1720—Idi Amin appears, with a green beret and Israeli paratroopers’ wings. Received with applause by the passengers, he declares: “Some of you know me, some of you don’t. For those who don’t—I am Field Marshal Dr. Idi Amin Dada.” He tells us that it is thanks to him that the passengers were permitted to disembark from the plane and to remain in Uganda. He announces further that the hijackers’ demands have been rejected in their entirety by Israel, while the other states have accepted them. After his statement he is applauded again.
1935—Supper. The menu: meat, potatoes, green beans, and dwarf bananas. The passengers and crew get involved in a long debate about how the terrorists managed to get on board the plane.
2035—The Ugandan doctor gives each passenger two antimalaria pills.
2245—People decide to get a bit of sleep at long last. Everybody lies down on the filthy floor; it’s hot as hell, and there is a veritable symphony of snores. People shout at one another to keep quiet; it’s like a summer camp of the Gadna [Israeli military cadets].
Tuesday, June 29. 0730—After breakfast, some of the people hear a radio report that Israel is refusing to negotiate with the terrorists, who are threatening to blow up the plane if their demands are not met. The passengers’ faces show signs of anxiety. The morning passes without any special incident. The terrorists continue to keep us under guard, sitting beside the door; afterward, they permit women and children to play on the patch of lawn at the front of the terminal. The Ugandan paratroopers are ordered to move back 50 yards from the building.
1355—I have proposed that a separate section be reserved for the snorers, to prevent a repetition of last night’s experiences. The fact that I write about such things only stresses further the contrast between the tranquility here and the tension being experienced by our relatives abroad. Here there is no talk of threats against the passengers’ lives, blowing up the plane, or any ultimatum. I hope the family informs the hospital of the reason for my absence from work.
1530—The terrorists read out a list of their demands—including the release of 53 detainees, 40 of them in Israel—by noon on July 1, 1976. In view of Israel’s almost certain refusal, I wonder what the options are? Either the terrorists carry out their threat to murder the hostages, which seems less probable; or a compromise, which seems most probable—by which a small number of detainees are released, or all the passengers, with the exception of the Israelis, are released on Thursday.
1910—The terrorists separate us from the others: a most dramatic scene. Every person who possesses an Israeli passport is called upon to leave the central hall and move to an adjoining room. The women begin to cry. The feeling is like an execution. The terrorists begin to burrow through the hand luggage. They find two albums of the Yom Kippur War and show great delight in leafing through them before the Israelis. We go out to the neighboring room. Across the door, in the middle, they have laid a plank, and the narrow space remaining is divided again, so that we are forced to bend and squeeze to get through to the other room. People with dual nationality are also ordered into there. In the meantime they have confiscated cameras and personal belongings.
2000—We are in a small room, part of which is filled with cardboard boxes. The terrorists warn us that they are full of explosives and if touched will go off. At first, we are frightened, but in time the fear wears off and people hang their shirts over the boxes. While we are getting organized one of the hostages goes up to a terrorist and asks for a cushion for his baby. The terrorist strikes him violently with the butt of his revolver. Our second night in Uganda.
Wednesday, June 30. 1130—Idi Amin arrives by helicopter. In the central hall he is welcomed by applause. When he enters our hall, he is received coolly, but when he says “Shalom” in Hebrew, he is rewarded with clapping. All he can promise us are blankets and pillows. He also informs us that the terrorists have no grudge against us, but only against the fascist Israeli government—and if the latter does not agree to the guerrillas’ demands, it does not care about the fate of its citizens. One of us, Ilan, tells him that by being here there is nothing we can do, and we would be able to help more if we were returned safely to Israel, where we could repeat the terrorists’ statements. Someone else criticizes Amin for not taking steps to overpower the guerrillas and release the detainees. Amin says that if he were to do so, the whole building would be blown up by the terrorists. From a conversation with one of the terrorists, I discover that their demands for the release of convicts have not yet been accepted, and that they do not intend to kill us. At times it is possible to talk to them calmly. Most of the time they walk among us with their guns hanging over their shoulders, but the ones outside have their guns cocked. In the meantime, over half the non-Israeli passengers have been released. Our fate will be decided in the course of the next 24 hours.
1400—Lunch.
1500—Rest.
1700—People are playing cards, reading books, or arguing about the various options open to the terrorists.
6
THE TERRORISTS’ ULTIMATUM
“The various options open to the terrorists.” Thus Moshe Peretz closed his diary on Wednesday.
Let another diarist take up the tale at this point: a government spokesman in Israel.
It is Wednesday, June 30, and we scurry between Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, trying to maintain an outward air of calm.
In the morning the government convenes and hears a report on developments. Immediately after the cabinet session, the team of ministers meets to hear an up-to-date report from each ministry. It is clear to the ministers that there is close cooperation between President Idi Amin and his army and the hijackers. The Foreign Ministry is busy that same day in considerable diplomatic effort to bring pressures to bear on Uganda. The ministry calls on heads of state from different continents to get to Amin and persuade him to discontinue his cooperation with the terrorists. Ambassador Chaim Herzog is in Israel (at a Congress of Jewish Organizations), and he is summoned to apply pressure to UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim. Religious bodies are approaching the pope. The French government is trying its luck with African governments and heads of state.
The Security and Foreign Affairs Committee of the Knesset convenes at 2:30 p.m. The prime minister and director general of the Foreign Ministry report on the diplomatic activity. Israel is not asking UN intervention (as differentiated from a personal approach to Waldheim with the intent of his putting pressure on Amin), in order not to relieve France of responsibility for the passengers. The German position on the release of the Baader-Meinhof prisoners is troubling Jerusalem. Israel knows of the German reluctance to respond to demands, and accordingly there is an assessment that the matter of prisoners not in Israeli hands is considerably hardening the government’s situation. The free world is showing sympathy: not one of the Western countries with nationals among the hostages is suggesting capitulation to the hijackers’ demands. Meanwhile the government is beginning to feel the pressure from families of the hostages—for whom the Transport Ministry has opened a special bureau.
The ministerial team convenes in the prime minister’s office at 9:00 p.m. They hear a brief summary describing the prisoners whose release is requested by the terrorists, and offer preliminary suggestions on Israel’s attitude in the event of a decision to negotiate with the hijackers. These proposals are brought up with a background of feeling that pressures on Amin are making no headway, and that the deadline of the ultimatum is drawing near.
Night: the transport minister and the director general of the prime minister’s office, Amos Aran, meet with families of the hostages, and clarify to them that the government is sensitive to the timetable that the hijackers have dictated, and that the main interest is in saving the lives of the passengers. The families are excited and demand abandonment of every other consideration as long as the hostages come home safe.
Bar-Lev holds a number of conversations with the African president, in the style of: “Mr. President, God has sent you. The han
d of history has decreed that you shall carry out God’s purpose and release the hostages. You know what they write about you in the world. You know what a bad name they have given you. Now is your chance to prove to the world how great a man you are. You, brave soldier, you will get the Nobel peace prize. The whole world will see who is the true Idi Amin. You must rescue the hostages to prove that the bad things written about you are lies.”
Another tack went: “Mr. President, Uganda is your country. It isn’t possible that you shouldn’t be the one to make decisions on what happens there. Nobody will lift a hand in Uganda without your agreement. You must intervene to rescue the hostages.”
President Amin replied: “The release of hostages doesn’t depend on me. Your government must release the terrorists that they have asked for. The hijackers are tough . . .”
Thursday, July 1: at 7:45 a.m. the ministerial task force meets in the prime minister’s office in Tel Aviv. They report on activity in their areas of jurisdiction. The diplomatic field must be worked to its utmost. The team decides to inform the hijackers of Israel’s willingness in principle to open negotiations. The ministers are guided by the assumption that the deadline is close (at noon the same day), that the attempts to persuade Amin have failed, and that the hostages are in tangible danger. All the members of the team agree to recommend to the cabinet to open negotiations—both in order to extend the deadline, and because there may be no other alternative but to negotiate. At this moment the team is fully aware that negotiations must proceed cautiously, because they will involve a whole complex of subjects.
At 8:30 a.m. the cabinet convenes and decides unanimously to accept the conclusion of the team, presented by Minister Galili, that the task force should be empowered to negotiate with the hijackers, while expressing willingness to release terrorists. After the meeting a number of ministers are of the opinion that the significance of the decision is both tactical and in principle. There is a willingness to respond to a part of the demands, and—at the same time—it is a move to gain time.
While the cabinet meeting is in progress the security and foreign affairs committee convenes. Rabin is delayed at the cabinet session, and in place of him appear Amos Aran, Shlomo Avineri, and the prime minister’s adviser on intelligence affairs, Rehavam Zeevi. The committee endorses the government decision, though a number of its members (Yigal Horowitz, Esther Herlitz, Mordechai Ben Porat, Yehuda Ben Meir, Eitan Livni) spoke among themselves afterward in terms of reservation about the decision.
The government’s decision is reported to Ambassador Gazit in Paris. Yigal Allon clarifies its significance: Israel will discuss with the hijackers the release of terrorists in her prisons against the release of the hostages. In other words, Israel seeks to avoid a situation in which she must apply to other countries (Switzerland and Germany) for the release of their prisoners. In the same spirit, the foreign minister passes on the decision to a number of world personalities.
While the government and the security and foreign affairs committee are holding their meetings under the impression that they must hasten to pass on Israel’s decision before expiry of the ultimatum, Colonel Bar-Lev hears from Idi Amin that he would do well to listen to an important announcement on Radio Kampala at 1:00 p.m. A similar message comes from France. What does it mean? Israel doesn’t know. At 1:00 p.m. Radio Uganda announces the hijackers’ decision to extend the ultimatum to Sunday. They have extended the ultimatum without reference to the government decision.
At 1:30 p.m. the ministerial team convenes for a discussion of the new developments. They reach the conclusion that the problem has become purely Israeli: with the second release of hostages, all hostages have been released except Israelis and those who hold dual nationality. At this meeting there is a proposal to send Moshe Dayan to Entebbe to negotiate, in parallel with the negotiation through Ambassador Gazit in Paris.
At 11:00 p.m. the team again meets to discuss the tactics of negotiation. The administrative personnel suggest checking first the logistic side of a trade. Where will it take place? What planes will transport the terrorists from prison in Israel? How will the swap be carried out? The team instructs Gazit and Zeevi to open negotiations on these questions. It is agreed that until there are satisfactory answers on these points there will be no discussion of the number of terrorists to be released or of their names. A joint Israeli-French negotiation team is proposed. In Paris this is conveyed and the French foreign minister agrees. Israel suggests that the released terrorists be flown by El Al to French territory as the hostages are brought to the same place.
It seemed, that Thursday, a victory for Track A. Or as many Israelis saw it, a surrender to terrorist blackmail. A black mood settled upon the nation, despite a bulletin that the two chief rabbis had delivered opinions favoring negotiation.
7
TRACK A: SURRENDER?
“Thursday was critical,” Prime Minister Rabin said later. “I had to report that we had no military option that could be applied before the Thursday deadline set by the terrorists.”
Relatives of the hostages broke into the prime minister’s compound as that deadline neared, demanding the release of the jailed terrorists named by President Amin’s companions as the price for the return alive of the hijacked victims in Uganda.
“I could not resist the demand to negotiate,” said the prime minister. “Military operations depended upon accurate intelligence and proof, by way of full dress rehearsals, that a commando strike could be conducted with success.”
His military commanders continued to work around the clock on the Track B option. They knew President Amin was to fly to the summit conference of African states, completing his term as chairman of the OAU. If the proso-profiles on President Amin and the suspected terrorist chiefs were accurate, there was hope for an extension of the hijackers’ deadline. With time, Dan Shomron’s tactical squads might hammer out a scheme with air force cooperation. Already Israeli specialists dressed in business suits were flying down to Nairobi, 4½ hours away by Israel’s state airline, El Al, which stopped at the Kenyan capital on its route to Johannesburg. Certain of Israel’s intelligence agents were driving into Uganda from Kenya, following the long road through the spectacular Rift Valley, a five-hour drive if the cars did not overheat and border police gave no trouble.
Some of this intelligence effort had come from Yerucham Amitai, a senior officer of the Israeli air force during the earlier War of Attrition. Deputy Commander Amitai had trained Uganda’s pilots during the honeymoon with President Amin until the dictator demanded that Israel supply him with supersonic jet fighters.
“When I told President Amin the fighters were too complicated and costly,” Amitai said, “he misunderstood and flew into a rage. I meant of course that Uganda’s air defenses were best built on more modest aircraft. He thought I meant Ugandans were not good enough to fly sophisticated jets. ‘We can do anything,’ President Amin ranted. ‘We shall put our men on the moon. We shall get Migs from Russia and bomb my greatest enemy, Julius Nyerere in Tanganyika.’ ”
When relations between Uganda and Israel were broken, the Russians moved in. They had been on the sidelines while Amitai was with the Israeli air force mission. “If I had Ugandan pilots in the air in my trainers,” Amitai had recalled, “and a Russian got into the Entebbe Airport circuit, I’d keep my boys circling and force the Russian to remain in second place until he began to plead to get down. But these were pinpricks. I knew Russian control was inevitable and that one day we’d have to reckon with enemies hiding behind Uganda’s mad president. We couldn’t play that game. We couldn’t give Uganda all its toys at the whim of a self-appointed field marshal, grand admiral, and super air chief! The Russians would, and did—including the Migs.”
Planning for the inevitable clash, Amitai and other Israelis kept meticulous records. They knew what Communist arms Big Daddy was getting, and how these were used to train Palestinian and other terrorists. They watched professional terrorists move into key Ugandan p
osts. More than three hundred Palestinians were appointed to civil service jobs vacated by Asians who were expelled as remnants of British colonial rule.
Israel built the new additions to Entebbe Airport during Amitai’s service. The men on Track B had already built models of the Entebbe runways and buildings when word came from Uganda that President Amin’s departure for the African summit talks coincided with the deadline extension of three days. To the paratroopers and commandos of the Special Air Service there was the sense of gears being shifted, of a nation delicately shifting balance from submission to action.
“Once you yield to blackmail,” Amitai had once said, “there’s no end to it. There will be more demands and more demands. The West is being blackmailed and we keep yielding to each challenge. It has to stop.”
The decision to stop was taken almost subconsciously. Yerucham Amitai, a great airman, survivor of Warsaw, a godly man, was not able to share the moment. He was killed in a crash sometime after 1972, when Uganda dismissed all Israeli military, diplomatic, and technical aid missions.
He possessed immense resolve. He would never have softened after that dreadful word selekzia, the selection of Jews, appeared in Thursday’s headlines.
Selekzia was the word repeated now as the hijackers released another 101 hostages from Uganda. All who remained in terrorist hands were Jews—plus the Air France crew whose captain refused to leave and persuaded his French colleagues that they too must remain to witness where the selection process might lead.
Some notion was conveyed by a 62-year-old woman among the released hostages whose name was transmitted to Jerusalem as Julie Oiserant. She told interrogators:
During the stopover in Athens I noticed two young Arabs boarding the plane with cans of stuffed dates, which seemed odd. One was red-haired and later I learned he wore a wig. They were followed into the plane by a German couple. The woman was about 28; she wore blue stockings, a dark blue skirt, and a light blue blouse. Her hair was dark, of a strange color. Later I discovered that she too was wearing a wig. The man, who looked slightly older, accompanied her to the first-class section.
90 Minutes at Entebbe Page 4
