Part of the evidence for placing the manuscript’s making in Rome lies in the
four legs on the closed chest: similar iconography occured in fifth-century
mural paintings in the basilica of San Paolo fuor le mure in Rome (Verkerk,
165). Her arguments have not everywhere been accepted, and other scholars
continue to believe, because of different affinities both textual and pictorial,
that the manuscript is probably Spanish, perhaps with a North African
connection. The date of late sixth to early seventh century has more general
acceptance. Showing Noah’s Ark as a boat became standard only later: see
Unger, The Art of Medieval Technology, 39–40.
117. Smalley, Study of the Bible, 5, quotes Philo. A full analysis of architectural
metaphors in Biblical exegesis is in de Lubac, Exe´gèse me´die´vale, 4. 41–60.
Authority for this idea may be found in texts like Proverbs 24:3–4: ‘‘Through
wisdom is an house builded; and by understanding it is established: And by
knowledge shall the chambers be filled with all precious and pleasant riches.’’
I discuss the architecture model, fundamental in monastic meditation prac-
tice, at length in The Craft of Thought.
118. Gregory the Great, Moralia in Job, epistula ad Leandrum 3. 109–114: ‘‘Nam
primum quidem fundamenta historiae ponimus; deinde per significationem
Notes to pp. 53–55
385
typicam in arcem fidei fabricam mentis erigimus; ad extremum quoque per
moralitatis gratiam, quasi superducto aedificium colore uestimus.’’
119. Du Cange, s.v. mens. Hugh says in De archa Noe that the mens holds time
(Bk. II. i. 8–12). Dante’s use of mente can sometimes be synonymous with
memoria (for example Inferno 2, 7–9). Chaucer says of the dying Arcite: ‘‘For
he was yet in memorie and alyve,’’ in a context where we would use the word
‘‘conscious’ (Canterbury Tales, I. 2698).
120. The various titles given to this work are listed in Goy, Die U
¨ berlieferung der
Werke Hugos von St. Viktor, 212: these are only a few of the variants. In his
edition for the CCSL, Sicard calls it simply De archa Noe, and the work
formerly titled ‘‘De Arca Noe mystica’’ he has retitled Libellus de formatione
arche. Sicard also commented extensively on the textual relationships of the
two works, concluding that they indeed belong together; see also his
Diagrammes me´die´vaux. The treatise De archa Noe was translated into
English (from the edition in PL 176) by ‘‘a Religious of C.S.M.V.,’’ Hugh
of St. Victor: Selected Spiritual Writings. I will discuss Libellus in Chapter 7.
121. Jerome, Commentarii in Hiezechielem, esp. Books 12–14.
122. Hugh of St. Victor, De archa Noe, I . iii. 35–37 (CCCM 176, 10): ‘‘Huius uero
spiritualis edificii exemplar tibi dabo archam Noe, quam foris uidebit oculus
tuus, ut ad eius similitudinem intus fabricetur animus tuus.’’
123. Hugh of St. Victor, De archa Noe, I . iii. 236–238 (CCCM 176, 17): ‘‘quam
cotidie sapientia edificat in cordibus nostris ex iugi legis Dei meditatione.’’
124. Jerome, Commentarii in Hiezechielem xii, on Ez. 40:4; CCSL 75 (554. 178).
125. Jerome, Commentarii in Hiezechielem i, on Ez. 3:5; CCSL 75 (32. 850–854):
‘‘Principia lectionis et simplicis historiae, esus uoluminis est; quando uero
assidua meditatione in memoriae thesauro librum Domini condiderimus,
impletur spiritaliter uenter noster et saturantur uiscera ut habeamus, cum
apostolo Paulo, uiscera misericordiae.’’
126. Hugh of St. Victor, De archa Noe, I I . i. 10–15 (CCCM 176, 33): ‘‘ita etiam in
mente nostra preterita, presentia, et futura per cogitationem simul subsis-
tunt. Si ergo per studium meditationis assidue cor nostrum inhabitare
ceperimus, iam quodammodo temporales esse desistimus et quasi mortui
mundo facti intus cum Deo uiuimus.’’
127. Hugh of St. Victor, De archa Noe, I I . i. 42–43 (CCCM 176, 34): ‘‘Hec est
archa, quam edificare debes.’’
128. Hugh of St. Victor, De archa Noe, I V . ix. 132–140 (CCCM 176, 115–116): ‘‘Hec
archa similis est apothece omnium deliciarum uarietate referte. Nichil in ea
quesieris quod non inuenias. Et cum unum inueneris, multa tibi patefacta
uidebis. Ibi uniuersa opera restaurationis nostre a principio mundi usque ad
finem plenissime continentur, et status uniuersalis Ecclesie figuratur. Ibi
historia rerum gestarum texitur, ibi mysteria sacramentorum inueniuntur,
ibi dispositi sunt gradus affectuum, cogitationum, meditationum, contem-
plationum, bonorum operum, uirtutum et premiorum.’’
129. Du Cange, s.v. apotheca, apothecarii. At least by the thirteenth century, the
word seems sometimes to have meant specifically drugs and medicines
386
Notes to pp. 56–59
(s.v. apothecaria). In great houses in France, the ‘‘dessert chef’’ seems to have
been called apothecarius (s.v. apothecarii, 4). It is worth recalling that sugars
were relatively scarce and often considered to have healing properties.
C HA P T E R 2
1. G. R. Evans, ‘‘Two Aspects of Memoria,’’ 263. I discuss this matter at greater
length in Chapter 4.
2. Wolfson’s essay is both philosophical and philological in nature, tracing the
usage of the Latin terms and how they translate Greek and Arabic (and
Hebrew, where appropriate). Wolfson’s essay should be read in conjunction
with Bundy, Theory of Imagination, whose pioneering and deservedly influential
study it corrects in some important aspects. A useful overview of Arabic-
medieval medical doctrine is Harvey, The Inward Wits. Minnis briefly surveyed
the function of vis imaginativa in ‘‘Langland’s Ymaginatyf and Late Medieval
Theories of the Imagination’’ – his essay begins to provide a corrective to overly
stringent interpretations of medieval faculty psychology, though like many
characterizations of what medieval people thought about imagination, it suffers
from being too narrowly focused both in topic and in sources considered. See
also the translated commentaries on Aristotle’s De memoria et reminiscentia by
Albertus Magnus and by Thomas Aquinas in Carruthers and Ziolkowski, eds.,
The Medieval Craft of Memory.
3. Wolfson, 115.
4. These doctrines are well reviewed in the Dictionnaire de Spiritualite´, s.v. sens
inteŕieur, and see also Rahner, ‘‘The Doctrine of the Spiritual Senses’’ and ‘‘The
‘Spiritual Senses’ according to Origen.’’
5. See Richard Rorty’s comments in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, esp. 3–13.
6. See Matson, ‘‘Why Isn’t the Mind–Body Problem Ancient?’’ 93.
7. Aristotle, De memoria, 451b 10ff. Though the actual role of the brain in sensory
experience and memory was accepted generally, an additional role for the heart
as the organ both of memory and of sensation remained. An excellent account
of ancient teaching on the psychology of memory is in Coleman, Ancient and
Medieval Memories. On the later medieval emphasis on the heart in literature,
see especially Jager, The Book of the Heart. References to Aristotle’s De memoria
et reminiscentia are by Bekker number (I will use the
short title De memoria
from here on). Except where otherwise noted, I have used Sorabji’s translation
throughout.
8. Aristotle talks about the heart as the seat of perception in Parts of Animals, 666a
14ff., and Generation of Animals, 781a 20ff. What he says in De memoria about
the processing of memory-images, however, might be interpreted as qualifying
these other statements. On Aristotle’s psychology, see the essays in A. O. Rorty,
ed., Aristotle’s De anima.
9. Wolfson, ‘‘The Internal Senses,’’ esp. 69–74; see also Harvey, Inward Wits, 4–8.
Early medicine and the contributions of the Alexandrine anatomists (third
century BC) are discussed in standard histories; a place to begin is Vegetti,
Notes to pp. 59–61
387
‘‘Hellenistic Medicine.’’ On medieval medicine and medical practice more
generally, see Siraisi, Medieval and Early Renaissance Medicine. Several early
drawings of the brain, including the one from CUL MS. Gg 1.1 reproduced
herein as figure 3, can be found in Clarke and Dewhurst, Illustrated History of
Brain Function.
10. Varro, De lingua latina, V I , 46 (LCL, vol. 1, 214–215).
11. Bosworth-Toller, An Anglo-Saxon Dictionary, s.v. heorte.
12. See Chapter 1 above, note 124.
13. Rorty discusses how the ‘ mind–body problem’’ was created in the Renaissance:
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, esp. 39–69. See also the first chapters of
Chalmers, The Conscious Mind. The classic exploration of the problem by
Nagle, ‘‘What is it Like to be a Bat?,’’ is an exceptionally succinct and well-
crafted contribution that deserves more attention from literary historians and
critics concerned with issues of subjectivity.
14. Aristotle, De anima, I I , 1; cited by Matson, ‘‘Mind–Body Problem,’’ 97.
15. Both quotations from Matson, ‘‘Mind–Body Problem,’’ 96–97; the whole
essay analyzes the intellectual matrix of ancient discussions of soul and body.
An analysis strongly linking ancient psychology, sensation and memory,
ethical behavior, and political life is that of Tracy, Physiological Theory and
the Doctrine of the Mean, who concludes that for Aristotle, and also Plato, the
essential model for understanding is physiological, based upon notions of
health in the organism. Tracy’s analysis has been corrected and nuanced by
Martha Nussbaum, especially with respect to Aristotle’s understanding of the
so-called ‘‘practical syllogism’ in ethical judgment; see her De motu animal-
ium, 165–220, and The Therapy of Desire, 48–101. See also Cooper, Reason and
Emotion, who particularly analyzes Aristotle’s ethical and political ideas in
terms of his views on judgment, persuasion, and ‘‘civic friendship.’’
16. Sorabji, Aristotle on Memory, 16. ‘‘Affection’’ and ‘‘emotion’’ are both words
that must be understood physiologically – they affect and move the body.
Nussbaum discusses the fact that for Aristotle emotion and judgment both can
also be described in physiological terms, though they are not limited to such
terms; Nussbaum, De motu animalium, 146–158.
17. Either the weight itself on perceptual organs or the excessive fluidity which
Aristotle associated with dwarfism, or both, hinders the persistence of images
and makes it difficult for the motion set up by a sensory impression in a
human receiver to stop and be ‘‘fixed’’ as a memory-image; see Sorabji,
Aristotle on Memory, 114.
18. Sarton, I I -I I , 893–900, gives Arnaldus’s bibliography and the printed editions
of his work; Arnaldus is discussed by Thorndike, History of Magic and
Experimental Science, vol. 2, 841–861. More recently, see the edition by
Garcia-Ballester, McVaugh et al. of Arnaldus’s complete medical works, still
in progress.
19. Arnaldus, Opera omnia, (Basle, 1585), in which see esp. Aphorismorum, cols.
243–244, and ‘‘De bonitate memorie,’’ cols. 837–838; the latter appears to be a
recension of the advice in Aphorismorum, together with some recipes for
388
Notes to pp. 61–63
memory enhancement ‘‘praised by the authorities,’’ ‘‘laudata ab autoribus.’’
The Aphorismi de gradibus, which appeared as vol. 2 (1975) of the complete
edition of Arnaldus’s medical works, is an important work on mixture,
complexion, and ‘‘degrees,’’ but has little to say about memory.
20. ‘‘Supervitet coitum superfluum et carnes facilis digestionis,’’ ‘‘One especially
should avoid unnecessary intercourse and easily digested meats’’; Matheolus
Perusinus, De augenda memoriae (Rome, [1494] iv.r.; I used the copy in the
Newberry Library, Chicago). Advice against drunkenness is also given by
Alcuin in his dialogue on rhetoric (ninth century); undoubtedly, some of
these prescriptions were passed along orally, and some are based on continuing
observation. It is well to remind ourselves that Avicenna’s work is compen-
dious; he is an originator in the pre-modern sense, not in our own.
21. That is, ‘‘gaudium temperatum et honesta delectio’’ (Aphorismorum, col.
244D); the likening of feeding memory to feeding the stomach is most fully
expressed by Geoffrey of Vinsauf, but the memory–stomach metaphor is
pervasive; it lies behind the standard monastic (and patristic) metaphor of
meditatio as ‘‘rumination’’; see Chapter 5, below.
22. Guy de Chauliac, 617, 620, and 627. Pepper is also of fourth-degree hotness,
and so would presumably not be good for memory, although it is rarely
mentioned as a specific prohibition.
23. Matheolus, De augenda memoriae, 4.v.: ‘‘Corpus teneatur mundum a super-
fluitatibus vnde quottidie ventris beneficium et si non naturale fiat artificiale.’’
24. Arnaldus, Aphorismorum, col. 244E.
25. Arnaldus, Aphorismorum, col. 244: ‘‘Solicitudo et visorum seu auditorum
frequens recordatio, memoriam corroborat et confirmat.’’
26. See Wolfson, ‘‘The Internal Senses,’’ 120–122.
27. Aristotle, De memoria, 450a 10–15; Sorabji, Aristotle on Memory, 49; Wolfson,
‘‘The Internal Senses,’’ 74–76.
28. Aristotle, De memoria, 449b 30. Nussbaum comments that it is not clear what
sort of image Aristotle thought one utilized for concepts like ‘‘goodness’’ or
‘‘truth’’: De motu animalium, 266–267. Thomas Aquinas says that intellect
itself retains ‘‘knowledge-forms’’ (it is conservativa specierum), concepts, and
other things composed for thinking; see Kenny, Aquinas on Mind, 41–57, who
explains what Aquinas meant by species and the relation of this concept to his
distinctive psychology of an ‘‘agent intellect.’’ Though this is a crucial differ-
ence in certain contexts (it is a major difference between Aristotle and
Neoplatonism, and important as well in Christian descriptions of how an
individual soul can be immortal), for the purpose of my discussion of memory
in this chapter it would only be confusing to emphasize it.
29. That is, ‘‘centrum omnium sensuum et a qua derivantur rami et cui reddunt
sensus, et ipsa est vere quae sentit’’; Avicenna, Liber de anima, IV. 1; p. 5, l
ines
57–59.
30. Aristotle, De anima, I I I , ii, 425b 12ff. Aristotle, and indeed the whole classical–-
medieval tradition, did not distinguish between sound-as-heard and as vibra-
tion of air; for them, sound was sound and wasn’t pertinent to the human
Notes to pp. 63–69
389
mind unless some abstracting process was involved. As Matson points out,
this is one reason why they had no mind–body problem.
31. I realize that the concept of ‘‘raw feels’’ is a spin-off of the mind–body problem,
and so on the historical grounds I argued earlier I shouldn’t even introduce the
language here; but I hope I will be forgiven. On ‘‘raw feels,’ see R. Rorty,
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, esp. 24, 88–98. See also Nagle, ‘‘What is it
Like to be a Bat?’’
32. Harvey summarizes al-Razi’s account (c. 900), 9–13, which in turn depended
largely upon Galen. Four ventricles are described, a pair in front and two
behind them, one following the other. Imaginatio is located in the front pair,
cogitatio in the middle one, and memoria in the last one. The concept of vital
spirits within the material body – one might think of these as the body’s
energy – is found throughout ancient and medieval psychology. They
were carried and channeled by hollow vessels, the nervi, and were active also
in the various ventricles of the brain, but exactly what they were composed
of was a matter of dispute. The nature of the vital spirits was a critical
concern for Descartes, but less fraught in earlier medical thought; see esp.
Jacquart, ‘‘Medical Scholasticism,’’ and Vegetti, ‘‘Between Knowledge and
Practice.’’ Sutton, Philosophy and Memory Traces, provides an account of
Descartes’s ideas about vital spirits that helps clarify his departures from
previous thought.
33. Avicenna, Liber de anima, I V , i (ed. Van Riet, 6. 66–68): ‘‘Formam enim
sensibilem retinet illa quae vocatur formalis et imaginatio, et non discernit
illam ullo modo.’’
34. Wolfson, ‘‘The Internal Senses,’’ 92.
35. Aristotle, De anima, I I I , xi, 434a 9–10.
36. Wolfson, ‘‘The Internal Senses,’’ 86–95.
37. Wolfson, ‘‘The Internal Senses,’’ 118–119.
38. Janet Coleman has some acute remarks on the importance of intentio
The Book of Memory Page 66
