Holocaust: The Nazi Persecution and Murder of the Jews

by Peter Longerich

  situation, they had to ‘guard against all possible events’.

  Immediately after this conversation the RSHA’s deportation specialist,

  Alois Brunner, arrived in Paris at the head of a command unit and, along

  with Röthke and Hagen, drew up a plan for the deportation of the Jews who

  were to be denaturalized. The plan was to deport the families of this group

  as well, both Jews and non-Jews. A raid was scheduled for 24 June; but the

  date was repeatedly postponed, as the legal precondition, the denaturaliza-

  tion law, did not exist. 130 In June, when Röthke requested 250 members of the Security Police from Gestapo chief Müller for the implementation of the

  raid, Müller refused; given the shortage of available manpower on the

  German side, the planned action could only be executed with the support

  of the French police.

  On 20 July 1943, however, Laval resolved to sign a new, harsher version of the

  denaturalization law, which had been produced in the meantime by the head of

  the French Office of Jewish Affairs, Darquier, and, in line with Brunner’s plans, to

  revoke French citizenship from the family members of those denaturalized since

  1927, thus creating the precondition for deportation. 131 However, on 25 July, the day of the fall of Mussolini, Laval decided to suspend publication of the denaturalization law. 132 On 7 August Laval told Oberg and Knochen that he planned to revert the law to the state of Bousquet’s draft. 133 On further prompting by the Germans Laval gave formal reasons for the decision: Pétain himself had to sign the

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  law. 134 But on 24 August the French head of state declared himself unwilling to provide this signature. 135

  By now, however, the Gestapo Jewish desk in Paris had developed an alternative

  plan: in case the planned action against the French Jews who were to be denatur-

  alized, as Röthke had said in July, brought in ‘only a meagre result’, ‘all traceable

  Jews’ were to be rounded up ‘in a large-scale operation involving the forces of the

  Security Police (SD) commando and Einsatzkommandos with the assistance of

  German troops’. All Jews ‘were to be transported to the East out of the area

  occupied by us in 1943, or taken back by the states still resisting this’. 136

  Reservations Concerning Italy, Germany’s Chief Ally

  Before September 1943, the Germans made no serious attempt to persuade the

  Italian government to hand over the 40,000 or so Jews living in the country who

  had been subjected to special racial legislation since 1938. 137 When Himmler discussed the persecution of the Jews of Eastern Europe with Mussolini in October

  1942, his interlocutor avoided any further discussion of the subject with an evasive

  turn of phrase. 138

  The Italian policy of protecting the Jews against the German persecutory

  measures in their occupied zones in Greece, France, and Croatia irritated the

  Germans not least because their Italian ally was thus endangering the unified

  nature of Judenpolitik throughout the whole of the German sphere of influence,

  and thus encouraging other governments to deviate from their radical line. 139

  Italy’s policy was, as Himmler pointed out to Ribbentrop in January

  140

  1943

  ‘for

  many circles in France and throughout Europe the pretext for holding fire on the

  Jewish question, because they point out that not even Italy, our Axis partner, goes

  along with us on the Jewish question’.

  In February Ribbentrop ‘urgently’ requested the Italians to be informed ‘that

  the anti-Jewish measures of the Reich Security Head Office . . . must not be sabo-

  taged any further. Our efforts with regard to the governments of Croatia,

  Romania, Bulgaria and Slovakia to deport the Jews resident in those countries

  have also encountered great difficulties with those governments because of the

  attitude of the Italian government.’141

  During his visit to Salzburg, at the beginning of April 1943, Mussolini may have

  voiced the prospect of interning the Jews in his country; that at least was what

  Ribbentrop assured the Hungarian Ambassador, Sztojay, when he tried to con-

  vince him a short time later that Hungary should tighten up its Jewish policy. 142

  Visiting Rome in the spring of 1943, the ‘Jewish expert’ at the German embassy

  in Paris, Carltheo Zeitschel, concluded that the German embassy in Rome would

  never ‘be able to crack such a hard nut as the Jewish question in Italy in the

  interest of the Axis alliance’. The SD in turn was not able to act autonomously in

  Italy. 143

  Murders and Deportations, 1942–3

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  The German Policy for the Further Extension of the

  Deportations after the Collapse of Italy

  After Italy’s departure from the Axis alliance and the occupation of much of the

  former ally’s territory and its zones of occupation by the Wehrmacht, the policy of

  the systematic murder of the Jews was once again extended to a number of

  territories. The application of the extermination policy to the former Italian-

  occupied zone of southern France also led to the radicalization of the persecution

  in the rest of France, where no distinction was now made between French

  nationals and non-French people. The decision to deport the Danish Jews is

  also closely related to the radicalization of German policy after the secession of

  the Italian ally even if its history lies before these events. The German interven-

  tions in Slovakia and above all in Hungary in 1944 were finally exploited by the

  Nazi regime into a ruthless further intensification of mass murder, even in the face

  of military defeat.

  Former ‘allies’ now made way for merciless regimes of terror that were com-

  pletely dependent on the ‘Third Reich’, and which were bound to their German

  masters to the bitter end.

  The ‘De-Judaization’ of Denmark as the Turning Point in

  German Extermination Policy

  Werner Best, appointed Reich Plenipotentiary in Denmark in November 1942,

  continued the relatively restrained policy towards the Danish Jews. In a note of

  January 1943, Best made it clear that an intensified Judenpolitik would inevitably

  destroy the basis of the previous occupation policy, namely collaboration

  with the Danish constitutional monarchy. No Danish government would pass

  anti-Semitic legislation, and in the end the Germans would be forced to set up

  their own occupying administration. 144 Best once again confirmed this position in April. 145 As the scenario outlined by Best was highly undesirable for the Germans at this point, Luther, Ribbentrop, and even Himmler agreed with

  Best’s stance. 146

  However, the acts of sabotage, strikes, and unrest that increased during the

  summer of 1943 brought an end to the restrained occupation policy that they

  recommended. Best now advocated a radical change of direction: he suggested

  that the position of the Reich Plenipotentiary be strengthened. He should govern

  the country in a kind of ‘personal rule’, based on the Danish administration (with

  an ‘administrative committee’ or a cabinet of specialists at its head) as well as with

  the help of increased powers in the sphere of internal security, namely his own

  police units. This solution,
which Best had presented as a negative scenario in

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  January, now clearly struck him as a realistic alternative to the German policy of

  occupation, which was by now losing its way. 147

  For a time, Best’s plans were thwarted by Hitler’s decision, at the end of August,

  to declare a military emergency in Denmark. A few days later, however, Hitler

  once again gave Best full political responsibility for the German occupation in

  Denmark. 148 Ribbentrop gave this mandate further concrete form by ordering the installation of a non-political cabinet of specialists. 149

  However, this mandate proved barely possible to implement, as Best learned

  from leading Danish figures a few days after his return to Copenhagen on

  6 September. Danish politicians were no longer willing to compromise themselves

  by collaborating further with the Germans at government level. However, the

  head of the Danish administration was prepared to make himself available to the

  Reich Plenipotentiary. This purely administrative solution did not correspond to

  the mandate that he had received from Ribbentrop, but in the given situation it

  struck Best as the only possible solution. 150

  To be able to explain the failure of the formation of a government to Berlin, and

  to provide a motive for a transition to a police regime under his leadership, Best

  had to be interested in intensifying the existing crisis. Such a controlled radical-

  ization, however, could be achieved most simply by activating the ‘Jewish ques-

  tion’ in Denmark. The deportation of the Danish Jews was precisely the means

  with which the change of policy from a policy of collaboration to a police regime

  could be secured; on the other hand, the Germans assumed that such a measure

  would affect a relatively small minority in Danish society, so that it might later be

  possible to calm the situation.

  On 8 September 1943, Best suggested to the Foreign Ministry that it use the state

  of emergency to attempt a ‘solution of the Jewish question’ in the country. If one

  waited until the lifting of the state of emergency, one would have far greater

  difficulties with the hostile reaction on the part of the Danish population, which

  was to be expected at any event. ‘If the measures were taken during the present

  state of emergency,’ Best argued, ‘the possibility remains that a constitutional

  government can no longer be formed, so that an administrative committee under

  my direction would have to be formed and I would have to legislate by decree.’ By

  this time, in fact, Best already knew that there was no longer any chance of

  forming a constitutional government, and that he would be forced to take over

  power in Denmark himself, with the help of the administrative committee. Best

  also stressed that in order to implement the deportations he would need the police

  units he had already requested. Thus the deportation of the Jews would also open

  up the way for a transition to a police regime, and it would immediately provide

  Best with the troops he needed. 151

  Best’s proposal for the deportation of the Danish Jews—presented on the day of

  the announcement of the Italian-Allied ceasefire—was approved by the German

  leadership. Hitler’s decision that the Danish and Italian Jews be deported,

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  conceived as a warning to two insubordinate nations, thus occurred more or less

  simultaneously. However, it transpired relatively quickly that the preparations for

  the deportation of the Danish Jews had not been kept secret, and that failure was

  likely. Best thus decided, after unsuccessfully presenting his concerns to the

  German leadership, 152 to let the date for the wave of arrests leak out. If this happened, a week-long ‘head-hunt’153 would be obviated by the escape of the Jews, and further complications for the already difficult situation in Denmark

  would be avoided. In the meantime, Best’s plans for the future form of occupation

  rule (a strong Reichkommissar utilizing the Danish administration) had assumed

  concrete form, leading him to envisage an imminent end to the state of emer-

  gency. 154 In other words, if the ‘Final Solution’ in Denmark had seemed like the ideal instrument for the accomplishment of a radical change of course in occupation policy, it had now become counter-productive to the further operation of

  the system of occupation. The will to accomplish the policy of extermination

  reached its limits where Judenpolitik threatened to lose its function within the

  system of occupation.

  Thus, in the interest of the general occupation policy, Best was able to allow

  the great majority of Jews living in Denmark to escape to Sweden as the result of

  an unprecedented rescue action. 155 If we consider Judenpolitik in Denmark within this larger context, it can come as no surprise that early in October

  Best, pre-emptively represented the flight of the Jews to the Foreign Ministry as

  a success: ‘Since the objective goal of the Jewish action in Denmark was the

  de-Judaization of the country and not the most successful head-hunt, it must be

  recognized that the Jewish action achieved its goal. Denmark is free of Jews, as

  no Jew who falls under the relevant regulations can legally live and work here

  any longer. ’156

  Compared with the situation in other countries with a greater collaborative

  potential, in Denmark, a country largely free of anti-Semitism and one with very

  little sympathy for the Nazi regime, the implementation of Judenpolitik did not

  serve to integrate native forces into the German policy, but rather the opposite.

  It had the function of excluding the Danish parties from the system of ‘supervised

  administration’, and of consolidating its transformation into a police state.

  Within the Judenpolitik that the Nazi regime pursued within its sphere of

  influence, the action in Denmark in autumn 1943 represented a turning point.

  Until now Judenpolitik had fulfilled an important integral function within the

  German collaboration and alliance policy, by involving the respective ‘partner’ in

  the German policy of a racist reorganization of the continent and making it an

  accomplice in a crime on a massive scale. But this policy did not go entirely

  smoothly. When the deportations were set in motion, the attitude of the allied or

  collaborating government had to be taken into account, which meant that the

  deportations happened slowly or not on the desired scale (Slovakia, France) or not

  at all (Old Romania, Italian occupied territories).

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  After the turning point of the war in the winter of 1942/3 it became more and

  more difficult to implement deportations in cooperation with allied or collabor-

  ating governments (to a limited extent this ocurred in Bulgaria and France; efforts

  with regard to Hungary and the Italian-occupied territories remained ineffective

  at first). However, the Germans did not abandon their policy, since precisely in

  view of the worsening military situation they saw the intensification of the

  persecution of the Jews and the associated compromising of their ‘partners’ as

  an important safeguard for the cohesion of the block under their rule. At
titudes

  towards the ‘Jewish question’ became an important gauge for the German side, on

  which they could read the loyalty of their partners.

  Goebbels’s diaries document this way of thinking on the part of the German

  leadership with regard to the allies Romania157, Italy, 158 and Bulgaria159: too ‘lax’ a treatment of the persecution of the Jews was seen as an indication of the weakness

  and lack of loyalty of the allies. But that meant, according to the logic of German

  Judenpolitik, that a radicalization of the persecution on the German model bound

  the allies irreversibly to the German Reich.

  ‘Most of our contemporaries’, Goebbels wrote in March 1943, recording

  remarks made to him by Hitler, ‘failed to realize that the wars of the twentieth

  century were racial wars, and that in racial wars there has only ever been survival

  or extermination, and that we must therefore understand that this war too will end

  with just such a result. ’160

  Three weeks previously he had noted of a conversation with Goering, ‘Goering

  is completely clear about everything that would threaten us all if we were to

  weaken in this war. He has no illusions about it. Particularly in the Jewish question

  we are so locked in that there is no escape left for us. And that is as it should be.

  From experience, a movement and a people that have broken the bridges behind

  them, fight much more relentlessly than those who still have the possibility of

  retreat.’161

  It should not be overlooked that it was the three states that successfully resisted

  German Judenpolitik—Italy, Romania, and Bulgaria162—that succeeded in leaving their alliances with Germany with separate ceasefires between September 1943 and

  1944. This stepping out of line on the part of—from the German perspective—the

  ‘pro-Jewish’ allies must have served as a confirmation of their policy that any kind

  of compromise on Judenpolitik was to be avoided at all costs.

  In other words: if Judenpolitik had originally (along with economic policy and

  military security and cooperation) been one of the main axes of German occupa-