crucial success from the perspective of the Nazi regime: it had been possible to
treat Jews publicly as non-persons who could be robbed, mistreated, and killed.
The pogrom made it clear to everyone that the total exclusion of the Jews from
German society had been completed; they had been condemned to a shadowy
existence.
This ‘social death’ of the Jews still living in Germany, decreed by the regime,
was the essential element in the organization of the public that the Nazi
government associated with the third wave of anti-Semitism in 1938. The ‘Jewish
question’ within Germany, raised repeatedly by the Nazi regime since 1933, was
now declared to have been largely ‘solved’; after almost six years of radical anti-
Semitic policies, the Jews living in Germany had essentially played their part as
dangerous aliens to its conclusion. Disregard and contempt for the Jews still
living in Germany, indifference to their further fate was now the attitude that
propaganda prescribed for the population. With the worsening of the inter-
national situation and the approaching war, the ‘Jewish question’ had to be
raised onto the international stage, the Jewish ‘enemy’ had to be presented as the
potential enemy in the capital cities of potential opponents. A Volksgemeinschaft
under National Socialist rule battling against the ‘Jewish global enemy’—that
was how one might describe the new arrangement that the Nazi regime, in the
phase of transition to war, presented as a leitmotif for the treatment of the
‘Jewish question’.
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Racial Persecution, 1933–1939
Judenpolitik between the Pogrom and the Start of the War
Discussions of the Party and State Leaderships Concerning
Further Anti-Jewish Measures
In the weeks that followed the pogrom, a series of major conferences of leading
representatives of the Nazi state were held to discuss further steps in Judenpolitik. So
far researchers have reconstructed the sessions chaired by Goering on 12 November
and 6 December, and the discussion on 16 December, chaired by Frick. At the centre
of these debates was the problem, and the solution of that problem: how the planned
complete exclusion of the Jews from German society could be harmonized with the
goal of forced emigration.
On 12 November, two days after the official announcement of the end of the
pogrom, more than a hundred representatives of a great variety of state and Party
offices met to discuss further developments in Judenpolitik. 85 At this meeting leading representatives of the regime made a series of remarkable declarations on
the ‘Jewish question’, which should be quoted here in some detail.
Goering introduced the session by first referring to the ministerial meeting of
28 April at which the ‘Aryanization question’ had been discussed, and finally
considered the June events in Berlin, the ‘dry run’ for Reichskristallnacht: ‘In the
meeting at which we first discussed this question and made the decision to
Aryanize the German economy, take the Jews out of the economy, put them
into the debt register and pension them of, alas we only made very fine plans,
which were then only pursued very slowly. Then we had a demonstration here in
Berlin. Then the people were told: something decisive is going to happen. But
again nothing happened. Now we have had this thing in Paris. After it came more
demonstrations, and now something must happen!’
But, Goering went on, ‘I have had enough of these demonstrations. They
damage not the Jews, but ultimately me, since I am finally responsible for the
economy.’
As for ‘Aryanization’, Goering elaborated, the ‘basic idea’ was this: ‘The Jew is
excluded from the economy and signs over his business to the state. He receives
compensation for it. This compensation is recorded in the debt register and
interest is paid at a particular percentage. That is what he has to live on.’
After Goering had explained further details of the Aryanization process, Heydrich
provided a survey of the destruction caused: 101 synagogues were destroyed by fire, 86
76 demolished; 7,500 shops were demolished. Thirty-five deaths, he later added to
the debate, were to be recorded.
In the subsequent discussion, Goebbels made further suggestions: they con-
cerned the prohibition on visiting theatres, cinemas, circuses etc.; 87 the Reich Deprivation of Rights and Forced Emigration, late 1937–9
115
railways were to install special compartments for Jews; Jewish pupils were to be
removed from general schools. Goebbels also demanded a decree ‘that Jews should
be forbidden to visit German swimming pools, beach pools, and German sana-
toriums’. They should ‘consider whether it might not be necessary to forbid Jews
entering German forests. Today Jews are running in packs around the Grunewald
[in Berlin]. That’s a constant provocation, there are constant incidents . . . And
then that the Jews can’t sit around in German parks.’
Finally Heydrich brought the discussion back to the ‘basic problem’, the
question of ‘getting the Jews to leave Germany’. Heydrich referred in detail to
the experiences they had had with the ‘Jewish Emigration Centre’ in Vienna, and
suggested the creation of a similar institution for the whole of the Reich. Goering
agreed with this suggestion.
Next Heydrich suggested an ‘Emigration operation for the Jews in the rest of
the Reich’, which should stretch over ‘at least 8–10 years’. In this period one of the
chief problems was the ‘proletarianization of the remaining Jews’, which was
already under way; the Jews should be allowed to practise certain occupations.
To be able to keep an eye on the Jews still remaining in Germany, according to
Heydrich, they should be identified by a badge. (‘A uniform’, Goering added.) On
the other hand, Heydrich considered unrealistic Goering’s suggestion of ghetto-
izing the Jews: the ‘control of the Jews by the watchful eye of the population as a
whole’ was the better way.
The fact that the suggestion of large-scale emigration of the German Jews was
generally positively received at the meeting was the crucial step for Heydrich and
the SD to assume the leading role in future Judenpolitik. The development by the
‘Jewish department’ of a comprehensive plan of expulsion secured in terms of
both domestic and foreign policy now had the chance of being declared the
official policy of the ‘Third Reich’. In contrast it became apparent that Goebbels
still clung to the concept of total segregation for the Jewish minority, without his
being able to integrate this within an overall plan for a ‘solution’ of the ‘Jewish
question’.
Finally Goering made the following fundamental statement about the future of
Judenpolitik: ‘If, in the near future, the German Reich should come into conflict with
foreign powers, it goes without saying that we in Germany should first of all let it
come to a showdown with the Jews. Besides that, the Führer will now take the
initiative with those foreign powers which have brought the Jewish question up, in
order to deal with the Madagascar project. He explained it all
to me on 9 November.
There is no other way. He will say to the other countries, “Why are you always talking
about the Jews?—Take them!” ’
Just four weeks after this remarkable meeting, on 6 December Goering held a
further major discussion with the Gauleiters, Reich Governors, and Oberpräsi-
denten, in which he set out the latest guidelines on Judenpolitik that ‘the Führer’
had explained to him in a conversation a few days before. 88
116
Racial Persecution, 1933–1939
At the meeting Goering particularly stressed Hitler’s decision ‘that all decrees to
be passed on the “Jewish question” are to be examined by me’. However, Hitler did
not want Goering’s new role to be publicly revealed, since ‘in my present position I
would be too compromised both at home and abroad’. Elsewhere he stressed that
he actually wanted ‘nothing to do with the whole Jewish question. But then of
course I don’t know how I am to keep my Four-Year Plan, the German economy,
in order.’
The most important aspect of the further development of Judenpolitik lay in
‘vigorously forcing emigration’. Goering discussed the plans pursued by Austrian
Economics Minister Fischböck and Schacht to make emigration possible through
international loans and a large-scale basic agreement, and analysed individual
aspects of the plan, which had already been authorized by Hitler.
The ‘Aryanization’ of Jewish property was to take place gradually and in a
controlled form. Goering expressly warned against a complete expropriation of
German Jews, since, in the event of renewed reprisals, the regime would then be
forced to go beyond economic measures: ‘If—God forbid—any of you or another
prominent man were got at by the Jew, the Jew knows that things would come
thundering down on him in quite a different way. Then if he has no more goods to
lose, he knows how he can be got at.’
Goering went on to reveal a series of concrete decisions made by Hitler with
regard to Judenpolitik. According to these, Jews were not to be labelled; 89 no prohibitions were to be introduced for selling to Jews; a Judenbann (ban on entry
by Jews) could be introduced in particular localities. On the ghetto question
Goering commented in general terms that ‘the Jews would somehow finally be
brought together in certain residential districts’.
Goering then revealed his intention of continuing to treat at least some of the
German Jews as hostages: ‘Of course we will retain a certain category of Jews.
Certain Jews, whom I could very easily allow to emigrate, I will not allow to do so
because I need them as guarantees that the other tribe outside will also contribute
for Jews without means.’
Finally Goering discussed the question of the employment of Jews; it could
occur in closed ‘worker formations’ or, within production facilities, in closed-off
areas.
Ten days after this conference, on 16 December 1938, another major discus-
sion of the ‘Jewish question’ took place, in which several Reich Ministers
participated, among them Heydrich and a large number of Gauleiters and
heads of the Prussian provincial administration. 90 On this occasion Wilhelm Frick, the Minister of the Interior, clearly distanced himself from the events of
9/10 November, which he described as ‘nonsense’, ‘indeed madness’. The
whole action had ‘only one positive consequence’, namely that the impetus
of the Jews to leave Germany had now become so great that ‘it is to be hoped
that in a few years we will be freed from them’.
Deprivation of Rights and Forced Emigration, late 1937–9
117
Frick went on to discuss Schacht’s emigration project, already mentioned by
Goering, and made a series of statements concerning the next imminent steps in
Judenpolitik. In the foreground were the problems that had, at the two Goering
conferences, emerged as the chief problems of future Judenpolitik: comprehensive
emigration, the conclusion of ‘Aryanization’, the questions of employment, and
accommodation. 91
Legislation after the Pogrom
As early as 12 November 1938, the day when Goering held his first conference on
the future of Judenpolitik, the first concrete legal and administrative measures had
been set in motion. These measures primarily concerned ‘Aryanization’. Jews were
prohibited from working in retail or business enterprises, and forbidden to offer
goods or services at fairs and so on. A Jew could no longer run a business; where
Jews occupied posts as managerial employees, they could be summarily dis-
missed. 92 The Decree to Restore the Appearance of the Streets as affecting Jewish Businesses decreed that Jewish shop- and home-owners were obliged immediately
to remove all damage caused in connection with the pogrom. All insurance claims
by Jews of German nationality were to be confiscated for the benefit of the Reich. 93
A further act of 12 November imposed an ‘atonement payment’ of one billion
Reichmarks upon Jews with German citizenship. 94 The businesses of domestic and stateless Jews had to be closed immediately, while foreign Jews were granted a
deadline of the end of the year. 95
A decree of 3 December 1938 ordered the compulsory ‘Aryanization’ of still
existing Jewish businesses by officially appointed trustees. Cash, securities, and
jewellery could no longer be freely sold, but had to be offered to public purchasing
offices; securities were to be put in depositories in foreign exchange licensed
banks. 96
In addition, during the weeks after the pogrom, a whole series of further
discriminatory anti-Jewish regulations was introduced:97 on 15 November 1938
the Reich Education Minister ruled that ‘all remaining Jewish pupils in German
schools be dismissed immediately’; 98 with the law of 8 December Jewish academics were forbidden to do private work in libraries and universities; 99 Jews were prohibited from owning any weapons; 100 they were excluded from any kind of cultural events; 101 they were no longer permitted to drive motor vehicles. 102 A police ordinance of 28 November empowered the authorities to impose spatial and
temporal residential restrictions upon the Jews. 103 This provided a major precondition for the implementation of the ‘ghettoization’ of the German Jews, the details
of which were still unclear. This new instrument was immediately applied: the chief
of the Security Police determined that Jews were to stay in their homes from
midday until 8.00 p.m. on ‘days of national solidarity’. 104 A fundamental 118
Racial Persecution, 1933–1939
edict issued by the President of the Reich Labour Exchange introduced a duty of
labour for ‘all unemployed Jews who are fit for work’. 105
On 28 December, after a conversation with Hitler, Goering announced the
authoritative ‘expression of the Führer’s will’ concerning further measures in
Judenpolitik. 106 In accordance with this catalogue, which was less severe than the far more radical plans discussed by Heydrich, Goebbels, and Goering after the
November pogrom, and which was aimed primarily at the restriction of the
mobility of the Jews, a further wave of discriminatory regulations was passed by
the ministerial bureaucracy over the ensuing weeks and months: Jews were
forbidden to use sleeping and dining cars, 107 rent protection for Jews was largely abolished. 108 Extensive restrictions, as decreed by Hitler, were imposed upon stays by Jews in spas and health resorts. 109
In the first months of 1939, these were joined by further anti-Jewish measures
that had not been contained in Hitler’s late-December catalogue. Thus, in
January and February 1939 various measures were introduced to force the
Jews to hand over to state offices jewellery, precious metals, and other valuable
objects. 110 In March 1939 Jews were definitively excluded from military and labour service. 111
If we consider the anti-Jewish measures passed in the first few months after the
November pogrom against the background of the steps discussed in the three
great meetings on 12 November, 6 and 12 December, it becomes apparent that the
five major problem areas discussed there—emigration, ‘Aryanization’, labelling,
ghettoizing, employment—were addressed at different tempos. While the further
intensification of the expulsion of the Jews—which was seen as the decisive
beginning of the solution—depended on the international negotiations under-
taken by Schacht, ‘Aryanization’ was pursued with the greatest vigour, spatial
concentration began relatively slowly, labelling was rejected or shelved, and the
problem of Jewish employment in view of the rapid impoverishment of the Jews
was acknowledged relatively late, but then taken up at an accelerated pace. After
large-scale ‘emigration’ proved to be illusory, compulsory employment and spatial
restriction (with a tendency towards ghettoization) were combined to form an
enforced regime and detention in camps was taken into consideration as the
‘interim solution’ best suited to a war situation.
Through the legal regulations for ‘Aryanization’ instituted after the November
pogrom, the existing authorization procedure became obligatory for the ‘Aryani-
zation’ or liquidation of Jewish property. 112 In December 1938 the procedure was straightened out by the relevant ministries and the staff of the Führer’s Deputy
(StdF), and in February there followed an order from the Führer’s Deputy
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