From just offshore, UJ 2110 and UJ 2111 provided fire support and other escort vessels covered the area in smoke. Such was the speed of the German advance that six Spitfires at Tingachi saltpans were captured intact. Five pilots of 74 Squadron and three ground crew of 7 Squadron (SAAF) who fled to Kos town were advised to leave by the harbour master, and taken on board the Italian water boat Adda. As soon as the vessel was clear, the jetty was destroyed by a direct hit.6
Troops of 1st Battalion Durham Light Infantry were standing-to at 4.45 a.m. as usual, when British Headquarters telephoned with news of two unidentified landing craft approaching Marmari. The commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel R.F. Kirby, had recently been hospitalised with a knee infection. In his absence the battalion second-in-command, Major Hugh Vaux, had taken charge. Vaux readied the counter-attack force (predominantly ‘A’ and ‘B’ Companies) and dispatched the Carrier Platoon under Captain George Sivewright on a mobile patrol to the Marmari area. Shortly afterwards, the platoon commander’s jeep ran into a burst of machine-gun fire. The result was spectacular: the rounds slammed home causing the driver to lose control of the vehicle, which somersaulted off the road in a cloud of dust. Minutes later, an NCO returned to report to Major Vaux that enemy forces had indeed come ashore in the Marmari area and were being engaged by the Carrier Platoon, and that Sivewright’s jeep had been shot up with unknown result.7 In the face of superior odds, the Carrier Platoon broke contact and withdrew eastward along the main Antimachia–Kos road.
At 6.10 a.m. ‘B’ Company of the Durham Light Infantry was ordered to take up a defensive position astride the main road in the Ingurlichi region (west of Platani); HQ Company was positioned to cover the ground north, between ‘B’ Company and the coast; ‘A’ Company (with two officers and forty men) was held in reserve in the Andisli region (between Ingurlichi and Kos town); ‘C’ Company was held in reserve in Kos and Battalion Headquarters was located in an olive grove north-west of Platani.
With daylight, aircraft from both sides recommenced operations. The first low-level strike by Beaufighters of 46 Squadron saw all four aircraft returning safely. The next attack by the Royal Air Force was carried out at about 7.18 a.m. by three 227 Squadron aircraft, one of which was shot down in flames. Just over an hour later, seven Beaufighters of 252 Squadron braved an intense anti-aircraft barrage to bomb and strafe shipping; four aircraft were damaged. Two machines of 89 Squadron and another of 46 Squadron were en route home after another attack when the latter was shot down and crashed off the Turkish coast, taking the pilot and unit CO, Wing Commander George Reid, to his death.8
Beaufighter operations resulted in the Pioniere boat handlers commencing their run-in prematurely, with the result that Feldwebel Wehrs found himself initially with only part of his Kompanie:
We reached the English field hospital, which was based at Marmari: One medical officer stood outside with his arms crossed and asked cockily in German: ‘What do you want from me?’ ‘To become my prisoner,’ I replied. Later this field hospital proved very useful for us, the two surgeons deployed there taking care of all casualties.9
At around 9.00 a.m., infantry of III./Gren.Rgt.440 were ferried ashore, enabling II./Gren.Rgt.65 to push east. As they moved inland, the Germans silenced each gun battery until there remained only one, whose fire was poorly coordinated and largely ineffective. The Germans also seized the Italian command post on Point 211 (Profeta Elia).
At Marmari, more and more troops disembarked, along with artillery and heavy weapons. On the south coast, 5. and 8. Kompanie of II./Gren.Rgt.16 arrived in two F-Lighters, one of which temporarily ran aground resulting in a delayed turn-around and late transhipment of 6. Kompanie (less II. Zug) from Citta di Savona. During the run-in, the landing craft was attacked by four Beaufighters, which met with well-aimed anti-aircraft fire. II. Zug and 7. Kompanie followed at 8.00 a.m. Defensive artillery fire was inaccurate and failed to deter the troops during a tiring ascent towards a dominating jagged ridgeline some 1,300ft above the beachhead. There, they were presented with a spectacular view of the rugged landscape separating them from their main objective 2 miles away. The batteries at Platani could be seen firing on the northern beaches; shells were also impacting on the Eremita ridge in the vicinity of 8. Kompanie.
An erroneous report of an enemy landing at Cape Foca had been relayed to the majority of the Durham Light Infantry, following which ‘C’ Company was deployed against the supposed threat east of Kos town. Due to a breakdown in communications, ‘D’ Company at Antimachia aerodrome could not be contacted and would remain out of touch for the duration of the battle. Before long, the area between Battalion Headquarters and the forward companies was taking mortar fire from the heights above Platani. At first, the explosions were mistaken for Italian shells falling short; it was then realised that enemy forces were in position on high ground south-west of the town.10
From his vantage point on the southern heights, Hauptmann Aschoff was ideally placed to assess the situation before organising his men into battle formation to attack Platani’s batteries. 6. Kompanie was selected to lead the assault, covered on the right flank by 5. Kompanie and supported by 7. Kompanie on its left. 8. Kompanie was to follow up as reserve on the extreme left. The troops began to descend under fire as they headed towards their objective.
Having discharged himself from hospital, Lieutenant Colonel Kirby had arrived on a motorcycle at Battalion Headquarters and reassumed command. After inspecting ‘B’ Company area, the CO ordered ‘A’ Company to move 1,400 yards south-west to strengthen the line held by ‘B’ and ‘HQ’ Companies along Wadi [Valley] Dermen. At 9.00 a.m. approximately eighteen Stukas attacked Platani and ‘A’ Company. The bombardment was closely followed by an infantry assault by the forward elements of Major von Saldern’s II./Gren.Rgt.65. ‘A’ Company was pushed back about 900 yards in the direction of Platani, with an estimated 50 per cent casualties. Subsequently, a joint British/Italian defence of the area was implemented between the company commander, Captain J.G.G. Gray and Capitano Carlo Orlandi of 10o reggimento di fanteria.
After being delayed by rough seas, Hauptmann Armin Kuhlmann’s Küstenjäger had landed in daylight and under light artillery fire. Consequently, Kampfgruppe Kuhlmann was unable to secure the drop zone in time for the arrival soon after 7.00 a.m. of the Fallschirmjäger who were subjected to heavy fire during and after their descent.11
At Antimachia, Captain J.H. Thorpe, commanding ‘D’ Company of the Durham Light Infantry, deployed his forces accordingly. The situation was not helped by a breakdown in wireless communications. Platoons were unable to contact Company Headquarters, which, in turn, was unable to reach Battalion Headquarters. Thorpe therefore sent a situation report to the latter by dispatch rider. The messenger, Private James Buglass, was not seen again. He was probably wounded or injured when intercepted en route. It is known only that he died on or about 19 October.
At approximately 8.40 a.m. the Brandenburg units linked up and together repulsed an Italian counter-attack from the west. A number of Fallschirmjäger were dispatched towards the direction of enemy threat, while the majority of Kampfgruppe Kuhlmann gathered for an attack, following the main road towards Antimachia. Advancing in the face of heavy fire from batteries in the Antimachia area, Kuhlmann’s forces overran infantry and gun positions until they reached a line 2 miles west of the aerodrome. Here, they paused to regroup and to await ammunition re-supply, forcing Italians captured en route to act as porters.12
Generalleutnant Müller and his staff were ferried ashore at 10.00 a.m. At about the same time, the transport flotilla waiting off Pserimos came under artillery fire. The vessels withdrew north, where they continued to offload men and equipment. By evening most had completed their task and departed.
In the meantime, it was the turn of ‘B’ and ‘HQ’ companies of the Durham Light Infantry to come up against II./Gren.Rgt.65. The German reliance on air support and heavy weapons had a predictably devastating effect. Snipers also took
their toll after infiltrating the walled olive grove area bordering the Dermen valley. To maintain the position, Lieutenant Colonel Kirby transferred thirty men of the Anti-Tank Platoon south from Lambi to the sector held by ‘A’ and ‘B’ companies, and Colonel Kenyon moved across a detachment of the RAF Regiment (which turned up at the wrong location). When jittery troops in ‘B’ Company reported seeing tanks – actually German half-tracks – four Bofors guns were manhandled from Lambi to cover the Antimachia–Kos road. Between midday and 2.00 p.m., two platoons of ‘B’ Company were overrun and the company commander, Captain J.E. Stafford, withdrew the survivors to the defence line of Battalion Headquarters. Half an hour later, Major Vaux ordered HQ Company to fall back on Battalion Headquarters. Kirby, who was visiting companies and attempting to contact Italian forces, did not return until 3.45 p.m, whereupon Vaux was dispatched to assist Lieutenant Colonel W.J. McDowall in the defence of Lambi and the northern flank.
In the Eremita area, II./Gren.Rgt.16 had had a harrowing time. The move towards the northern plain was made under increasingly accurate artillery fire. As the infantry dashed from cover to cover they suffered their first casualties. Among the rugged, pine-covered slopes it took two hours for 6. Kompanie to rendezvous with 7. Kompanie. 5. Kompanie had drifted east and became separated from 6. Kompanie by enemy strong points and a well-defended ammunition dump.13 Furthermore, there were infantry positions 200 yards along the line of advance of 6. Kompanie. Before the main objective could be tackled, the immediate problem had to be resolved. Supported by all available heavy weapons, and with II. Zug providing covering fire and watching the right arc, I. Zug was tasked with spearheading an attack against the ammunition dump.
The assault began at 1.50 p.m. with troops covering 150 yards before faltering in the face of heavy fire. One of the attacking infantry, Gefreiter Karl Wiegard, was shot in the stomach and head and fell just short of the objective. The situation dictated a drastic approach and the troops were ordered to swing hard right towards the line of defence and punch straight through the dump. II. Zug and support weapons were redeployed accordingly; Gruppe Kalsbach of I. Zug, which had led the attack so far, was to maintain its present position, and two Gruppen under the command of Feldwebel Meyer were tasked with penetrating the dump via a depression that was covered by defensive mortar fire. The latter gained ground as far as a wire perimeter fence. Purely by chance, a gap was found allowing Meyer to gain entry. III. Zug and elements of II. Zug followed, with machine guns providing cover fire against defending machine guns situated 150–200 yards away. During the attack, Unteroffizier Bullman shot up an anti-tank gun, thereby preventing the crew from coming into action. Immediately afterwards, Bullman was seriously wounded by a mortar bomb. With III. Zug as reserve, I. Zug moved to seize the high ground within the compound, covered on the right by II. Zug. Mortars provided fire support as the assault troops cleared ammunition huts and took care of resistance with hand grenades and explosives until the defending forces finally gave way.
If the Germans thought the battle was won they were immediately proved wrong. Their opponents, whoever they were, were brave and resolute men.14 After withdrawing only a short distance, they halted along the edge of an olive grove behind the camp where two machine guns were sited to prevent a follow-up attack. The first attempt to break though was made by I. Zug under Leutnant Schallau and involved a simple yet quite unexpected tactic. Accompanied by encouraging cries of ‘Hurrah!’ the troops charged, taking their enemy by surprise and making considerable headway. However, any further progress was thwarted with well-directed fire from just 75 yards away. The Kompanie was caught inside the camp, prevented from continuing by the perimeter fence and with mortar bombs landing dangerously close to ammunition crates. A mortar crew was ordered forward to destroy the defence position. During the move, Obergefreiter Franz Bielmeier was killed. He fell in open ground, making it impossible for anyone to reach him, or to recover the mortar bipod he had been carrying. Another strategy was called for: covered by machine guns, III. Zug dashed forward in order to reinforce I. Zug. This resulted in several casualties, prompting the survivors to continue along a ditch and through drainage pipes in an effort to avoid further losses. In the meantime, the redoubtable Feldwebel Meyer had gone ahead and found a breach in the wire, which he extended while under fire. He and Leutnant Schallau squeezed through and made for cover behind a nearby tool shed. Both Züge followed. They were joined two hours later by II. Zug. Their adversaries’ machine guns were still aimed towards the ammunition dump and away from the gathered German troops who were now in visual contact with 7. Kompanie. To the right, the sound of firing indicated the whereabouts of 5. Kompanie, whose troops were also in contact with those defending the dump.
Offshore, Beaufighter crews persevered with near-suicidal attacks against German shipping. During a low-level strike in the afternoon by 46 Squadron, one aircraft was seen to hit its target only to disappear in the explosion. Two more aircraft were severely damaged by Flak and came down in the sea off Turkey. Only one Beaufighter managed to return to base.15
West of Antimachia the German advance had resumed at 2.00 p.m., with a Zug of Fallschirmjäger north of the main road and another of Küstenjäger on the south side. Italians who had surrendered a 7.5cm anti-aircraft battery supported the attack by firing at AA positions at the aerodrome. Taking advantage of the many ravines in the area, the paratroopers succeeded by late afternoon in reaching the high ground just north of their objective. Prevented by communication problems from contacting their comrades south of the road, they pressed on independently and by 6.10 p.m. had secured the airfield and taken thirty-three British prisoners.
According to Company Sergeant Major W. Carr of the Durham Light Infantry, at 5.30 p.m. Captain Thorpe issued orders to destroy all documents immediately prior to withdrawing ‘D’ Company Headquarters from just north of the aerodrome to a nearby valley. At about this time, Luftwaffe bombers carried out the first of two raids on the aerodrome – to the consternation of German ground forces in the area, who suffered one casualty as a result of ‘friendly fire’. Carr was part of a small group caught up in the second attack:
At 1750 5. 87’s came over, they were diving to drop their bombs when the forward troops of Jerry put up a Very light (white) so they banked and dropped the bombs, seven in all, a distance of six yards from us. The Coy. Comdr. was wounded in the small of the back left side. The shrapnel passed through his web belt cutting the left buckle; wound did not bleed very much, put on a field dressing. This was last raid of the day.16
At their beachhead at Cape Tigani, German troops were also in action, holding out against a series of infantry assaults, supported by artillery fire, against their hilltop positions on Annunziata. To the north, III./Gren.Rgt.440 had established a line from the coastal region of Cara Mustafaina (west of Marmari) inland to Point 66 (Lacu) and north-east to Point 211. Pili, and the neighbouring hamlets of San Nicola and San Giorgio, were taken without resistance, and at 1.00 p.m. Kampfgruppe Müller ordered the Bataillon to push towards Antimachia in order to link up with Kampfgruppe Kuhlmann. As an additional precaution, the Bataillon was to secure a plateau (Point 145) just east of the town. The task was carried out by a Zug of 10./Gren.Rgt.440 with mobile anti-aircraft and anti-tank guns.
In spite of strong opposition, II./Gren.Rgt.65 had made good progress east along the coast road. Allied troops were virtually powerless to defend themselves against German artillery and air support. Accordingly, Lieutenant Colonel Kirby issued orders to pull back at 5.15 p.m. and to form a defence line around Kos. ‘A’ Company could not be contacted and remained in position until nightfall, before conducting an independent withdrawal to Kos town. This left II./Gren.Rgt.65 holding a line from Platani, north-east to the town outskirts and north-west to the coast at Lambi. For the British holding the Kos perimeter there were few options: They could defend their positions to the last man; fall back on Kos and conduct a fighting withdrawal along the coastal corridor as far as Ca
pe Foca; take to the hills to continue a pointless guerrilla action, or surrender. At the port of Kos, the crews of three tank landing craft (LCTs) were spared any such choice when their offer to help with the defence was declined by the army. It was therefore decided to leave under cover of darkness for Turkish waters. Commanding LCT 3 was Sub Lieutenant R.E. Fletcher, RNVR:
At approximately 1730 we were informed by soldiers from the firing line that the enemy was about one mile to our east and advancing rapidly. This information together with the fact that our position was being ranged by mortar and 75 m.m. fire decided commanding officers [of the landing craft] to leave then rather than await the remaining one and a half hours until dusk.17
All three boats had experienced ongoing mechanical problems and due to a severe petrol leak, LCT 3 could not be started. A few men tried to get the craft underway, while the majority of the crew was ordered on to LCT 114. When the engine caught fire, Fletcher judged the situation to be hopeless and ordered all weapons to be dismantled. Small arms were disposed of by being thrown overboard; code books were destroyed and the seacocks opened in order to scuttle the craft. The motor mechanic, who had been issued with two grenades, which were to have been placed in the engine room, had disappeared. Consequently, the enemy later captured LCT 3 relatively intact. The last of the crew transferred to LCT 139, which left under fire and with mortar bombs sending up huge geysers of seawater around LCT 3.
It was a day RAF Lance Corporal William Johnston would never forget. With others from 123 Maintenance Unit he had earlier left their headquarters at the Asklepieion and attempted to reach Lambi. After surviving enemy mortar fire, strafing and bombing by Ju 87 Stukas, he decided to return to the Asklepieion to blow up nearby petrol and ammunition dumps. His efforts were interrupted by the arrival of Stukas whose bombs at least partially destroyed the site. Unable to add to the destruction, Johnston again set off towards Lambi. On the way, he joined a nine-man sniper group under Lance Corporal Newton of the Durham Light Infantry. For the next three hours the men held a position between Tingachi and Lambi, before they were forced to fall back on Kos town. By 5.00 p.m. they were just 200 yards from the shore, where they remained for another one and a half hours. Eventually, with the enemy closing in, the men took advantage of their only chance of escape and ran to board a departing launch (HSL 2517).
Churchill's Folly Page 6
