My shoulder was broken and painful; a grenade exploded against it and my right arm was almost severed, dangling by only a few strands and bleeding profusely. I kept a grip on it with my left hand in order not to bleed to death. I was very thirsty, but choosing the moment I leapt clear and asked a sergeant at the command post to bandage the stump. The other side was still firing. One of our men looked at me and asked, ‘Can we surrender?’ I replied threateningly, ‘I will kill you first.’15
As the fighting continued, Ritchie was confronted by a German soldier in a nearby gun position:
He drew a bead on me with his SCHMEISSER while I took very careful aim at him with my revolver. We must have both fired simultaneously as I felt nothing unusual in my shot, but, when I aimed a second time, I found my foresight a twisted piece of metal. His bullet had apparently hit the tip of my barrel and had been deflected past my face. Picking up my rifle, I waited for him to appear again and as his head rose above the parapet, I shot him through the forehead.16
Over the next hour there was a series of similar engagements:
0915 hrs. Another German suddenly appeared from the dead ground in front and opened up at me with his SMG [sub-machine gun]. Lying in the open a mere 40 yds away, he was asking for trouble, but no sooner had I shot him than a comrade joined him so I disposed of him in the same way.
0945 hrs. One German with a SMG suddenly appeared in the far [number 6] gun position … fired a burst into the ammunition tunnel, then ran to the rear gun position and did the same. I got him as he came towards us, still shooting from the hip.
1000 hrs. Two Germans came from dead ground in front, jumped into the old built-up position forward of [number 6 gun] … and with head and shoulders fully exposed began to recce my position through field glasses. Selecting the one I thought was an officer, I fired at him and he dropped out of sight. The other immediately ran away before I could get a shot at him.17
Due to the initiative and courage of such officers, Tilney was able to return to Fortress Headquarters. Before doing so, he ordered Tarelton to muster his available forces and to advance northward via the western slopes of Rachi Ridge and establish contact with the Buffs. Tarleton was to place his men under command of Lieutenant Colonel Iggulden, whereupon the combined force was to attack south via Rachi and concentrate on Meraviglia. Tarleton made his way to Battalion Headquarters. He at once clarified the situation: cancelling the proposed attack by ‘D’ Company, and informing Captain Turner of the latest plan. Mortars were disabled and extra bandoliers of small arms ammunitions issued. Efforts to contact the AA Platoon were unsuccessful. It is possible that two of the sections tried, and failed, to rejoin the battalion, whereas the remaining two sections under Captain Rickcord remained in action on Meraviglia until the very end. The extra activity no doubt alerted the enemy that something was afoot. Air attacks increased, adding to the discomfort of those already under fire from the commanding heights. It was especially hazardous for runners, who constantly risked their lives to deliver messages and maintain contact between units and sub-units.
Earlier that morning, Lieutenant Ted Johnson had redeployed his men on the lower slopes of Rachi/Meraviglia to cover the proposed attack on San Nicola. When this failed to materialise, Johnson found himself trapped in an increasingly precarious position where the slightest movement brought an instant response from enemy positions lower down:
We engaged what targets we could find, but with plunging fire I doubt if we had much effect. At about 10.00 hours the rocky position I was in, with about four others, of which Lieut Tom Massey-Lynch of A Company was one, became bracketed either side by sustained Spandau fire. We had exhausted almost all ammunition and were hailed by our opponents to give up. Our immediate reaction to this suggestion was to let fly a short burst of fire from our one serviceable Bren and its dwindling ammunition and to move ourselves to another hole amongst the rocks, but we soon realized that a move was out of the question as any attempt even by a single man was met by a burst of very accurate and frightening machine gun fire from our opponents who had us pinpointed. Over the next half hour Tom and I discussed our predicament and from what we knew of the adverse situation of the overall battle, and our local situation, we could not achieve anything by launching ourselves and our three or four very tired soldiers into some heroic suicide action.18
In order to stay awake Johnson had been taking the amphetamine Benzedrine for the past three days. As the effect wore off, he was overcome with exhaustion and unable to think clearly. As far as he and Massey-Lynch were concerned, there was only one solution:
We set about making our weapons and controlled stores unserviceable with a terrible feeling of failure. Disposal of ammunition was no problem as the few rounds we still had were quickly shot off and nobody had any grenades left. The rifles and the one Bren gun were stripped down to their component parts; in the case of the Bren, these parts were scattered into the rocks as far as we could throw them. The rifles were less easy to dispose of as only the magazine and the bolt could be detached. The sights were smashed with rocks. Any other small items of equipment such as bayonets were also disposed of. I had a Prismatic Compass, Binoculars and Pistol, all of which had to go. This wilful destruction of His Majesty’s stores and equipment took us about as long as it has taken the reader to read about it. Meantime our opponents were getting restless in our failure to comply with their shouted instructions.
Now the hardest part of the entire battle came. We had to raise a piece of white vest which somebody produced from his pack and when we were sure that no fire was coming in our direction we eased ourselves out of our rocky position and commenced the sad and shameful trek down the hillside to the point where we could see our captors. The only part of this sad journey I clearly remember was that I picked up an abandoned soldier’s greatcoat en-route down the hill – my instinct of self welfare can’t have been totally lost.19
In the neighbourhood of San Nicola, the Buffs and ‘B’ Company of the Royal West Kents had returned to the previous day’s positions and taken over from the LRDG patrols after an uneventful night. The day dawned with none of the usual signs of enemy movement, prompting Captain Flood, OC ‘B’ Company, to send Lieutenants Caller and Gordon Huckle on a reconnaissance into San Nicola. When it was discovered that the Germans had abandoned the area, the company pushed forward onto Point 100 and Rachi Ridge, with ‘D’ Company of the Buffs advancing on their left. Only a few individual Germans were found in dugouts. By 10.30 a.m., ‘B’ Company of the Royal West Kents had established contact with the King’s Own on Searchlight Hill. Captain Flood, Lieutenant Colonel Egerton of the King’s Own, and Major E.W. Tassel, commanding ‘D’ Company of the Buffs, gathered for an impromptu conference, after which Tassell left to report to his CO. At about 11:30 a.m., Egerton told Captain Flood that as a result of what had been observed in the area of Fortress Headquarters, he was withdrawing all troops from the Rachi feature to join up with the Buffs at the north end of the island. ‘B’ Company was instructed to cover the withdrawal. Subsequently, Egerton, Tassel and Flood were reunited on the north-western outskirts of San Nicola, where they encountered a non-too-pleased Lieutenant Colonel Iggulden.
In the meantime, the Royal West Kents in the Anchor area – about 160 all ranks – were on the move. Captain B.A. Pond and ‘B’ Echelon led the order of march. It is always difficult to disengage and withdraw when in contact with the enemy in daylight. To minimise losses, the Royal West Kents headed south-west and into cover before moving northward in the general direction of San Giovanni. Although the troops were harassed by small arms fire there was no follow-up by German ground forces. But as soon as it was vacated, the battalion area was heavily bombed. It was probably assumed that the British were making for Lakki, as the road to the port was also bombed. Soon afterwards the port area was targeted. Large numbers of aircraft remained overhead throughout the rest of the morning and into the afternoon, but fortunately for the infantry the Luftwaffe seemed more interested in t
he gun positions in the area of Mounts Patella and San Giovanni.
The terrain that the Royal West Kents had to negotiate is rough and undulating and intersected by ravines. Bordering the ravines and on the lower hill slopes, olive groves and terraced fields afforded a certain amount of cover, but higher up the vegetation is generally sparse, consisting mainly of the ubiquitous Greek spiny spurge. Progress was hindered by long-range sniper fire. Along the way, small parties from different units were encountered; some heading for pre-arranged RVs, others making for the beaches, but all moving away from Meraviglia and the enemy. It was evident that command had completely broken down and there was little hope of organising an effective counter-attack. Nevertheless, Tarleton pressed on and at around 1.00 p.m., Battalion Headquarters reached the heights north-east of San Giovanni, overlooking Gurna Bay. An hour later, Captain Mike Rochford turned up with written confirmation of Tilney’s morning orders, for forwarding to Lieutenant Colonel Iggulden. It was assumed that Point 100 and San Nicola were still strongly defended by the enemy. No one seemed sure about Meraviglia anymore. Under the circumstances it was decided to skirt around the south side of Rachi to try and reach the Buffs by moving south and west of Germano, using the cover afforded by broken ground at the base of the feature. Sub-unit RVs were allocated close to Point 177 (Condrida) and, it was hoped, not far from the Buffs positions.
After leaving Tarleton at about 10.00 a.m., Tilney had returned to Meraviglia and attempted to regain some semblance of control. His task was not helped by the premature destruction of secret ciphers, which left signallers with no option but to transmit in clear during communications with the outside world. At 11.05 a.m. a signal was sent to the Middle East suggesting Lakki as a suitable spot in which to insert airborne troops. It was a perilous drop zone: a built-up area with low-lying hills on three sides and the sea on the other. The War Office had already approved the deployment to Leros of 11th Battalion Parachute Regiment; fortunately the order was never implemented. Another desperate plea followed:
If you reinforce LEROS we can restore situation. You MUST rpt MUST provide air cover. It is exhaustion we are fighting not numbers.20
The unrelenting cacophony produced by all kinds of weapons, bomb explosions and low-flying aircraft told its own story. Captain Robert Ambrose of the Faughs was among those taken prisoner when their position south-east Meraviglia was overrun. Thereafter there was little to prevent the Germans from reaching Fortress Headquarters. Ritchie therefore ordered his party to fall back to where they could best cover the Meraviglia plateau, as well as the eastern approaches of the HQ tunnel. He was joined by Major Richard Dixon of the Cheshire Regiment together with Captain Charles S. Duncan, Royal Artillery, and about a dozen troops. They were instructed to join an attack with the aim of re-occupying the battery command post and then re-taking the former position of Captain Ambrose. Ritchie recalled:
I led my men off at the double, but before we had travelled 50 yds a rifle grenade landed in a hole about a foot from me. I had a strange feeling of hot needles shooting through my body and then must have “blacked out” for the next thing I remember was waking up in the LRDG signal tunnel, feeling very weak and extremely stiff with four or five field dressings on my left arm and leg. My “tin hat” had several holes through the left brim and I was later told that the butt of my rifle had been shattered by the blast and had no doubt saved my life by taking most of the shrapnel coming my way.21
Ritchie’s position was taken. Minutes later, Major Dixon was shot dead by a sniper. Colonel Prendergast took charge of the defence, and under his leadership the attack was at last repulsed. Snipers were a problem for both sides. During the night, the Fallschirmjäger had reached Platanos, where Obergefreiter Helmut Dassler and several comrades moved into a building that had once been a pharmacy. Their arrival did not go unnoticed, and anyone who dared to show himself was instantly shot at by an unseen assailant. Dassler, who was unable to use his machine gun after being wounded in one arm, had acquired a British sniper rifle. Here was an ideal opportunity to put the weapon to use. In order to lure the marksman into revealing his location, a steel helmet was placed on the end of a rifle and used as a decoy. Dassler’s close friend, Walter Keller, described what happened next:
He [Dassler] said: ‘The moment he fires I’ll be able to see his muzzle flash.’ So, he waited for the muzzle flash and then returned fire, whereupon everything went quiet. He announced: ‘I’m sure I got him.’ We were standing around and were quite happy with our achievement when all of a sudden, Dassler, who was within two metres of me, slumped towards me and said: ‘I’ve been hit.’ They had hit him with a dumdum bullet … It had gone through his lung and left a huge hole in his back, and he said: ‘Walter, they’ve got me.’22
Keller and his comrades attended to Dassler as best they could, reassuring him that his injuries were not at all serious:
We took him to the field hosp. where he gave me his Deutsches Kreuz [German Cross]; I was to send it to his parents. He was transferred to Athens, but died there at the end of Nov. He was the bravest soldier I have ever known.23
At about 12.45 p.m., Tilney left Meraviglia by jeep to find and brief Lieutenant Colonel Egerton and to reconnoitre Rachi Ridge. Searchlight Hill and Point 109 appeared to be deserted, and there was no sign of movement by the Royal West Kents along the western slopes. Eventually, the brigadier found a Sergeant Price and an unnamed private, both of the King’s Own, and learned that in view of the deteriorating situation, their CO had ordered a general withdrawal north. It was apparent that Tarleton could not be expected to RV with the Buffs in time to organise a joint defence about Meraviglia. Tilney therefore amended his plan and sent the two men by jeep with instructions for Tarleton to concentrate his force in the area of Porta Vecchia. The message never got through, and Tilney and Tarleton were to stay out of touch for the remainder of the battle. Tilney’s next move was to try to locate the Buffs and re-deploy them on Meraviglia. Meanwhile, the CO of the battalion had been discussing events with Lieutenant Commander Frank Ramseyer, who recalled:
12. On arrival at Headquarters the Colonel [Iggulden] sent for me and explained that although we were doing well in the north, he had cause to believe that the central sector was not at all happy. Although no idea of surrender was intended he thought it would be as well if craft were prepared in Partheni Bay in case a sudden collapse occurred and evacuation became necessary.
13. During the early part of the invasion, I had made provisional arrangements in case such an emergency was sprung on me, so Lieutenant Percy [Lieutenant E. Percy, RN] and I jeeped to Partheni to concert them. A tug was instructed to have steam up by 1700 B and lighters ready to tow; a caique, and 2 motor boats were prepared and small craft checked over and placed with oars in them at what, we hoped, would prove strategic points round the harbour.24
The situation in the central part of the island was critical, as Ramseyer was about to discover:
15. On returning to [the Buffs] Headquarters at about 1300 I found Major Jellicoe preparing to leave to get through the enemy lines to Brigade Head quarters in order to find out the exact position so that the Buffs could co-ordinate their effort to greater advantage. To save Major Jellicoe and his party a long journey on foot we proceeded as far as Navy House [at the junction of the San Nicola – San Quaranta road] in the jeep where I left them to make their own way by usual S.B.S. methods of crawling under reeds, through hedges and round trees, and returned to Headquarters.
16. The Colonel then wished to go forward to see for himself how his sector was progressing so I accompanied him. En route we were amazed to see groups of British soldiers in open route order proceeding away from the battle area towards Partheni. The Colonel stopped and interrogated them, and they said they had orders to retire to the north. Many were without arms, very dejected and exceedingly tired.
17. These parties and subsequent parties encountered were ordered to go no further, disperse over the immediate area and await further orders
. About a mile from Navy House the Colonel of the Kings Own was located and he and Colonel of the Buffs discussed the position. During this conversation a Jeep drew up with a screeching of breaks and a very dishevelled Brigadier tumbled out. It was Brigadier Tilney and he appeared to be very angry. Apparently the units we had encountered had retired without orders from him and as a result the position in the centre was badly weakened. Colonel in command of the Buffs was ordered to take over all stragglers and co-ordinate them with his own, and the other Colonel was placed under his orders.25
With so many troops concentrated in one place, San Nicola had become a prime target for the Luftwaffe. Tilney therefore instructed Iggulden to send one company to reinforce by dusk the scattered troops still on Meraviglia, with the remainder to follow under cover of darkness.
Tilney was unaware that the majority of the Royal West Kents were then only a short distance away, still heading towards San Nicola. ‘B’ Echelon had gone ahead to try and contact the Buffs, leaving ‘C’ Company to lead the way through the vegetation and trees below Rachi’s southern slopes; HQ Company, Battalion Headquarters and ‘D’ Company followed at ten minute intervals. En route, caves and tunnels were checked lest they concealed the enemy. More often than not, they were found to harbour Italians and stragglers from other units. It was a time-consuming process accompanied by much shouting and movement and before long it attracted fire from Point 100. Either the Germans had never relinquished possession of the feature, or else had filtered back during the day. From Rachi, signal lights were fired to indicate the position of the Royal West Kents. Moments later, aircraft carried out a low level sweep, but left after only a superficial search. The troops continued towards the Germano–Condrida area where they took up defensive positions.
Churchill's Folly Page 25
