[3881] How among the ancients sacred things and functions were in the hands of the profane, etc., for which elsewhere [→Z 131–32, 2367–68, 2670–71], see the Politics of Aristotle, bk. 6, end, Florence 1576, p. 543, especially at the end, and Vettori on the same page.1 (14 Nov. 1823.)
Latin monosyllables. Pluo [to rain], according to our observations on the ancient and vulgar monosyllabism of such diphthongs (like uo) which are not recognized by the grammarians [→Z 3684–85]. (14 Nov. 1823.) See the following thought.
For p. 3850 end. Buo has become obsolete with the compound imbuo [to moisten] remaining. If therefore imbuo is from in and buo (see Forcellini) and not instead a corruption and pronunciation of imbibo (which indeed exists) pronounced imbivo (imbevere, imbevo which is precisely the same as imbuo, and is certainly from bibo [to drink], and see the French and Spanish verbs)—imbiuo–imbuo, as lavo [to wash] in its compounds and in Greek is luo, and on the contrary from pluere [to rain] we form piovere, llover [to rain], etc. You may see p. 3885. And one could bring forward a thousand examples on these points. So exbuae would be a corruption or pronunciation of exbibae, vinibuae of vinibibae, perhaps also bua (bumba)2 from biba. About such changes which arise from the affinity, etc., between v and u, I have spoken elsewhere [→Z 3235, 3698–99, 3731–32]. Or else Imbuo could be formed directly from in and from bua, whether because this word is an alteration of biba, or because it is an ancient monosyllable meaning a drink, which has remained only for children’s use, perhaps also in origin a children’s word. (14 Nov. 1823.)
Wine, food, etc., often gives an extraordinary quickness, vivacity, rapidity, facility, fecundity of ideas, of reasoning, of imagining, of witticisms, quips, sallies, repartee, etc., liveliness of wit, sly remarks, resources, clever badinage, extreme subtleties of thought, profundity, abstruse truths, tenacity [3882] and continuity and precision of reasoning at great length with many successive inductions, without tiring, the facility of seeing the most distant and fleeting connections, and of moving rapidly from one to the other without losing the thread, etc., supreme flexibility of mind, etc. This according to the particular conditions of the people concerned, and also their circumstances whether as they are at that moment, or habitual at that time, or habitual in the rest of their lives, etc. But this expansion of the faculties produced by wine, etc., is in itself independent of habituation. And men who are more stupid by nature, by habit, etc., sometimes become at that moment witty and very imaginative, etc. See p. 3886. This should be applied to my observations [→Z 1553, 1819–22, 3197–206, 3344–47] showing that, because talent and the faculties of the mind are to a large extent a physical thing and influenced by physical things, etc., diversity of talent is to a large extent innate, and exists independently too from diversity of habits, exercises, circumstances, culture, etc.1 (14 Nov. 1823.)
For p. 3801. Both among barbarous or savage nations, and among civilized ones, as well as among corrupt ones, etc., society has produced countless practices or cases, deeds, etc., which are particular, voluntary or involuntary, etc., which either no one can deny are against nature in general and against our own, against the well-being of the species, of society itself, etc., even against the well-being of other creatures which depend on us, etc. Or if it is being denied, it can only come from habituation, and from the fact that those practices, etc., are proper to us, which is why when we describe practices and deeds of other nations and individuals, etc., that are sometimes less unnatural than ours as barbarous, we do not so describe our own, etc. And generally we call barbarous what is different [3883] from our own habits, etc., not what is against nature, insofar as and because it is against nature.1 But returning to our topic, these utterly unnatural practices or deeds—which in the absence of society would never have taken place, nor would there be any example in any species on land or sea—have taken place and do take place and always will in any society whatsoever, savage, civilized, very civilized, barbarous, at different times and different places, but wholly unnatural things everywhere. Which means that society has produced them, and that it could not and cannot not produce them, that is not produce unnatural practices and deeds, and if not of this sort, then of that sort, and if not these, then those, but always, etc. E.g., suicide, a disorder contrary to the whole of nature, to the fundamental laws of existence, to the principles, to the bases of being of all things, even potential things; a contradiction, etc., from what does it arise if not from society? etc. etc.2 See p. 3894. Now in no species of animals, not even the most social, will one be able to find that there ever have or ever had taken place not just practices, but particular deeds, not merely as unnatural as those of human individuals and peoples in any society, but even much less so. With the exception of some fortuitous disorder, either involuntary and therefore not to be attributed to the species, or voluntary but through a decision determined by some highly extraordinary and fortuitous circumstance. And the sum total of these cases even in an entire species, counting from the beginning of the world, will not be comparable to the sum total of cases of such a nature in a single human population in the course of a single century, [3884] indeed sometimes a single year. This is a strong proof that the natural society which exists among animals is not in itself and necessarily the cause of things contrary to nature, but only accidentally, and that the opposite is true concerning human society. And it confirms that man is by nature much less suited to society than a great many other animals, etc. (14 Nov. 1823.)
“Les Dames vous devront ce que la langue italienne devait au Tasse; cette langue d’ailleurs molle et dépourvue de force, prenait un air mâle et de l’énergie lorsqu’elle était maniée par cet habile poëte” [“Women will owe you what the Italian language owed to Tasso; that language, otherwise weak and devoid of strength, took on a manly and energetic appearance when it was in the hands of this skillful poet”]. So wrote the royal prince of Prussia, later Frederick II, to the marquise du Châtelet, from Rémusberg on 9 Nov. 1738. (Oeuvres complettes de Frédéric II Roi de Prusse, 1790, tome 16, Lettres du Roi de Prusse et de la Marquise du Châtelet, 5th Letter, p. 307.) And I note these words so that one can see the exactness of the judgments foreigners make about our literature, and the truth about their actual knowledge of it. Leaving aside what Frederick says in general about our language, isn’t the detail about Tasso, which is a fact, and did not demand much to learn how it stood, completely contrary to the truth? Frederick says of Tasso what is true of Dante, of whom Tasso is the exact opposite, even more than he is of Ariosto, and almost of Petrarch himself. See p. 3900. (14 Nov. 1823.) Unless Frederick is thinking of Tasso in comparison with Metastasio and means to talk about that, and in comparison even more with the Frugonians, with the Arcadians among our poets and prose writers of the [3885] last century, whether purists or barbarizers, in short with those who neither wrote nor knew Italian, in which case his statement is certainly exempt from any reproach or controversy. (15 Nov. 1823.) See p. 3949.
For p. 3706. But if, as I suspect, fuvi for fui is not a doubling of the u, formed for correctness of pronunciation, of which correctness there are in this and similar cases many examples, etc. (see p. 3881, etc.). Although this doubling could have been prompted by a wish to avoid the hiatus but in a such a way that the v was interposed to avoid it, not simply insofar as it is suitable and normal for it to be interposed between vowels creating the hiatus, but insofar as one of them and this the more strongly stressed of them in our case was the u, that is in fact another v, according to what is said elsewhere [→Z 3235, 3698–99] about the letters u and v being identical especially for the Romans. Who only used one character to express one and the other letter, that is in ancient times and in the capital letter V, in more recent times both in the semicapital or uncial, or perhaps in what was at that period, or even in ancient times, the italic and the normal, whether the u is the same as the uncial, or different, as in the Vatican, Ambrosian, St. Gall, or Veronese palimpsests, etc. (15 Nov. 1823.)
For p. 3588, margin. �
�Di ciò che io, sapendo essere vostro servitio, senza altri vostri commandamenti era tenuto di fare” [“For what I, knowing it to be your business, without other orders from you, was required to do”]. That is senz’alcun vostro comandamento, di proprio moto [without any order from you, on my own initiative]. Bernardo Tasso, Lettere, Venice 1603, Lucio Spineda, Book 1, fol. 27, p. 2, small octavo.
[3886] Elsewhere [→Z 980–81, 2281–83, 2375–76, 3514–15, 3557] I observe that the Romans’ cul very frequently in Italian changes to chi or cchi (o-cu-lus, o-cchi-o [eye]) or gli (peri-cul-um, peri-gli-o [danger]), in Spanish to j (o-cu-lus, o-j-o), in French to ill or eil or ail or aill, etc. (péril, abeille [bee], vermeil [vermilion], ouaille [flock], o-cul-us, o-eil, etc.). It should be noted that such changes are certainly not formed directly from cul, but from cl which is contracted in Vulgar Latin pronunciation, as one can sometimes see in written illustrious Latin, especially in the poets; such as seclum, periclum, etc. (17 Nov. 1823.)
Saltuaris, saltuarius, saltuatim, saltuensis, saltuosus from saltus us [leap, forest pasture]. (17 Nov. 1823.)
Salitio word used by Vegetius1 demonstrates the ancient supine salitum from salio [to leap] through irregular contraction, but only one survivor, saltum, from which could be formed saltio, not salitio, since such verbal forms come from supines or follow the form of the supine. (17 Nov. 1823.)
For p. 3882. And people who normally display no intellect or talent except in grave and serious matters, on those occasions often make a remarkable display of them in joking, etc. And men of deep talent, etc., but who are very short of or far from what is called wit, and perhaps are quite the opposite of witty—slow, needing a lot of time to think, invent, etc., cold, dry, etc.—at such moments become very witty indeed, quick off the mark, etc. And people whose minds are reflective or similar, but not inventive, not imaginative, etc., at such moments display and actually acquire for that brief period of time a notable faculty of invention, imagination, etc. etc. And so on concerning differences in talent, etc. (17 Nov. 1823.)
[3887] For p. 3856. In the 16th century Italy produced many illustrious captains, such as Trivulzio, Montecuccoli, etc., whether these served their own respective Italian nations, or another Italian nation different from their own—as the Republic of Venice frequently hired Italian Generals from other states to command their forces on land or sea—or served foreign princes, who in those days very frequently made use of Italian generals and officers to govern their armies and brought them into their service, often offering very large rewards. About which it is curious to read a small observation by Bernardo Tasso, Lettere cited earlier (p. 3885, end), bk. 1, fol. 29, and the whole of that letter.1 I say the same about Italian politicians and ministers, etc., and Italian negotiators, etc., of that century, and also of the following centuries, until present times, in which we have truly reached the extreme of political nullity, and passivity, and incapacity for any sort of operation, or certainly total inaction in deed, both at home and abroad. Like Mazarin, Alberoni, Bentivoglio, and Lucchesini too, etc. The domination of religion in past times, and up to the revolution (although always decreasing, but not extinct by the time of that revolution), but especially before the 17th century, and consequently the credit, influence, and importance of the Pope and the Court of Rome, contributed greatly, and perhaps, especially in certain periods, principally, to keep Italy in action, to give it the space to practice politics and affairs, to give it material and means to be involved in negotiations, to give it importance and weight, negotiators, diplomats, politicians, men who had an active role in the events and destinies of Europe, whose names went down in history. [3888] Whether in strictly religious matters, which then were closely bound up with political affairs, and were of great temporal importance, or even in matters which were purely political, Italians at that time received from religion great and continuous opportunities, and the need, to act and think. How much politics had to be set in motion by Italians at the Council of Trent and in all the affairs of Lutheranism, Calvinism, etc. Great negotiations and bargaining and maneuvering and great and solemn affairs were then conducted by Italians, or by an Italian Court, such as the Pope’s, and by members who belonged to an Italian court, and among these not a few politicians shone out, etc. Cardinals and nuncios and prelates and bishops, etc., powerful with foreigners, etc. Negotiations, etc., of foreigners with us, who preserved the use and exercise of politics and affairs in our country, etc. etc. This cause of action and some form of life for Italy was not limited in its effects to politics, diplomacy, public affairs. Naturally its effects spread to all parts of civil society. There was a life in Italy. So all parts of the nation and society participated in it, as usually happens. Hence the splendor of the arts, the great building projects, etc., especially in Rome, seat of the most important politics in Italy, etc., the church of St. Peter, the sculptures, paintings, poems, orations, histories, the age of Leo X, industry, commerce, etc. Especially in the 16th century, but afterward as well, up to the revolution, [3889] Rome—by bringing together outstanding minds and setting them in motion, its own, Italian, foreign as well, and by affording material to intellects to develop and the opportunity to those already developed to take part in it and practice their skills, given its position as the seat of important affairs—possessed a spirit of society, and social intercourse, etc., that was steadily decreasing up to the point of extinction, though it did not die out completely until the final years, etc. etc.1 (17 Nov. 1823.)
As I have shown elsewhere [→Z 543ff., 590–91, 3411–12], the only perfect state of a close-knit society is that of perfect unity, that is of absolute monarchy, when the monarch lives and governs and is monarch for the well-being of his subjects, according to the spirit, the rationale, and the essence of true monarchy, and as happened in the beginning. But when the effect of monarchy comes down in sum to this, that only one person in the nation lives, and all the rest only live in one person and for one person, and subjects only serve the well-being of the monarch, instead of the latter serving the former, and that the effect and substance of unity is that the more perfect that unity is, the more life and well-being is confined to only one person, or at least the spirit of that unity and the subject of the national constitution aims in effect to that end, then any other state is certainly better. For without perfect unity, men in a close-knit society cannot truly enjoy perfect [3890] social well-being, nor is the nation capable of perfect life. But it is worse not to live and not to be a nation (and the nation under such a monarchy does not exist) than not to live perfectly and not to be a perfect one. Now, as I have likewise shown elsewhere [→Z 543ff.], it absolutely cannot happen that absolute monarchy does not fall into the state described, nor that it preserve its true state for any intrinsic and essential reason, and by anything other than chance, and chance is very unlikely to occur, while a thousand intrinsic and essential reasons within absolute monarchy in respect to the nature of man are positively opposed to its being preserved, etc. (17 Nov. 1823.)
“Σχεδὸν μὲν οὖν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα δεῖ νομίζειν εὑρῆσθαι πολλάκις ἐν τῷ πολλῷ χρόνῳ, μᾶλλον δὲ ἀπειράκις· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἀναγκαῖα τὴν χρείαν διδάσκειν εἰκὸς αὐτήν, τὰ δὲ εἰς εὐσχημοσύνην καὶ περιουσίαν” (Victorius: splendorem et ubertatem) “ὑπαρχόντων ἤδη τούτων” (scil. τῶν ἀναγκαίων) “εὔλογον λαμβάνειν τὴν αὔξησιν. ῞Ωστε καὶ τὰ περὶ τὰς πολιτείας οἴεσθαι δεῖ ἔχειν τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον. ῞Οτι δὲ πάντα ἀρχαῖα, σημεῖον τὰ περὶ Αἴγυπτον ἐστίν· οὗτοι γὰρ ἀρχαιότατοι μὲν δοκοῦσιν εἷναι, νόμων δὲ τετυχήκασι καὶ τάξεως πολιτικῆς. Διὸ δεῖ τοῖς μὲν εἰρημένοις ἱκανῶς χρῆσθαι, τὰ δὲ παραλελειμμέν�
� πειρᾶσθαι ζητεῖν” [“We may almost take it therefore that all other political devices also have been discovered repeatedly, or rather an infinite number of times over, in the lapse of ages; for the discoveries of a necessary kind are probably taught by need itself, and when the necessaries have been provided it is reasonable that things contributing to refinement and luxury should find their development; so that we must assume that this is the way with political institutions also. The antiquity of all of them is indicated by the history of Egypt; for the Egyptians are reputed to be the oldest of nations, but they have always had laws and a political system. Hence we should use the results of previous discovery when adequate, while endeavoring to investigate matters hitherto passed over”] Aristotle, Politics, bk. 7, Florence 1576, p. 593. (“iis quae tradita sunt ita ut satis esse possint” [“those which have been sufficiently transmitted to us”] Victorius).1 (18 Nov. 1823.)
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