The Battle of Champion's Hill was not only the biggest battle of Grant's campaign, but had been the most decisive victory yet for the Union. The Confederate defenders fought gallantly and put up fierce resistance and but it was not enough. The Federals remained undefeated and refused to suffer an ignominious setback. The results of the battle were as follows. Casualties for the Union were: killed - 410; wounded - 1844; and missing - 187 for a total of 2441. On the Confederate side casualties were: killed - 380; wounded - 1018; and missing - 2453 for a total of 3851.
The rebels were completely routed and in full retreat. Grant was immediately on their heels with the divisions of Osterhaus and Carr. These divisions appeared on the scene as the rebels began to flee. McClernand was with these divisions and once again Grant was displeased with McClernand's failure to reach the field in a timely manner despite the urgings of himself and staff officers sent for that purpose. It is true McClernand had a small, well-placed force in his front, but he had failed to use any ingenuity to turn the enemy position. So yet another nail was hammered into McClernand's coffin.
Battle of Big Black River Bridge
The evening of May 16th found Carr and Osterhaus at Edward's Station. Blair was about three miles to the southeast and McPherson's corps was encamped between two and six miles west of Champion's Hill. Hovey's division, which bore the brunt of the battle, remained on the battlefield. Grant and his staff pushed on past the lead elements of his advancing host until well after dark. Finally, after no one came up, they decided to move back about a mile and rejoin the head of the column. That night Grant and his staff slept on the porch of a house being used as a rebel hospital.
In his memoirs, he wrote an enlightening passage demonstrating how someone can display two diametrically opposed behaviors. "While a battle is raging one can see his enemy mowed down by the thousand, or the ten thousand, with great composure; but after the battle these scenes are distressing, and one is naturally disposed to do as much to alleviate the suffering of an enemy as a friend." 83
Most people think of Grant as a callous, uncaring, stolid individual, but in reality, Ulysses was a very kind, gentle soul who could hardly stand the sight of blood. There was probably no one in the Civil War who hated war more than Ulysses S. Grant. He felt obligated to serve his country in her hour of need and do his duty to the best of his ability. This passage reflects the very human side of Grant. As circumstances changed, so did his behavior.
The morning of the 17th found the army continuing the pursuit at half past three. Sherman left Jackson by noon on the 16th and reached Bolton before he stopped for the night. His rear guard did not arrive in Bolton until 2 A.M. on the 17th. Grant directed him to march, early on the 17th, by a different road than that taken by the rest of the command. Sherman was instructed to march to Bridgeport with his corps which placed him north of the other corps and in a position to effect a crossing of the Big Black. This would place him in an excellent spot to turn the enemy's flank if the enemy was found in Grant's front.
As Grant suspected, the rebels were found dug in on the east bank of the Big Black River awaiting the advance of the Union army. Instead of continuing to the north, using the Big Black to shield his flank, as Grant had done when he advanced toward Jackson, Pemberton opted to defend Vicksburg. The Big Black could have been used by Pemberton to shield his escape to the north, thus saving his army, but once again he exercised poor judgment. Grant suspected this might be what Pemberton would do so that is one of the reasons he sent Sherman on a more northward course. Johnston was heading north and wanted Pemberton to try to escape to the north where they could possibly unite, but with this decision the last opportunity evaporated for Pemberton to save his army. Pemberton was trapped and Grant had succeeded in keeping the Confederate forces separated.
As the National forces deployed for battle with the enemy a peculiar incident took occurred. It was not peculiar because it had an effect on the outcome of the battle, campaign or war rather this type of incident led to the development of rumors or legend.
In his memoirs, Grant described the incident like this. "While the troops were standing as here described an officer from Banks' staff came up and presented me with a letter from General Halleck, dated the 11th of May. It had been sent by the way of New Orleans to Banks to be forwarded to me. It ordered me to return to Grand Gulf and to cooperate from there with Banks against Port Hudson, and then to return with our combined forces to besiege Vicksburg. I told the officer that the order came too late, and that Halleck would not give it now if he knew our position. The bearer of the dispatch insisted that I ought to obey the order, and was giving arguments to support his position when I heard great cheering to the right of our line and, looking in that direction, saw Lawler in his shirt sleeves leading a charge upon the enemy. I immediately mounted my horse and rode in the direction of the charge, and saw no more of the officer who delivered the dispatch; I think not even to this day." 84
The author has staunchly defended Grant’s incredible degree of honesty throughout this book, and also, has written about Grant's illness and the amount of time that had elapsed between the war and when he wrote his memoirs. After researching this legend, there is no doubt such an incident took place, but Grant was clearly wrong about the particulars of what occurred.
The dispatch Grant received from Halleck dated May 11, 1863, reads as follows:
WASHINGTON, D. C., 11 A.M., May 11, 1863.
If possible, the forces of yourself and Banks should be united between Vicksburg and Port Hudson, so as to attack these places separately with the combined forces. The same has been urged on Banks. Hooker recrossed to the north side of the river, but he inflicted a greater loss upon the enemy than he received. 85
This message from Halleck is obviously the dispatch Grant recollected. There are a number of discrepancies between Grant's account and the above dispatch. 1) Grant got the date right. 2) Grant said it ordered him to return to Grand Gulf, but this dispatch said nothing about Grand Gulf. 3) Grant said the dispatch came by way of New Orleans, but this dispatch came by way of Memphis. 4) Last, that it had been sent through Banks to Grant.
Most of these minor discrepancies can be easily explained. First, Grant had the date correct unless another undiscovered dispatch exists. The above message does not mention Grand Gulf, but it does say to unite with Banks between Vicksburg and Port Hudson. The only Union position then held between Vicksburg and Port Hudson was Grand Gulf, a logical assumption. Last, Grant stated that the dispatch had been sent to Banks from New Orleans. The dispatch said that "the same has been urged upon Banks." The unknown officer Grant referred to as delivering the message was Brigadier-General William Dwight of General Banks' command. It is a logical conclusion that, with one of Banks' officers delivering the letter, and the same or similar correspondence being sent to Banks, that the letter was forwarded by Banks and it came by way of New Orleans because that was where Banks' headquarters was located.
That Grant's recollections about the incident are hazy, there can be no doubt, but Catton stated in Grant Moves South, that the story was probably legend. Yet the dispatch from Halleck to Grant dated May 11, 1863, actually exists. Catton also stated that if the May 11th dispatch is the one alluded to by Grant it was only mildly worded and, therefore, could hardly be referred to as a direct order. The wording in the May 11th letter is certainly not strident, but anyone who has ever received so much as a suggestion from someone in authority realizes it carries more weight than a direct request from a lesser individual.
McFeely treated the incident with more validity, but as usual sought some deep-rooted psychological meaning to his insubordination. McFeely believed Grant was taking the final step toward assumption of command. Now no one could overrule his decisions or so the thought went.
McFeely showed keen insight into various stages of Grant's career, but typically, he went too far in trying to demonstrate some evil trait in Grant's character.
That this incident actually occu
rred and was not a legend, there is no doubt. That Grant misconstrued some of the facts is also quite evident. That Grant deliberately disobeyed a directive of his superior is also true, but there is no deep, dark hidden significance to his actions during this incident. He was only exercising his prerogative as the on-scene commander. The circumstances at the time in question undoubtedly called for continuous forward movement and the order in question would not have been issued had Halleck been at that spot at that time. The on-scene commander always has the duty and responsibility of exercising his judgment in the field based on the most current information.
Grant explained why he did what he did in a letter to Halleck dated May 24, 1863. A brief excerpt from this letter fully explained his actions which Halleck accepted without any reservations. "When I crossed the Mississippi river, it was my intention to detach an army corps, or the necessary force, to cooperate with General Banks, to secure the reduction of Port Hudson and the union of the two armies. But I received a letter from General Banks, stating that he was in Louisiana, and would return to Baton Rouge by the 10th inst. By the reduction of Port Hudson, he could add only twelve thousand to my force. I had certain information that General Jo. Johnston was on his way to Jackson, and that reeforcements were arriving there constantly from Port Hudson and the Southern cities. Under this state of facts I could not afford to delay; beating the enemy too, near Port Gibson, I followed him to Hankinson's ferry on the Black river. This placed my forces fifteen miles on their way from Grand Gulf to this place, Black river bridge, or Jackson, whichever I might turn my attention to.
Altogether, I am satisfied that my course was right, and has given us with comparative ease what would have cost serious battle by delay." 86
The Confederates had chosen to do battle just east of the Big Black River. They had constructed a strong parapet along a bayou which was about one mile in length. These fortifications were manned by over four thousand defenders and some twenty pieces of artillery. The main rebel army had already retired over the bridges, but Pemberton still had hopes of Loring rejoining him. Loring had been separated from the rest of the Confederate army after the battle of Champion's Hill and, subsequently, moved to join Johnston. Of course, Pemberton had no way of knowing this.
The Yankees deployed Osterhaus and Carr's divisions opposite the enemy in a semicircle. Lawler's brigade of Carr's division was posted on the extreme right of the Union line. McPherson's corps was in the rear of McClernand ready to lend aid wherever needed. Lawler discovered what appeared to be an opening on the far left end of the rebel line where he could advance unopposed.
While Grant was reading the letter from Halleck, Lawler, entirely without orders, took eleven hundred men and charged the left end of the Confederate line under heavy fire. Not to be outdone, the remainder of Osterhaus and Carr's divisions also charged. The entire enemy force in front of Lawler gave way and soon the remainder followed. The surprising success of the operation demoralized the Southern forces as they fled across the Big Black. The panic spread to the enemy troops on the western bank as well and they promptly set fire to the bridges before most of their comrades were over the river. This allowed Grant's army to capture an entire brigade plus some eighteen cannon. The results of the Battle of the Big Black River Bridge were as follows. Union casualties were: 39 - killed; 237 - wounded; and 3 - missing for a total of 279. Confederate casualties were: 3 - killed; 9 - wounded; and 539 - missing for a total of 551.
Pemberton's force had been unable to stop the advancing hordes and was utterly depressed after suffering so many defeats. Consequently, Pemberton retreated for the comfort and safety of Vicksburg.
Grant’s immediate task was somewhat different. He had to construct a number of bridges enabling his army to pursue and surround the embattled city. The battle was over by nine o' clock the morning of May 17th and by the morning of May 18th the Union army had three new bridges constructed over the Big Black River. Sherman reached Bridgeport at noon on the 17th with the only pontoon bridge available to the Yankees and by the morning of the 18th his entire corps was over the river.
As the Union army approached Vicksburg, Grant became anxious to secure a base of supplies for resupply. He was travelling with Sherman who was heading for the Walnut Hills area just northeast of Vicksburg. By the evening of May 18th, Sherman and Grant reached the area of Haines's Bluff where six months before Sherman had suffered his disastrous defeat. Sherman, who had been skeptical of the campaign, yet fully supportive, turned to Grant and said: "Until this moment, I never thought your expedition a success. I never could see the end clearly, until now. But this is a campaign; this is a success if we never take the town." 87
Operations around Vicksburg
By the morning of the 19th, Grant had the city besieged. McClernand took up a position to the southeast of Vicksburg, while McPherson was on his right and due east of the town. Sherman occupied a position to the northeast of the city. Grant made his headquarters near those of Sherman.
As Grant invested the town, his force grew to about 45,000 men. He did not realize Pemberton possessed a force of over 31,000 men inside the besieged city. Grant was aware Johnston had assembled a force of between 20,000 and 25,000 men and was located to the northeast of Vicksburg some 30 or 40 miles. Even after he surrounded the city he was still outnumbered, but the circumstances had changed. Now he held all the cards. He had secured a base of supplies, separated the enemy and would be able to beat either enemy force in detail if attacked.
As May 19th dawned, Grant was impressed with the power and skill his forces had displayed as they dispatched the enemy during their recent engagements. He was further convinced of the enemy's waning morale and depression. Therefore, he ordered an assault all along the lines for two o' clock that afternoon.
Grant was quite justified to order the assault of May 19th. His men were confident of success because they had just beaten the enemy in five successive battles. Conversely, the enemy appeared demoralized so it could be assumed they would readily capitulate. The rebels had to comprehend there was no escape, so death by battle or starvation was clearly on the horizon. Last but not least, Grant believed Pemberton to have only about fifteen thousand men with him. Surely they realized Grant outnumbered him by more than a three to one margin and would succumb to logic.
The signal to commence the assault was the firing of three volleys by the artillery. Sherman's corps had been in position longer than the other two so they were more prepared to make the assault. At 2 P.M., Blair's division advanced, but found the going rough. The ground was cut by deep ravines and fallen timber. A number of regiments reached the Confederate works and planted their colors, but failed to breach the line. Steele's division of Sherman's corps carried a number of outworks, but could not breach the primary defensive works. On McPherson's front, the ground was more favorable for the protection of his troops, but decidedly unfavorable for an advance. McPherson was unable to advance far, except for an assault by Ransom's brigade which failed to carry the works in his front. McClernand's command was the last corps to get into position, but by 2 P.M. the entire corps was ready. His corps was the only one able to advance the Union position.
The assault was a failure, in that it failed to penetrate the rebel defenses, but Grant did gain knowledge from this assault in two areas. First, he was able to get a better feel for the roughness of the local terrain. The ground was covered by deep ravines, steep hills and dense forests. Second, he discovered that the disorganized and demoralized rabble which had fled before him at the Big Black River Bridge now had their backs to the wall. They were fighting behind impressive fortifications and their pride and courage had been restored. Once again, they were the tough adversary that had battled Grant at Shiloh. In short, it would not have been easy to take the town by storm, but it had to be tried. Union losses in the assault of the 19th were: 157 - killed; 777 - wounded; and 8 - missing for a total of 942. The losses on the Southern side are unknown.
The next two days were s
pent strengthening the Federal positions. Communications were set up with all parts of the command and supply lines were established at Chickasaw Bayou and Warrenton.
By the 21st, Grant determined another attempt upon the Confederate lines should be tried. He recorded in his memoirs the reasons for adopting such a course. "I now determined on a second assault. Johnston was in my rear, only fifty miles away, with an army not much inferior in numbers to the one I had with me, and I knew he was being reinforced. There was danger of his coming to the assistance of Pemberton, and after all he might defeat my anticipations of capturing the garrison if, indeed, he did not prevent the capture of the city. The immediate capture of Vicksburg would save sending me the reinforcements which were so much wanted elsewhere, and would set free the army under me to drive Johnston from the State. But the first consideration of all was--the troops believed they could carry the works in their front, and would not have worked so patiently in the trenches if they had not been allowed to try." 88
On May 21st, Grant issued the orders for an assault at 10 o' clock the morning of the 22nd. This time he altered the type of attack in hope of better success. The artillery was supposed to bombard the enemy positions, softening them up for a number of hours. Then the infantry was to form in columns for an attack at certain strategic points. The men were to move at quick time and were instructed not to fire until the outer works were stormed. This time Grant requested help from Admiral Porter. His fleet was to begin shelling the town during the evening of the 21st, and up to thirty minutes past 10 A.M. on the 22nd.
Grant The Forgotten Hero Page 26
