German air support had intensified dramatically on the 14th, with Stukas always on call. The constant presence of the Luftwaffe and the often intense bombing was a permanent feature of the battle. The indescribable din of exploding bombs, artillery, mortar and small arms fire could wreak havoc with a man’s senses, leaving him feeling drained and lacking the will to fight. By day three, troops on both sides were under a tremendous strain: tired, often hungry and thirsty, but ever alert to the tell-tale whistle of a falling bomb, or the roaring ‘whoosh’ of another incoming round moments before it detonated with a sound like a huge door slamming shut. Sometimes, depending on a projectile’s trajectory, there was no warning whatsoever: just an ear-splitting bang, a hot blast of displaced air and a deadly unseen spray of hot shrapnel, followed by a hail of stones and debris and choking dust. For some, the stress was unbearable, as Clark witnessed:
For a couple of days we had been taking pot shots at a man who we could see on a rock in the middle of the bay. We thought it was a parachutist who had been stopped short in the bay on the first day. Eventually, after two days and nights, of what must have been terrible conditions, he swam in to shore, and I sent a couple of men to pull him in. Imagine our astonishment when we found it was Pte. [name omitted] from our Company who had left his post on the first day of the invasion and disappeared. We slated him good and proper, although we did give him clothes and food, and put him in a slit trench. I wasn’t at all surprised when I heard he had disappeared again, and that was the last we saw of him.14
Dusk brought a temporary respite from the Stuka attacks, and a lessening of the shelling that prevailed during daylight hours. But there was still intermittent gunfire as nervous sentries imagined seeing movement in every shadow. Whether from bravado or to reassure themselves, many Germans were especially vocal at night. It was a strange, almost surreal, experience for the British who listened from their own defensive positions. In between sentry duty, soldiers on both sides huddled beneath greatcoats and blankets and tried to catch up on lost sleep. For others, there was little rest. After the day’s attacks, the grim work of medical orderlies such as Taffy Kenchington continued:
We were called on to dig shallow graves for anyone who had died at the R.A.P., or maybe find the jeep to take some of the wounded to the A.D.S. [Advanced Dressing Station] at Porto Lago [Lakki] and, when they had been patched up, maybe a chance to get them taken off the island by M.T.B., sub’ or M.L. This had to be done before dawn, when the dreaded Stuka would be up looking for just such a target.15
After dark, a strong patrol of HQ Company of the Buffs moved into position on Point 111, extending the British line, which stretched west to Clidi and south through Quirico to Germano. The ground from Meraviglia west to Searchlight Hill was still in Allied hands, and the Germans were so far still contained on Appetici. To avoid being cut off by a significant British presence on Point 101, Major von Saldern pulled back his troops from the north-west slopes of Meraviglia and the line extending from Point 108 to Santa Marina, to a line from Rachi, north to the coast near Patriarcato. A Kompanie was also deployed just north of San Quaranta on the west shore of Alinda Bay. Kampfgruppe Müller had suffered substantial losses and had failed to secure a number of key features. Furthermore, there were insufficient German forces to maintain contact between those in the Vedetta-Grifo Bay area and those to the west of Alinda Bay. This left a dangerous breach, which had to be covered throughout the night by reconnaissance patrols. If ever there was a time when Brigadier Tilney might have reversed the situation on Leros, it was now. Unfortunately, he was unaware of the German plight, and with his own forces having also suffered during the day’s fighting was unable to follow up on their successes:
It was felt that the initiative could be better retained by attacking the enemy on two sides and attempting his elimination on the morrow. If that failed, a mainly defensive policy might have to be resorted to.16
Müller knew that his Kampfgruppe could not hope to continue without heavy weapons, but landing conditions were impossible. The best that could be achieved was to provide ammunition re-supply through continuous airdrops. Late on Sunday afternoon, he issued a revised battle plan: the beachhead at Mount Vedetta–Grifo Bay was to be held until ordered; the beachhead at Alinda Bay was to be held until 2.00 p.m. on the 15th. The Luftwaffe would then support a major push via Meraviglia to Pandeli Bay, with the intention of establishing a new beachhead from Pandeli castle through Meraviglia, south to Points 132 and 79, and east to Point 102 (Mount Vigla). Sufficient forces were to remain on Rachi to prevent Allied movement between Alinda and Gurna Bays. Furthermore, Hauptmann Dörr with troops remaining of III./Gren.Rgt.440, II./Gren.Rgt.65 and 6./Lw.-Jäger-Rgt.22 was to land in the evening of the 14th east of Appetici and take command of the units already there, preparatory to seizing Pandeli castle and linking up with Kampfgruppe von Saldern.
In the afternoon, Penn, Aldenham and Blencathra had steamed towards Leros with instructions to bombard enemy shipping at Alinda. Each carried a deck cargo of ammunition for the island. However, on being advised that the situation in Leros had deteriorated, and due to his concern about the possibility of heavy air attacks, Lieutenant Commander James H. Swain, RN, on board Penn ordered the cargoes jettisoned. At approximately 5.30 p.m., the destroyers arrived at Alinda Bay. Soon after, they commenced firing on three enemy caiques, before responding to a request from the island to engage German defence positions. From onshore, a captured gun was turned against Penn in an attempt to prevent her searchlight from being used to illuminate targets. The response was an immediate burst of 20mm cannon fire. The bombardment continued for about fifteen minutes, during which both enemy and friendly forces suffered. The hospital at Villa Belleni was hit, resulting in the deaths of several patients. While withdrawing from Rachi, Lieutenant Ted Johnson and his party were caught in the open, fortunately without incurring casualties. In the area of San Quaranta, ‘C’ Company of the Buffs also had to seek cover. In this instance, there were casualties. Such was the disruption that Major Bourne considered it impractical to press on and instead pulled back to Point 81, south-east of Quirico:
After it was all over, it was necessary to collect the Company together again. I was unable to make wireless contact with Bn. H.Q. and as it was now dark, I took the decision to reform on higher ground rather than stay in a less defensive area.17
On completion of the fire mission, the destroyers withdrew north-east of the island, and Aldenham was detached to bombard Gurna Bay. As the destroyers departed, Blencathra reported ‘extinguishing’ a searchlight – presumably that reported by the LRDG on Marcello as having been damaged at their location. Shortly afterwards, Penn and Blencathra steamed to within a mile or so of Leros in order to shell additional shore targets, before proceeding north-east at 7.23 p.m. Meanwhile, the Aldenham’s fire mission was cancelled, allowing her to rejoin the force.
At about 7.00 p.m. ‘C’ and ‘D’ Companies of the Buffs together with ‘B’ Company of the Royal West Kents were relieved by LRDG, thus being provided with a brief respite before battle was resumed the next day. At the same time the SBS at Germano withdrew, one patrol under Sergeant Workman again remaining overnight with the anti-tank guns at Gurna Bay.
At 9.15 p.m., Hauptmann Dörr and his command were ferried from Kalymnos and deployed below Appetici. During the operation there were several casualties, probably as a result of accurate shooting by coastal guns. While withdrawing, the flotilla was engaged by at least one of the British warships, which were then targeted by Do 217s of K.G.100 equipped with glide bombs, two of which narrowly missed HMS Aldenham. The destroyers succeeded in returning to Turkish waters at midnight, and arrived at Kulluk at dawn on the 15th.
Tilney’s requested reinforcements were also on the way from Samos. After departing from Port Vathi the previous night, MMS 103 with ‘A’ Company of the Royal West Kents reached Lakki at 10.40 p.m. The troops disembarked and moved to a nearby assembly area, while the company commander, Major Robert
Butler, proceeded to Fortress Headquarters for orders. The minesweeper remained long enough to take on board wounded before she again put to sea.
During the day, air operations in the Leros area had resulted in a Heinkel He 111 being shot down during an offensive sweep by Beaufighters of 46 and 227 Squadrons. Two Beaufighters failed to return. A Ju 52 was also lost to anti-aircraft fire. Further south, Baltimores attacked shipping in Suda Bay, Crete, without visible result, and seven out of sixteen Hurricanes were reported missing during sweeps over the island.18
At Leros, a night supply drop was carried out to the north of Serocampo Bay, the sight of so many parachutes causing panic among Italians in the sector held by Second Lieutenant Frank White’s LRDG. The former were convinced that they were about to be overwhelmed by German paratroopers, and reacted accordingly when an unfamiliar voice hailed from the rocks below: ‘Inglese officer – don’t shoot!’ The Italians promptly opened fire, and it was with some difficulty that White made them stop, enabling him to call on the man to identify himself. There was no reply, which provoked another burst of firing from the jittery Italians. Once more, White brought them under control and called for whoever was there to come forward. From out of the darkness emerged an exhausted and shaken lieutenant of ‘A’ Company, the King’s Own. According to White, the subaltern explained that his company commander, Captain Blythe [sic], had been killed at Appetici and that he was under orders to evacuate Leros with a party of forty or so others. When informed, Brigade Headquarters had other ideas. The officer was ordered to return to action with his men and any stragglers encountered along the way.19 Clearly, at least some of the island garrison were already convinced that they were fighting a losing battle.
11
Day Four
Monday, 15 November 1943
At about 2.00 a.m. on Monday, the Germans on Kalymnos received an unexpected delivery when Allied aircraft mistook the island for Leros. Thirty-six crates of machine-gun ammunition were located in and around Kalymnos town by daybreak.
During the night at Samos, several tons of ammunition and stores were loaded on board Echo and Belvoir, and the majority of the remainder of the Royal West Kents embarked for passage to Leros. The destroyers were continuously shadowed and bombed by the Luftwaffe, although this did not prevent HMS Echo from landing troops at Lakki in the early hours of the 15th. However, the slower Belvoir had to be rerouted to Turkish waters, where she later transferred her troops to small craft for onward passage under cover of darkness.1 At 4.45 a.m., HMS Echo got underway to rendezvous with Belvoir for the return journey. On board were the news correspondent, Marsland Gander, and his conducting officer, Captain David Crichton. Their photographer, Sergeant Wood, had orders to remain on the island.
Meanwhile, at 10.40 p.m. on the 14th, MTBs 315, 307 and 266 had slipped to carry out an inshore sweep around Leros. Soon after, a leak forced MTB 307 to divert to Turkish waters, leaving just two boats to continue the patrol. An unidentified destroyer was spotted north of Leros, but disappeared before either boat could investigate further. Nearly two hours later, at 4.55 a.m., the MTBs were illuminated by searchlights and engaged by shore batteries, which necessitated a rapid departure from the immediate area. On board MTB 315 the senior officer, Lieutenant Commander Christian P. Evensen, RNVR, decided to search for the destroyer sighted earlier. Shortly afterwards, when just north of Alinda Bay, two ‘R-boats’ were reported just offshore and some 3,000 yards away, hurriedly proceeding south behind a heavy smoke screen. As the MTBs closed, searchlights on Leros were suddenly switched on, illuminating about a dozen vessels heading towards the coast. Evensen reported:
We found ourselves within 100 yards of a small craft very similar to our L.C.M., obviously full of troops as their heads were easily discernable against the searchlights. Action was immediately joined; closing the range to about 50 yards both M.T.Bs opened a very heavy fire with .5” and 20 mm guns.2
It is impossible for those unfamiliar with them to imagine the devastating impact of such weapons. The terms .5 inch (.50 calibre) and 20mm refer to rounds with a maximum diameter of half an inch and 20 millimetres respectively. Depending on the weapon system, rounds can include ball – typically a copper-jacketed lead-core bullet, high explosive (HE), armour piercing (AP), tracer, incendiary, and combinations such as AP/incendiary. With some weapons it is common to use more than one type of round in the ammunition feed. An MTB’s 20mm Oerlikon, for example, might be loaded with HE/tracer, HE and HE/incendiary rounds. Automatic weapons have a high cyclic rate, with the Oerlikon capable of expending about 450 rounds per minute, although it is usual for a gunner to fire short bursts in order to maintain accuracy and conserve ammunition. But even a single round can wreak havoc, and will easily punch through the thin metal skin of a landing craft. The effect on a human being is horrific. The combined firepower of two MTBs would have been truly terrifying for those at the receiving end:
At the range it was impossible to miss, and though the target took every kind of avoiding action we stayed with her until she was stopped and well on fire in at least six different places, and we had expended 2000 rounds of our ammunition into her. Whilst this was going on we were engaged by, probably, an R-boat at extreme range; neither of the boats being hit. We next observed a large barge, power driven and apparently made of wood. At the same time we saw, in the searchlights, a destroyer which we presumed to be the same enemy destroyer we had seen earlier and apparently covering the landing. I gave the order to M.T.B.315 to prepare to attack with torpedoes, and detailed M.T.B.266 to attack the barge we had just located with depth charges, after which, she was to follow us in and attack the destroyer. Fortunately the destroyer suddenly challenged us and it transpired to be H.M.S. “Echo”. Meanwhile, M.T.B.266 carried out a perfect depth charge attack on the barge, which apparently disintegrated. The “Echo”, coming through the position a few minutes later, reported hundreds of men in the water screaming for help.3
Marsland Gander was presented with a unique opportunity to record the event:
Despite the menace of coming light, the Captain [Lieutenant Commander Richard H.C. Wyld, RN] had decided to make a last sweep round the island. We careered through the hoarse, surging sea, whipped by a fresh wind, at exhilarating speed. Then, as we rounded Point Bianca, jinking this way and that, we saw the Italian searchlight from the old castle groping over the water. Streams of red tracer came from the Germans waiting and crouching on the beaches and hillsides, but still the light was not extinguished. Presently it gripped something and halted. The Echo, too, like a beast before the kill, checked momentarily, and I felt the sinews stiffening. It was a German F lighter, rather similar to one of our own tank landing-craft, lying there motionless, perhaps preparing to unload. The Echo, vibrating now with all the full power of her engines, swerved and heeled violently towards the enemy. She closed to four thousand yards and her guns hammered till my eardrums seemed ready to crack.
The F lighter, which I could see through glasses, was crammed with vehicles and guns. She was taken so completely by surprise that she never attempted to return our fire, perhaps her guns were silenced by the first salvoes. Now we were flinging over scores of 4.7 inch shells that erupted all round her in the water till she was lost to sight in smoke and spray. Some of our “bricks” were plunging into the hull causing great spouts of flame, and then after a short, sharp action lasting at most only five or ten minutes we left her blazing furiously and drifting helplessly …
As we continued to zig-zag round the island one of the bridge look-outs called “Craft bearing green four five, sir.” Straining in the half light I could just detect three dim shapes. We challenged with a signalling lamp, and back came the code reply. They were two of our own motor torpedo boats about to attack another German landing craft. This time we held to our course, and let the m.t.b’s get on with the job. There was a gigantic underwater explosion as one of the little attackers dropped a depth charge under the stern of the enemy craft. But we were not stopping now
for anything.4
The torpedo boats withdrew, leaving their victims close to shore and under heavy fire from coastal batteries. Unbeknown to the Royal Navy, some if not all landing craft had been attempting to evacuate German wounded and British prisoners. What was in all likelihood the same F-lighter attacked and left burning by HMS Echo turned back from north-east of Pasta di Sopra Point. It was met by Infanterieboot I-O-94. But the ordeal of those on board was far from over. The flames spread to a cargo of mortar bombs, which began to explode due to the intense heat. Nevertheless, the I-Boot crew managed to rescue thirteen seriously injured. There were more explosions as depth charges on the F-lighter also detonated. According to the skipper of I-O-94 the vessel started drifting, again came under fire, and sank.
Observers on Leros reported a landing craft foundering in the same area soon after midday. Somehow it reached the coast. Two infantrymen of 6./Gren.Rgt.16 were guarding the Kompanie stockpile of ammunition and provisions on the west side of Pasta di Sopra Point when they were alerted by the sound of an approaching engine, as recalled by Oberfeldwebel Walter Lünsmann:
I thought: Now they’ve got us! But then the coastal artillery started firing. This meant that it could only be a German ship. We went over the hill to see what had happened. The coastal artillery stopped firing. A Fährprahm was beached, with its doors open. I went on board and instructed the people there, some of whom were wrapped in blankets, to disembark. The first two did not understand German; presumably, they were English. The next ones refused or, perhaps, were unable to move. We carried the men off the boat in our ground sheets.5
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