Walther Funk became Minister of Finance. Göring had kept Schacht’s seat warm for him but Funk had far less power than his predecessor. Göring had naturally made off with the plums, saving them for his Four Year Plan. Göring was compensated with the title of Field Marshal, while Neurath was to be given a sinecure and Ribbentrop moved across the Wilhelmstrasse to take his place as Foreign Minister; he already had his own National Socialist ‘Ribbentrop Bureau’ putting its feet in the more delicate ballet of diplomatic process. One of his pet projects was a German–Japanese alliance.8 As the French ambassador François-Poncet put it, Ribbentrop ‘had a prodigious ignorance of diplomatic matters’.9
Ribbentrop was beside himself with excitement at his appointment. He had been a singular failure in London: sent to seal an alliance, he had come back empty-handed. He had spent all of December concocting a report in ‘miserable German’ in which he advocated a tripartite alliance with Italy and Japan.10 Goaded on by his sparkling-wine heiress wife Annaliese, his former Anglophilia had now turned to hatred.11 Since his return he had been doorstepping Hitler, who had affected not to notice him.ii He was finally summoned to appear before the Führer in the Chancellery conservatory on the 2nd. While Ribbentrop was closeted with his master, his Austrian secretary Reinhard Spitzy was kicking his heels outside as an SS servant congratulated him that he was no longer adjutant to an ambassador but to a minister. After his appointment, Ribbentrop’s hubris returned and he repaired to his expensively rented wing of the Kaiserhof Hotel opposite, ordered a whiskyiii and called his wife.12
As Reichsaussenminister (generally contracted to RAMiv) Ribbentrop added the old Presidential palace to his collection of residences. He promptly tore it down and replaced it with a neo-baroque edifice designed by Hitler’s architect Albert Speer that was more to his taste. He told Spitzy, ‘My good fellow, now we are going to pursue a proper German policy . . .’13 As much as possible, policy was to be dictated by ideology, although the Nazi leaders still wanted to avoid alarming foreign governments, which explains the moderate changes at ambassadorial level. The secretary in the Chancellery, Lammers, informed the ambassadors in Rome, Tokyo and Vienna of their dismissal by telephone that day.
There were some positive results from the shake-up in the Wilhelmstrasse. The ambassador to Rome, Ulrich von Hassell, was retired. His dislike for Hitler and his regime had been only too apparent and the Italians had complained. Ciano, the Italian Foreign Minister, in particular loathed his habit of quoting Dante – ‘I distrust foreigners who know Dante.’14 The fairly neutral, old-school Dirksen in Tokyo was not dropped but shifted to London. He owed his retention to his mother having once been useful to Hitler in Berlin society.
Significant changes came at a lower level of the diplomatic corps that was little permeated by the Party. The leading anti-Nazi, Erich Kordt, became the head of Ribbentrop’s secretariat in the Foreign Office, and was instrumental in having his brother Theo shifted from Athens to take over his old job of counsellor at the embassy in London. Finally, on 2 April, Ernst von Weizsäcker was promoted to become Permanent Under-Secretary of State. The Opposition was now in position to alert foreign governments to Germany’s intentions. Despite many threats, the Nazis were never able to bring the Wilhelmstrasse wholly under their control.
On 4 February the changes that had taken place were explained in a wireless broadcast. The ‘strongest concentration of all political, military and economic forces’ was to be placed in the ‘hands of the supreme leader’. On the 5th the new structure of the Reich was the main theme in Germany’s newspapers and the source of a great deal of gossip and conjecture. It was believed that there had been a plot against the government and an attempt on the Führer’s life. Hitler told his closest retinue not to let the public know that the real reason for change had been the fallout over the Blomberg–Fritsch Affair.15
The writer Jochen Klepper read all about it when his Jewish stepdaughters handed him the morning newspaper: ‘This is completely unexpected . . . It is a day so heavy with destiny that it can only be compared to 30 January 1933: it is much more significant than June 1934.v It is as if the last barrier is gone . . . ’16 On the afternoon of the 5th Hitler gathered the generals around him and read them parts of Gürtner’s report on the Fritsch case. In the circumstances they could only agree that Hitler had done the right thing. That evening he told the story to his ministers, in an emotional address that brought cabinet government to an end in the Third Reich.
SCHUSCHNIGG IN BERCHTESGADEN
Hitler turned his attention to Austria. With Austria amalgamated into the Reich, Germany could bring Hungary and Jugoslavia into economic subservience. He had been hesitant about Italy, but now the Duce’s opposition seemed to have abated and the meeting with Prime Minister Chamberlain’s envoy Lord Halifax had assured Hitler that Britain would not stand in his way. Halifax had intimated that the British government would be prepared to accept the reversion of Danzig, and border alterations in Czechoslovakia too, with time.
Since then the redoubtable anti-appeaser Sir Robert Vansittart had been removed as Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, and the Foreign Secretary, Eden was on his way out too. He resigned in a huff on 20 February after a tiff caused by Chamberlain’s meddling in foreign affairs. His departure came as a relief to Hitler, especially as he was replaced on the 26th by the selfsame Lord Halifax who had given him so much encouragement at Berchtesgaden.17
Göring was egging Hitler on to invade Austria if Schuschnigg would not yield. Göring’s Four Year Plan was responsible for providing the funding and resources for German rearmament. Germany was seriously short of steel, which was such an important commodity to the Nazis that Hitler was the sole arbiter of who got what. On 8 February Göring complained to Hitler that the Four Year Plan would never be complete. He was looking around for a means of achieving autarky in the shortest possible time.18
As it was, Austria’s steel production was small, just 4 per cent of Germany’s, but there was a greater potential in working the iron-ore mines of the Erzberg. Perhaps an even greater incentive to conquest was the reserves in Austria’s national bank. With 782 million RM in foreign exchange, Austria possessed twice as much cash as Germany for shopping abroad and purchasing raw materials needed for war. On 10 February Göring met his economic advisors. The German balance of payments was ‘bleak’, and there was talk of cuts to high-priority projects. Göring’s gaze turned greedily towards the River Inn that separated Germany from Austria.19
The idea behind the Berchtesgaden talks between Hitler and Schuschnigg had been Papen’s. The meeting had been on the cards for some time, but had been postponed as a result of the Blomberg–Fritsch Crisis.20 Papen had visited Hitler on 5 February following his dismissal, since he was anxious to restore his status as Hitler’s personal representative in Austria.21 Hitler had put Papen’s recall on hold, depending on his ability to bring him Schuschnigg. On Saturday, 12 February, Papen took Schuschnigg to see Hitler in Berchtesgaden in the company of the Austrian Foreign Secretary, Göring’s new protégé, Guido Schmidt. Göring did not attend the meeting as he felt the moment for negotiation was over.
Schuschnigg was anxious, and told the Mayor of Vienna, Richard Schmitz, that if anything were to happen to him he was to assume the Chancellorship. He gave orders that the border be closed if he were not back by 9 p.m.22 As they made their way up to the Berghof, Schuschnigg, Schmidt and Papen passed a unit of Austrian Legionnaires, stationed to humiliate Schuschnigg. They found the Führer in no mood for small talk. When the Austrian Chancellor tried talking to Hitler about the beauty of the view, it was brushed aside. Although the conversation was conducted behind closed doors, Hitler’s rants could be heard on the floor below: ‘I, an Austrian by birth, have been sent by Providence to create the Greater German State! And you stand in my way! I will crush you!’23 He, Hitler, was the better Austrian; he, Hitler, had no Slavic blood – an allusion to the Austrian Chancellor’s Slovenian name. In one report, Hitler
threatened to invade Salzburg.24 He told Schuschnigg that no one would come to his defence.25
He demanded that the dismayed Austrian Chancellor include in his cabinet the moderate Austrian Nazi lawyer – Schuschnigg’s former comrade-in-arms – Arthur Seyss-Inquart.vi Schuschnigg was also to amnesty all Nazi terrorists in Austria’s jails and concentration camps. Austrians were to be allowed to be Nazis. Hitler also required the dismissal of the Austrian General Staff Chief, Lieutenant Field Marshal Jansa, who possessed a viable plan for protecting the country against German aggression.26 For his part Schuschnigg asked that two of his bugbears be removed from Austria, Tavs and Leopold.
Schuschnigg then had to endure lunch, ending with an Apfelstrudl – no tribute to the visiting Austrian but prepared to please the vegetarian Führer’s irrepressible sweet tooth. During the meal Schuschnigg looked pale, while Hitler talked on general matters, avoiding politics.27 The Austrian was desperate for a cigarette, but Hitler delivered one of his monologues against smokers and smoking. He had to wait until the meal ended before he could light up, and then only one cigarette, negotiated for him by a compassionate but wholly unbriefed Ribbentrop,28 whose one contribution to the debate was to propose a currency and customs union between the two countries.29 That afternoon Hitler continued to dictate a settlement to him in a way that would become increasingly infamous.
This settlement was based on the Keppler Protocol, named after Wilhelm Keppler, the Nazi ‘Commissioner for Austria’, who was also present that day.30 The Protocol went much further than the demands made before lunch, calling for a partial removal of Austrian sovereignty. It encapsulated the slow, ‘evolutionary’ Anschluss favoured by Hitler at the time. Schuschnigg was to hand over some of his independent foreign policy to Hitler, inasmuch as it touched on matters of mutual German–Austrian interest; there was to be a lifting of all bans on National Socialist activity, which was declared ‘compatible with Austrian sovereignty’; Seyss-Inquart was to be named Minister of the Interior to ensure that National Socialism was allowed full liberty; Schuschnigg had to sack his press secretaries; Glaise-Hostenau was to be made Minister of War, and there were to be regular exchanges between the two armies; finally, the Austrian economy was to be integrated into that of Germany and Dr Hans Fischböck made Minister of Finance.31
Schuschnigg conferred with his Foreign Minister before informing Hitler that such decisions had no value under the Austrian constitution: nothing could be done without the agreement of the President. Hitler showed his displeasure by shouting to his butler, ‘Get me Keitel!’ According to one account, Hitler’s general was buckling on his sword in the conservatory below, one of a trio of military men who had been brought in to intimidate Schuschnigg, along with the air force General Hugo Sperrle and Reichenau. Keitel claimed later that he had no idea why he had been asked that day.32 The Austrians feared they were about to be arrested when Keitel appeared asking for orders. Hitler grinned and said, ‘There are no orders. I just wanted to have you here.’33 Hitler later told his circle that he had asked Keitel how many divisions Germany had at the Austrian border, and what sort of resistance they were likely to encounter from the Austrians. Keitel had allegedly replied, ‘Not worth mentioning, my Führer.’34
Papen intervened and managed to make Hitler agree to only a partial implementation of the Protocol by the 18th, as the rest would require the President’s consent. Hitler told Schuschnigg he had given him three days to put the agreement into effect and that it was to last five years: ‘That is a long time and in five years the world will look different, anyway.35 Hitler recovered his composure and hinted at darker plans: ‘In tanks, planes and motorized vehicles we are the leading power today. It would be completely irresponsible and unjustifiable merely from an historical point of view not to use a magnificent instrument like the German Wehrmacht.’36
Schuschnigg appeared prepared to cooperate. According to Papen, the inclusion of the Nazi wooden horse37 Seyss-Inquart in the Cabinet was the only concession that he had not planned to make before arriving in Berchtesgaden.38 Other sources suggest that he had been negotiating with Seyss since Tavs’ arrest.39
The Austrians left at 11 p.m. after signing the Protocol. On the way back to Salzburg, Papen was the only one to speak: ‘Now you have some idea, Herr Bundeskanzler, how difficult it is to deal with such an unstable person.’40 Schuschnigg returned to Vienna at once. The next day he conferred with the President, Dr Wilhelm Miklas, who reluctantly agreed to give in to German demands, including the appointment of Seyss-Inquart as Minister for Security and an amnesty for the Nazis then languishing in custody. Austrian Nazis in uniform were free to roam the streets again.
Hitler turned up the heat. The Abwehr chief Canaris was summoned to see Keitel, who told him to step up the campaign of sabotage41 until Tuesday the 15th.42 Canaris, who was still deeply involved in the dirty tricks in Austria and in whipping up the ethnic Germans in the Sudetenland, was provided with the detailed plans for ‘Case Otto’. Hitler also appointed Major Klausner as Gauleiter to replace Leopold, who was perceived to have overstepped the mark. Despite reservations, the Austrian parliament approved the agreement.43
The Italian Foreign Minister, Ciano, got wind of the talks. He had been pleased with the news of Ribbentrop’s appointment as Foreign Minister because ‘. . . he has made clear his hostility to the English, who have treated him badly’. The Anschluss, on the other hand, he thought inevitable and ‘The only thing to do is delay it as long as possible.’ Mussolini thought much the same; he was irritated, but believed the merger a fait accompli.44 Goebbels didn’t learn the details of the meeting at Berchtesgaden until the following week. Like Göring, he deemed cannons more articulate than words but noted that Hitler was happy, and that neither London nor Paris would raise a finger to help. Heydrich told him that Schuschnigg was ‘crushed’.45
Nazi bureaucrats were already carrying out the preliminary spadework for the assimilation of Austria. In 1937, SS department II-112 had drawn up lists of the most important Jews outside the Reich; the aim was to build a huge personnel index of Austria. Jews were not picked at random, as Adolf Eichmann made clear:
For weeks before the Anschluss, as far as Department VII was concerned, the Austrian campaign was prepared on roll-file cards . . . We looked at Jewish civil servants and freemasons in every ideological corner. We sat like schoolboys on benches and copied the information on to the cards; then they were arranged alphabetically, letter by letter, and anything that was not urgent was put to one side. With this card-index the first wave of the SD [Sicherheitsdienst – the SS’s own secret service] stormed into Austria.46
Information had been supplied by Keppler, who also had close contact with the Freundeskreis Heinrich Himmler – captains of industry who courted the leader of the SS. Keppler was also in touch with the Dresdner Bank, which was keen to mop up the Austrian Mercur Bank in the event of an Anschluss.47 The cards for Austrian Jews were completed in June 1937 and in September that year the head of the department, Herbert Hagen, and his expert on Zionism, Adolf Eichmann, undertook a trip to the Middle East. The two men had already hatched the idea of creating a central bureau for Jewish emigration to speed up the process of evicting the Jews.48
The aim of the trip was to reach Palestine, where they wanted to send the Jews too, but the British were reluctant to let them in. On 2 October 1937 Eichmann and Hagen docked in Haifa and were given authority to land for only twenty-four hours. They hired a droshky and drove around for the allotted time, even going to the top of Mount Carmel to admire the view. On 3 October they landed in Egypt and made for Cairo, where they spent twelve days. There they met Arab leaders and a couple of Nazi agents who had travelled down from Palestine to talk to them. When they tried to obtain visas for a better look at Palestine, however, the two Germans were thwarted by the British authorities.49 The District Commissioner for Galilee, L.Y. Andrews, and a policeman had been killed by Arab terrorists, and the ensuing unrest proved a useful pretext to keep them out
.50
Victor Klemperer in Dresden had a fairly good idea what Hitler was going to tell the Reichstag on the 20th. He noted in his diary ‘that he has been his own Minister of War since 4 February, that he has dismissed Blomberg and Fritsch and that he was half-way towards annexing German-Austria’.51 Hitler spoke for three hours that day, addressing the issues of the return of the colonies, the League of Nations, Germano-Polish friendship, Russo-German hatred and the need to protect the Sudeten Germans. The overture to Poland was significant. He needed them on his side if he was to get away with the plans expressed in the Hossbach memorandum.52 The shambles in the armed forces was to be covered up by Caesarist foreign policy: ‘. . . The German Reich is no longer willing to tolerate the suppression of ten million Germans across its borders . . . I am glad to say, however, that the Austrian Chancellor has shown insight and satisfactory agreement has been reached with Austria.’53
In general the speech was mild and expressed warm feelings towards Austria. After his performance there was a social gathering at the Chancellery. Papen thought Schuschnigg would resign soon. Goebbels noted, however, that Papen also stood up for religion while he, Goebbels, had been busy closing religious newspapers – one Catholic and one Protestant – for the sake of balance. He was itching to strike harder. On 24 February he noted about a ‘cheeky speech’ made by the Cardinal Archbishop of Munich, Faulhaber: ‘Our revenge will not be long in coming.’54
In the Austrian provinces, National Socialist demonstrations greeted Hitler’s speech. Reading the newspaper, Jochen Klepper wrote that ‘Austria was being spoken of as if it were already ours.’55 Seeing the same news, Klemperer seized on the threat of war implicit in the promise of a stronger army.56 From that moment onward the Austrian city of Graz and the rest of the province of Styria effectively fell to the Nazis. In Britain, the Foreign Secretary, Eden resigned that day. ‘This is good for us,’ noted Goebbels.57 He wasn’t wrong: the British Foreign Office had already written Austria off.58 Appeasement was now official policy, it seemed, and the British government felt the need to buy Germany off. The ambassador, Sir Nevile Henderson, brought the Wilhelmstrasse an offer to return Germany’s African colonies with the exception of South West Africa, which was now owned by South Africa. Goebbels joked that they would offer them Portuguese colonies instead. Eventually Henderson reappeared with a suggestion that they might like the Congo.59
1938: Hitler's Gamble Page 4
