras 8. 9.
4.
Polybius 1.16.1-11,Zonaras 8.9. On the name Messala, see Pliny Natural History 35. 22.
5.
Polybius 1. 16. 4-17. 1. Eutropius 2. 19. 2 and Orosius 4. 7. 3 claim that Hiero paid 200 talents.
Chapter 3
1.
Mercenaries, Polybius 1. 17. 3-4; reduction in Roman army, 1. 17. 1-2; four legions again sent to Sicily, 1. 17. 6.
2.
J. Roth, The Logistics of the Roman Army at War (Brill, 1999), p. 158,171-2,288, 316, 318.
3.
General narrative, Polybius 1. 17. 6-13; the pickets outside the camp 1. 17. 11-12 and 6.37. 11. This institution is attested at the siege of Jerusalem in AD 70, Josephus, Helium Judaicum 5. 482-3.
4.
Caesar, Bellum Gallicum 2. 32, Cicero De Officiis 1. 35.
5.
Polybius 1. 18. 1-7.
6.
Polybius 1. 18. 8-19. 4; size of the Punic army, Polybius 1. 19. 2, Diodorus Siculus 23. 8. 1. The much later source of Orosius gives only 30 elephants, 1,500 cavalry and 30,000 infantry, 4. 7. 5.
7.
Zonaras 8. 10; Polybius 1. 19. 6.
8.
Polybius 1. 19. 7-11, DS23. 8. 1, 9. 1, 7.
9.
B. Caven, The Punic Wars (London, 1980), p. 25, Lazenby, The First Punic War (London, 1996), p. 58.
1.
Zonaras 8. 10, Frontinus, Strategemata 2. 1. 4
1.
Agrigentum, Polybius 1. 19. 13-15; Hiero supplying the Roman army, Polybius 1. 18. 11; extension of Roman war-aims, Polybius 1. 20. 1-2, and F. Walbank, A Historical Commentary on Polybius 1 (Oxford, 1970), p. 72, who cites Polybius' claim that the victory at Telamon in 225 BC encouraged the Senate to plan to expel the Celts entirely from Transpadine Gaul, 2. 31. 7.
1.
Defections to Rome, DS23. 4. 1; unsuccessful operations, DS 23. 3. 1 and 23. 4. 2. It is possible that these places were misidentified by Diodorus' excerpter, see Lazenby (1996) p. 53; Mytistratus, DS23. 9. 2-3; Herbesus, DS 23. 8. 1; Camarina, DS 23. 9. 4; Enna DS23.9. 5.
2.
Lipara a trap, Polybius 1. 21. 5-8, 8. 35. 9, Zonaras 8. 10, Livy Per. 17; Thermae, DS 23. 19. 1; the Gauls, Zonaras 8. 10, DS 23. 8. 3, Frontinus Strat. 3. 16. 3.
3.
Thermae, Polybius 1. 24. 3-4, DS 23. 9. 4; annual changes in commanders, Zonaras 8. 16. The main drafts of reinforcements for the Punic armies in Sicily mentioned by Polybius were in 262, 1. 18. 8, and in 255 including 140 elephants, 1. 38. 2-3.
4.
Polybius 1. 29. 1-10; Italian prisoners, Zonaras 8. 12; Kerkouane, Lancel (1995), pp. 268-9, 367.
5.
Regulus' reluctance to take command, Dio 11. 20; his army, Polybius 1. 29. 9; First Legion, Polybius 1. 30. 11; Roman generalship, see A. Goldsworthy '"Instinctive Genius"; The Depiction of Caesar the general', in K. Welch and A. Powell (edd.), Julius Caesar as Artful Reporter. The War Commentaries as Political Instruments (Swansea, 1998), pp. 192-219.
6.
Polybius 1. 30. 1-7; see Lazenby (1996), p. 100 for a discussion of the possible identity of Adys.
7.
Roman officers spot the Carthaginian error, Polybius 1. 30. 9.
8.
Polybius 1. 30. 10-14; dawn attack, Polybius 1. 30. 10; night attack, Zonaras 8. 13.
9.
Use of Tunis as base, Polybius 1. 30. 15; desire to gain credit for ending war, 1. 31. 4-5; similar behaviour by other Roman commanders, e.g. Tiberius Sempronius Longus at Trebia in 218, Polybius 3. 70. 7, and Titus Quinctius Flamininus during the negotiations with Philip V of Macedonia in 198-197, Polybius 18. 11-12.
10.
Polybius 1. 31. 1-8, Dio 11. 22-3.
11.
Polybius 1. 32. 1-9; Xanthippus' arrival, DS 23. 16. 1; his competence, Polybius 1. 32. 7.
12.
Polybius 1. 33. 1-6; see Lazenby (1996), p. 104 for a discussion of the possible site of the battle.
13.
Polybius 1. 33. 9, see also Lazenby (1996), p. 104-5. For cases of more than three lines being formed by legions in the first-century BC, see Pharsalus, Caesar Bellum Civile 3. 89; examples of whole legions in reserve include Emporion in 195, Livy 34. 15, a victory over the Boii in 193, Livy 35. 5; examples from the Second Punic War include Numistro, Livy 27. 2,12, and in Spain
in 205, Livy 29. 2.
14.
Polybius 1. 33. 8-34. 12.
15.
For possible later service in Egypt see Lazenby (1996), p. 106, who mentions that Ptolemy III appointed a Xanthippus to a governorship in 245, Hieronymus In Daniel 11. 7-9; for the Regulus myth see Diodorus 23. 16. 1, DS 24. 12, and discussion in A. Pauly, G. Wissowa et al., Real-encyclopadie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft (Stuttgart, 1893-), Atilius (51), cols. 2088-92.
16.
For Hamilcar's campaigns against the Numidians see Orosius 4. 9. 9. The chronology of Hanno's operations in Libya are uncertain, Polybius 1. 73. 1, 74. 7, DS 24. 10.
17.
Polybius 1. 39. 7-40. 16. It does not really matter for our purposes whether Metellus fought the battle as a consul or proconsul. For a discussion of the relevant sources see Lazenby (1996), p. 120.
18.
Casualties, Eutropius 2. 24, Orosius 4. 9.15; elephants, Polybius 1. 38. 2, DS 23. 21, Zonaras 8. 14, Pliny Natural History 8. 16; Gauls, DS 23. 21.
1.
Polybius 1. 41. 4-48. 11. Polybius gives the strength of the garrison as 10,000, 1. 42. 11, but Diodorus says that they consisted of only 7,000 infantry and 700 cavalry, DS 24. 1. However, he also says that a draft of4,000 men was taken into the city by sea. The same passage gives the Roman strength.
2.
Polybius 1. 56. 1-58. 9; Eryx, DS24.8
Chapter 4
1.
Polybius 1. 20. 6-14.
1.
For the early history of Roman seapower see J. Thiel, A history of Roman sea-power before the Second Punic War (Amsterdam, 1954), pp. 3-59; the assumption that classici derived from classis or fleet see Thiel 1954), pp. 33-4, (J. Lazenby, The First Punic War (London, 1996), p. 63 takes a more cautious line); the defeat of the Roman squadron by the Tarentines, Livy Per. 12, Appian, Samnite History 7. 1. For a general survey of ancient naval warfare see W. Rogers, Greek and, Roman Naval Warfare (Maryland, 1964), esp. pp. 266-305.
2.
For the claims of Messala, see Ineditum Vaticanum 4.
3.
T. Shaw (ed.) The Trireme Project: Operational Experience 1987-90; Lessons Learnt. Oxbow Monograph 32 (Oxford, 1993); for a brief summary of the findings see L. Casson, Ships and Seafaring in Ancient Times (London, 1994), esp. pp. 60-77.
4.
For the 'forty' see Casson (1971), pp. 50-51, 82-3; the 'thirties' see Athenaeus 5. 203c; also see Morrison (1996), pp. 1-40, and p. 309 for 'tens' as largest ships recorded as being used in battle; Carthaginians first to build 'fours', Aristode, Fragment 600; Syracuse built first 'five', Diodorus Siculus 4. 41. 3.
The Fall of Carthage Page 49
