General Banks has made requisition on me for steamers, coal, and forage, which I have sent. Shall I send the Ninth army corps back to Burnside as soon as Johnston is driven from Jackson? 7
The last telegram during this time period is from Grant to Halleck and is dated July 18, 1863.
VICKSBURG, July 18, 1863.
Johnston evacuated Jackson the night of the 16th inst. He is now in full retreat east. Sherman says most of his army must perish from the heat, lack of water, and general discouragement. The army parolled here has to a great extent deserted, and are scattered over the country in every direction. Learning that Yazoo City was being fortified, I sent Herron there. Five guns were captured, many stores and about three hundred prisoners.
General Ransom was sent to Natchez, to stop the crossing of cattle for the eastern army. On arrival he found that a large number had been driven out of the city, to be pastured. He also discovered that munitions of war had recently been crossed over to the west for Kirby Smith. He mounted about two thousand of his men and sent them in both directions. They captured a number of prisoners and five thousand head of Texas cattle, two thousand head of which were sent to Banks. The balance have been and will be brought here. In Louisiana they captured more prisoners, and a number of teams loaded with ammunition were brought back to Natchez, with the teams captured, and two hundred and sixty-eight thousand rounds, besides artillery ammunition, destroyed. It seems to me now that Mobile should be captured, the expedition starting from that point on Lake Pontchartrain. There is much sickness in my command now, from long and excessive marching and labor. I will cooperate with General Schofield as soon as possible, so as to give him possession of the line of the Arkansas. Shall I retain or send back the Ninth army corps? 8
The one trait which appears in all three pieces of the above correspondence is Grant's unselfishness. In each, he willingly offered to send troops to the assistance of others. He always manifested a deep concern for doing whatever he could to support the cause, even if it meant diminishing his command.
Note should also be made of his continuing desire to keep his superiors informed. He was accused by Halleck early in the war of neglecting this part of his duty which was never true. All the promotions and glory had not gone to his head. He still was entirely subordinate. McFeely wrote in his book, about how Grant had become insubordinate and had assumed total control. McFeely even offered that Halleck could not override Grant's decisions. This reference regards Grant's actions upon receipt of Halleck’s order while Grant was approaching Vicksburg at the Big Black River Bridge. As explained, Grant’s actions were nothing more than the appropriate measures taken by the on-scene commander during the course of a military operation. The independent ability of the American soldier to make crucial military decisions in a timely manner has always been cited as a substantial advantage. Contrast this situation with that the Russian soldier, who was never trusted to make the slightest decision. He had to submit the tiniest question up the chain of command all the way to Moscow for a decision. The same was true of the German commanders during World War II. They had to submit all their decisions to Hitler for approval.
This ability is considered an incredible advantage, yet when Grant exercised field command, it was cited as insubordination. This is poppycock. Grant was never knowingly insubordinate in his life. Further evidence of his subordination is displayed by his constant effort to keep his superiors informed of what was transpiring in his department.
In the above correspondence, not only did Grant keep Halleck abreast of Sherman's efforts against Johnston, but he also tried to assure Halleck about the dispersion of Pemberton's army which had surrendered at Vicksburg. He had foreseen the disintegration of that army and his intelligence reports confirmed that. Grant knew Halleck was worried about the parole of Pemberton's army. If he was, in fact, insubordinate, he would not have cared about allaying Halleck's concerns. In truth, Grant's intelligence was entirely correct. Two weeks after the surrender of Vicksburg, Pemberton wrote to Jefferson Davis, stating that most of the army had gone home and all he could put into the field was 1600 men out of the 31,600 who had surrendered. Of course, Grant had no way of knowing about Pemberton's correspondence with Davis.
The last point to note in this correspondence is the proposal of an expedition against Mobile, Alabama. The proposal contained in the correspondence dated July 18th, is the first mention of what was to become a pet project of Grant. It was a sound military proposal and one of immense military value if undertaken immediately. Fuller stated in his book that "this idea was not only tactically sound, but a brilliant strategical conception.....It is not improbable that the capture of Mobile, at this time, would have shortened the war by a year." 9 As usual, Grant's foresight was given short shrift by Halleck.
In the middle of July, after Sherman recaptured Jackson, Halleck suggested to Grant that if he felt like recommending Sherman and McPherson for promotions they would be given prompt consideration. Grant was an excellent manager in addition to a great general. He always praised his deserving subordinates and he was very pleased when both were promoted to Brigadier-General in the Regular Army. He offered three reasons why these should promotions be made. "The first reason for this is their great fitness for any command that it may ever become necessary to intrust to them. Second: their great purity of character, and disinterestedness in any thing except the faithful performance of their duty and the success of every one engaged in the great battle for the preservation of the Union. Third: they have honorably won this distinction upon many well-fought battlefields. The promotion of such men as Sherman and McPherson always adds strength to our army." 10 In addition, he added one point which was always of paramount importance to him. "The army does not afford an officer superior to either, in my estimation. With such men commanding corps or armies, there will never be any jealousies or lack of hearty co-operation." 11
One might get the impression Grant confined his laudatory approbation to his friends or fellow academy graduates, but nothing could be further from the truth. He offered many other promotions to officers in both the Regular Army and the volunteer service. Most all his recommendations received prompt approval.
Another question which arose early in 1863 got his attention during July of that year. Lincoln had issued his famous Emancipation Proclamation on January 1, 1863. With the freeing of the slaves, and the Union armies capturing more and more southern territory, it became inevitable that the issue of arming the slaves to serve in the Northern armies would come to the fore. Even though the noble idea of freeing the slaves was popular in the North, the proposition of enlisting black soldiers was not warmly received in the North or the Army.
At the beginning of the war, Grant was not an abolitionist. His sentiments lay mostly with preserving the Union. Although he opposed slavery, he felt freeing the slaves was a subordinate issue. Like most soldiers, he tried to be apolitical, but entirely loyal to carrying out the decrees of the government. He always maintained that when the government passed laws too odious for him to execute, he would resign.
With the advent of orders from the government to organize and arm the slaves, Grant set about the task dutifully. Initially, he employed his new soldiers in guard duty because he felt the Negro soldiers would do best in defensive operations as opposed to active campaigning in the field. His reasoning behind this could not to be found. In correspondence with the adjutant-general of the army on the 11th of July he wrote: "I am anxious to get as many of these Negro regiments as possible, and to have them full, and completely equipped.....I am particularly desirous of organizing a regiment of heavy artillerists from the negroes, to garrison this place, and shall do so as soon as possible." 12 Again in correspondence on the 24th of July he said: "The negro troops are easier to preserve discipline among than our white troops, and I doubt not will prove equally good for garrison duty. All that have been tried have fought bravely." 13
Grant again touched upon this subject in a letter to Abraham Lin
coln dated August 23, 1863. "I have given the subject of arming the negro my hearty support. This, with the emancipation of the negro, is the heaviest blow yet given the Confederacy. The South rave a greatdeel about it and profess to be very angry. But they were united in their action before and with the negro under subjection could spare their entire white population for the field. Now they complain that nothing can be got of their negros.....Gen. Thomas is now with me and you may rely on it I will give him all the aid in my power. I would do this whether the arming the negro seemed to me a wise policy or not, because it is an order that I am bound to obey and do not feel that in my position I have a right to question any policy of the Government. In this particular instance there is no objection however to my expressing an honest conviction. That is, by arming the negro we have added a powerful ally. They will make good soldiers and taking them from the enemy weaken him in the same proportion they strengthen us. I am therefore most decidedly in favor of pushing this policy to the enlistment of a force sufficient to hold all the South falling into our hands and to aid in capturing more." 14
As the war progressed, and more black soldiers appeared in the ranks, Grant's opinion changed, until, by the end of the war, he felt that the black soldier was every bit as good as the white soldier. This was another example of how Grant adjusted his opinion to meet the changing circumstances. Whereas, this issue caused great opposition with some Yankee commanders, Grant was subordinate to both his superiors and the law of the land.
Also in July, Grant was asked by Halleck to submit his ideas about the creation of civil governments in the areas which the Union had captured. This was a significant change in his career. Now the government was actually seeking his opinion on an issue. Previous attempts by Grant to make suggestions to Halleck were met with disdain, so it was quite a watershed event that anyone would seek his thoughts. Halleck also sounded out Sherman on the same matter, but there was a distinct difference in the situation of Grant and Sherman when it came to Halleck. Sherman was on friendly terms with Halleck, while Halleck was never fond of Grant. Sherman's thoughts on the matter of restoring civil government to the areas which had rebelled could easily be surmised. Sherman responded to Halleck's request using phrases such as it "would be simply ridiculous" to consider restoring civil authority at that time. He went on to amplify that it would be folly to revive state governments "or to institute in this quarter any civil government in which the local people have much to say." And if Sherman had not made himself clear enough he continued in his typical style: "They had a government, and so mild and paternal that they gradually forgot they had any at all, save what they themselves controlled; they asserted absolute right to seize public moneys, forts, arms and even to shut up the natural avenues of travel and commerce. They chose war.....We accepted the issue, and now they begin to realize that war is a two-edged sword." 15 Sherman, being subordinate, sent a copy of his response to Grant.
Grant’s response to Halleck represents perfectly one of the differences between himself and Sherman. Grant, on most occasions, manifested brilliant foresight and immeasurable compassion. Sherman tended to deal more with the here and now. Grant sent Halleck the following response: "I have just read General Sherman's private letter to you, but do not fully coincide with the general as to the policy that should be adopted toward these people. While I believe with him that every effort should be made to fill up our thinned ranks, and be prepared to meet and destroy their armies wherever found, I think we should do it with terms held out that by accepting they could receive the protection of our laws. There is certainly a fine feeling existing in the state of Louisiana and in most parts of this state toward the Union. I enclose you copies of resolutions sent me by citizens of both Louisiana and Mississippi showing something of this feeling." 16
Another old issue resurfaced in July of which Grant had hoped he had seen the last. The issue was trade with the South and specifically trade in cotton. Grant had dealt with this question in the administration of his duties while he was at Memphis. The topic was a thorn in his side and the idea totally repugnant to him.
Grant's position on the issue was to prohibit any trade between the North and South. He was vehement about the issue and freely expressed his opinion to anyone who would listen. He felt by allowing trade with the enemy, the corrupt traders were giving sustenance to the rebels and providing them with the funds to continue resisting the efforts of the Union army. Therefore, he opposed all efforts to allow any trade between the two sections.
On July 4th, the Secretary of the Treasury wrote Grant concerning the issue of trade being allowed in captured territories. The Secretary of the Treasury was the Honorable Salmon B. Chase who was an outspoken advocate of allowing this trade to take place. In the letter of July 4th, he urged upon Grant some of his views. "I find that a rigorous line within districts occupied by our military forces, from beyond which no cotton or other produce can be brought, and within which no trade can be carried on, gives rise to serious and to some apparently well-founded complaints." 17 It appeared the administration in Washington was turning a blind eye to the consequences of trade with the South. Though they knew that trade would prolong the war, increase casualties and virtually tie one arm behind Grant's back, they nevertheless insisted on pressing forward their position. There were, after all, Union loyalists who lived in the South and apparently they had made complaints about not being able to trade their goods. Grant's tough position on this issue was unfairly injuring them and Lincoln certainly did not want to offend any loyal Southerners. Just as important though, were the people back home who Lincoln could ill afford to offend. The mills in New England required cotton produced in the Confederacy and Lincoln was not about to upset the very people he needed to support the war effort. On this point, the administration was determined to have its way.
Grant responded to Chase's letter on the 21st of July.
Head Qrs. Dept. of the Ten.
Vicksburg Miss. July 21st 1863.
Hon. S. P. Chase
Sec. of the Treasury,
Sir:
Your letter of the 4th inst. to me, enclosing copy of letter of same date to Mr. Mellen; Spl. Agt. of the Treasury is just received.---My Asst. Adj. Gen. by whom I shall send this letter is about starting for Washington hence I shall be very short in my reply.
My experience in West Tennessee has convinced me that any trade whatever with the rebellious states is weakening to us of at least Thirty three per cent of our force. No matter what the restrictions thrown around trade if any whatever is allowed it will be made the means of supplying to the enemy all they want. Restrictions if lived up to make trade unprofitable and hence none but dishonest men go into it. I will venture that no honest man has made money in West Tennessee in the last year whilst many fortunes have been made there during the time.
The people in the Mississippi Valley are now nearly subjugated. Keep trade out for but a few months and I doubt not but that the work of subjugation will be so complete that trade can be opened freely with the states of Arkansas, La. & Mississippi. That the people of these states will be more anxious for the enforcement, and protection, of our laws than the people of the loyal states. They have experienced the misfortune of being without them and are now in a most happy condition to appreciate their blessing.
No theory of my own will ever stand in the way of my executing, in good faith, any order I may receive from those in authority over me. But my position has given me an opportunity of seeing what could not be know by persons away from the scene of War and I venture therefore to suggest great caution in opening trade with rebels.
I am sir, very respectfully
your obt. svt.
U. S. GRANT
Maj. Gen. Com 18
Note even though Grant strenuously opposed the policy promulgated by the administration, he made clear to Secretary Chase he would faithfully execute any orders given by his superiors dealing with the issue. Ever the faithful subordinate, he continued urging the administrat
ion to change this policy throughout the summer and until the end of the war.
In a letter on July 26th, he stated: "I am very much opposed to any trade whatever, until the rebellion in this part of the country is entirely crushed out. Secretary Chase differs, however." 19 Grant again focused on the issue in a letter on August 15th: "My opinion is, that all trade with any enemy with whom we are at war is calculated to weaken us indirectly. I am opposed to selling or buying from them whilst war exists, except those within our lines." 20 On August 26th, he returned to the issue in a letter to Secretary of War, Edwin Stanton. "If trade is opened under any general rule, all sorts of dishonest men will engage in it, taking any oath or obligation necessary to secure the privilege. Smuggling will at once commence, as it did at Memphis, Helena, and every other place where trade has been allowed within the disloyal states, and the armed enemy will be enabled to procure from Northern markets every article they require." 21
Though Grant continued to urge his views upon the government the administration was determined to have its way. Although his views differed from those of his superiors, he dutifully executed whatever orders were directed concerning this subject.
In the letter of July 21st, to Secretary Chase, Grant mentioned he was sending that letter to Washington via his Assistant Adjutant General, John Rawlins. Rawlins was being sent to Washington on a special fence-mending mission by Grant. During Grant's Vicksburg campaign, he had come down hard on General McClernand, who President Lincoln had sent west to raise volunteers and to whom the President had entrusted the task of opening the Mississippi River to navigation. Grant felt he needed to make a special effort to inform the President why he had taken such strong measures and hopefully, soothe any ruffled feathers.
Grant The Forgotten Hero Page 29
