As the Brandenburg paratroopers were congratulating themselves, a comparatively modest infiltration of Kalymnos was in preparation by the LRDG. During the night of 18–19 October, three ORs and the Greek Intelligence officer of ‘A’ Squadron, Second Lieutenant G.V. ‘Pav’ Pavlides, set out from Leros in a rowing boat. On reaching their destination, two men stayed with the boat while Pavlides and Sergeant D. Bassett left on reconnaissance. Shortly after daybreak they were surprised by a small group of Germans, one of whom was shot in the ensuing firefight. Pavlides and Bassett withdrew and that night managed to return to their boat, whereupon the patrol returned without further mishap to Leros.
Another patrol (S2) under Lieutenant Stan Eastwood was less successful. After arriving by caique off the west coast of Kalymnos, the five men transferred to a rowing boat for the final approach. They were to report on enemy shipping, and if possible ascertain when the Germans intended to invade Leros. The mission had barely begun when the patrol commander, Lance Corporal A.I. Curle and Private Reed were captured. Gunner Richard (Dick) Edwards was seized soon after, as was LRDG Sergeant R. Tant, a New Zealander, who came ashore on the night of 21–22 October in an attempt to locate Eastwood’s party. Only Lance Corporal W.F. (Bill) Whitehead evaded capture. The remainder were removed to Kos for transportation to the mainland with other prisoners of war. At a holding area at Antimachia, Curle discussed the possibility of escape with an Austrian guard who agreed to co-operate – provided he could come too. The plan was abandoned when the guard was changed that evening. The next night, Curle, Sergeant Tant and fellow prisoner Lance Sergeant G. Morley of the Durham Light Infantry engaged another guard in conversation. When Curle went to bed, the three continued chatting. Sergeant Tant recalled:
In the evening I sat at the entrance to our compound talking to L/Sgt. MORLEY (D.L.I) until everybody had gone to bed. One of the sentries came over and started talking to us. He was very friendly and spoke the whole time on his hatred of the NAZIS. Eventually we asked him what he would do if we attempted to escape, to which he replied he would shoot, but in the air. We told him there would be no need to shoot at night and he agreed, saying that perhaps we could escape one night. We immediately said “What is wrong with tonight”, and he said “Nothing”, but we must wait until he came on Guard again at 0100 hours as there was only five minutes to go before the guard would be changed. We then convinced him that we would have little time to travel before light. He said he would ask his fellow guards (2) if they would permit us to go and in the meantime Sgt. MORLEY gathered our belongings, while I tried to find L Cpl. CURLE.9
Tant was still searching for his friend when the guard returned and announced that if they intended to go they had to leave immediately:
I was still unable to find L/Cpl. CURLE. We walked out of the stables carrying our kit and supplied with the password “KOENIGSBERG”. After covering about 100 yards we stopped to ‘muffle’ our boots and then continued on through the area, circled the village on the West side, and made towards the west point of the mountains.10
The next morning Curle gave his captors the slip and with the help of an Italian evader was soon reunited with Tant and Morley. On 4 November all four were taken in a Greek caique to Turkey. Tant and Curle continued by caique to Leros where they arrived at dawn on the 5th. Lance Corporal Whitehead followed that night, due in no small part to a Kalymnian, Zacharias Tyliacos, who swam to Leros with word of his plight. Eastwood, Edwards and Reed also managed to escape and eventually all three reached Turkey.
Just three days after its last troops left Levitha, 15./4.Rgt. “Brandenburg” mounted a parachute assault against Astipalaea in conjunction with air-sea landings by 1./1. Regiment “Brandenburg”, the latter arriving in seaplanes and paddling ashore in dinghies. The impressions of a Luftwaffe officer who flew the men into battle were recorded in a Brandenburg report:
The 1./1.Regiment Brandenburg behaved impeccably on the aircraft during the flight to Stampalia [Astipalaea]. The Jäger were in high spirits and sang all the way. The pilot was particularly impressed that, given the coming landing on the occupied island, ‘Kameraden, today there is no going back’ was sung. The pilot’s report finished with the comment that never before had he flown such a Truppe.11
As a preliminary to the invasion, the Luftwaffe targeted key installations, destroying an Italian wireless station at Porto Scala. At approximately 9.15 a.m. on 22 October, 15./4.Rgt. “Brandenburg” was dropped at Maltezana, in the middle of the island. The paratroopers were followed by 1./1. Regiment “Brandenburg” who landed along the south-west coast. As they advanced, the Germans freed forty-eight German prisoners, most if not all of whom were from the ill-fated Olympos convoy. The Italians put up little, if any, resistance, and were soon rounded up so that by 2.00 p.m. the Germans were already in control of the island.
M2 Patrol was divided between three locations, with Lazarus and five men manning a wireless post at Assitia. Judging the situation to be hopeless, the OC decided to disperse the troops and to meet later at a pre-arranged rendezvous (RV) for evacuation by sea. By evening of the 26th, Lazarus and four of his men had gathered at a hideout where they were looked after by islanders. The wireless set, which had been concealed following the German landing, was recovered, but it proved impossible to reach anyone outside Astipalaea. When the battery ran down, a 10-volt replacement was found in the wreckage of the wireless station at Porto Scala. This was insufficient to power the transmitter, but enabled the men to tune in to the BBC, from where they subsequently heard about the fall of Leros. The party was evacuated to Turkey by a Greek-manned caique towards the end of November and reached Haifa on 8 December. A number of patrol members were taken prisoner.12
On Saturday, 23 October, the day after radio contact ceased between Astipalaea and Leros, a Fascist radio broadcast announced that Axis prisoners of war on Levitha had overpowered their captors. Faced with the loss of two island outposts, the commander of 234 Brigade on Leros, Major General F.G.R. ‘Ben’ Brittorous, decided to mount a seaborne operation to re-take Levitha.
Those selected for the task were predominantly LRDG. Men with little or no boating experience underwent hurried training to familiarise themselves with the collapsible assault boats in which they would have to paddle to shore. Six boats were available.13 But a hazardous delivery run on the deck of a destroyer had left the frail craft damaged by shrapnel. The discovery of each tear or hole necessitated hauling the boat on to dry land in order to carry out essential repairs. To add to their misery, Brittorous appeared on the scene. Trooper John D. Kevan recalled:
A bit of a chop demanded the close attention of all aboard to avoid swamping and/or capsizing. Along the coastal-track about seventy yards from where we were struggling came a train of Jeeps with, in the leading one, a florid-faced and imposing staff-officer. He stood up and bellowed at us for not saluting him! This was not what the LRDG was used to and words were quietly uttered which even I had not heard before. We managed an, “Eyes Left”, (or “Right” depending upon how the boat responded to the lively sea) and apparently honour was satisfied for we saw no more of General Brittorous.14
Another who experienced the wrath of Brittorous was Trooper Ron Hill:
We sat on a wall for a “drag and a spit”, tired, getting hungry and wet through when along the road, in a cloud of dust, bowled a jeep, laden with brass hats, naturally inspiring the usual ribald comments from us, the rude soldiery. In a few moments the jeep returned, fast, in reverse and out poured a choleric, red-faced Brigadier, with adjutant. Slaying the unfortunate sergeant in charge he had us off the wall in a trice and called to attention: he wanted to know if we ever saluted our officers … pointing to his red tabs. (He’d have burst a blood vessel if we’d said “No, only first thing in the morning”). So he dressed us down, good and proper, ending with the words, ominous and prophetic, “So you think yourselves tough, do you? I’ll bloody well give you something to be tough about”.15
On Saturday evening, ML
579 and ML 836 embarked twenty-four and twenty-five troops respectively and set out from Leros. The assault force was equipped and organised along infantry lines into two sections, each comprising three detachments and a headquarters, with Captain John Olivey in overall command and OC Section 1, and with Lieutenant Jack Sutherland OC Section 2. Also with Section 1 were Captain Dick Lawson (medical officer) and Lieutenant John Kay. The whole was designated ‘Olforce’. It was an unusual and unwelcome role for such a specialist formation that had been raised in North Africa primarily to gather intelligence and to undertake deep penetration mobile patrols. As stated in an LRDG report:
The plan for the attack on LEVITA [sic] was difficult to form since there was little accurate information available of enemy strength or disposition, consequently it was with great misgivings that 50 men [sic] of LRDG were embarked on such a foolish operation, but no appeal to the G.O.C would rescind his orders that it was vital to the Navy that the enemy garrison should be liquidated.16
The main joint objective was the high central ground, which overlooked the southern port of Levitha and from where it was proposed to deny the rest of the island to the enemy. Section 1 was to land in the western Baia del Fico, and Section 2 near Cape Tromba on the south coast. Once ashore, each section was expected to establish its own headquarters and clear the surrounding area. At dawn, the two sections were to link up while retaining any commanding positions occupied during the night. At 10.00 p.m. the two MLs would return and, depending on the situation, either offload stores or disembark an Italian garrison force. In the event of failure, both sections were to make for the western end of the island to await evacuation. Levitha was still held by a detachment of 11./Lw.-Jg.Rgt.21. Allied Intelligence underestimated the strength of enemy forces whose number was thought to number between twenty and thirty.
The voyage from Leros took nearly three hours and many of the troops were seasick by the time they reached Levitha. Hill describes their arrival:
Embarking into the tossing and pitching fol-boats [sic], down the scramble mats from the ML, in pitch darkness, was almost suicidal, particularly when the NZ sergeant [Edwin J. Dobson] slipped when lowering himself into the boat and fell head first almost capsizing it, water pouring over the free board. For one awful moment I had visions of going to the bottom of the Aegean, laden down as I was with a Tommy gun and spare magazines, two pouches of hand grenades, to say nothing of my heavy German rock-climbing boots. Somehow we staggered ashore through the surf and heavy swell …17
The troops unloaded and collapsed their assault boats before concealing them. Neither landing was opposed, but as per operation instructions, the MLs engaged likely shore targets before they withdrew. It is doubtful whether this preliminary action achieved anything other than to alert the island garrison. The first prominent height along Olivey’s route was Point 133 (Mount Vardia), which was selected as a storage area for the section’s 2-inch mortar, extra ammunition and stores. The section unknowingly bypassed defensive posts on either side of the feature, before pushing on towards nearby Point 130 (Segnale). Headquarters was set up on a plateau on the summit where prepared defence works surrounded the buildings of an unmanned Italian meteorological station. By this time, Sutherland’s party was already in action, as recounted by Trooper Ron Hill:
When the shelling from the ML ceased our party moved forward south east towards the high ground but immediately got into trouble when a party of NZs ran onto a dugout, were fired upon & one [probably Trooper Hector Mallett] was seriously injured when a hand grenade burst in his face. Captain Sutherland then withdrew slightly to a bomb crater at the base of the high ground & tried to contact the ML. Just as contact was established the position came under fire & he ordered the set to be closed down. Never at any time afterwards was contact made. A patrol was then sent out to recce & on its return the whole of our party moved off in three lines westward along the shore of the inlet (where we saw the “Hedgehog” beached & burnt out).18
As he had avoided detection by enemy forces, Olivey decided to seize their next objective before dawn and slightly ahead of schedule. Two patrols under Sergeant Harris and Corporal Thomas Bradfield were tasked with forging ahead and linking up with Lieutenant Sutherland’s section. By first light both detachments were on a ridgeline in the centre of the island (Pagliomandra). They then came under rifle and machine-gun fire from Point 112 (Castello), where an ancient ruin provided an ideal defensive position. Corporal Bradfield was evacuated to Segnale with a serious arm wound, following which Olivey ordered the two patrols to return to his location. At about this time a Bren gun team was overcome while moving into position to provide covering fire. Both men were captured.
Meanwhile, Lieutenant Sutherland’s section had attacked German positions in the south-east of the island, seizing a machine gun on Point 74 (Mount Trumba) and a mortar on Point 141 (Mount Calasuria). Ron Hill recalled:
This was successful and the German dugouts amongst the rocks on the high ground were overrun but progress was slow for the defences were hard to distinguish amongst the rocks. These positions included one machine gun & one light mortar post.19
Trooper Ian Gold was among those in Section 2:
We captured about five Germans from the Machine Gun Post and Sergeant Dobson was trying to make the German Sergeant understand to lead us to the next post. He made out he couldn’t understand so Dobbie gave him two good boots up his backside and he soon understood what he meant.20
When a second New Zealander (probably Trooper Archibald Penhall) was seriously wounded in the face by an exploding stick grenade, Hill assisted the medical orderly in finding cover for the casualty. In doing so he came upon what he thought was a cleared German position.
I snatched a blanket from off one of the bunks to find myself face to face with a very live German. At the same time someone on the lower bunk grabbed my ankle and it took a sharp kick in the face to make him let go. My first adversary then fired at me at point-blank range but it was star-light dark and the shot missed as I made a hurried exit, still clutching the blanket. I then turned and tossed in a couple of hand-grenades and sprayed a few rounds from the Tommy gun into the dug-out and on my comic German shout of “Kommen zie aus” – and don’t tell me it isn’t German, it had the right effect – out came nine Germans, of which two were badly wounded.21
According to Hill, by daybreak, when the high ground was secured, thirty-five prisoners had been taken. At about this time, Olivey observed a curious incident from his vantage point atop Segnale:
Just before sunrise about twelve Germans appeared on their hill and with them a soldier in British uniform who commenced signalling in semaphore. At first his signals were readable but shortly [afterwards] they got very erratic and quite unreadable. Jerry was obviously up to his old games of asking us to surrender … My reply to his signals was a few rifle shots in the direction and he and his prisoner scattered to their trenches.22
Dawn heralded a drastic change in circumstances for the LRDG. Ron Hill:
From daylight onwards our position deteriorated. Enemy machine gunners on the south side of the north “island” covered all our movements northward & we had insufficient men to force the narrow strip of land where the Germans had established their HQ. The prisoners and our wounded also hampered our movements. At about 8 am a seaplane took off from the inlet and flew over both our & Captain Olivey’s positions on recce & was engaged by the Bren Gunner. Later the ’plane made off westwards & within an hour 8 Stukas & 4 seaplanes returned & machine gunned our positions from low level. Bombs were also dropped on Captain Olivey’s HQ.23
The seaplane observed taking off was probably evacuating a prisoner of war to the mainland. Trooper Kevan, in Captain Olivey’s section, was one of those sent on patrol during the night. After ascending a nearby height, he had found himself alone and taking enemy fire. Kevan responded with his Thompson, but otherwise stayed in cover. Before long, he was also exposed to ‘friendly’ fire:
At about 0830 I hea
rd a sound nearby and turning my well-kept-down head I was dismayed to see a German soldier a few feet away pointing a heavy machine gun at me. The decision was quickly made – dead hero or live prisoner – so I threw my weapons and rocksack [sic] down the hill and cautiously made my way up to the German position as directed.24
Soon after, Kevan was escorted to a northern bay where two seaplanes were moored. He boarded one, squeezed between the pilot and rear gunner/observer.
We took off and, before heading for Greece, made a couple of straffing passes over my patrol which was unpleasant.25
Morale received a much-needed boost when an Arado seaplane made a forced-landing several miles offshore after being shot up by both sections. A while later, two Rhodesian soldiers returned from Mount Vardia, where they had been sent by Olivey to fetch the section 2-inch mortar and to bring up extra ammunition. They also brought with them three prisoners. (The prisoners were later evacuated to the western slope of Segnale but escaped after overpowering one of their two guards; the other guard fled).26
Late in the morning, the three detachments were re-deployed in an effort to eject enemy forces from Castello. Gunner J.D. (Jim) Patch was in command of Detachment 3:
I was sent out with my patrol to make a wide detour round to the left in order to attack the enemy held hill from the flank or the rear whichever proved more practicable. I took the patrol round to the flank keeping the objective under observation but from that direction there was no possible means of approach as we would have had to cross four hundred yards of open ground and the hill upon which the enemy was established was sheer on this side. I therefore decided to try [and] approach from the rear but at this time more enemy aircraft appeared and began ranging the whole island. These aircraft numbered, as far as I could judge, eight Stukas and four two-seater seaplanes. We advanced with much caution in order not to be spotted by these ’planes and as we approached the rear of our objective a column of the enemy was observed filing in twos and threes and at very wide intervals along a ridge towards their position on the hill – our objective. They seemed to number about thirty men. We were then placed in an unfortunate position. We were 200 yards range from the enemy in very open country with bushes only one foot high and no rocks. The enemy ’planes had now spotted us and the column had withdrawn to the other side of the ridge. The aircraft flew over us one by one, never firing but coming within ten feet of our heads while a machine gun post now established among rocks on the ridge kept us occupied with spasmodic fire. I therefore decided to withdraw. This was accomplished very slowly as the enemy had us under continuous observation & fire and a wide stretch of open country had to be traversed in this manner.27
Churchill's Folly Page 9
