Milliken's Bend La
April 21st 1863
Dear Father,
Your letter of the 7th of April has just this day reached me. I hasten to answer your interogitories.
When I left Memphis with my past experience I prohibited trade below Helena. Trade to that point had previously been opened by the Treasury Department. I give no permits to buy Cotton and if I find any one engaged in the business I send them out of the Department and seize their Cotton for the Government. I have given a few families permission to leave the country and to take with them as far as Memphis their Cotton. In doing this I have been deceived by unprincipled speculators who have smuggled themselves along with the Army in spite of orders prohibiting them and have been compelled to suspend this favor to persons anxious to get out of Dixie.
I understand that Govt has adopted some plan to regulate geting the Cotton out of the country. I do not know what plan they have adopted but am satisfied than any that can be adopted, except for Government to take the Cotton themselves, and rule out speculators altogether will be a bad one. I feel all Army followers who are engaged in speculating off the misfortunes of their country, and really aiding the enemy more than they possibly could do by open treason, should be drafted at once and put in the first forlorn hope.
I move my Head Quarters to New Carthage to-morrow. This whole country is under water except strips of land behind the levees along the river and bayous and makes opperations almost impossible. I struck upon a plan which I thought would give me a foot hold on the east bank of the Miss. before the enemy could offer any great resistance. But the difficulty of the last one & a half miles next to Carthage makes it so tedious that the enemy cannot fail to discover my plans. I am doing my best and am full of hope for complete success. Time has been consumed but it is absolutely impossible to avoid it. An attack upon the rebel works at any time since I arrived here must inevitably resulted in the loss of a large portion of my Army if not in an entire defeat. There was but two points of land, Hains Bluff & Vicksburg itself, out of water any place from which troops could march. These are thoroughly fortified and it would be folly to attack them as long as there is a prospect of turning their position. I never expect to have an army under my command whipped unless it is very badly whipped and cant help it but I have no idea of being driven to do a desperate or foolish act by the howlings of the press. It is painful to me as a matter of course to see the course pursued by some of the papers. But there is no one less disturbed by them than myself. I have never saught a large command and have no ambitious ends to accomplish. Was it not for the very natural desire of proving myself equal to anything expected of me, and the evidence my removal would afford that I was not thought equal to it, I would gladly accept a less responsible position. I have no desire to be an object of envy or jealousy, nor to have this war continue. I want, and will do my part towards it, to put down the rebellion in the shortest possible time without expecting or desiring any other recognition than a quiet approval of my course. I beg that you will destroy this letter. At least do not show it.
Julia and the children are here but will go up by the first good boat. I sent for her to come down and get instructions about some business I want attended to and see no immediate prospect of being able to attend to myself.
ULYSSES 60
The reader will remember Grant requested this letter to remain confidential and not to be disclosed to the public. He made the distinct point that it would be folly to attack such strongly fortified positions as long as there was an opportunity to turn those positions. Yet history records Grant as a hammerer or butcher prone to frontal attacks.
It is also clear from this letter that the ranting of the press calling for his dismissal had hurt his feelings. No matter how much pressure was applied by the press he continued to focus on his objective.
His answers to his father's inquiries demonstrate how unassuming, modest and humble he really was. Has America ever raised such a true and unpretentious patriot other than Washington?
Grand Gulf
Grant was back at Perkin's plantation by April 24th. During the next few days, Grant and Porter reconnoitered the east bank of the Mississippi in an effort to locate a suitable landing spot north of Grand Gulf. Regretfully, no ideal spots were found. It soon became apparent that he would have to go farther south, past Grand Gulf, to affect a landing. This meant running the batteries of Grand Gulf similar to what was done at Vicksburg. Grand Gulf appeared to be a tougher nut to crack than Grant had expected.
He wrote to Sherman on the 24th, portraying some nervousness about his present position. In this letter, Grant exhibited concern about going into battle with less than adequate medical supplies to care for the wounded. This was a funny emotion coming from someone who viewed his troops as fodder for battle.
IN THE FIELD, April 24, 1863.
Major-General W. T. SHERMAN,
commanding Fifteenth Army Corps:
In company with Admiral Porter I made to-day a reconnoissance of Grand Gulf. My impressions are, that if an attack can be made within the next two days, the place will easily fall. But the difficulties of getting from here (Smith's Plantation) to the river are great.
I foresee great difficulties in our present position, but it will not do to let these retard any movements. In the first place, if a battle should take place, we are necessarily very destitute of all preparations for taking care of wounded men. All the little extras for this purpose were put on board the Tigress, the only boat that was lost. The line from here to Milliken's bend is a long one for the transportation of supplies, and to defend, and an impossible one for the transportation of wounded men. The water in the bayous is falling very rapidly, out of all proportion to the fall in the river, so that it is exceedingly doubtful whether they can be made use of for the purposes of navigation. One inch fall in the river diminishes the supply of water to the bayous to a very great extent, while their capacity for carrying it away remains the same. Should the river fall sufficiently to draw off all the water on the point where you are encamped, our line will have to be by wagons across to below the Warrenton batteries.
Whilst there I wish you would watch matters, and should the water fall sufficiently, make the necessary roads for this purpose. You need not move any portion of your corps more than is necessary for the protection of the road to Richmond until ordered. It may possibly happen that the enemy may so weaken his forces about Vicksburg and Haine's bluff, as to make the latter vulnerable, particularly with the fall of water to give an extended landing. I leave the management of affairs at your end of the line to you.
I shall send Surgeon Hewitt to the bend to-morrow, to consult with the medical director about the best policy to pursue for caring for our sick and wounded.
U. S. GRANT, Major-General. 61
Notice in the above letter, Grant's statement about encountering difficulties and his typical response. He remained optimistic and would not allow any of those difficulties to hinder or slow his movements. During this time, and later in the movements involved in capturing Vicksburg, Grant appeared to be everywhere all the time. He drove himself hard, but he never asked anyone to do something he would not have done.
His soldiers were used to seeing him around unlike many of the pompous generals which populated the Army of the Potomac. He appeared at various stages of the march down the west bank. He impressed observers most by his lack of theatrics. His businesslike manner provided his men a sense of direction that everything would turn out all right if they followed his lead. One thing was evident to all who came in contact with him, when Grant was around action followed.
Dana recalled an incident in which he was riding beside Grant during the Vicksburg campaign on a dark night. "Grant's horse stumbled and nearly pitched the General into the mud, and Dana found himself thinking, 'Now he will swear.' Grant disappointed him. He regained control of his horse and went on with his ride without giving any sign of impatience or irritation, and Dana reflected afterward t
hat from one end of the campaign to the other he never heard Grant use an oath." 62
During the Vicksburg movement Grant was under more pressure than he had ever been in his life and he displayed no signs of cracking. He had a constitution of iron.
By April 27th, he had moved McClernand's command to a place called Hard Times, Louisiana. McPherson's corps was following on McClernand's heels. Grant was ready to attempt a landing on the east bank of the Mississippi, and in cooperation with Admiral Porter capture Grand Gulf. He sent the following order to General McClernand.
PERKINS' PLANTATION, LA.,}
April 27, 1863.}
MAJOR-GENERAL J. A. McCLERNAND,
Commanding 13th A. C.
Commence immediately the embarkation of your corps, or so much of it as there is transportation for. Have put aboard the artillery and every article authorized in orders limiting baggage, except the men, and hold them in readiness, with their places assigned, to be moved at a moment's warning.
All the troops you may have, except those ordered to remain behind, send to a point nearly opposite Grand Gulf, where you see, by special orders of this date, General McPherson is ordered to send one division.
The plan of attack will be for the navy to attack and silence all the batteries commanding the river. Your corps will be on the river, ready to run to and debark on the nearest eligible land below the promontory first brought to view passing down the river. Once on shore, have each commander instructed beforehand to form his men the best the ground will admit of, and take possession of the most commanding points, but avoid separating your command so that it cannot support itself. The first object is to get a foothold where our troops can maintain themselves until such time as preparations can be made and troops collected for a forward movement.
Admiral Porter has proposed to place his boats in the position indicated to you a few days ago, and to bring over with them such troops as may be below the city after the guns of the enemy are silenced.
It may be that the enemy will occupy positions back from the city, out of range of the gunboats, so as to make it desirable to run past Grand Gulf and land at Rodney. In case this should prove the plan, a signal will be arranged and you duly informed, when the transports are to start with this view. Or, it may be expedient for the boats to run past, but not the men. In this case, then, the transports would have to be brought back to where the men could land and move by forced marches to below Grand Gulf, re-embark rapidly and proceed to the latter place. There will be required, then, three signals; one, to indicate that the transports can run down and debark the troops at Grand Gulf; one, that the transports can run by without the troops; and the last, that the transports can run by with the troops on board.
Should the men have to march, all baggage and artillery will be left to run the blockade.
If not already directed, require your men to keep three days' rations in their haversacks, not to be touched until a movement commence.
U. S. GRANT,
Major-General. 63
Now Grant had his forces in position to attack Grand Gulf and cross the Mississippi. While Pemberton was entirely befuddled about what Grant's intentions were, Grant still felt he needed another diversion to cover his purpose. Remember, Pemberton was already busy discovering what he could about Steele's movements north of Vicksburg and Grierson's drive through central Mississippi. Still, Pemberton was in such a strong position he could easily have dispatched the necessary troops to thwart any attempt to take Grand Gulf.
The chips were down and Grant felt he had to make sure the landings on the east bank. Therefore, on April 27th, he sent Sherman a dispatch requesting him to make a convincing demonstration against Haines's Bluff. "The effect of a heavy demonstration in that direction would be good as far as the enemy are concerned, but I am loth to order it, because it would be hard to make our own troops understand that only a demonstration was intended and our people at home would characterize it as a repulse. I therefore leave it to you whether to make such a demonstration.....I shall probably move on Grand Gulf tomorrow." 64
While Grant expressed his concern for his subordinates' reputation, Sherman resented Grant's suggestion that Sherman would have his reputation damaged further by the press. He immediately responded by pledging his cooperation and venting anger at any suggestion of incurring the wrath of the press or the public. "We will make as strong a demonstration as possible. The troops will all understand the purpose and will not be hurt by the repulse. The people of the country must find out the truth as best they can; it is none of their business. You are engaged in a hazardous enterprise, and, for good reasons, wish to divert attention; that is sufficient for me, and it shall be done.....I will use troops that I know will trust us. As to the reports in newspapers, we must scorn them, else they will ruin us and our country. They are as much enemies to good government as the secesh, and between the two I like the secesh best, because they are a brave, open enemy and not a set of sneaking, croaking scoundrels." 65
Grant had suffered much criticism from his own subordinates concerning his plan to capture Vicksburg. A great deal of the criticism had been directed at Grant because he left Sherman in the rear instead of placing Sherman at the front of the expedition. Could it be he had in mind another diversion all along to protect his movement across the river? If so, who better to carry out a serious feint than a professional?
Sherman made the diversion on the 29th of April with ten regiments and eight gunboats left by Porter. Sherman made such a convincing demonstration the Confederate commander at Haines's Bluff had to call for reinforcements. Troops destined to be sent to confront Grant were delayed at Haines's Bluff. Not a single casualty was incurred by the Federal forces during the operation.
While Sherman was making his feint, Porter attacked Grand Gulf. At 8 o' clock, the morning of the 29th, Porter began his attack with his entire force of eight gunboats. The attack lasted until half past one in the afternoon. The enemy guns at Grand Gulf were situated on bluffs some forty feet above the river. Porter found what Foote discovered at Donelson. The batteries could not be harmed by the gunboats, but could easily rain fire down upon them. Porter withdrew suffering some fifty-six wounded and eighteen dead. Most of the casualties came from a shell which penetrated the flagship.
Throughout the battle, McClernand and 10,000 of his men were aboard the transports ready to affect a landing upon receiving the proper signal. Grant viewed the entire operation from a tug in the middle of the river. As soon as Porter backed off, Grant came aboard the flagship and was abhorred by the sight of mangled and dying men. After a short conversation, he again revised his plans. It was clear his men could not affect a landing under the presence of the fully functioning enemy batteries, so he immediately decided to move his forces south once again. This would require Porter's fleet to run another set of batteries. Once below Grand Gulf, Grant could land his forces and cut off Grand Gulf from the rear before turning his attention to Vicksburg. Porter immediately agreed to the plan and volunteered the use of his fleet as transports for the soldiers.
On the evening of the 29th of April, Porter's fleet ran past the batteries at Grand Gulf. The National troops, meanwhile, marched from Hard Times across the peninsula to a place on the Mississippi called DeShroon's.
While the army was marching from Hard Times to DeShroon's, Grant ordered Sherman to withdraw from Haines's Bluff and follow McPherson with two of his divisions as fast as he could. Sherman left Blair's division at Milliken's Bend to guard the depot until he was relieved by reinforcements from Memphis and then to follow the remainder of Sherman's corps.
Grant's initial inclination was to have the navy transport the troops to the town of Rodney, Mississippi, some fifteen miles south of DeShroon's on the Mississippi River. From there the army could move on Port Gibson in an effort to turn Grand Gulf. What Grant needed was a good, dry road and no one in his command was familiar with what lay on the east side of the river. In addition, his maps were of little value.
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Grant needed hard information, so during the evening of April 29th, a detachment of Illinois soldiers rowed across the river and seized one of the local slaves who appeared knowledgeable and took him to the general's headquarters. Grant explained to him what he wanted to do and asked him which way he would go. The slave told him the best road in that part of the country could be found at Bruinsburg which led directly to Port Gibson. The decision was instantly made to follow the new route.
On the morning of April 30th, the navy transports began loading the National troops and transporting them to Bruinsburg. By noon on the 30th, McClernand's corps and one division of McPherson's corps were safely landed on the east shore of the Mississippi and were moving toward Port Gibson.
All the months of hard work, planning and abuse from the press had been suffered so as to attain this single objective. Grant wrote in his memoirs the feelings he had concerning the crossing of the Mississippi. "When this was effected I felt a degree of relief scarcely ever equalled since. Vicksburg was not yet taken it is true, nor were its defenders demoralized by any of our previous moves. I was now in the enemy's country, with a vast river and the stronghold of Vicksburg between me and my base of supplies. But I was on dry ground on the same side of the river with the enemy. All the campaigns, labors, hardships and exposures from the month of December previous to this time that had been made and endured, were for the accomplishment of this one object." 66
Battle of Port Gibson
As Grant's forces moved eastward toward Port Gibson it would be worthwhile to examine the Union forces and the Confederate opposition. On May 1st, Grant had McClernand's entire corps and two brigades of Logan's division on the east side of the river, in all about 20,000 men. Even when reinforced by Sherman on May 7th, he only had approximately 40,000 men with him. On the opposing side, the rebels were under the command of General Joseph E. Johnston. Johnston commanded all the Southern forces between the Blue Ridge and the Mississippi River and had been in his position since November 24, 1862, when appointed by Jefferson Davis. Johnston not only commanded the rebel forces, but also commanded much respect from the Federal commanders. In immediate command in the vicinity of Vicksburg was General Pemberton. He commanded approximately 50,000 men throughout the State of Mississippi.
Grant The Forgotten Hero Page 23
