It appeared as though Hood meant to carry out his plans by marching around Thomas, ford the Cumberland and make a dash for the Ohio. And still, Thomas did nothing. Thomas was now, in effect, disobeying a superior's direct order.
Grant was not the only worried party. By now, the whole Administration was afraid of losing all it had gained in the West. On December 7th, Stanton telegraphed Grant at 10:20 A.M. "Thomas seems unwilling to attack because it is hazardous, as if all war was anything but hazardous. If he waits for Wilson to get ready, Gabriel will be blowing his last horn." 105
At 1:30 P.M., Grant replied to Stanton. "You probably saw my order to Thomas to attack. If he does not do so promptly, I would recommend suspending him by Schofield, leaving Thomas subordinate." 106 This greatly pained Grant, for though he felt Thomas was slow, he was personally fond of him.
The frantic telegraph communications continued. On December 8th, Grant telegraphed Halleck. "Please direct General Dodge to send all the troops he can spare, to General Thomas. With such order, he can be relied on to send all that can properly go. They had probably better be sent to Louisville, for I fear either Hood or Breckinridge will go to the Ohio river. I will submit whether it is not advisable to call on Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois, for sixty thousand men for thirty days. If Thomas has not struck yet, he ought to be ordered to hand over his command to Schofield. There is no better man to repel an attack than Thomas, but I fear he is too cautious to take the initiative." 107
During the evening, Grant again sent Thomas a message urging him to attack.
CITY POINT, VA. December 8, 1864.--8.30 P.M.
MAJOR-GENERAL THOMAS,
Nashville, Tenn.
Your dispatch of yesterday received. It looks to me evident the enemy are trying to cross the Cumberland River and are scattered. Why not attack at once? By all means avoid the contingency of a foot race to see which, you or Hood, can beat to the Ohio. If you think necessary call on the governors of States to send a force into Louisville to meet the enemy if he should cross the river. You clearly never should cross except in rear of the enemy. Now is one of the finest opportunities ever presented of destroying one of the three armies of the enemy. If destroyed he can never replace it. Use the means at your command, and you can do this and cause a rejoicing that will resound from one end of the land to the other.
U. S. GRANT,
Lieutenant-General. 108
No sooner had Grant sent Thomas his latest dispatch when Halleck answered Grant's telegram from earlier on the 8th. "If you wish General Thomas relieved, give the order. No one here will I think interfere. The responsibility, however, will be yours, as no one here, so far as I am informed, wishes General Thomas removed." 109 At 10 P.M., Grant answered Halleck. "Your despatch of nine P.M. just received. I want General Thomas reminded of the importance of immediate action. I sent him a despatch this evening, which will probably urge him on. I would not say relieve him, until I hear further from him." 110
On December 9th, Halleck telegraphed Thomas based on the conversation he had with Grant on the 8th. "Lieutenant-General Grant expresses much dissatisfaction at your delay in attacking the enemy. If you wait till General Wilson mounts all his cavalry, you will wait till doom's day, for the waste equals the supply. Moreover, you will be in the same condition that Rosecrans was last year--with so many animals that you cannot feed them. Reports already come in of a scarcity of forage." 111
Nothing could budge Thomas until he was ready, but Halleck made a good point in the above message. Of all people, Thomas was an eyewitness to the distress that befell the National forces due to Rosecrans's inaction at Chattanooga, yet Thomas refused to be hurried.
At 9:30 P.M., the evening of December 8th, Thomas sent a telegram which stated: "With every exertion on the part of General Wilson, he will not be able to get his force of cavalry in condition to move before Sunday [December 11th]." 112
Thomas replied to Halleck on the 9th. "Your dispatch, of 10.30 A.M. this date, is received. I regret that General Grant should feel dissatisfaction at my delay in attacking the enemy. I feel conscious that I have done everything in my power to prepare, and that the troops could not have gotten ready before this. And if he should order me to be relieved, I will submit without a murmur. A terrible storm of freezing rain has come on since daylight, which will render an attack impossible, till it breaks." 113
When Grant received the dispatches above, he had had enough. He had previously ordered Thomas not to wait for Wilson, but Thomas had ignored Grant's direct orders to attack. Late on December 9th, Grant telegraphed Halleck. "Despatch of eight P.M. last evening, from Nashville, shows the enemy scattered for more than seventy miles down the river, and no attack yet made by Thomas. Please telegraph orders relieving him at once, and placing Schofield in command. Thomas should be ordered to turn over all orders and despatches received since the battle of Franklin, to Schofield." 114
Before this directive could be carried out, Thomas telegraphed Grant in response to Grant's telegram of December 8th. "December 9, one P.M. Your despatch of 8.30 P.M. of the 8th is just received. I had nearly completed my preparations to attack the enemy to-morrow morning, but a terrible storm of freezing rain has come on to-day, which will make it impossible for our men to fight at any advantage. I am therefore compelled to wait for the storm to break, and make the attack immediately after. Admiral Lee is patrolling the river above and below the city, and I believe will be able to prevent the enemy from crossing. There is no doubt but that Hood's forces are considerably scattered along the river with the view of attempting to cross, but it has been impossible for me to organize and equip troops for an attack at an earlier moment. General Halleck informs me you are much dissatisfied with my delay in attacking. I can only say I have done all in my power to prepare, and if you shall deem it necessary to relieve me, I shall submit without a murmur." 115
At 4 P.M., on December 9th, after seeing the above dispatch to Grant as it passed through Washington, Halleck sent Grant this message. "Orders relieving General Thomas had been made out when his telegram of this P.M. was received. If you still wish these orders telegraphed to Nashville, they will be forwarded." 116
Grant telegraphed his response to Halleck at 5:30 P.M. "General Thomas has been urged in every possible way to attack the enemy, even to giving the positive order. He did say he thought he should be able to attack on the 7th, but he did not do so, nor has he given a reason for not doing it. I am very unwilling to do injustice to an officer who has done as much good service as General Thomas, however, and will therefore suspend the order until it is seen whether he will do anything." 117
Notice in the above dispatch how the killer, butcher, hard-war man was one of the most tenderhearted individuals anyone could ever hope to meet. There are multitudes of bosses in the world who would have removed an insubordinate employee for far less than what Thomas had put Grant through, yet he was bending over backwards to understand Thomas' situation. Many critics have severely criticized Grant for his treatment of Thomas during this time period mainly because Thomas was a national hero. Grant had in fact, acted with great benevolence in regard to Thomas in this situation. From a military point of view, Thomas' behavior was way out of line.
At 7:30 P.M., the evening of December 9th, Grant sent the following message to Thomas. "Your despatch of one P.M. received. I have as much confidence in your conducting a battle rightly as I have in any other officer. But it has seemed to me that you have been slow, and I have had no explanation of affairs to convince me otherwise. Receiving your despatch of two P.M. from General Halleck before I did the one to me, I telegraphed to suspend the order relieving you until we should here further. I hope most sincerely that there will be no necessity of repeating the order, and that the facts will show that you have been right all the time." 118
No communications were exchanged on December 10, 1864, as the ice storm continued unabated about Nashville. After hearing nothing from Thomas for almost 48 hours, Grant sent this telegram on De
cember 11th.
CITY POINT, VA., December 11, 1864.--4 P.M.
MAJOR-GENERAL THOMAS,
Nashville, Tenn.
If you delay attack longer the mortifying spectacle will be witnessed of a rebel army moving for the Ohio River, and you will be forced to act, accepting such weather as you find. Let there be no further delay. Hood cannot even stand a drawn battle so far from his supplies of ordnance stores. If he retreats and you follow, he must lose his material and much of his army. I am in hopes of receiving a dispatch from you to-day announcing that you have moved. Delay no longer for weather or reinforcements.
U. S. GRANT,
Lieutenant-General. 119
On the 11th, word was received from Thomas that a force of two or three thousand rebels had crossed the Cumberland and were moving on Bowling Green, Kentucky. Thomas was required to send two brigades of cavalry off to deal with them. The Confederates also attacked the National garrison at Murfreesboro, but were repelled. So the inclement weather which debilitated Thomas' forces seemed to have no effect on the Southerners.
On December 11th, at 10:30 P.M., Thomas answered Grant's telegram of earlier that day. "Your despatch of four P.M. this day is just received. Will obey the order as promptly as possible, however much I may regret it, as the attack will have to be made under every disadvantage. The whole country is covered with a perfect sheet of ice and sleet, and it is with difficulty the troops are able to move about on level ground. It was my intention to attack Hood as soon as the ice melted, and would have done so yesterday, had it not been for the storm." 120 More excuses and still no attack.
On December 12th, Thomas telegraphed again in the same vain. "I have the troops ready to make an attack on the enemy, as soon as the sleet which now covers the ground has melted sufficiently to enable men to march; as the whole country is now covered with a sheet of ice so hard and slippery, it is utterly impossible for troops to ascend steeps, or even move over level ground in anything like order. It has taken the entire day to place my cavalry in position, and it has only finally been accomplished, with imminent risk and many serious accidents, resulting from the number of horses falling with their riders on the roads. Under these circumstances, I believe an attack at this time would only result in an useless sacrifice of life." 121
Grant had many operations to consider and Thomas' dawdling in Nashville was seriously impinging on operations concerning Canby, Sherman and Butler. He was devoting an inordinate amount of time to Thomas' situation. Thomas was causing Grant a great deal of mental anguish through his insubordinate actions. The pressure for action drove Grant to the point where he could no longer wait for Thomas to act.
At 12:30 P.M., on December 14th, Halleck telegraphed Thomas unbeknownst to Grant. "It has been seriously apprehended that while Hood, with a part of his forces, held you in check near Nashville, he would have time to co-operate against other important points left only partially protected. Hence, Lieutenant-General Grant was anxious that you should attack the rebel forces in your front, and expresses great dissatisfaction that his order has not been carried out. Moreover, so long as Hood occupies a threatening position in Tennessee, General Canby is obliged to keep large forces on the Mississippi river, to protect its navigation, and to hold Memphis, Vicksburg, etc., although General Grant had directed a part of these forces to co-operate with Sherman. Every day's delay on your part, therefore, seriously interferes with General Grant's plans." 122
Thomas replied to Halleck later on the 14th. "Your telegram of 12.30 P.M. to-day received. The ice having melted away to-day, the enemy will be attacked to-morrow morning. Much as I regret the apparent delay in attacking the enemy, it could not have been done before with any reasonable prospect of success." 123
The above dispatches were no longer of any consequence to Grant. General Grant refused to put any credence in further communications with Thomas. He now felt forced to act without regard to anyone's feelings. General Logan happened to be at City Point during this time, so having high regard for Logan's fighting and leadership abilities, Grant dispatched Logan on December 13th to go to Nashville, relieve Thomas and assume command.
After reflecting on the situation, he had second thoughts and decided to go himself to Nashville and assume command. Grant left City Point the evening of December 14th. Upon his arrival in Washington, he received news that Thomas had finally attacked Hood earlier on the 15th. Logan had already reached Louisville when he got word and his mission ended there.
Thomas' long delayed attack on Hood commenced at an early hour on December 15th. Thomas had accumulated 55,000 infantry and 12,000 cavalry compared to less than 25,000 men in Hood's force. His plan was to make a demonstration on his left, while he made a strong attack from his right, thereby turning the enemy's flank.
The weather was favorable for the attack on the 15th with a dense fog shrouding his movements. As Steedman began his demonstration which got the attention of the rebels, A. J. Smith and Wilson struck a crushing blow against Hood's left flank. As soon as Smith assailed the rebel left, Thomas had Wood assault the rebel center. Soon the Yankees had driven the Confederates from their original line of works. By nightfall, the Federals had pushed the Southerners about eight miles, but the rebel army remained intact. The National offensive was resumed at 6 A.M., on December 16th. By the afternoon, the Union offensive successfully broke the rebel lines causing a panicked retreat by what remained of Hood's army. The Southern army in the West had been obliterated and was now fleeing in a rout. Thomas' victory had been absolute which vindicated Grant's assumption that Thomas had had more than enough force to eliminate Hood's army for days.
On December 15th, Grant sent Thomas a congratulatory message.
WASHINGTON, D. C., December 15, 1864.
MAJOR-GENERAL THOMAS,
Nashville, Tenn.
I was just on my way to Nashville, but receiving a dispatch from Van Duzer detailing your splendid success of to-day, I shall go no further. Push the enemy now and give him no rest until he is entirely destroyed. Your army will cheerfully suffer many privations to break up Hood's army and render it useless for future operations. Do not stop for trains or supplies, but take them from the country as the enemy have done. Much is now expected.
U. S. GRANT,
Lieutenant-General. 124
Thomas' victory was one of the most complete of the war resulting in the total destruction of Hood's army. Critics, who have relied on the principle of the ends justify the means, have heavily criticized Grant for failing to appreciate Thomas' abilities. In fact, Grant had tolerated rank insubordination on the part of Thomas for almost two weeks. Grant's opinion of the situation at Nashville, even at a distance, was vindicated by the ease with which Thomas' forces dispatched what remained of Hood's army. Contrary to the writings of critics, Grant's assessment of Thomas' abilities was absolutely perfect. Thomas was one of the greatest on defense, but was slow and deliberate on offense.
Despite the enormous amount of stress Thomas had inflicted upon Grant during the previous two weeks, Grant was one of the first to congratulate him on his success. This was more evidence of Grant's truly magnanimous behavior. To quote Shakespeare, "The quality of mercy is mightiest in the mightiest".
With Nashville behind him, Grant was free to turn his attention to one of the few remaining pillars supporting the Confederacy, the last major blockade running port still open, Wilmington, North Carolina.
Wilmington
The reader may recall from the section on Sherman's March to the Sea about the running communications Grant had with Sherman leading up to the movement. In this correspondence, on innumerable occasions, references were made by Grant to a mission being undertaken to close the last blockade running port at Wilmington. Not only would closing Wilmington to the enemy help expedite the end of the war by cutting off the much needed war making materials from Europe, but Wilmington would make an ideal location from which Federal forces could advance inland to cooperate with Sherman's movements. In addition
, with Sherman moving upon the coast of Georgia, Grant figured the forces about Wilmington might be sent to help arrest Sherman's advance. In this case, Fort Fisher, the fort guarding the entrance to the Cape Fear River, might be weakly held making an assault somewhat easier.
Grant had wanted to undertake the mission against Wilmington for months, but for one reason or another had been unable to mount an offensive. One of the primary obstacles blocking the operation against Fort Fisher was General Butler. Not only was Thomas giving Grant headaches through his listless behavior in Nashville, but now his patience was wearing thin with a preposterous scheme being organized by Butler. Apparently Butler had concocted a scheme which called for loading a ship full of gunpowder and moving it close to Fort Fisher where it would be exploded, hopefully destroying the fort. If this sounds familiar, it should, for it bears a small resemblance to Burnside's mine. To say the least, Grant had no confidence in the proposed plan. In his memoirs, Grant had this to say about the project. "I had no confidence in the success of the scheme, and so expressed myself; but as no serious harm could come of the experiment, and the authorities at Washington seemed desirous to have it tried, I permitted it." 125
Grant chose General Weitzel of the Army of the James to lead the expedition. Unfortunately, General Butler decided he wanted to go in command of the expedition. Admiral Porter commanded the naval squadron which was to transport the expedition.
In November, Grant discovered that General Bragg, who was in command of the Southern forces in the vicinity of Wilmington, had been called to Georgia to defend against Sherman's invasion, leaving Wilmington virtually undefended. On November 30th, Grant notified Butler that Weitzel should proceed on the mission while Bragg was away. Grant prodded Butler to get going, but just like Thomas, he was not able to make much headway. Finally, on December 9th, the expedition was ready to set sail, but due to heavy storms on the seas, the operation was not able to get under way until December 13th.
Grant The Forgotten Hero Page 57
