However, this bottle was not marked “poison,” so Alice ventured to taste it, and, finding it very nice . . . she very soon finished it off.[7]
Any problems with Alice’s thinking?
Answer: Aside from being hilarious, this passage is chock full of errors in thinking. I’ll just mention a few. Because a bottle is labeled “DRINK ME” does not mean Alice should drink it. The label begs multiple questions, among which are “Is it safe?” “What is it for?” “Why should I drink it?” “Who made the sign?” “Why does that person want me to drink the contents of the bottle?” (The Victorian medicine bottle had neither a screw top nor a label on the side. It was corked, with a paper label tied to the neck.)
“Alice was not going to do that in a hurry. ‘No, I’ll look first.’ ”
Notice Alice had already decided that she would drink the stuff. She will drink it after she looks at it. Thus, she has dismissed the question of “Should I drink?” and substituted the question “When shall I drink?” To the later question she has a ready answer: as soon as I look. Never plunge into any major action without due deliberation.
Alice just needed to go through some rationalizations before acting. Her thinking is way off the point of course and defective in itself. Those nice little stories were not so nice. They were the traditional fairy tales, filled with episodes of horror and usually p. 246 containing a pious moral. That they told about children who got burnt and eaten up by wild beasts, among other unpleasant things, hardly seems relevant to the issue at hand, which is to drink or not to drink. Furthermore, a red-hot poker has nothing to do with the question of the danger lurking in the bottle. Besides, a red-hot poker will burn you anytime you hold it. You don’t have to hold it too long to get burned. How long is too long, anyway? The same minimization of danger is present in Alice’s discussion of the knife: to bleed it is not necessary to cut very deeply. Deep will do.
That the bottle is not labeled as poison is neither here nor there, for a poison can be a poison whether labeled or not. Nevertheless, Alice concludes that since the bottle is not labeled poison, it is safe to taste. Stated more formally, Alice’s thinking would go: “All poisons are labeled poison. This bottle is not labeled poison. Therefore, it is not a poison. Therefore, it is safe to drink.” Premise one is wrong. Therefore, all conclusions derived from it are wrong.
Even if premise one were correct and the liquid were not a poison, conclusions one and two don’t ring true. There are lots of substances that, though not poisons, would not be safe to drink—polluted water, for instance. Other substances are not poisons but would be unpleasant to drink—vinegar, for instance. Other liquids are a food, a poison, or a drug, depending on the definition, and might not be suitable for a little girl to drink—Irish whiskey, for instance.
By focusing on side issues that are off the point, Alice convinces herself that drinking the stuff in the bottle is OK. This is an obvious rationalization to justify the real reason for her action, which is her curiosity as to what would happen.
And speaking of curiosity, I am curious about what the next chapter will be about, since, as I write this, I don’t know. And because I don’t know, I can’t tell you. Let’s turn the page and see. I hope the next chapter is not labeled “READ ME,” but I have a sneaky feeling it is.
Notes
p. 247 1. Lewis Carroll, Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland, illust. John Tenniel and colored by Fritz Kredel (New York: Random House, 1946), pp. 72-73. All references to Alice are to this edition.
2. Ibid., pp. 73-74.
3. Ibid., p. 74.
4. Ibid., p. 3.
5. Judge Holbrook, quoted in an article by Kevin Moran, Houston Chronicle, March 26, 2002.
6. This isn’t a direct quotation from Carroll. It’s actually a misquotation by Martin Gardner, ed. The Annotated Alice (New York: Norton, 1990), pp. 228-29. The reference is to Through the Looking Glass and What Alice Found There, chapter 7.
7. Paraphrased from Carroll, Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland, pp. 9-10.
9 – Read Me
p. 249 This chapter covers the uniform field theory, a theory of knowledge designed to help you arrive at the truth. Up to this point, we have concerned ourselves with multiple particular illustrations of clear and crooked thinking. It is possible by induction to generalize about the nature of our activity and arrive at the general principle governing our search for reality. That general principle, the uniform field theory, is that the correct perception of the truth is based on the understanding of all the evidence.
Reasoning itself is a form of evidence because by definition it can be a sign that points to the truth. As a form of evidence, reasoning is subject to correct interpretation. Thus, any and all rules of exact thought, all the guidelines about clear thinking, and all analysis of the named and unnamed fallacies—all the rules, laws, maxims and all the “Pattened Principles” inflicted on you in previous chapters—boil down to the application of the uniform field theory of truth.
But, in a practical sense, all the evidence is rarely available to us. All we can hope for in this, the best of all possible worlds, is a correct interpretation of all the available evidence.
Thus, no conclusion can be final because it cannot be based on all the evidence. Future evidence does not yet exist, and the past evidence might be obscured, unavailable to us, missing, or actually fake. Therefore, all conclusions must be based on partial, incomplete, and sometimes erroneous evidence.
Since conclusions can never be based on all the evidence, all conclusions must be considered tentative. If all conclusions are tentative, p. 250 then they all must be subject to revision and possible change if and when new evidence becomes available.
Thus, in our quest for truth, the most important questions to ask are about evidence. Such questions take the form “Why? What’s the evidence? How do you know that for sure?” Questions of that ilk bring out the evidence and lead to correct conclusions about reality and truth.
Sometimes it is helpful to jog our thinking about evidence by using the RA mnemonic: Evidence must be (R)elevant and (A)dequate. If the evidence fails on any significant part of R or A, that is, if it is not relevant or adequate, the conclusion is not supported.
For emphasis and to cement the idea in your memory, please repeat this out loud right now: The uniform field theory holds that our correct perception and understanding of reality is based on the correct interpretation of the available evidence.
From which follows:
Lesson: Analysis of the evidence is crucial. Evidence must be relevant and adequate. Otherwise, a firm or reasonable conclusion cannot be reached.
For the purpose of analysis, it is sometimes helpful to divide correct analysis of evidence into two parts, relevance and adequacy. These parts are similar to each other and in some senses are also different. All relate back to the uniform field theory. The two parts of the uniform field theory relate to analysis of the available evidence, not to the analysis of all the evidence, as mentioned. Each of these two parts bears weight, but the most important part of the initial consideration of evidence is relevance.
Genus definition of relevance: Evidence is relevant if it pertains directly and unemotionally to the merit of the position at issue and supports the conclusion. Evidence that does not pertain directly to or does not support the conclusion is irrelevant.
Divisional definition of relevance: Evidence is relevant if it
• relates directly to the conclusion.
• provides some reason to believe, counts in favor of, or makes a difference to the perception of the truth of the conclusion.
• is not an emotional appeal.
p. 251 If the evidence doesn’t relate to the conclusion in a reasonable way, it is irrelevant and the conclusion is not justified. Good evidence must have a bearing on, provide support for, or make a genuine difference to the truth or falsity of the conclusion. Otherwise, the evidence is not relevant. All emotional appeals, strictly speaking, cannot directly relat
e to the truth of any conclusion. Therefore, emotional appeals are suspect because they are likely to be irrelevant.
A red-hot poker is irrelevant to whether Alice should obey “DRINK ME.”
We have already looked at lack of relevance in its many varied forms. That a red-hot poker will burn the hand is true, but it is not relevant to the issue that Alice was considering. That the bottle might contain poison was relevant to the issue because one should not drink a poison and Alice was trying to decide whether to drink. Alice’s subsequent thinking on this issue got derailed because she concluded that since the bottle was not labeled poison, the liquid in the bottle was OK to drink. Many other liquids besides poisons should not be drunk, and the absence of a poison label doesn’t mean that the content of the bottle is not a poison. A poison is a poison whether or not it is labeled as such.
Beware sound arguments or valid arguments that are off the point. They are irrelevant.
Arguments such as the hot-poker one that Alice considered actually have true premises: Hot pokers do burn hands. Consequently, you should not hold them. But such arguments, in Alice’s case, do not directly relate to the question of whether she should drink. They are off the point and therefore irrelevant. Poisons kill. That is true. Such considerations, that one should not drink poisonous fluids, relate directly to the issue Alice considers and are therefore to the point and relevant.
Authority is irrelevant.
Citing an authority is always irrelevant because an authority can be wrong. We might pay more attention to the reasons given by an authority than we would to those given by a nonauthority simply because of that authority’s qualifications, but we need not accept those reasons as relevant unless they are. Past experience has shown that an authority acting outside his own narrow field is no authority at all and that some authorities are biased in some way. Of course, citing an anonymous authority, or any authority that cannot be checked and questioned, is irrelevant.
Principle: Accept an authority for the reasons given, not because the authority is an authority.
p. 252 From which follows:
Lesson: Focus on the reasons, not the authority. Pay no attention to biased, unqualified, or anonymous authorities, for those are, to the extent of those limitations, irrelevant.
A stockbroker, though an authority on the stock market, is biased because he makes his living selling or buying shares for you. Therefore, any recommendation to buy or sell must be viewed as irrelevant unless supported by reasons.
For example, “Did you know that interference from in-laws is the number-one cause of divorce in the United States?”
“How do you know that for sure?”
“I heard it on The Oprah Winfrey Show today.”
Is the authority cited Oprah herself? If so, why and how is she qualified? Was the authority one of Oprah’s guests? If so, why and how is she qualified? Was it an audience member? A writer plugging her new book? An unidentified invited “expert”? If the authority fits any of these categories, the claim is not relevant to the conclusion, and nothing has been proven. Even if the expert were a genuine professor of social work who studied the issue for many years, and, after such study, reached that rather startling conclusion, we would have to see the actual data to determine whether the conclusion related to the data and was justified.
Another example: “A highly placed well-respected public figure said in a recent article in U.S. News & World Report that historians will probably describe President Clinton as having developed a very strong, forward-looking, and well-defined foreign policy for the post-cold war years.”
Unnamed authorities—cast a cold eye on them. When I read something like this, I just pass over it because the information density and the reliability is mighty weak. It turned out (I learned several weeks later) that the “highly placed, well-respected public figure” was Madeleine Albright, secretary of state under President Clinton. I liked Albright. Some people didn’t. Other people were neutral. But whether I liked her—and whether you liked her, whether other people liked her, or whether most people liked her—doesn’t matter. Likes or dislikes don’t matter because they don’t materially relate to any conclusion. What is related to the possible truth of the conclusion is that Albright is a biased source. She is part and parcel of the vaguely described and much-praised foreign policy. So in admiring—some might even say in p. 253 flattering—Clinton’s foreign policy, the secretary of state indirectly and self-servingly praises herself. Furthermore, the secretary of state serves at the pleasure of the president. In view of the power relationships involved, it would be highly unlikely that Albright could hold, would hold, or (if she held different views from Clinton) would voice opinions contrary to those of the president. A biased authority is, to the extent of the bias, no authority at all.
Mere assertions are irrelevant.
Anyway, her bias is neither here nor there, for Albright gave us no reasons for her assertions. She just told us that Clinton’s foreign policies were (in her opinion and in so many words) great. She didn’t tell us why they were great. Therefore, no relevant reasons were offered to support her conclusions. She herself probably suspects that she is a biased authority. That is why she doesn’t cite herself as holding the opinions stated. Oh, no. She doesn’t say, “I believe that. . . .” Instead, she cites the unnamed historians of the future: men and women who may or may not hold the opinions that she has stated and who are not available for cross-examination. Thus, the authority cited is not only anonymous but also not yet existent. Maybe those men and women historians of the future would support the secretary of state’s self-serving opinion with evidence; maybe they would not.
Therefore, for us to read Albright’s statements is mainly a waste of time. Believe none of this ilk.
Groupthink, herd instinct, popular opinions, received standard wisdom, and (so-called) common sense are all usually irrelevant.
Appeals to patriotism, tradition, and common opinion are appeals to highly questionable authorities or to no real authority at all. Such appeals are off the point and therefore not relevant. The bandwagon and consensus mean nothing. That a movie is popular or not is not relevant to the consideration of whether you should see it. Your tastes may differ from the masses, and the masses may be wrong.
How about this claim? “If tanning were really unsafe, millions of Americans wouldn’t do it every week.”
“Really? How do you know that for sure?”
What large numbers of people think is the truth and what they do are not relevant to what is actually the truth. The benefits and dangers of tanning cannot be deduced from the fact that the activity is popular. Never infer anything from what the majority does or thinks. Remember that a large body of people believe in astrology, psychokinesis, extrap. 254sensory perception, out-of-body experiences, creationism, and so forth. At one time, the majority believed the Earth was flat and at the center of the universe. Polls show that the percentage of those believing in ghosts, haunted houses, and communication with the dead has risen in the last decade (News scan data points, Scientific American 285 [2001]: 26). That is no reason for us to believe such nonsense.
Even science, some of the time, takes quantum leaps in the wrong direction, as in the (premature) discovery of cold fusion, the Piltdown man hoax, and nonexistent N-rays. How many times have you heard some medical discovery announced in the news only to learn a year later that another study seems to contradict the first? Mammography versus no mammography? PSA screening versus no PSA?
Recent screening tests for the early and exact diagnosis of neuroblastoma in children showed that early and exact diagnosis of such tumors made no difference in survival. In fact, most of the early tumors detected underwent spontaneous involution and therefore required no treatment whatsoever. Estrogen replacement, according to a recent controlled prospective study, caused an increase in fatal heart attacks, not a decrease, as previously reported. Estrogen replacement increases the incidence of dementia, not decreases it, as previously
reported.
All fake reasons are irrelevant.
We discussed how people use fake reasons to justify conclusions already accepted. Usually, the conclusion should come after a consideration of the reasons for it, not vice versa. In rationalization, the stated reasons usually bear little or no relation to the conclusion and have been simply made up to justify a questionable position.
For example, “Yes, I subscribe to Hustler. But I do it for the great articles.”
This is likely a rationalization. I have never seen a great article in Hustler, but I have seen plenty of great pictures of beautiful nude women. Besides, even if, from time to time, great articles did appear in Hustler, that is not the real reason that he subscribes to Hustler. Nor is it the reason I subscribe to Hustler. If fake reasons are given in support of a claim, they cannot be relevant to the truth. There are just too many fake things out there. Don’t add to them.
All appeals to emotion are irrelevant.
All appeals to tradition or personal circumstance; all innuendo or obloquy; all guilt by association; all use of flattery, pity, shame, or charity; all threats of violence, all violence itself, though sometimes p. 255 effective in getting things that are wanted—are not relevant to the conclusion and are therefore unreasonable.
Emotions may influence us to help or to do something, but that is beside the point. Emotional appeals are not relevant to a reasoned conclusion and are poor substitutes for real evidence. Use of emotions to get to the truth is a poor substitute for reason. Don’t do it.
Take this: “Trust me. You have nothing to fear.” Unsupported by reasons, the command to trust is irrelevant. When coupled with the above assertion, one might do well to be on guard.
Truth, Knowledge, or Just Plain Bull: How to tell the difference Page 30
