cannot be seen as a revelation of the dictator’s last and most secret intentions, but
primarily as an attempt to use the striking idea of the ‘destruction’ of the Jews of
Palestine as a common interest of German and Arab policy to distract the Great Mufti
from his desire to receive a public declaration from Hitler that the German government
supported the liberation of all Arabs. For, at that point, Hitler did not want to make
such a declaration, fearing that the French Protectorate government in Syria would
react to such a signal by switching to the Allied camp.
Notes to pages 290–293
537
87. Ian Kershaw, ‘ “Improvised Genocide”? The Emergence of the “Final Solution” in the
Warthegau’, Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 6th ser., 2 (1992), 65: in 1942
information reached the United States that in October 1941 the Jews of the district of
Konin, 3,000 people in all, had been systematically murdered. These figures were
confirmed by a German investigation (see ZSt, 206 AR-Z 228/73).
88. Ruling of Stuttgart district court, 15 Aug. 1950, in Irene Sagel-Grande et al., Justiz und NS-Verbrechen. Sammlung deutscher Strafurteile wegen nationalsozialistischer
Tötungsverbrechen, 1945–1966, vol. vii (Amsterdam, 1972), 231a.
89. Aly, ‘Final Solution’, 70 ff.
90. PRO, HW 16/32, 4 Oct. 1941.
91. Statement by Lange’s driver, Justiz und NS-Verbrechen xxi, no. 594, LG Bonn, ruling of 23 July 1965; see Kogon et al., eds, NS-Massentötungen, 110 ff.
92. Lucjan Dobroszycki, ed., The Chronicle of the Lodz Ghetto 1941–1944 (New Haven and
London, 1984), 96–7 and 124–5.
93. Faschismus-Ghetto-Massenmord. Dokumentation über Ausrottung und Widerstand
der Juden in Polen während des zweiten Weltkrieges, ed. Tatiana Berenstein et al.
(Frankfurt a. M., 1962), 278.
94. The Lodz Gestapo report for 9 June 1942 also refers to the central role of Greiser
(‘Judentum’); Faschismus, Berenstein et al., eds, 285.
95. Monitoring report by the Forschungsamt, 16 Jan. 1942, YVA, 051/13b; See Klein, ‘Rolle der Vernichtungslager’, 474.
96. Steinbacher, ‘Musterstadt’ Auschwitz, 135 ff.
97. Ibid. 273 ff. The author was unable to clarify whether the Jewish workers were also
suffocated with gas or executed. On the start of murders with Zyklon B in Auschwitz
cf. pp. 281 ff.
98. Diensttagebuch, ed. Präg and Jakobmeyer, 14 Oct. 1941, p. 413.
99. Ibid., esp. 427–8. The decree was back-dated to 15 October; see , Faschismus, Beren-
stein et al., 128–9.
100. IfZ, MA 120. This was the result of a meeting that Frank held with a small group,
plainly following on from the government meeting. Bogdan Musial (Deutsche
Zivilverwaltung und Judenverfolgung im Generalgouvernement. Eine Fallstudie
(Wiesbaden, 1999), 196 ff.) on the other hand, sees the statement as already contain-
ing the plan to kill these people in the district itself. This, he writes, should be seen as the ‘prelude to state-organized mass murder’. At the meeting on 17 October 1941,
Musial states, Frank had already been commissioned by Hitler to take part in the
systematic murder of the Jews of the General Government, which Hitler had already
decided upon. (In fact, on 17 October, Frank mentioned that he would soon be
appearing frequently in Lublin ‘because of a special commission from the Führer’,
but he does not identify that commission more closely.) Musial’s argument is
unconvincing. The transcripts of the meetings do record that the representatives
of the civil administration attempted to persuade one another, using radical rhetoric,
of the need to set Judenpolitik on the road to mass murder; but they do not show that
the measures for the implementation of a genocide that had already been decided
upon and which were to cover the whole of the General Government, were discussed
here. The planned ‘transfer’ of the 1,000 Jews from Lublin (possibly to the district
538
Notes to pages 293–295
of Galicia, where the mass shootings had begun) precisely shows that at this point
there were no plans yet to murder millions. The Nazis were still talking about
crossing the threshold to genocide, but were not yet at a stage at which mass murder
was being organized and executed. In fact the murderous plans at this point were
likely to have been restricted to Jews unfit for work in the districts of Lublin and
Galicia, a commission that Globocnik hid from the civil administration. See
also Dieter Pohl, Von den ‘Judenpolitik’ zum ‘Judenmord’. Der Distrikt Lublin des
Generalgouvernements 1939–1944 (Frankfurt a. M., 1993), 108, who states that these
plans were ‘precisely at the threshold between plans for expulsion and for mass
murder’.
101. IfZ, MA 120, in abbreviated form in Diensttagebuch, ed. Präg and Jacobmeyer, 436.
102. Ibid.
103. Tagungsbericht, ZStL Polen 98, 1-213.
104. Dieter Pohl, Nationalsozialistische Judenverfolgung in Ostgalizien 1941–1944. Die Orga-nisierung und Durchführung eines staatlichen Massenverbrechens (Munich, 1996),
140 ff. Typical of this phase, for example, is the ‘intelligence action’ in Stanislau on 3
August, in which 600 men were shot (Urteil LG Münster v. 31 May 1968, 5 Ks 4/65, IfZ
Gm 08.08). On these first murders see also Sandkühler, ‘Endlösung’, 148 ff.
105. Pohl, Ostgalizien, 138.
106. IfZ, Gm 08.08, Münster district court. 31 May 1968, 5 Ks 4/65, statement from the
director of the field office, Krüger, vol. xxx. 96–7.
107. On Stanislau, see Pohl, Ostgalizien, 144 ff.
108. Dienstkalender, ed. Witte et al., 233
109. BAB, BDC-Akte Globocnik, memo to Himmler, 1 Oct. 1941. Cf. Pohl, Lublin, 101.
110. This is also the view of the editors of the Dienstkalender, p. 233, n. 35.
111. BDC-Akte Globocnik. The letter refers to having ‘fundamentally agreed with’
Globocnik’s ideas concerning the ‘German settlement’ of the district of Lublin
and the ‘gradual expulsion of the indigenous population’, but this agreement on
Himmler’s part does not, as Breitman, Architect, 186, claims, refer to the ‘cleansing’
of the district of Jews.
112. Musial sees a direct connection between the decision to build Belzec and plans for the settlement of ethnic Germans. See Musial, Zivilverwaltung, 201 ff., and Musial, ‘The
Origins of “Operation Reinhard”. The Decision-Making Process for the Mass Murder
of the Jews in the Generalgouvernement’, YVS 28 (2000), 113–53. The author himself
does admit, however, that the ambitious plans for the German settlement of the
district would still not have been feasible even with the murder of the 300,000
inhabitants (‘Origins’, 151–2). Musial’s assertion that Belzec was intended for the
murder of the Jews across the whole of the General Government within a time-
frame of around ten years is pure speculation (Zivilverwaltung, 207–8).
113. 208 AR-Z 252/59, 6 Nov. 1979, statement by Stanislav Kozal. Building start on 1
November, published in Nationalsozialistische Massentungen, ed. Kogon et al. (Frank-
furt a. M., 1985), 152–3. This date is confirmed by the study of Michael Tregenza,
‘Belzec Death Camp’, Wiener Library Bulletin 30 (1977), 8–25.
114. See pp. 280 ff.
115. See pp. 262
ff.
Notes to pages 295–298
539
116. Peter Chroust, ‘Selected Letters of Doctor Friedrich Mennecke’, in Götz Aly, Cleansing the Fatherland: Nazi Medicine and Racial Hygiene (Baltimore, 1994), 242–3, 25 Nov. 1941.
117. Dienstkalender, ed. Witte et al., 20 Oct. 1941, p. 241. The editors quote from a
declaration by Mach on 26 Mar. 1942 to the Slovakian council of state, which mentions
the German offer (see n. 167, below).
118. Klein, ‘Rolle der Vernichtungslager’, 478, has already referred to this.
119. Jules Schelvis, Vernichtungslager Sobibor (Amsterdam, 2003), 37; on the preparations for its construction there is a statement by the Polish railway worker Piwonski, from
1975: ZSt Dok. 643, 71-4-442; cf. Browning, Origins, 365. It cannot, however, be clearly
established whether these building preparations in autumn 1941 actually refer to an
extermination camp; it could equally be another planned building that was later
converted.
120. Sandkühler, ‘Endlösung’ 159 ff.
121. Pohl, Lublin, 101 and 105–6.
122. APL, Governor, district of Lublin, Judenangelegenheiten, Sygn. 270.
123. Pohl, Lublin, 109 ff.
124. StA Lwów, R 35 (Governor, district of Galicia), 12–97, Rundverfügung des Distrikt-
gouverneuers.
125. Sandkühler, ‘Endlösung’, 141 ff.
126. StA Lwów, R 37 (Stadthauptmann Lemberg), 4–140, File note re meeting of district
administration, concerning meeting on 9 January 1940.
127. Sandkühler, ‘Endlösung’, 148 ff., and Pohl, Ostgalizien, 180 ff., have different view on this.
128. Minute of 10 Jan. 1942, as in n. 126.
129. Lange to Stahlecker, 1 Oct. 1941, OS, 504-2-8. As early as August, Einsatzgruppe A had received permission to set up an ‘enlarged police prison’. The further suggestion,
already submitted by Stahlecker on 21 July and renewed on 25 August, that the planned
camp should be described as a ‘concentration camp’ had been rejected by the RSHA:
OS, 504-2-8, RSHA II C 3 an Ek 2, 17 Sept. 1941. On the deportations to Riga, the
murders that took place there, and the conditions in which the deportees lived, see the
overview by Wolfgang Scheffler, ‘Das Schicksal der in die baltischen Staaten depor-
tierten deustchen, österreichischen und tschechoslovakischen Juden 1941–1945’, in
Schefffler and Schulle, eds, Buch der Erinnerung, i. 1–45.
130. YIVO, Occ E 3–29, File note Drechsler, 20 Oct. 1941.
131. YIVO, Occ E 30, Minute RK Ostland, 27 Oct. 1941. On the gas chamber letter see above, pp. 279–80.
132. YIVO, Occ E 3–30.
133. YIVO, Occ E 32, RK Ostland, II a 4, 9 Nov. 1941.
134. YIVO, Occ E 26, telegram from Leibbrandt to RK Lohse, 13 Nov. 1941.
135. IMT xxvii. 2–3, 1104-PS. Kube sent Lohse the report from the District Commissioner of Sluzk, in which he had complained about the massacre by Police Batallion 11 in the
district capital on 27 October 1941.
136. YIVO, Occ. E 3–28; also 3363-PS, IMT xxxii. 436.
137. 18 December 1941, YIVO, Occ E 3–28. The phrase ‘fundamentally disregarded’ and the
reference to any ‘dubious cases’ that might arise, show that the Eastern Ministry did
540
Notes to pages 298–301
not wish to confirm in this way Lohse’s question as to whether ‘all Jews’ in the Ostland
were to be liquidated.
138. Breitman, Architect, 218; BAB, R 43 II/684a, Brandt to Lammers, transmission of
Himmler’s file note concerning the conversation.
139. See p. 289.
140. For literature on the deportations to Minsk and the events that took place there, the following provide important information about Minsk: Safrian, Eichmann-Männer,
150 ff; Karl Löwenstein’s notebooks, idem, Minsk. im Lager der deutschen Juden (Bonn,
1961); and the memoirs of Heinz Rosenberg, Jahre des Schreckens . . . und ich blieb
übrig, dass ich Dir’s ansage (Göttingen, 1985).
141. Hans-Heinrich Wilhelm, Die Einsatzgruppe A der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD 1941/42
(Frankfurt a. M., 1986), 124–5, refers to personal notes by Bock, a copy of which is in the possession of the author; YIVO, Occ E 3–34.
142. YIVO, Occ E 3–36.
143. This is apparent from Leibrandt’s communication to Lohse on 4 December 1941: this
suggests Heydrich now wanted to set up the camp near Pleskau: YIVO, Occ E 3–35;
published in Gertrude Schneider, Journey into Terror: The Story of the Riga Ghetto
(New York, 1979), 184.
144. On this see Scheffler ‘Schicksal’, 13 ff.
145. Jäger-Bericht, IfZ, Fb 101/29. See Wolfgang Scheffler, ‘Massenmord in Kowno’, in
Scheffler and Schulle, eds, Buch der Erinnerung, 83–92.
146. Gerald Fleming, Hitler and the Final Solution (London, 1985), 76 ff; EM 151, 5 Jan. 1942.
147. Statement, 15 Dec. 1945 to Soviet investigators, in Wilhelm, ‘Einsatzgruppe A’,
566–7.
148. Published in Dienstkalender, ed Witte et al., 278. The time was 13.30.
149. Ibid., 30 Nov., 4 Dec. 1941, p. 284; PRO, HW 16/32, telegrams from Himmler to Jeckeln, 1 Dec. 1941 and 4 Dec. 1941.
150. Andrej Angrick and Peter Klein, Die ‘Endlösung’ in Riga: Ausbeutung und Vernich-
tung, 1941–1944 (Berlin, 2006), 239 ff; on the first shootings see H. G. Adler, Ther-
esienstadt 1941–1945: Das Antlitz einer Zwangsgemeinschaft (Tübingen, 1960), 799.
151. Angrick and Klien, Riga, 338 ff.
152. Walter Manoschek, ‘Serbien ist judenfrei’. Militärbesatzungspolitik und Judenvernichtung in Serbien 1941/42 (Munich, 1993), 35 ff.
153. Ibid. 43–4.
154. Ibid. 49 ff.
155. Ibid. 79 ff. The order initially spoke of 2,100 victims, but the number was raised by 100
after another German soldier was killed.
156. Manoschek, Serbien, 86 ff.
157. NG 3354; Manoschek, ‘Serbien’, 104.
158. NG 3354; Manoschek, ‘Serbien’, 102.
159. Ibid. 84–5.
160. Ibid. 96–7.
161. Ibid. 86.
162. PAA, Inland IIg 104, Rademacher report, 7 November; Manoschek, ‘Serbien’, 102 ff.
163. Zimmermann, Rassenutopie, 248 ff.
Notes to pages 302–306
541
164. Dienstkalender, ed. Witte et al., 20 Oct. 1941, p. 241. The editors quote from an
explanation by Mach, dated 26 Mar. 1942, to the Slovakian council of state, which
mentions the German proposal.
165. The position represented here differs particularly from the versions given by Burrin and Browning.
166. This view is held by Mommsen and Broszat.
167. I am thinking primarily of the works of Pohl, Sandkühler, Musial, and Gerlach.
16.
The Wannsee Conference
1. PAA, Inland II g 177, memo from Heydrich to Luther. On 1 December HSSPF Krüger
und State Secretary Bühler of the General Government were invited to clarify the
question of competencies concerning the ‘Jewish problem’ (note from Eichmann and
invitation letter of 1 December; it was already included in the Eichmann trial as
Dokument T 182, published in Tagesordnung Judenmord. Die Wannsee-Konferenz
am 20. Januar 1942. Eine Dokumentation zur Organisation der ‘Endlösung’, (Berlin,
1992), ed. Kurt Pätzold and Erika Schwarz; facsimile in Yehoshua Büchler and Yehuda
Bauer, ‘A Preparatory Document for the Wannsee “Conference” ’, HGS 9 (1995), 121–9.
For literature on the Wannsee Conference
see: Mark Roseman, The Villa, the Lake, the
Meeting: Wannsee and the Final Solution (London, 2002); Christian Gerlach, ‘Die
Wannsee-Konferenz, das Schicksal der deutschen Juden und Hitlers politische Grund-
satzentscheidung alle Juden Europas zu ermorden’, Werkstattgeschichte, 18 (1997), 7–
44; Eberhard Jäckel, ‘The Purpose of the Wannsee Conference’, in James S. Pacy and
Alan P. Wertheimer, eds, Perspectives on the Holocaust: Essays in Honor of Raul
Hilberg (Boulder, Colo., 1995); Peter Klein, Die Wannsee-Konferenz vom 20. Januar
1942. Analyse und Dokumentation (Berlin, 1995); Pätzold and Schwarz, Tagesordnung;
Safrian, Eichmann-Männer, 171 ff.; Wolfgang Scheffler, ‘Die Wannsee-Konferenz und
ihre historische Bedeutung’, in Erinnern für die Zukunft (Berlin, 1995).
2. Elke Fröhlich, ed., Die Tagebücher, Teil II, vol. ii, 13 Dec. 41, pp. 498–9.
3. This is the argument put forward by Gerlach, ‘Wannsee-Konferenz’.
4. This is what Rosenberg recorded in his diary concerning a discussion with Hitler on 14
December, at which he presented him with the manuscript of a planned speech at the
Sportpalast (Rosenberg, Tagebuch, PS-1517, IMT xxvii. 270 ff., 16 Dec. 41, also published in Wilhelm, Rassenpolitik, 132): ‘Where the Jewish question is concerned, I would say
that, following the decision, the remarks about the New York Jews should perhaps be
changed somewhat. I would take the view that one should not speak of the extermin-
ation of the Jews. The Führer agreed with this stance and said they had burdened us
with the war and brought destruction; no wonder they were the first to feel the
consequences.’ In Gerlach’s view, the ‘decision’ mentioned by Rosenberg is Hitler’s
‘fundamental decision’, which must in that case have been made between 7 and 14
December (‘Wannsee-Konferenz’, 24). In my view, however, the ‘decision’ plainly
refers to Germany’s declaration of war upon the United States, as a result of which
the German policy pursued hitherto of keeping the USA out of the war with ‘reprisals’
against the German Jews and with propaganda deliberately directed at the ‘Jewish
warmongers’ around Roosevelt, had been superseded. Any further anti-Semitic threats
542
Notes to pages 306–314
directed against the USA would now even be counter-productive, because they only
Holocaust: The Nazi Persecution and Murder of the Jews Page 98
