The new commander turned out to be an old acquaintance of ourselves – newly promoted Brigadier Robert Tilney, late CO of the Leicestershire Yeomanry, a gunner regiment, whom we last met in our mountain warfare training in the Lebanon. As he arrived we wondered how well equipped he would be as a Gunner to organize the fight which would be an infantry battle.13
It was perhaps inevitable that a change of command would bring with it new arrangements for the expected enemy assault. Originally, it had been decided by Lieutenant Colonel Maurice French to concentrate the Royal Irish Fusiliers on high ground in central Leros. Lack of numbers precluded wider dispersal. (At the time, rifle companies averaged about sixty ‘other ranks’ although this number would fluctuate due to unit requirements and the arrival in October of the battalion rear party and reinforcements from the Middle East.) By early October, Battalion Headquarters had been established at Meraviglia, close to Brigade, or Fortress, Headquarters; ‘A’ Company was positioned on the northern slopes, covering Gurna and Alinda Bays and Rachi Ridge; ‘B’ Company (less one Platoon on Astipalaea in support of the LRDG) occupied the ‘Windmill’ area (San Giovanni), overlooking Gurna Bay and low ground to the west; ‘C’ Company, as mobile reserve, was south of Meraviglia, covering the ‘Anchor’ area (Porta Vecchia) and Pandeli Bay; ‘D’ Company held Rachi, between Gurna and Alinda Bays, and HQ Company (part of which had been siphoned off to strengthen the rifle companies) was situated in the area of ‘Charing Cross’ (near Point 132 south of Meraviglia). Changes in early November would see the Faughs having to prepare entirely new positions.
The Long Range Desert Group, operating mainly in the north and south of the island, manned observation posts, and with a wireless link to their headquarters on Meraviglia. They would be less affected by the revised defence policy.
During the night of 16–17 October, the Faughs were reunited with the battalion rear party from Egypt. After being withdrawn from Kastellorizo, ‘B’ Company of 2nd Battalion Queen’s Own Royal West Kent Regiment arrived and was retained on Leros. The first troops of the depleted 4th Battalion Royal East Kent Regiment (The Buffs) also landed, followed on 5 November by 1st Battalion King’s Own Royal Regiment (Lancaster).14 By this time, the infantry had been joined by 3rd Battery (less one Troop) 1st Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment Royal Artillery (equipped with twelve 40mm Bofors guns); one Troop of Field Artillery (with four 25-pounder field guns which had found their way on to Samos after capture by the Germans in France in 1940), additional detachments of the LRDG and Special Boat Squadron, and supporting sub-units including Royal Army Medical Corps and Royal Engineers: a total of just over 2,900 officers and men.15
Accurate figures are difficult to come by, but the Italian garrison on Leros probably totalled 5,500 personnel. This included I battaglione (battalion) of 10o reggimento di fanteria (infantry regiment) of Divisione ‘Regina’; 8a compagnia mitraglieri da posizione costiera (coastal machine gun company); 402a compagnia mitraglieri ex-Milizia Volontaria per la Sicurezza Nazionale (ex-‘Blackshirts’ machine gun company); part of 147a squadriglia (maritime reconnaissance squadron) equipped with Cant seaplanes, and mainly unarmed workers and survivors of sunken ships. The Italians occupied positions overlooking likely landing areas including the bays of Blefuti, Lakki (where Italian Headquarters was situated), Gurna and Serocampo. They also manned hilltop gun sites. For a small island, Leros possessed an astounding number of heavy weapons.16 Unfortunately, effective gun control was virtually non-existent. In his after-action report Brigadier Tilney commented:
There were no Fixed Signal Services on the island. It seems almost inconceivable that the Italians can have regarded LEROS as a powerfully defenced base and yet refrained from installing any form of buried communications or any fire control system with buried cables. A most elaborate gun control centre existed on PATELLA … but communications from this centre to AA and coastal batteries were by air lines which were destroyed beyond hope of repair in the early stages of the enemy air offensive. Only three batteries were equipped with wireless sets, most indifferent ones that were rarely in contact, and there was no visual signalling equipment on the island. When battle was joined therefore, it was impossible for anyone to exercise adequate control over the guns.17
In the days to follow, communications generally were to present a serious problem due to insufficient and inadequate equipment and terrain that allowed only restricted wireless links at the best of times. Conditions at Fortress Headquarters were also less than ideal. Men and equipment were crammed into a tunnel that ran through the hilltop, with an entrance at each end and a central vertical shaft providing access to an observation post. When Tilney took over his predecessor’s command centre, he was unimpressed. In his after-action report, the brigadier, writing in the third person, described the place as being wholly unsuitable:
Apart from being in a most conspicuous place which came in for almost incessant bombing, the tunnel itself was dark and narrow with only three small bays built off it. It was far too small and became hopelessly congested. The most suitable alternative would have been to have occupied the Italian H.Q. in PORTOLAGO but the Commander appreciated that he could not afford to upset the Italians when by firmness and tact good progress was being made with them; in any event the static wireless sets and the field telephone exchange had previously been installed in the tunnel and there was neither time nor sufficient spare cable to allow of a move to a more suitable locality.18
Acting on instructions of Major General Hall, Tilney quickly made himself unpopular by ordering a drastic shake-up of the established defence plan. Johnson recalled:
Brigadier Tilney gave his orders to his COs for the new plan of defence on 6th November and the Faughs buckled down to move stores, weapons and ammunition to the new positions. This was a tiring and tedious job with little or no transport. Time for sleep was short. During the day one dug or blasted holes in the rock and carried stores. During the night fatigue parties became stevedores unloading precious cargo from anxious Royal Navy ships and submarines who were champing at the bit to get away to the Turkish Coast before dawn and the inevitable Stuka sortie.19
The principal of the revised strategy was to deny the beaches to the enemy. A problem was lack of transport, which prevented Tilney from maintaining a strong central reserve. Instead, troops were deployed on a dangerously wide front thereby aggravating the already poor line of communications. In order to destroy the enemy as quickly as possible, ideally before he could land and consolidate any initial gains, the island was divided into three sectors. The Buffs were deployed in the North, the Faughs (with ‘B’ Company of the Royal West Kents) in the Centre, and the King’s Own (less one company) in the South. Each battalion, with one company held as local reserve, was sited to cover potential landing places on the coast. Units also had to be ready to move into any sector and under the authority of the area commander. Fortress reserve (‘C’ Company of the King’s Own) was held near San Quaranta, south of the imposing height of Point 320 (Clidi), with the primary task of counter-attacking paratroopers who might be dropped in the North Sector. All British transport – about ten jeeps – were allotted to the company each evening until ‘stand down’ the following morning. Medium machine guns were sited to sweep likely landing areas; the four 25-pounders from Samos were placed on a feature in the Blacutera area (between San Giovanni and Meraviglia), and 2-pounder anti-tank guns and 40mm Bofors were installed at strategic points in and around the centre of the island. The loyalty and fighting quality of the Italians had long been in doubt. Dispersed throughout the island, they were destined to play a comparatively minor role, enforced by Tilney’s decision to restrict their movement when battle commenced:
To ensure that they did not leave their positions it was ordered that, to avoid confusion between German and Italian troops, the Italians could only leave their positions at the risk of being shot unless they were wearing the distinguishing sign as issued, i.e. signal armlets.20
In the first days of Nov
ember, Allied warships and aircraft searched for shipping gathering for the impending German assault against Leros. But daylight moves between staging points were protected by fighters, and at night dispersed vessels were virtually impossible to detect. The Royal Navy achieved a rare success in the early hours of 7 November when HM ships Penn and Pathfinder sank the coast patrol vessel GA 45. Submarines also took a toll on German commandeered sailing vessels, and some enemy small craft were damaged in air attacks, but at a cost. On 5 November alone, Beaufighter units lost six aircraft and four crews during Aegean operations: Bf 109s of 8./J.G.27 accounted for four machines of 227 Squadron which were engaged on an offensive sweep around Rhodes, and at Lavrion Bay off the Greek mainland, two crews of 47 Squadron were taken prisoner when their aircraft were shot down by ship’s Flak. On the 6th a low-level shipping strike left the German R 34 and R 194 disabled with at least three killed and many more wounded, but cost 603 Squadron one aircraft, while 47 Squadron lost two machines (together with one crew); another aircraft belly-landed on returning to Gambut. Two pilots of 7./J.G.27 were each credited with a Beaufighter destroyed. On the 7th, a Beaufighter of 252 Squadron was written-off and the crew injured in a take-off accident. Three days later, a pilot in 47 Squadron was killed and a 603 Squadron crew was taken prisoner when two more Beaufighters fell to Messerschmitts of III./J.G.27.
As well as shipping strikes, Allied aircraft flew numerous reconnaissance sorties; Wellingtons undertook mine laying operations in the Aegean, and Hudsons carried out regular night-bombing raids on Antimachia aerodrome. Overall, these had minimal effect: without long-range fighters little could be done to prevent the Luftwaffe from maintaining air superiority, or from continuing to threaten Allied warships.
After considering the risks and taking into account the prevailing problem of fuel limitations, it was decided on 10 November not to allow British destroyers to operate against enemy invasion forces by day, unless specifically ordered to do so by the Commander-in-Chief, Levant. Motor launches (MLs), motor torpedo boats (MTBs) and motor gun boats (MGBs) operating under the SBNO Aegean had to lay up in Turkish territorial waters during daylight hours. At night, the MLs were to carry out anti-invasion patrols, while the MTBs and MGBs remained in harbour at immediate notice to act on enemy reports. The Germans, too, feared being caught in the open. Around Leros, the Kriegsmarine was dissuaded from using destroyers by day due to the very real danger presented by coastal batteries and the threat posed by the Royal Navy. More than ever, the day really did belong to the Luftwaffe.
As a result of enemy activity, the British expected German invasion craft to assemble at Kos and Kalymnos after dark on 10–11 November and to spend at least one night to refuel and prepare to move to departure points in northern Kalymnos. Accordingly, Kalymnos harbour was bombarded by the destroyers Petard and Rockwood and the Polish Krakowiak. At least two escort vessels (UJ 2101 and UJ 2102) sustained splinter damage, and the already damaged merchantman Trapani was set on fire and capsized; no landing craft were hit. While withdrawing, HMS Rockwood was struck by a glide bomb that, luckily, failed to explode. The damaged ship was taken in tow by Petard under constant air attack to the Gulf of Doris.21 Under Captain M.S. Thomas, RN, (Captain (D), 8th Destroyer Flotilla), HM ships Faulknor, Beaufort and the Greek Pindos bombarded Kos harbour a few hours later, albeit with little effect. Originally, this force was to have withdrawn to Mandelyah Gulf, but in order to place himself in a position to be of assistance Rockwood and Petard, Thomas ordered his ships to make for Port Deremen, in the Gulf of Kos.
Earlier, four minesweepers had left Kastellorizo for Leros with reinforcements including the Buffs rear party from Egypt. Two of the vessels, BYMS 72 and BYMS 73, reached their destination without mishap, but the former could not be offloaded in time and departed still carrying essential stores. She would return the next night – with far-reaching consequences for the proposed German landings.
In the early hours of 10 November, MMS 102 ran aground off enemy-occupied Kos. On board was Leonard Marsland Gander, a correspondent with The Daily Telegraph, together with his conducting officer, Captain David Crichton of Army Public Relations and Sergeant Wood of the Army Photographic Unit. To avoid running the risk of another beaching, the accompanying minesweeper (MMS 103) was discouraged from staying to assist. Daylight brought help from an unexpected quarter with the arrival of a caique whose crew included two naval officers: one British, the other American. They took on themselves the responsibility for freeing the stranded minesweeper, and in the meantime arranged for the transfer of her passengers by motor launch and caiques to the damaged Adrias off Turkey. The following evening, all personnel transhipped from Adrias to motor launches 456 and 461 for onward passage to Leros. With those on board ML 461, Marsland Gander disembarked at Alinda Bay, while ML 456 proceeded to Lakki. Within hours both boats would be back at sea, but under very different circumstances.
Throughout the war, the Germans relied on Enigma, a machine designed for the encryption and decryption of secret messages. These were duly intercepted and passed on to cryptanalysts and translators at Bletchley Park in Buckinghamshire, England. When, during the night 6–7 November, a German signaller transmitted: ‘Owing to compromise of code word “Leopard”, new code word “Taifun” is to be used from now on’,22 he did not only inform German commanders. Yet, those privy to ‘Ultra’, as the decoding operation was called, did not always take full advantage of their unique position. Ultimately, any advance knowledge of German intentions had little effect on the outcome of the war in the Aegean in 1943. On 11 November, Ultra revealed that Operation Taifun was to commence the following day. Air reconnaissance also showed considerable movement of landing craft between Kos and Kalymnos. However, as relief destroyers were not expected until late on 12–13 November, it was essential for those already in the area to conserve fuel. Accordingly, Captain Thomas was ordered to move to an anchorage nearer the Kos Channel, from where Beaufort and Pindos could be sent to attack any landing craft reported off Kos. The force shifted berth to Alakishli Bay and arrived at 1.57 a.m. on Friday, 12 November.
8
Operation Taifun
Day One: Friday, 12 November 1943
On the eve of Operation Taifun, Generalleutnant Müller had at his disposal a Battle Group of motivated and experienced combat troops, most of whom had already seen action against the British on Kos. They were divided into three sub-divisions, the largest of which was the eastern landing force. This comprised Kampfgruppe Schädlich, with Leutnant Hans Schädlich in command of 1./Küstenjäger-Abt. “Brandenburg” (Hauptmann Armin Kuhlmann had been severely wounded in an air raid at Kalymnos); Kampfgruppe von Saldern, under Major Sylvester von Saldern and consisting of II./Gren.Rgt.65, II. Bataillon/Luftwaffen-Jägerregiment 22 (II./Lw.-Jäger-Rgt.22) and 2./Pi.Btl.22, and Kampfgruppe Dörr, with Hauptmann Erwin Dörr commanding III./Gren.Rgt.440. The western landing force, or Kampfgruppe Aschoff, was provided by II./Gren.Rgt.16 commanded by Hauptmann Philipp Aschoff. The Kriegsmarine and Pionierlandungskompanie 780 (Pi.Ldgs.Kp.780) were responsible for most of the sea-going transport, with the exception of the Küstenjäger Pioniersturmboote. The third, airborne, element was designated Kampfgruppe Kühne, with Hauptmann Martin Kühne commanding I. Bataillon/Fallschirmjägerregiment 2 (I./Fallschirmjäger-Rgt.2) of the Luftwaffe. A second wave comprised 3./Fla.Btl.22 and 3. and 4./Art.-Rgt.22 together with heavy weapons of II./Gren.Rgt.16 and II./Gren.Rgt.65. III.-Bataillon/Jägerregiment 1 “Brandenburg” (III./1. Rgt. “Brandenburg”) and Fallschirmjäger of 15./4.Rgt. “Brandenburg” were held in reserve near Athens.
German planners assumed that gun batteries could target virtually all of Leros, and that potential landing sites along the coast were especially well covered. It was also expected that vulnerable stretches of coastline were fortified and mined. To minimise losses during the assault, a number of less heavily defended, but unlikely, landing sites were selected. It was intended for the first wave to secure these locations and to neutralise local d
efensive positions. Although the troops would only be lightly armed pending the arrival of heavy weapons with the second wave, they could rely on air support throughout the operation. Close inter-service cooperation was crucial.
The original battle plan had allowed for both the first and second waves to embark simultaneously, with the latter ready to follow up when required. However, enemy action, bad weather and unavoidable delays had reduced the availability of transport vessels for the troops and their equipment to five F-lighters; four Infanterieboote (I-Boote); ten Pionierlandungsboote (Pi-La-Boote – nine of which appear to have taken part in the initial landing); one Pionierführungsboot (Pi-Führungsboot) and two Küstenjäger Sturmboote. Close escort was to be provided by two R-Boote and three U-Jägern.
This meant there was now only sufficient craft to embark the first wave, with the same vessels having to return for the second wave. It was imperative to accomplish the initial assault before daylight, but with a full moon adding to the problems, Y-Time (H-Hour) could not be scheduled any earlier than 4.30 a.m. In order to reduce further delays, elements of the second wave were transferred to Kalymnos, the nearest German-occupied island to Leros. On X-1 (D-1) the Headquarters staff of Kampfgruppe Müller moved to Isolavecchia Bay in Kalymnos, location for the command post (CP) during the first stage of the battle. It was intended to transfer the CP to Leros once a beachhead had been established.
Churchill's Folly Page 14
