The organization refers to itself twice as Jemaah Islamiyah. The government correctly translates this to mean “the Islamic group,” but apparently without recognizing that Jemaah Islamiyah is the name of an Egyptian terrorist organization. Jemaah has been in operation since the 1970s and is the largest militant Islamist group in Egypt. It is a radical offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood, with its spiritual leader, Omar Abdel-Rahman, known in the United States as “the blind sheikh.” Rahman is currently serving a life sentence in an American prison following his conviction on conspiracy charges involving terrorist plotting.
There is additional evidence suggesting the manual may be connected to Jemaah. The assassination of El-Mahgoub, which is the one described in the greatest detail, was linked to followers of Rahman. That would help to explain how the writers of the manual knew so much about that attack.
But there is another step to this identification. While the writers may be part of Jemaah, that organization worked with another terrorist group, Egyptian Islamic Jihad, run by Zawahiri. In 1991, Zawahiri took control of EIJ, and the organization lost many of its direct connections with other terrorist groups. The date, of course, closely coincides with the writing of the manual, and may have been produced as part of Zawahiri’s new leadership.
This does not, however, link the manual to al-Qaeda. Once again, Zawahiri and bin Laden were heading in different directions at that time, and the document is focused on the government of Egypt, not something of particular interest to the al-Qaeda leader. Al-Qaeda began to significantly finance EIJ only in 1998, and only then did Egyptians begin to play a large role in the planning of attacks.
This is not, of course, a Sherlock Holmes mystery; whether the document was written by Jemaah, EIJ, or some other group, the significant point is that it could not have been an al-Qaeda manual. Beyond all of the factual issues, there is also the problem that the manual is amateurish. Again, contrary to the representations of various governments, there is virtually nothing in its pages that isn’t basic. Don’t set up training near a police station, hold a gun like this, rent ground-floor apartments to allow for easy escape—these are hardly the musings of a terrorist mastermind.
This analysis establishes four facts: that the Manchester Manual is not an al-Qaeda document, that it was written in the early 1990s, that the authors were part of a jihadist group looking to overthrow the government of Egypt, and that the goal was divergent from the aspirations of bin Laden at that time. Only by recognizing those points can the failures of the American and British governments in dealing with this document become clear.
Because this manual was written at a different time by a different group with different goals than Western officials believed, American and British policies were driven by a fiction. Challenges that did not exist were reviewed and countered with policies that were not necessary. False arguments were offered up to address criticisms. It was as if the Pittsburgh Steelers prepared for a game against the Dallas Cowboys by reviewing the playbook from Tuscaloosa High School; the meanings and threats were all misunderstood.
The majority of the problem came from the sections of the manual about interrogation, resistance, and responses. As the governments have said, the document does provide information about each of those areas. One of the points most often repeated by the Americans and the British is that the manual says Islamists who have been arrested should falsely proclaim in court that they had been tortured.
It says no such thing.
The interrogation section is not suggesting that captured members of the group make false allegations of torture, or employ general resistance measures—it is examining torture and resistance in Egypt. It is written by Islamists who, the writing shows, have been exposed to the torture inflicted universally by Egyptian security officers on suspected Muslim terrorists.
Again, this is made clear simply by reading the document. As mentioned above, in the interrogation and investigation section, it is discussing the “Ministry of Interior Affairs” in “our country.” That is not some general reference to law enforcement and intelligence groups around the world.
It lists the forms of torture to expect: hanging by feet, beating with thick wires, pulling out nails, shocking with electric current, burning with fire, hitting the genitals, dragging over barbed wire, and eighteen other tactics. These are all cited by human rights groups as the tactics used by Egypt. Nothing like the torture of the Egyptians was ever inflicted by the Americans and the British.
The document provides specific examples of Islamists who were tortured—of course, all of them Egyptians (it does cite a book by an Iranian torture victim and instructs the members of the group to read it). And, as mentioned above, it provides a step-by-step description of the arrest and interrogation process, including an explanation of where torture would take place and when.
Eventually, if there are criminal charges brought, the suspect would be taken to court. And it is there that he is supposed to make his first public proclamation of having been tortured. “At the beginning of the trial . . . the brothers must insist on proving that torture was inflicted on them by State Security (investigators) to the judge . . . complain to the court of mistreatment in prison . . . the brother has to do his best to know the names of the state security officers who participated in the torture and mention their names to the judge . . . during the trial, the court has to be notified of any mistreatment of the brothers inside the prison. . . .”
This is not some arbitrary instruction intended to make the Egyptians squirm from false accusations; it is the best way to make the torture stop. Regardless of what investigators do, Egyptian courts are not tolerant of torture. Indeed, after the Islamists made repeated and vocal accusations of abuse to the court in the case arising from the assassination of El-Mahgoub, the court investigated and concluded that the men had been tortured. As a result, their confessions were tossed out as unreliable. So, by complaining of the torture to the courts, a detainee in Egypt is acting in the way most likely to make it stop. That is all the section on making public accusations of torture is about. That has nothing to do with the American and British interpretation about making false accusations, which simply does not match the text of the document.
In the end, the evidence is overwhelming that the Manchester Manual is not an al-Qaeda document and that its contents have been misinterpreted—or misrepresented—by Western officials. Moreover, while the document was found in the computer of a man associated with al-Qaeda, his strongest connection was to a Libyan terrorist group that, unlike al-Qaeda, is primarily focused on overthrowing that country’s government. Unfortunately, the American and British governments fell into a common trap—assuming that all terrorists are al-Qaeda, when, at least at the time when the Manchester Manual was written, they were competitors for money, attention, and followers.
196–197: Some details of the White House meeting to discuss possible detention facilities from contemporaneous notes taken by one of the participants.
197: History of Guantanamo from Rear Admiral M. E. Murphy, The History of Guantanamo Bay, 1494–1964, an official government record written for the Department of the Navy and originally published in January 5, 1953. Also see Robert D. Heinl Jr., “How We Got Guantanamo,” American Heritage Magazine, February 1962. Also see Admiral George Dewey, “Our Navy for a Greater Navy,” Our Navy: The Standard Magazine for the U.S. Navy, May 1913.
197: Some details of the contractor’s experiences from his testimony of February 15, 2009, for the Center for the Study of Human Rights in the Americas.
BOOK TWO
Chapter 7
201–202: Some details of Blair’s trip to meet Karzai from the Campbell diaries and from photographs of the event.
201: Details of the background and evolution of Hamid Karzai from the Combined Arms Center Report. Also see Nick B. Mills, Karzai: The Failing American Intervention and the Struggle for Afghanistan, Wiley, 2007.
203–204: Some details of the problems with intellige
nce distribution after 9/11 from an October 12, 2008, sworn declaration by Arthur Brown, former national intelligence officer for East Asia at the CIA, filed in Federal District Court in Washington, D.C., in the case of Boumediene v. Bush.
204–206: Some details of the January 8 meeting between Behmen and the Americans from sworn declarations of September 22, 2008, by the prime minister; Zlatko Lagumdžija, at the time the foreign minister and chairman of the Council of Ministers for Bosnia-Herzegovina; as well as the September 15, 2008, declaration of Wolfgang Petritsch, then the high representative of the European Union for Bosnia-Herzegovina. Petritsch is a member of the Austrian government, and subsequent to these events served as Austria’s ambassador and permanent representative to the United Nations in Geneva. For background, see the Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly Report, “Lawfulness of Detentions by the United States in Guantanamo Bay,” April 8, 2005; and United Nations Human Rights Council, “Joint Study on Global Practices in Relation to Secret Detention,” advance unedited version, January 26, 2010 (U.N. Detention Report).
207–209: Some details of the FBI interrogation of al-Libi from Mayer, The Dark Side; Jason Vest, “Pray and Tell,” American Prospect, June 19, 2005; “Off the Record: U.S. Responsibility for Enforced Disappearances in the ‘War on Terror,’ ” a briefing paper published on June 6, 2007, and based on research conducted by Amnesty International; Cageprisoners; the Center for Constitutional Rights; the Center for Human Rights and Global Justice at NYU School of Law; Human Rights Watch; and Reprieve. Also see Open Society Foundations, “Confinement Conditions at a U.S. Screening Facility on Bagram Air Base,” Policy Brief No. 3, October 14, 2010.
209–210: The arrival of the detainees was described in fascinating detail by Sue Anne Pressley, “Detainees Arrive in Cuba amid Tight Security,” Washington Post, January 12, 2002. Also see Katharine Q. Seelye, “First ‘Unlawful Combatants’ Seized in Afghanistan Arrive at U.S. Base in Cuba,” New York Times, January 12, 2002; and Agence France Presse, “Bound and Shackled Prisoners Unloaded at US Navy Base,” January 11, 2002. Additional facts from Walter J. Boyne, Beyond the Wild Blue: A History of the U.S. Air Force, 1947–2007, Thomas Dunne Books. 2007.
211: Details of 374’s condition from his medical records, entry dated January 12, 2002.
213: Details of the Circle Bar from direct observation. Also see Scott Aiges, “Circle Bar a Hangout for the Cool, the Hip and the Happening,” Times-Picayune, April 7, 2000.
213–215: Some details of the debate over the draft Yoo-Delahunty memo from “Status of Legal Discussions re: Application of Geneva Convention to Taliban and al Qaeda,” an undated and unsigned White House memo. Also see Tim Golden, “After Terror, a Secret Rewriting of Military Law,” New York Times, October 24, 2004.
215–216: The description of the Sarajevo central prison from direct observation. Some details of the events there from the Behmen sworn statement. Also see the May 6, 2008, testimony of Stephen H. Oleskey of Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr, “City on a Hill or Prison on the Bay?” hearings before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight.
216: Decision of Bosnian court from Decision, Municipal Court in Zenica, Kv9-2002, January 16, 2002. Also see Rjsenje, “U Istraznom Premeto Protiv Belcasem Bansayah i. dr.,” Vrhovni Sud Federacija Bosne i Hercegovine, Ki-101/01, 17.01.2002 (translation: Decision, “In the Investigation Case Against Belcasem Bansayah et al.,” Supreme Court of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ki-101/01, January 1, 2002).
216: Some details of the Algerian Six’s trip to Guantanamo from Oleskey testimony of May 6, 2008.
217: Some details about Gonzales’s briefing of Bush and his decision from Alberto R. Gonzales, Memorandum for the President (draft), “Decision re: Application of the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War to the Conflict with al Qaeda and the Taliban,” January 25, 2002. Also see James P. Pfiffner, “Policy Making in the Bush White House,” Issues in Governance Studies, Governance Studies at Brookings, October 2008.
217: Descriptions of the Common Article Three from Ray Murphy, “Prisoner of War Status and the Question of Guantanamo Detainees,” Human Rights Law Review 3:2 (2003).
217–218: Details of the Rumsfeld memo and subsequent electronic communication from the original documents.
218–219: Some details of the CIA’s interview of al-Libi from CIA operational cables dated February 4, February 5, and February 19, 2004; the Senate Postwar Report on Iraq; and the Senate Prewar Report on Iraq.
219: Details of the CIA files on Egypt were shared with the author.
220–221: Some details of the operations of Guantanamo from “Review of Department Compliance with President’s Executive Order on Detainee Conditions of Confinement,” an undated Department of Defense report (DOD Guantanamo Report).
221–222: Some details of the events leading to the pursuit of Sufaat from Detainee Assessment, Jamal Muhammad Alawi. Also see CIA Directorate of Intelligence, “Khalid Sheikh Mohammed: Preeminent Source on al Qaeda,” July 13, 2004.
222–224: Some details about the interviews with Mazigh, and the subsequent call from Arar and Edelman, from a transit slip written by Buffam on January 5, 2003, and headed “Time Line Regarding Conversations with Maher Arar.” Also see Royal Canadian Mounted Police Task Detail Report, Task ID 260, dated November 6, 2003, and headed “Re: Maher Arar”; and “Time Line—Maher ARAR, Project A-O Canada,” March October 27, 2003. That is an official document that was prepared by the RCMP. Also see the Arar Report.
224–225: Details of the Yoo memorandum from the original document. Some details of the draft Gonzales memorandum from the original document.
225–227: Some details of Powell’s reactions and his objections from the original memo of his comments on the Gonzales memo. Details of his letter from the original document. Also see William H. Taft IV, Memorandum to the Counsel to the President, “Subject: Comments on Your Paper on the Geneva Convention,” February 2, 2002.
227: For the news article read by Gonzales see Rowan Scarborough, “Powell Wants Detainees to Be Declared POWs; Memo Shows Differences with White House,” Washington Times, January 26, 2002.
227–228: Some details of El-Maati’s experiences in Egypt from the Iacobucci Report and United Nations Human Rights Council, “Joint Study on Global Practices in Relation to Secret Detention,” Advance Unedited Version, January 26, 2010 (U.N. Detention Report).
228: Some details of the Ivins interview on January 29, 2002, from the FBI 302 of that date for case no. 279A-WF-222936. Also see the 302 from the April 24, 2002, and April 25, 2002, interviews of Ivins for the same case.
228–229: Details of the State of the Union address from a video recording of the event.
229–230: A few details of the meeting about the Geneva Conventions from contemporaneous notes taken by a participant. The notes were only summarized to the author. Other details from participants in the meetings.
230: Details of the Ashcroft letter from the original document.
230–231: Information from the e-mail alerting the FBI to Ivins from the original document. Some details of the FBI’s reaction, and its opinion of Ivins, from the Anthrax Panel Report.
231: Details of the request from the American Society of Microbiology from the original e-mail.
232: The quotes of Bush’s order from the original document. As mentioned, these events are often depicted as a defeat for Powell; they were not. Most of those assertions are made in reference to the draft of the Gonzales memo, which was revised before going to the president. Powell also never told Bush that the Geneva Conventions should apply to al-Qaeda, or needed to be applied on a blanket basis to the Taliban. The results described in the narrative are what he was seeking. This was also confirmed by Jack Goldsmith, a subsequent head of the Office of Legal Counsel, in his book The Terror Presidency, W. W. Norton, 2007.
232–233: Ivins’s manipulation of the sample submissions from the Ant
hrax Panel Report, the Amerithrax Report, and the first Arredondo affidavit. Also see FBI Electronic Communication from Washington Field Amerithrax 3, “Title: Amerithrax; Major Case 184,” June 27, 2005.
233: Some details of the information provided by al-Libi from a CIA report, “Iraqi Support for Terrorism,” January 29, 2003; another report of the same title, dated September 2002; a CIA report headed “Iraq and al-Qa’ida: Interpreting a Murky Relationship,” June 21, 2003; a partially declassified report to the intelligence community from the Defense Intelligence Agency issued as DITSUM #044-02; DIA Special Analysis, February 28, 2002; the Senate Postwar Report on Iraq; CIA operational cables dated February 4, February 5, and February 19, 2004; and a May 24, 2007, letter from Edward J. Markey, William D. Delahunt, and Jerrold Nadler to President George Bush.
Chapter 8
235–236: Details of the Rasul v. Bush filing from the original document.
236: Details of the press conference from a transcript prepared by FDCH Political Transcripts, “News Conference Announcing the Filing of Petition of Habeas Corpus on Behalf of Detainees at Camp X-Ray,” February 19, 2002. Other details of the press conference from the broadcast of Channel 10 (Australia) Late News, February 20, 2002.
237: The man whose voice mail is quoted left virtually identical messages to habeas lawyers around the country, some of which were retained. His message was almost uniformly the same.
237–238: Some details of the meeting between Dunlavey and Rumsfeld from “Summarized Witness Statement of MG (Retired) Mike Dunlavey” (Dunlavey statement) prepared by Lieutenant General Randall M. Schmidt, the AR 15-6 investigating officer for what became the Schmidt-Furlow Report of April 1, 2005. The Dunlavey statement was exhibit 12 of seventy-six attached exhibits. Some details of Dunlavey’s background from DOD press release no. 673-97, “Maj. Gen. Michael E. Dunlavey Appointed to Reserve Forces Policy Board,” December 11, 1997. Also see the sworn August 24, 2005, testimony of Lieutenant General Randall Mark Schmidt, taken as part of an inquiry by the investigations division of the Army Inspector General’s Office (the Schmidt testimony).
500 Days: Secrets and Lies in the Terror Wars Page 72
