“῞Ωστε καὶ εἰκότως σιγᾷ τὴν πρώτην, καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο φθέγγεται” [“So that rightly he is silent at the beginning, and then afterward exclaims”]. Theon, loc. cit. above, Confirmation 2, p. 164.1 Alla prima, Τὴν πρώτην for da prima, da principio [from before, from the beginning], etc., is used by the same writer as well, Commonplace 1, p. 171.2 See pp. 4211, 4226. (Bologna, 16 Feb. 1826.)
“Οὕτως ἰὼν” (going, proceeding, that is behaving, acting) “σωφρόνως” (wisely, prudently) “ὁ Βασιλεὺς, ὑπερεῖδε τῆς ἱκετηρίας” (ὁ ᾿Αγαμέμνων τοῦ Χρύσου). Ibid., p. 162.3 [“So the king behaving wisely took no notice of that supplication” (Agamemnon, of Chryses)] “Itaque considerate progressus rex, supplicationem illam despexit” (translation by Camerarius). See p. 4464.
For p. 4164, penultimate paragraph. Likewise Commonplace 1, p. 172, line 2.4
Sbadato with its derivatives for che non bada, non suol badare [who does not pay attention, careless]. Accorto, avveduto [shrewd, prudent], malaccorto, malavveduto, inaccorto, etc. Disavveduto [imprudent, incautious]. Saporito per saporoso [tasty].
Mulina [mills], plural. See the Veronese Addenda to the Crusca. Le fata [the fates], le fondamenta [foundations], le pera [pear trees], etc., le prestigia [illusions, magic]. See Monti Proposta, on this word.5 Le uova [eggs].
Κεῖνος φέριστος ὅστις ἀγνοεῖ βροτῶν
῾Ως ἔστιν ἐξαμαρτόντα μὴ δοῦναι δίκην·
Χείριστος δ' ὁ μεγίστην ἐξουσίαν λαβών.
[The best of mortals is the one who does not know
A criminal can escape justice.
The worst is the one who has acquired most power].6
(“Νέωτα δ'οὐδεὶς ὅστις οὐ δοκεῖ βροτῶν” [“There is no one who does not think that the new year…”], Simonides in Stobaeus). (18 Feb. 1826.)7
Positivized diminutives. Chiovo–chiovello with their derivatives, chiavo–chiavello [nail] with their derivatives, chiavare–chiavellare [to nail], etc. Sommeil [sleep], soleil [sun], (somniculus, soliculus), and similar.
Spe-cul-um–spe-gli-o–spe-cchi-o [mirror]. Ventricolo–ventriglio [ventricule–gizzard].
Ratto for rapido [rapid] is the Latin raptus from rapio [to seize quickly] (see these thoughts p. 2789), and means qui rapit [who rapidly hurries off, quickly seizes] in an active or neuter sense, and is a participle used as an adjective.
“Idolum aliquandiu retro” (some time before) “non erat” [“There were no idols some time before”]. Tertullian, De idololatria, ch. 3. See Forcellini, etc. (Bologna 19 Feb., 2nd Sunday in Lent, 1826.)
[4166] Vinco–vinciglio [osier, wicker]. Avvincere–avvinchiare, avvinghiare, avvincigliare [to captivate, to clutch, to grasp].
For p. 4164, last paragraph. “Ελεεῖσθαι ἀξιοῖς παρὰ τούτων οἵ, τὸ σὸν μέρος, οὐκ εἰσί”; [“you think it right that you should be pitied by those, who, because of you, no longer exist?”]1 (no longer exist, that is perished). See p. 4211.
῎Αθλιος means both unhappy, and evil, mentioned elsewhere [→Z 3343].
Not only can we not (So far are we from being able to, etc.) know or conjecture sufficiently about everything that human nature universally, aided by favorable circumstances, is capable of, but even for one individual, past, present, or future, we cannot know exactly nor conjecture fully about the range or scale his faculties might have had or might have in appropriate circumstances. (Bologna, 21 Feb. 1826.)
Αὐτίκα [at once] at the beginning of a sentence, etc., mentioned elsewhere [→Z 2865–66]. Theon the Sophist, loc. cit. above, second comparison, i.e., between Achilles and Diomedes, beginning, p. 204, line 1.2 (Bologna, 22 Feb. 1826.)
Scempio–scempiato [foolish, silly], with its derivatives.
Fugio–fugito [to flee]. See Forcellini.
Positivized Greek diminutives. ἄρνος–ἄρνειον (as in Italian agnello, and agneau [lamb], etc.).
For p. 4164, penultimate paragraph. Likewise in Question p. 221, line 4 at the end and 225, line 3. τὸ γύναιον simply for wife.3
Ventolare active and neuter. Sventolare [to wave, to flutter]. Bezzicare [to peck at, to provoke]. Bazzicare [to frequent].
Altro [other] for alcuno, niuno [any, none]. See Crusca under Fare contrappunto [to set in contrast].
Conto, syncope of cognitus, for conoscente, ammaestrato [learned, instructed], etc. See the Crusca and also acconto [acquainted]. Sparuto [frail] for sparvente because originally it was the opposite of parvente [visible], appariscente, vistoso [gaudy, garish], etc.
Fondamenta [foundations].
Concordato for concorde, or concordante [concordant, harmonious], with its derivatives. Accordato [in tune], discordato, scordato for che scorda, scordante [out of tune, discordant]. See Crusca. Riguardato for che ha riguardo [who takes care, is mindful].
Frettoloso [hasty]. Freddoloso [sensitive to cold]. Meticulosus [meticulous]. Formidolosus [timid]. Fraudulentus. Frauduleux [fraudulent]. Turbulentus [turbulent]. Truculentus [truculent]. Succulentus [succulent].
Tigna, tinea–tignuola [tinea, ringworm]. Aranea–araneola [spider], etc.
For p. 4145, line 1. This is referred to by Lucian, Adversus indoctum plures libros ementem, speaking about a similar purchase, which makes a better comparison to the ones inquiring Englishmen make today.4
[4167] Voveo–votum—Italian votare [to vow]. See Forcellini, Spanish, etc. Transire–transitare [to pass].
Senza altrimenti (that is punto, in niun modo) ordinare sua famiglia [without putting his brethren in any order at all]. Lives of the Fathers in the Veronese Addenda, see In trasatto.
Cutretta–cutrettola [yellow wagtail]. Latin costa and Italian costola [rib]. Ragnolo, ragnuolo [spider].
Indefessus, indefesso, etc., for infaticabile [indefatigable]. See Forcellini as well under indefatigatus, infatigatus, etc. (Bologna, 4 March 1826.) Rilevato, relevé for alto [high, in relief]. Inexhaustus [unexhausted], etc.
For p. 4164, paragraph 9. Likwise étendu in the same sense; disteso, distesamente [extensive, extensively], etc. And see the example of Dante and of Tasso in the Crusca under Dilatato [enlarged].1
Sbevazzare [to drink heavily].
Fare with an accusative of time, for passare, see the Crusca. —The Scholiast to Euripides, Hippolytus, l. 35,2 “ἔθος γὰρ τοῖς ἐφ' αἕματι” (ob caedem patratam) “φεύγουσι” (exulantibus) “ἐνιαυτὸν ποιεῖν ἐκτὸς τῆς πατρίδος” [“it is the custom that those who go into exile for having committed murder remain a year outside their country”]. See p. 4210 end.
Latin and Italian serpere–serpeggiare [to wind, to twist and turn]. Pasteggiare that is far pasti [to dine], etc.
In the De divinatione Cicero quotes Cato who marveled how one haruspex meeting up with another managed not to laugh. Apply this saying to Monarchs and their congresses, especially in recent times.3 (Bologna, 6 March 1826.)
Scappare–scapolare [to escape–to dodge].
Curvatus for curvus [bent over]. Virgil in his description of the turbo, a children’s game.4 See Forcellini.
Many people become insensitive to praise, and yet remain sensitive to criticism and to ridicule, a sensitivity they lose quite late on in life or not at all. And losing the latter rather than the former sensitivity is much harder. Certainly then there is no one who is sensitive to praise, and insensitive to criticism, to censure, to aspersions or calumny, to mockery; whereas there are plenty who are the opposite. For it is true that, even in the purely social sphere, man has a much more fleeting and limited faculty to experience pleasure than to feel displeasure. (Bologna, 9 March 1826.)
[4168] Pece–pegola [pitch], impegolare [to cover with pitch, to get involved with], etc.
Maledetto, esecrato, odiato, abbominato,
abborrito [cursed, abominable, hated], etc., for deserving malediction, etc., or who is usually accursed, etc., and see Forcellini. Conversely amato, desiderato, sospirato [loved, desired, sighed for], etc.
For p. 4137. Man inclines to one principal and single end. Every deliberate choice he makes in theory or practice is directed toward this end. This end is therefore his greatest good. And what is this greatest good? Surely it is happiness. Up to this point all philosophers are in agreement, both ancient and modern. But what is it, and of what does it consist, and what kind of happiness is proper and right for the nature of man, the one he desires greatly and above all else, that in fact is his only desire, that he continually seeks and tries to obtain? Consequently what is the greatest good of man, the end of man? On this point there is no sect, no philosopher, ancient or modern, who does not disagree with the others. Some people are surprised at such disagreement among the philosophers on this point, when there has been so much agreement about the rest. But why be surprised? How do you find out about, how can you determine, what does not exist, what does not have a nature or essence, what is a being of reason? The end of man, the greatest good of man, his happiness, do not exist. And he seeks and will always seek only these things above all else, but he seeks them without knowing what their nature is, what they consist of, nor will he ever know, because in fact these things do not actually exist, although because of the nature of man they are the necessary end of man. There we have the famous controversies about the greatest good explained. The greatest good is wanted, desired, and sought out of necessity by man, always and to the greatest degree, and as the only end; but in wanting it, seeking it, and desiring it, he has never known nor will he ever know what it is (the controversies mentioned above are themselves the proof of this); and that is because his greatest good does not exist in any form at all. The end of the nature of man will perhaps exist in nature herself. But we need to distinguish that from the end that the nature of man [4169] makes him seek. This end does not exist in nature, and cannot exist by its very nature. And this discourse must be extended to include the greatest good of all animals and living beings. (11 March, Vigil of Passion Sunday, 1826, Bologna.)
Man (and likewise the other animals) is not born to enjoy life, but only to perpetuate life, to communicate it to others who come after him, in order to preserve it. Neither he himself, nor life, nor anything in this world is properly for him, on the contrary his entire being is for life. —A terrifying, but a true proposition and conclusion of all metaphysics. Existence is not for the existent being, does not have for its end the existent being, nor the good of the existent being; if there is any experience of good, that is purely by chance: the existent being is for existence, entirely for existence, this is its only real end. Existent beings exist so that existence exists, the individual existent being is born and exists so that existence continues and so that existence may be preserved through him and after him. All this is clear from seeing that the true and only end of nature is the preservation of the species, and not the preservation or the happiness of individuals; which happiness does not even exist at all in the world, not for individuals nor for the species. On the basis of this we have necessarily to arrive finally at the general, summary, supreme, and terrible conclusion mentioned above.1 (Bologna, 11 March 1826.)
Negletto, contemptus (see Phaedrus, the fable “Calvus et musca”),2 spregiato, dispregiato, or disprezzato, etc. etc., for dispregevole [contemptible]. Implacato for implacabile [implacable]. See Forcellini, etc. Provvisto for che provvede or ha provveduto [who provides or has provided], mentioned elsewhere [→Z 4126]. See Monti Proposta, under provvisto,3 where in the 2nd example you find avvisato too with a similar sense.
Puretto positivized diminutive, adjective for puro, like pretto [pure]. See Crusca.
[4170] Inconcusso for inconcutibile [indestructible]. See Forcellini, etc. Inaccessus, inaccesso, etc., for inaccessibile [inaccessible]. Rampare; root of rampicare [to climb], mentioned elsewhere [→Z 4004]. See Monti Proposta,1 entry rampare. Fastello, affastellare [bundle, to bundle up], etc., lexicalized diminutives from fascio for peso [weight]. Cespo–cespuglio [tuft–bush]. Vituperato for vituperoso [shameful], etc., or degno di vitupero, di esser vituperato, vituperevole [deserving of shame, of being shamed, shameful], etc. See the Crusca not only in § 2 but in all the other examples.
Poco restò for poco mancò or manca [nearly], etc. See Monti, Proposta, under Restare [to remain].2
Πῖλος–πιλίον [wool], σάνδαλον–σανδάλιον [sandal], τρίβων–τριβώνιον [thin cloak], ὅρκος–ὅρκιον [oath].
Corona–corolla [garland], Latin diminutive as from asiNus, aseLLus [donkey], etc.
Abbreviato for breve [short].
Febbricare or febricare for febricitare [to have a fever]. See Crusca under febbricare, febbricante, febricante. It seems to be the root of febricito. See Forcellini. Erpicare for inerpicare or inarpicare [to climb]. Crusca.
Per poco è or fu, etc., che non [it won’t, wouldn’t take much]. See Dante, Inferno, canto 30.3
Rocco–Rocchetto [Crozier–Rochet]. See Monti, Proposta, entry Rocco.4 Pelliccia from pellicula for pelle [skin, pelt] of animals, etc. See the French, Spanish, etc. Benda–bandeau [headband, bandage]. Floccus–flocon [flake]. Linon [lawn, linen].
Infamato for infame [infamous]. Crusca Incolpato for incolpabile or for colpevole [blameworthy, guilty], etc. See Crusca and Monti, Proposta, entry Incolpato, and in the Biblioteca Italiana “Dialogo di Matteo, Taddeo, etc.”,5 etc. Temuto, formidatus, paventato, etc., for formidabile, [fearsome] especially in poetry.
σωμάτιον for σῶμα [body] Athenaeus, bk. 4, p. 178e, ed. Commelinus 1598.
Praetexo, praetextum–prétexter [to give as pretext or excuse]. Eximo, exemptum–exempter [to exempt from].
For p. 4145, line 4. *“‘Indeed there were artificial dogs placed at the doors; like those which Vulcan had fashioned from gold and silver,’ Odyssey 7, 93: ‘Δῶμα φυλασσέμεναι μεγαλήτορος ᾿Αλκινόοιο’ ‘Domum ut custodirent magnanimi Alcinoi’ [‘to keep watch over the palace of great-hearted Alcinous’]. Which Petronius Arbiter tells us had been a custom also among the Romans, ch. 29, p. 104, ed. Burmann: ‘Non longe,’ inquit, ‘ab ostiarii cella canis ingens catena vinctus in pariete erat pictus, superque quadrata litera scriptum: Cave, Cave Canem’ [‘Not far,’ he says, ‘from the porter’s lodge there was a picture on the wall of a huge dog collared and chained, and above him written in capital letters: Beware, Beware of the Dog’].”* Feith, Antiquitatum Homericarum bk. 3, ch. 11, § 2.6 A custom preserved in the modern world. See p. 4364. (20 March, Monday in Holy Week, Bologna 1826.)
Rinegato, renegado, etc., for che ha rinegato [who has repudiated]. Homme déterminé [determined, resolute]. Pensées, or idées suivies, for qui se suivent, conséquentes, conseguenti le une dalle altre [which follow on one from the other, consequent, all of them consequent]. [4171] Raisonnement suivi [logical argument], etc.
Modern civilization must not be considered simply as a continuation of ancient civilization, as its progression. This is how both writers and men generally regard it, and from that point of view it follows they consider the most flourishing periods of Athenian and Roman civilization as incomplete, and in every respect inferior to our own. But whatever the filiation historically speaking between modern and ancient civilization, and the influence that the latter has on the former, especially at its birth and in its early development, logically speaking, these two civilizations, which are essentially different, are and must be considered as two separate civilizations, or rather two different and distinct species of civilization, each actually complete in itself. From this point of view, the parallel between them becomes extremely useful and interesting. And as a matter of fact just as men and nations are capable of being in a state of savagery, of barbarism, of civilization, which are distinct kinds of state, so they are capable of distinct species of civilization that
differ not only because of simple nuances, like those now distinguishing the cultured nations, but because of the special, essential characteristics they have, determined by circumstances, and often and in large measure by chance. And it is almost impossible, as it is to find two faces perfectly the same, although all are born in the same way, to find in any two peoples (or in any two periods of time) without a highly intimate relation between them, the same civilization, and not two [4172] distinct species. —I mean by ancient civilization, and as the term of comparison with the modern, the civilization of the Greeks and the Romans, and of the ancient peoples governed and civilized by them, or whom they brought to adopt their customs. —This can serve as preliminary to a “Comparison between the ancients and moderns.”1 (Bologna, Tuesday in Holy Week, 1826, 21 March.)
Mando, mansum–mansare corrupted to become mangiare, manger, manjar [to eat]. See Forcellini and Glossary. Manducare (which we also said as manicare, as it were mandicare) seems to be a frequentative of mandere, like fodicare of fodere [to dig], etc. I think though that the u of manduco is long. Moreover there is the exchange between the u and i, mentioned elsewhere [→Z 3006–3007].
Colpire–colpeggiare [to hit].
“En métaphysique, en morale, les anciens ont tout dit. Nous nous rencontrons avec eux, ou nous les répétons. Tous les livres modernes de ce genre ne sont que des redites” [“In metaphysics, in moral philosophy, the ancients have said everything. We concur with them, or we repeat what they say. All modern books in these subjects are only replicates”]. Voltaire, Dictionnaire philosophique, art. “Emblème.”2 (Bologna, Holy Thursday, 1826, 23 March.)
Eruca–ruchetta, roquette [rocket], etc. Falco–faucon, falcone [falcon], etc. Nepita or nepeta, Latin, nepitella, nipitella [Italian catnip].
Entortiller [to wrap, to twist]. Naziller [to nasalize]. Bouillir–bouillonner [to boil].
Maereo or moereo [to mourn, to grieve]–moestus or maestus for maerens [grieving].
Attorcere–attorcigliare, attortigliare [to twist], intorticciato. Squartare–écarteler [to quarter, to cut up].
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