[3080] Assaltare from assalire, like the simple Latin salto from salio. (1 August, feast of the Pardon, 1823.) See p. 3588.
For p. 2740, margin. I think that the ψ was brought into use as much to express πσ, as βσ and φσ; and so the ξ as much for κσ, as for γσ and for χσ; brought into use, I say, by the scribes who in those early times and in the period of imperfection of spelling, could not distinguish sufficiently and were confused in respect to the various pronunciations and sounds, especially cognate ones, nor did they take any care to distinguish one from the other more than the minimum in their writings, or they were not capable of doing this perfectly. I believe as a consequence that in the very ancient times φλὲψ [vein] was pronounced and written φλὲβσ,1 not φλέπς; ἀλείψω [I will anoint] was pronounced and written ἀλείφσω, and not ἀλείπσω; λύγξ λύγγς [hiccup], and not λύγκς; ἄρξω ἄρχσω [I will begin], and not ἄρκσω; and the same for the other doubles. But afterward, once the use of these doubles was introduced I believe that those letters went on being pronounced according to their grammatical derivation or the ancient usage and ancient radical letters, and that therefore, e.g., the ψ and the ξ had now one pronunciation [3081] and now another, that is, now πσ now βσ, etc. I do not believe, on the contrary I maintain that the ψ was always pronounced πσ, and the ξ always κσ. A transition which is not difficult even in pronunciation (and ordinary and regular in a million other cases both in Greek pronunciation and in its writing and grammar) from one to another cognate one, that is from the palatals γ and χ to the palatal κ, and from the labials β φ to the labial π. Especially since π and κ are truly medial in pronunciation between their cognates, although the term “medial” is assigned to γ and to β, and to δ, not to τ, etc. I deduce this from Latin, among which equally x was substituted both for cs and gs, and in ancient times was written and pronounced, e.g., gregs, legs, regs, not grecs, lecs, recs, as today, at least we Italians, usually pronounce them. See Forcellini and the Dictionaries of grammar, literature, and the Encyclopédie Méthodique, art. “X.”1 But that later even with the ancient Latins, or those of the classical period, x was always pronounced cs, as today, is demonstrated by consideration, e.g., of the verbs lego [to gather, to read], rego [to guide], tego [to cover] and similar (in fact coming from the nouns mentioned) which in their perfects form rexi, texi (lego has legi). Where certainly x in very ancient times was equivalent to gs, as I have said elsewhere [→Z 1122–23]. But here we can see how the participles lectus, rectus, tectus, which originally were legitus, etc., and then contracted, changed the g to c. It remains therefore more than likely that even those perfects were pronounced with the c, recsi, tecsi in spite of [3082] their grammatical derivation and therefore it is equally likely that wherever there should have been a g in x, it changed to c, since there is no greater reason why it should make this transition in the perfects mentioned than in any other word. (2 August, Feast of the Pardon of Assisi, 1823.)
It is demonstrated both by reason and experience, from all histories, and from the knowledge of man, that any society whatsoever, and more so the civilized, and especially the most civilized, continuously tends to fall into monarchy, and sooner or later, whatever their political constitution, they fall inevitably, and even when they rise from it, their resurgence lasts a short time and is of no benefit to them, and that in short in society there is not nor can there be a long-lasting political state except absolute monarchy. It is likewise demonstrated, and with the same proofs, that absolute monarchy, whatever it is like in its beginnings, whatever it can from time to time go back to being for a few moments through ephemeral circumstances, always tends toward and falls almost immediately and irreparably into despotism; because given [3083] the nature of man, in fact of every living being, it is almost physically impossible that someone who has absolute power over his fellows, does not abuse it. That means that it is impossible for him not to make use of it to benefit himself rather than others, indeed for him not to disregard the others in order to look after himself alone, which is neither more nor less than the substance of despotism, and indeed the opposite of what true and good monarchy, an imaginary being of the rational mind, ought to be and never was nor is nor can be. Now it is equally certain, at least it was for the ancients, and is for all wise men of modern times, that the worst political state possible and the one most contrary to nature is that of despotism. It is just as certain that the political state has influence on the state of society in such a way, and is such a great part of it, that it is absolutely impossible, if the former is bad, that the latter be good, and if the former is imperfect, that the latter be perfect, and where the former is appalling, that the latter be not equally appalling. Now since the political state [3084] of despotism is inseparable from the state of society, and is stronger and bigger and more long-lasting in civilized societies, and all the more the more civilized they are,1 summarizing what I have said above, see if any one who can use his reason can honestly say whether the state of society in the human race can be in accordance with nature, and whether civilization is a process of perfecting, and whether the true perfection of society and man, and therefore the maximum possible happiness of both, can be entrusted to and exist in the highest social and individual civilization, and likewise the state to which man naturally tends, that is the one to which nature had ordained him, and the happiness and perfection which nature had ordained for him. (2 August, Feast of the Pardon of Assisi, 1823.)
Delicacy, e.g., delicacy of the forms of the human body, is for us an essential and indispensable part or quality of ideal beauty with respect to man, both in relation to real life, and to the imitation made of it by some or other [3085] art, poetry, etc. See pp. 3248–50. Now it is the exact opposite in nature. Because delicacy, not only relatively, that is the kind of delicacy which our imagination and concept of beauty require in human forms, and that kind of level and extent which that concept requires, but delicacy considered absolutely, is by nature ugly in human forms, that is unfitted to those forms. Since man by nature must have been, and natural man is, quite the opposite of delicate in forms. On the contrary, very coarse and very sturdy, as one who because of the necessity of providing for his needs on a daily basis is constrained to continuous toil, and is burned brown and roughened by the sun and the inclemency of the elements. And delicacy would do him harm, so that if by accident he turns out from birth to be a delicate person, this is a misfortune and a physical defect for him, and therefore something unfitting and a physical ugliness, [3086] as are so many other corporeal defects which both natural and civilized man (and so too other animals and plants) carry from birth, not because of the law and general rule of human nature, but through irregular circumstances and individual, family, or national accident, etc. Because of these things it is absolutely certain that in the idea which natural man forms of the physical beauty of his species, delicacy does not come into it at all, which for all civilized nations in all ages was and is an indispensable part of such an idea. Indeed on the contrary it is absolutely certain that delicacy for natural man comes into the idea of human physical ugliness. For if natural man maybe does not require in female forms the same coarseness as in male, it will not be because he requires delicacy, nor either that he conceives in any way delicacy as beautiful in the female sex. Indeed, on the contrary, he will require [3087] in women’s forms the level of robustness which is compatible with the nature of that sex, and will consider so much more beautiful those forms insofar as they show the level of robustness which is not out of proportion to the sex. And if their robustness does go out of proportion, he will condemn it, not as opposed to delicacy, as if delicacy were part of the beautiful, but without any relation to delicacy, he will condemn it as disproportionate and out of the ordinary in that sex. Whereas on the contrary civilized nations require in women’s forms as much delicacy as is not out of proportion, and they praise its excess rather than its defect. And when they condemn its excess, they
condemn it only as excess, not in so far as it is delicacy, nor inasmuch as it is the opposite of roughness or coarseness. Whereas natural man, in condemning excessive robustness, does not condemn it as robustness, but as excessive according to the proportions which he observes in the general condition.
[3088] Here then we have the universal idea of all nations and civilized epochs about human beauty (which is indeed that beauty on which men naturally agree rather than on any other) directly opposed to the idea of natural man, in relation to the part we have considered. Now let people try to say that the ideal of the beautiful is natural and inborn, as well as universally consistent, eternal, immutable.
And in the difference of ideas which we have noted, which is more consistent with human nature, which derives more from nature, and (if truth were to have any place here) which is more true, fairer, more reasonable? Certainly that of natural man. Therefore let it not be said, as we say of so many others on so many occasions, that he does not agree with us about the beautiful, because he does not have a keen enough sense, nor a mind fitted to conceive true ideal beauty. (Which we might say, I believe, still about the Ethiopians, whose human ideal beauty is black and not white, pug-nosed, thick-lipped, woolly-haired.) How can weakness, laziness ever be beautiful in a [3089] species of animal? And yet it is so in man in all civilized nations, since delicacy cannot be without one and the other, and is physically born from them, and displays them necessarily to the intellect.
Country people’s feeling and judgment of human beauty and delicacy. —This feeling and judgment is certainly for the reasons given more authentic than ours. More natural and therefore more authentic than ours, we men of keen sense and taste, profound connoisseurs of the beautiful, is the feeling and judgment of gross, coarse, untrained, ignorant spirits.
What has been said about delicacy, should be said about many other qualities which in the consensus of all ages and civilized peoples ought to be found in the forms of man for them to be beautiful, and which by nature were not found, or ought not be found in the forms of men, [3090] or were found and the opposite ought to have been found.1 Since both the soul and the interior of man and therefore customs and life, as well as the exterior forms are, in many qualities, profoundly changed from what they were in primitive men. And on the subject of these qualities, the feeling and judgment of such men about human corporeal beauty differs from or expressly contradicts that of all civilized nations and eras universally, and it is always more reasonable. (4 August 1823.)
As the forms of natural man differ from those of civilized man, so do those of one savage nation from those of another, those of one age from those of another, through variation of natural physical circumstances or those coming from man himself. And (not to go as far as families and individuals) it is natural and a matter of observation that men dedicated to the various material occupations (to say nothing of the moral ones, which have an influence on physiognomy, and of acquired characters and habits, [3091] which also have a powerful influence on it, and make it different in the same individual at different times) receive from the exercise of those occupations certain differences of forms, each according to the nature of the profession which he exercises and according to the parts of the body which in that profession are used more or remain more inactive, differences so notable that the attentive observer, and in many cases without any extensive observation, can easily recognize the profession of such an unknown person, whom he sees for the first time, simply by noting certain details of their forms. So one can recognize the farm worker, the carpenter, the cobbler, even without other circumstances which might disclose what he is.
What then is the true human form? And since there is a very great difference and in part a large contradiction in its qualities which are observed in entire nations, classes, etc., of persons, although generally and regularly common in any particular class, how can one determine exactly that form according to the categories of regular qualities and of the parts which regularly comprise it? And since one cannot determine the regular and perfect human form, [3092] because it regularly differs in entire classes, nations, and ages, how can one determine the beauty of the same? When will you find a quality which might constitute beauty that is not or has not been regularly missing from entire classes and generations of men, or that has not been entirely the opposite? What then is this type of ideal beauty, universally recognized, eternal, invariable? When not even in relation to our proper visible form, can one imagine a type, recognized as such by all men, in all times, which can never, or can never have not been such? When it cannot be found even in nature? Where then will it be found, or where will it be imagined, or whence will it be extracted?
For it is certain that if a person were to exist (as certainly many have existed and do exist), who had never seen any other form of men than one of the ones mentioned above, proper to a specific nation, or class, or bloodstock, etc. [3093] etc., the idea which he would form of visible human beauty would not go beyond the proportions and qualities which he would have observed in such a form, and would be a very long way from, and sometimes contrary to, the idea which someone else would conceive who found himself in the same circumstance in respect of another manner of forms. To this other person, the beauty imagined and recognized by the first would appear true ugliness, or composed of qualities which he, at least in part, would judge altogether ugly and unfitting, because they are different or contrary to those which he would be accustomed to see. A farm worker who had never seen forms belonging to the city, do we think he would form an idea of beauty consistent with or similar to that of city dwellers? In fact do we not think it would be completely the opposite in many essential parts? A people of cobblers would conceive the beautiful form of man to be stocky, broad, and thick-shouldered, legs thin and bent backward, arms almost bigger than his legs, etc.
[3094] All this forms part of the discussion about what in human forms depends on nature taken in its broadest sense, that is on physical causes, etc. What then can be said about what depends on customs? It appeared impossible to Cellini in the 16th century, a very fine judge of what was beautiful and a century of exquisite taste, to impart grace and dignity to his portrait of Bembo (which he had to do for a medallion), because Bembo did not wear a beard. And Bembo grew his beard so he could be portrayed by Cellini, and so that the portrait would cut a fine figure because he was bearded, and so it happened.1 What would an artist of our day think? Many things can be said on the various opinions, etc., of various nations and times about the custom of the beard (which is in fact a natural thing), in relation to what is beautiful. The same about hair and such different and opposite hair styles, haircuts (total or partial) considered to be beautiful or ugly in different ages by the same nation, in different nations, etc. And yet even in relation to hair there is natural hairstyling, etc. etc. (5 August 1823.)
[3095] Future subjunctives used by Latin in place of future indicatives, on which elsewhere [→Z 1970–73, 2656]. Odero [to hate], meminero [to remember], I also believe coepero [to begin], novero [to number]. Perhaps ero [to be] with the compounds potero [to be able], subero [to be under], etc. were originally future subjunctives. (5 August 1823.)
People criticize the Iliad for its lack of unity, for the fact that its readers are most interested in Hector, for its double Hero (Hector and Achilles), and conclude that, while Homer might be superior in parts to other poets, in terms of the sum of those parts, of the development of the poem, of regularity, he is inferior to other epic poets, in particular to Virgil.1 Of course, if those rules which are contrary to the good and great effect of poetry, and to the nature of man, were the true rules of poetry, I too should not dissent from such judgments. In connection with the rest of this thought, see p. 470, paragraph 2.
Homer, of course, came before the rules of the epic poem; indeed, those rules were drawn from his poems. If we consider them, then, as having been drawn and inferred from his poems, and founded on his authority, in particular that of the Iliad, it is my conten
tion that [3096] whoever so drew them was mistaken, and that all those from that moment down to the present day who obeyed or advocated those rules, or obey them or advocate them (as do all litteratores),1 on the grounds that they are founded on the example of Homer, were or are similarly misguided. For no such example exists, and those rules were not born of the form of the Iliad, nor may they legitimately be derived from it. If we consider them, then, as independent of Homer, as existing in their own right, and suppose them to be the offspring of reason and absolute speculation (which they are not), I assert categorically that as Homer did not know them, so neither did he obey them; but rather, in following nature, a teacher far superior to Poetics and the Doctors of the Schools and theories, he effectively departed from those rules. I would add that these rules are ill-conceived, whoever invented them, because they are incompatible with the nature of man, because if they are followed the epic poem is unable to create the great, powerful, and beautiful effect which it should, or at least [3097] is unable to create the greater and better effect which in itself it is yet capable of, and that accordingly, such rules are both bad and false.
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