Yours, etc.,
W. T. SHERMAN, Brigadier-General commanding. 21
This was one of many reports Sherman sent to Grant containing an optimistic tone. Sherman cannot be faulted for being an optimist, after all Grant was an extreme optimist himself, but in this report Sherman did not exaggerate. With Sherman being the most experienced commander on the scene, and the one on which Grant most relied, it is not hard to imagine Grant becoming overly secure about the situation which existed at Pittsburg Landing.
The only boundary to this field of operations which had not been rendered impregnable was the southwestern front. Grant has been heavily criticized by most historians for not entrenching on this front. This is a very elementary operation and the historians are correct in their criticism. While, Grant made an obvious mistake in this regard, it would be a mistake to suggest that this was an oversight on his part.
In his memoirs, he addressed this very issue. "When all reinforcements should have arrived I expected to take the initiative by marching on Corinth, and had no expectation of needing fortifications, though this subject was taken into consideration. McPherson, my only military engineer, was directed to lay out a line to intrench. He did so, but reported that it would have to be made in the rear of the encampment as it then ran. The new line, while it would be nearer the river, was yet too far away from the Tennessee, or even from the creeks, to be easily supplied with water, and in case of attack these creeks would be in the hands of the enemy. The fact is, I regarded the campaign we were engaged in as an offensive one and had no idea that the enemy would leave strong intrenchments to take the initiative when he knew he would be attacked where he was if he remained. This view, however, did not prevent every precaution being taken and every effort made to keep advised of all movements of the enemy." 22
Later in his memoirs, Grant returned to the subject explaining his actions in response to criticism. "The criticism has often been made that the Union troops should have been intrenched at Shiloh. Up to that time the pick and spade had been but little resorted to at the West. I had, however, taken this subject under consideration soon after re-assuming command in the field, and, as already stated, my only military engineer reported unfavorably. Besides this, the troops with me, officers and men, needed discipline and drill more than they did experience with the pick, shovel and axe. Reinforcements were arriving almost daily, composed of troops that had been hastily thrown together into companies and regiments-fragments of incomplete organizations, the men and officers strangers to each other. Under all these circumstances I concluded that drill and discipline were worth more to our men than fortifications." 23
Further evidence of Grant's early aversion to fortifications seems to have gone unnoticed by most historians. This correspondence was written on August 23, 1861, while Grant was stationed in Jefferson City, Missouri. He directed this correspondence to headquarters. "I am not fortifying at all. With the picket guard and other duty coming upon the men of this command, there is but little time left for drilling. Drill and discipline are more necessary for the men than fortifications. Another difficulty in the way of fortifying is that I have no engineer officer to direct it; no time to attend to it myself, and very little disposition to gain a "Pillow notoriety" for a branch of the service that I have forgotten all about." 24 Grant’s priorities shine through like a lighthouse in the night. He firmly believed that drill and discipline took priority over all other concerns.
He would never have made such a mistake later in the war, but clearly he had given the matter some thought. One may not agree with his reasoning concerning fortifications, but the ground, itself, provided excellent defensive opportunities. The critics cannot infer that his lack of entrenchments indicated a reckless attitude toward the protection of his command.
Grant had five divisions arrayed at Pittsburg Landing, approximately 37,000 men. The first line of defense comprised the divisions of Sherman and Prentiss. They were placed to cover the gap between Owl Creek and Lick Creeks, through which the enemy would be forced to attack. Sherman was encamped near Shiloh Church covering Grant's right front, while Prentiss was on Sherman's left covering Grant's left front. Sherman was about two and one half miles southwest of the landing, while Prentiss was out about two miles. Immediately behind Sherman about two miles out was McClernand’s division. Hurlbut was behind Prentiss and a little over one mile from the landing. The last division was that of W.H.L. Wallace which was to the right and rear of Hurlbut, about one mile due west of the landing. Lew Wallace's division containing an additional 7500 troops was stationed at Crump's Landing about five miles north of Pittsburg Landing. He was held in reserve guarding Grant's transports and stores which were located at Crump's.
The size of the Confederate force facing him at Corinth was unknown to Grant, but was known to be increasing rapidly. General Albert Sidney Johnston was massing a force of between 40,000 and 45,000 men at Corinth. Also, unknown to Grant, was that Johnston had assembled an able contingent of subordinate commanders, unlike those Grant had faced at Fort Donelson. General P.G.T. Beauregard had been named Johnston's assistant, while the division commanders were Generals Bragg, Polk, Hardee and Breckinridge.
To date, Grant had developed a low opinion of the Southern willingness to fight and ability to sustain that action. He still felt one more significant battle would finish the southern cause in the West. Shiloh would change all that, but for now he was chafing at the bit to get going. It never crossed his mind that they would have the audacity to attack him.
Bruce Catton wrote a passage concerning Grant's development as a military thinker and his observations are appropriate to examine prior to Shiloh. Catton wrote: "The war had taught him a few good lessons: that when untrained armies face each other, neither general gains by deferring a fight until the training of his own men is perfected; that in any hard battle there comes a time when both armies are ready to quit, and that the one which can nerve itself for one more attack at such a time is very likely to win; that troop morale is better in an active campaign than in training camp; that war means fighting, so that feints and demonstrations accomplish little, and the real objective of a campaign is not to make the enemy retreat but to destroy him root and branch." 25 Catton hit the nail on the head in many of these observations. That Grant was able to learn these principles as he went along was extremely fortunate for the National cause. Because Grant was able to learn these lessons and apply them so quickly qualifies him as a military genius of the first order. McClellan never understood the first principle; Halleck could not comprehend principle number three; and even Lee underestimated the importance of the last principle.
As April approached, Grant still found himself on the defensive according to Halleck's directives and still waiting for Buell. As stated earlier, Grant relied heavily on Sherman for much of his intelligence. In turn, Sherman had been forwarding very optimistic reports of the situation. In his memoirs, Sherman wrote: "I always acted on the supposition that we were an invading army; that our purpose was to move forward in force, make a lodgment on the Memphis and Charleston road, and thus repeat the grand tactics of Fort Donelson, by separating the rebels in the interior from those at Memphis and on the Mississippi River. We did not fortify our camps against an attack, because we had no orders to do so, and because such a course would have made our raw men timid." 26 On April 5th, Sherman wrote to Grant: "I have no doubt nothing will occur to-day more than the usual picket firing. The enemy is saucy, but got the worst of it yesterday, and will not press our pickets far. I will not be drawn out far unless with certainty of advantage, and I do not apprehend anything like an attack on our position." 27 Grant was obviously misled by the optimistic nature of Sherman's correspondence, but that does not absolve him of responsibility for not being as prepared as he might have been for an enemy attack.
Another criticism leveled at Grant was that he was not present at the outbreak of hostilities at Shiloh. (Fort Donelson all over again) This argument rings hallow. Without
belaboring the point, the commanding general is not always at the scene of the action. Examples are: Schwarzkopf in the Gulf War; Eisenhower during the invasions of North Africa, Sicily and Normandy; MacArthur in the Korean War. This argument is nothing more than a smoke screen for Grant's critics. It offers one more item they can us to prove his incompetence. While, the entrenching issue is valid, this is nothing but hyperbole.
Grant stated in his memoirs why he had not moved to Pittsburg Landing. "I was intending to remove my headquarters to Pittsburg, but Buell was expected daily and would come in at Savannah. I remained at this point, therefore, a few days longer than I otherwise should have done, in order to meet him on his arrival." 28
Grant's nervousness about not being at Pittsburg is confirmed by a note he wrote to Halleck dated March 27, 1862. Notice in this letter Grant mentioned waiting for Buell.
March 27, 1862.
"I visited the different divisions at Pittsburg to-day.....News having arrived of the promotion of General McClernand to the rank of major-general, without the date of promotion of either him or General Smith being known, makes it necessary for me to move my headquarters from this place to Pittsburg. I will not go up, however, until something further is heard from General Buell's command, and until full directions are given for their transfer to this place." 29
As April dawned, the action around Pittsburg Landing began to heat up. Beginning the 1st of April, the enemy's cavalry became bolder and the skirmishing, which had already become a regular experience, became much heavier. Grant failed to recognize that this skirmishing was actually the enemy reconnoitering the Yankee positions.
On April 2nd, General Johnston left Corinth with a force of 44,000 men to attack the Federals at Pittsburg. He wanted to reach Pittsburg before Buell in hopes of defeating Grant in detail. The attack was originally scheduled for April 4th, but delays caused a postponement of 48 hours.
April 4th saw the rebel cavalry capture a small picket guard of six or seven men on Sherman's front some five miles out from Pittsburg on the Corinth road. Colonel Buckland tried to provide relief by leading a regiment to recapture the guard. Sherman pursued the enemy with a brigade for eight miles, but could not recapture the pickets. Also on the 4th, hearing skirmishing along the front, Grant rode out to see what was happening. It was late at night and rain was falling in buckets. He encountered General W.H.L. Wallace and Colonel McPherson who had already been to the front and found everything quiet. As they were returning to Pittsburg, Grant's horse slipped and fell on his leg. He was lucky nothing was broken, but he was seriously injured and unable to walk without crutches for a couple of days.
Around this time, a large rebel force was spotted west of the National forces along the Mobile and Ohio Railroad. What Grant said about this sighting in his memoirs is significant. "My apprehension was much greater for the safety of Crump's landing than it was for Pittsburg. I had no apprehension that the enemy could really capture either place. But I feared it was possible that he might make a rapid dash upon Crump's and destroy our transports and stores, most of which were kept at that point, and then retreat before Wallace could be reinforced. Lew Wallace's position I regarded as so well chosen that he was not removed." 30 The significance of this is Grant sent a letter to Buell on the morning of April 6th expressing that he had been expecting an attack. This issue will be scrutinized later regarding the question of surprise.
The Confederate force mentioned above had been reported by Lew Wallace. This force was said to be eight regiments of infantry and twelve hundred cavalry at Purdy. A force of equal or greater size was reported at Bethel. Consequently, Grant ordered W.H.L. Wallace to be ready to move his division to the support of Lew Wallace on a moments notice. Grant also sent the following dispatch to General Sherman.
HeadQuarters, Dist of West. Tenn.
Pittsburg, April 4th 1862.
Gen. W. T. Sherman
Commdg. 5th Division
Gen:
Information just received would indicate that the enemy are sending a force to Purdy, and it may be with a view to attack Gen. Wallace at Crump's Landing. I have directed Gen. W.H.L. Wallace, Commdg. 2nd Division, temporarily, to reinforce Gen. L. Wallace in case of an attack with his entire Division, although, I look for nothing of the kind, but it is best to be prepared.
I would direct, therefore, that you advise your advance guards to keep a sharp lookout for any movement in that direction, and should such a thing be attempted, give all the support of your Division, and Gen. Hurlbut's if necessary. I will return to Pittsburg at an early hour tomorrow, and will ride out to your camp.
I am, Gen, Very Respectfully
Your Obt Servant.
U. S. GRANT
Major. Gen. Commdg 31
Even as critics have charged Grant with being surprised and not taking all the necessary precautions (entrenching), he nevertheless alerted his commanders to remain vigilant and made all the required preparations that could be made to safeguard his command.
As April 5th arrived, Sherman again reported active Confederate operations on his front. That afternoon Grant rode out to survey the situation for himself, but agreed with Sherman's assessment that the activity was mostly enemy reconnaissance actions. When he returned to Savannah, he wrote to Halleck concerning the considerable enemy movements of April 5th. "I have scarsely the faintest idea of an attack, (general one) being made upon us but will be prepared should such a thing take place."
The reader should note two details in his correspondence with Halleck. Critics declare it demonstrates Grant's complete lack of awareness of the enemy's intentions and, therefore, his fault for being surprised. The two thoughts that should be gleaned from this telegram are these. One; he believed he had taken every possible precaution to prepare for an attack and two; the term (general one) is noteworthy. He meant a general attack along a large front as opposed to a localized attack at one specific spot with limited objectives. This distinction will be important during the later analysis concerning the question of surprise.
General Nelson, with the first division of General Buell's army, arrived at Savannah about noon on April 5th. Grant ordered Nelson to move down the east bank of the Tennessee where he could be ferried across to Crump's or Pittsburg Landing, wherever he was required. While Nelson was at Savannah, he and Grant visited an old friend of Grant's from Ohio, Colonel Jacob Ammen. Ammen was one of Nelson's brigade commanders. Ammen recorded in his diary the gist of Grant’s conversation that day. "You cannot march through the swamps; make the troops comfortable; I will send boats for you Monday or Tuesday, or some time early in the week. There will be no fight at Pittsburg Landing; we will have to go to Corinth, where the Rebels are fortified. If they come to attack us we can whip them, as I have more than twice as many troops as I had at Fort Donelson." 33
At this late date, Grant was still totally unaware what was about to befall him. Within twenty-four hours, one of the largest battles of the Civil War would be thrust upon him.
Grant was anxious to move his headquarters to Pittsburg Landing as soon as possible. The new promotions which had occurred clouded the command situation at Pittsburg in his absence. Without him there, McClernand would be in command, but he felt he needed to confer with Buell, so he would wait until April 6th to move his headquarters. Unbeknownst to Grant, Buell had arrived at Savannah during the evening of April 5th, but had failed to make Grant aware of his arrival.
Battle of Shiloh
The orders were issued on April 5th for the change in headquarters’ location and Grant's steamer was ready to go at the landing in anticipation of the move. His horse had been saddled so he could ride out to see Buell before he headed off to Pittsburg. Rawlins could not sleep, so he was up early sorting the mail when Grant walked into the office. He was going through his mail when breakfast was ready. Just after six o' clock, Grant and his staff sat down for breakfast. As breakfast began, the dull rumbling of armies in action broke the silence. The sounds quickly became discernible as
something more than the previous skirmishing. The sounds of cannon placed the action near Pittsburg Landing. Grant arose and said: "Gentlemen, the ball is in motion. Let's be off."
Within fifteen minutes, Grant and his staff were aboard his steamer, Tigress, and headed upstream. Before he left he penned two quick dispatches; one to Buell and one to Nelson.
Savanna, April 6, 1862.
Brig.-Gen. Wm. Nelson, commanding Division in Buell's Army:
An attack having been made on our forces, you will move your entire command to the river opposite Pittsburg. You can easily obtain a guide in the village.
By order of Major-General Grant:
John A. Rawlins, A. A. G. 35
Savanna, April 6th 1862
Gen. D. C. Buell,
Heavy firing is heard up the indicating plainly that an attack has been made upon our most advanced positions. I have been looking for this but did not believe the attack could be made before Monday or Tuesday.
This necessitates my joining the forces up the river instead of meeting you to-day as I had contemplated.
I have directed Gen. Nelson to move to the river with his Division. He can march to opposite Pittsburg.
Respectfully your obt. svt.
U. S. GRANT
Maj. Gen Com 36
The hurried nature of his letter to Buell is indicated by the careless spelling and omitted word. He also made a curious statement about his expecting this attack. This issue will be discussed later in the chapter.
Grant The Forgotten Hero Page 11
